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We can’t dictate a priori the ontology
of the universe.
Jody Azzouni (    , p.     )
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Introduction
T    dissertation addresses a traditional philosophical question by means of a somewhatunconventional method. The question is: do numbers exist? To make this question
tractable within the length of a dissertation, I restrict the investigation to the  nite cardinal
numbers ( ,  ,  ,  , . . . ). Themethod I employ does not have a single name or characterization,
but its basic tenet is the use of scienti c  ndings to inform the investigation of philosophical
problems. Methods of philosophical inquiry that comply with this tenet have been called
naturalism (Quine,     ), second philosophy (Maddy,     ), experimental philosophy (e.g.,
Machery,     ), or, more broadly, empirically informed philosophy (e.g., Dutilh Novaes,
    ), and, more recently, synthetic philosophy (Schliesser,     ). These methods have been
gaining traction in philosophy in the last decades, but philosophers of mathematics have
been resistant to adopting them, particularly when it comes to ontological questions (with a
few honorable exceptions, such as Maddy (    )). The reason for this lack of enthusiasm for
empirically-informed methods is straightforward: it is widely assumed that, if mathematical
objects exist, they must be outside of space and time,  and therefore empirical data would
be irrelevant to an investigation of the existence of mathematical entities.
The dominance of this view can be traced back to Frege (    ), the founding father
of contemporary philosophy of mathematics, who advanced compelling arguments against
numbers being either concrete or mental entities. If numbers are neither physical nor men-
tal, the only remaining option seems to be to “place” them outside of space and time, if
they exist at all. This move, however, drives the philosophy of arithmetic into a corner. If
one assumes that numbers exist, their non-spatiotemporality leads to Benacerraf’s problem
(Benacerraf,     a). Outside of space and time, numbers are completely out of our reach,
and it becomes a mystery how we can acquire numerical knowledge. On the other hand, if
one rejects the existence of numbers, this poses problems of its own. For example, in  c-
tionalism, the currently trendy version of nominalism, arithmetical statements are rendered
false, since they supposedly speak of nonexistent things (Balaguer,     ). For those who be-
lieve that there is something that can be properly called arithmetical knowledge, and reject
platonism  exactly because it faces serious di culties in explaining the origin of arithmeti-
 To give two literal examples: “if there are mathematical objects, then they exist outside of space and time”
(Balaguer,     , p.    ); “If numbers exist, they would surely be abstract” (Giaquinto,     , p.  ).
 Platonism refers to the view according to which abstract entities (objects, structures, propositions, etc.)
exist outside of space and time. Because it is contentious whether Plato himself endorsed this view, and because
contemporary platonists are unlikely to endorse all of Plato’s views on this matter, the term ‘platonism,’ when
referring to this view in philosophy of mathematics, is spelled with lower-case initial (Balaguer,     ).
 
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cal knowledge,  ctionalism is an equally unsatisfactory alternative. Other nominalistic ap-
proaches that reformulate or reinterpret arithmetical statements (such as Hellman’s (    ))
usually involve arti cial idealizations that, although logically impeccable, are practically un-
feasible or unrealistic.
My response to this state of a airs is a typical philosophical move: if an assumption is
impeding progress, put it aside and try to  gure out an alternative. In this spirit, the starting
point of this dissertation is the adoption of a neutral stance with regard to the existence and
nature of numbers. An immediate consequence of this step back is that, once we no longer
take for granted that, if numbers exist, they must be outside of space and time, we can start
appreciating how empirical data could be relevant to an investigation of the ontological
status of numbers.
In my view, the fundamental phenomenon to be explained in an investigation of the
ontological status of numbers is the collection of relevant human experiences. Humans do
arithmetic, speak of numbers, develop notation systems to refer to them, and use these things
to help solve practical and theoretical problems. All of these practices take place in this
world, and therefore are subject to scienti c inquiry. What we are looking for in an on-
tological investigation of arithmetic is a class of entities that could account for the main
features of these human experiences. Thus, instead of trying to  gure out a priori what these
entities are, we should instead rely on a scienti c description of these experiences. Hope-
fully, this scienti c description will reveal valuable information about which entities under-
lie our arithmetical experience—at least the spatiotemporal ones. Then, if we establish that
spatiotemporal entities are insu cient to account for the main features of our arithmetical
experience, this by itself will constitute evidence for the postulation of non-spatiotemporal
entities. However, this is not a conclusion that should be established a priori.
Fortunately, there is plenty of scienti c data available on the human experience of num-
bers. Numerical cognition is a branch of the cognitive sciences that investigates how human
beings and other animals deal with information we usually see as numerical. Numerical cog-
nition encompasses a number of disciplines, ranging from neurobiology and developmental
psychology to linguistics and computer science. This  eld of investigation has progressed
considerably in the last decades, and now it provides an illuminating picture of the roots
of our numerical concepts and practices. Another source of data relevant to this enterprise
is mathematics education. Educators have amassed considerable information about how we
really come to acquire arithmetical knowledge at a young age.
I thus adopt a bottom-up approach: we look carefully at the scienti c data gathered in
these disciplines, look at the philosophical discussions of the ontological status of numbers,
and try to extract from the data answers to the relevant philosophical question.
A rst important nding for this investigation is the fact that human infants, long before
they start learning to speak, possess the capacity to identify the cardinal size of small collec-
tions, up to three or four elements, quickly and accurately at a glance without counting—this
ability is called subitizing. Above three or four elements, infants cannot do so, but they still
can estimate cardinal sizes approximately, with estimate error increasing as the size of target
collections grows. Many studies have repeatedly con rmed that the abilities to subitize the
size of small collections accurately and to estimate the size of larger ones with increasing er-
ror are innate in humans and many non-human animals, such as monkeys and birds (Nieder,
 
    ). The abilities to subitize and to estimate are believed to constitute the most basic cog-
nitive foundations of numerical competence in human beings (Dehaene,     ). However,
these innate abilities, although remarkable, are very limited in comparison to truly numer-
ical competence, which is acquired only after years of training (Carey,     ). To mention
just one obvious example of how numerical competence outperforms these innate abilities,
by counting we can determine the exact size of any collection, no matter its size (if suf-
 cient time is provided), whereas by estimating we can hardly distinguish a collection of
eight items from a collection of nine items. A fundamental di erence between counting
and subitizing or estimation is that the former is a rule-based procedure that makes use of a
culturally created symbolic system—the list of counting words—whereas the latter are non-
procedural and non-symbolic skills (after all, neither infants nor non-human animals master
a symbolic system similar to our counting words upon which they could rely for subitizing
or estimation).
The contrast between our limited innate non-symbolic abilities to deal with discrete
quantities and the in nite potential of culturally created symbolic counting and calcula-
tion techniques suggests that the latter are a cultural response to the shortcomings  of the
former (Barner,     ). While genetic evolution endowed us, by means of subitizing, with
the notion of exact quantities, it denied us access to those exact quantities beyond three or
four elements. By counting, we become able to overcome this limitation. This suggests that
counting is a cognitive technology specially developed by our ancestors to tackle the problem
of assessing the cardinality of larger collections accurately. Likewise, other symbolic systems,
such as the system of Arabic digits and the associated algorithms for arithmetical operations,
can be seen as cognitive technologies created to facilitate calculation (Ifrah,     ).
What these data suggest is that what we call “arithmetical knowledge” is knowledge of
these cognitive technologies, of techniques. This runs against the traditional view according
to which arithmetic is about a class of objects known as numbers. Certainly, we speak of
numbers as if they were existing objects, and speak of arithmetic as if it were about num-
bers, but these are rei ed ways of speaking that, in fact, are about counting and calculating
procedures. The idea that numbers exist as objects, as we will see, results from the encapsula-
tion—a process of rei cation—of procedures into discursive objects, and ful lls the cognitive
function of making arithmetical operations easier (Sfard,     ). In this sense, the idea that
numbers are objects is a cognitive tool in itself.
The scienti c description of human experiences with numbers to be discussed here re-
verses the traditional platonist schema according to which  rst there were eternal numbers,
then we somehow obtained representations of them, and then these representations  nally
allowed us to count, calculate, and do arithmetic in general. In the sequence of events that
takes place when a typical child is learning arithmetic, and which most likely took place
in remote history,  rst the child learns techniques for counting and calculating; from these
techniques, she acquires the idea of an ordered sequence of cardinal values; in a later stage,
she starts speaking and thinking of this sequence as constituted by a certain kind of object
called numbers (Carey,     ; Sfard,     ). In the bottom-up approach adopted here, the
 That is, “shortcomings” in view of the need to determine the exact cardinal size of collections with more
than three or four items.
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ontological hypothesis suggested by this reversal of the platonist schema is that numbers as
such do not exist. What exists are certain human-made techniques which engender in us the
idea that a special class of objects called numbers exist. In other words, the suggestion is
that operations such as the counting procedure are the objective subject matter underlying
arithmetic, rather than a putative class of non-spatiotemporal objects. The hypothesis to be
defended here is that arithmetical statements are true of these procedures, rather than true
of non-spatiotemporal numbers.
The initial idea for this project came from reading Dutilh Novaes’s Formal Languages in
Logic (    ) and Dehaene’s Number Sense (    ) in parallel. I observed that Dutilh Novaes’s
account of the role of formal languages in deductive reasoning could be almost directly trans-
lated to the role of numerals in numerical cognition. Dutilh Novaes shows that formalisms
are cognitive technologies which enable us to overcome cognitive tendencies that make de-
ductive inferences considerably hard for non-trained minds. Dehaene, in turn, suggests that
numerals have the power to sharpen our innate ability to estimate cardinal sizes only approx-
imately to the point of converting it into the ability to count and understand exact cardinal
sizes. The analogy is clear: numerals are like formalisms in that both are part of humanly
invented techniques that boost our cognitive abilities.
The idea that “numbers” are cognitive technologies is not new. In non-philosophical
circles, this idea has been around for a while. The linguist Heike Wiese holds that “numbers
are  exible mental tools that can be employed in a wide range of contexts” (Wiese,     ,
p.    ). In what he calls “a street-level, economic ontology of numbers,” the economist David
Harper, inspired by Wiese (    ), claims that “numbers are technological objects (‘tools’
in the widest sense of the term) that are constituted by both form and function” (Harper,
    , p.    ). The anthropological and cognitive linguist Caleb Everett holds that “numbers
were and remain cognitive tools—tools that transformed our lives long before the usage
of advanced mathematics” (C. Everett,     , p.    ). In the  eld of numerical cognition,
perhaps the most notable occurrence of this idea is in the title of the highly in uential paper
by Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, and Gibson (    ) titled “Number as a cognitive technology:
Evidence from Pirahā language and cognition.” Based on their investigation of Pirahã, a
language spoken by a small group of Amerindians in the Brazilian Amazon which is the only
known language without numerals, they conclude that “numbers may be better thought of as
an invention: A cognitive technology for representing, storing, and manipulating the exact
cardinalities of sets” (Frank et al.,     , p.    ).
This idea has made its way into philosophy too. However, philosophers, who are well
aware of the necessary distinction between numerals and numbers, are more reluctant to claim
that numbers are cognitive tools. Without an account of how numbers, widely held as non-
spatiotemporal entities, could be a human invention, philosophers feel more comfortable
saying that numerals are cognitive technologies. Speaking of mathematical symbols in gen-
eral, De Cruz and De Smedt (    , p.   ) write: “[u]sing mathematical symbols can be seen
as epistemic actions, not unlike the use of other external tools in scienti c practice, such as
microscopes, particle accelerators and slide rulers.” In a similar spirit, Menary (    , p.   )
claims that “[m]athematics and writing systems are examples of culturally evolved symbol
systems that are deployed to complete complex cognitive tasks.” In the literature on  E
cognition, mathematical symbols are often mentioned as examples of cognitive tools (e.g.,
 
Clark,     ). The novelty of my proposal is that I o er a philosophical account of how
numbers themselves—not the putative non-spatiotemporal entities, but the discursive ob-
jects numerals refer to, in a sense to be speci ed in Chapters   and  —can be conceived of
as cognitive tools in their own right.
Synopsis of the dissertation
This dissertation follows a threefold structure. The  rst part comprises Chapters   and  .
In these chapters, I motivate the empirically informed methodology adopted. The second
part comprises Chapters   to  , where I review the scienti c data and theories relevant for
the present investigation. The third part comprises the  nal chapter (Chapter  ), where I
return to the question of the ontological status of numbers, now informed by the scienti c
theories discussed. In the following paragraphs I summarize the main points discussed in
each chapter.
In Chapter  , I show that the aprioristic methods that have pervaded the philosophy
of mathematics cannot o er a conclusive answer to the question of the ontological status
of numbers. I argue that at the heart of this impossibility lies a tension between the idea
that the existence (or nonexistence) of numbers is an objective fact—either they exist or
they do not, and this is not up to philosophers to decide—and the related need to provide
independent evidence for the ontological claimsmade by a priori accounts. A priori methods
cannot provide this kind of evidence and, therefore, there is no conceivable a priori means
of verifying the ontological claims made by a priori accounts. I argue that such ontological
claims should be put aside as unveri ed or unveri able hypotheses. The inconclusiveness
of a priori methods suggests that we should broaden the scope of the investigation and take
into account scienti c data about the human experience of numbers.
In Chapter  , I propose an empirically informed methodological approach to the ques-
tion of the ontological status of numbers. In this approach, the most fundamental question
concerns how human beings acquire numerical competence. One of the most important
 ndings in numerical cognition is that numerical competence is inseparable from the use
of symbolic systems for numbers. The fact that we cannot count and calculate accurately
without mastering a symbolic system for numbers brings to the fore the instrumental role
of numerals as tools which enhance and expand our cognitive capacities, and relates to the
broader philosophical discussion about symbolic cognitive tools. In Chapter   I review cen-
tral topics in the literature on cognitive tools that are key to make sense of the scienti c data
about numerical cognition we will see in this and subsequent chapters. In the  nal section
of Chapter  , I sketch the cognitive, epistemic and ontological hypotheses about numbers
that I will further investigate in the following chapters.
In Chapter  , I discuss the innate abilities to deal with discrete quantities that humans
share with non-human animals. I review evidence for the existence of these abilities, charac-
terize them precisely, and investigate whether they can be properly quali ed as numerical,
as many cognitive scientists have claimed. Based on a critical assessment of the terminology
scientists use to describe and explain these abilities, I conclude that they are non-numerical
and, therefore, are better called quantical abilities, following Núñez (    ). This has an im-
portant consequence: since number concepts are not a product of genetic evolution, every-
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thing we know about numbers, from counting to formal arithmetic, must be a product of
cultural processes.
In Chapter  , I review further scienti c  ndings that reinforce the hypothesis of the
cultural origins of numerical concepts. The focus of Chapter   is the ontogenetic develop-
ment of numerical cognition, i.e., the processes through which children acquire numerical
competence. If numbers are a cultural creation, we must be able to observe children learning
number concepts from their parents or caregivers through regular processes of enculturation,
as is usually the case with culturally transmitted contents. As we will see, this is exactly what
studies in developmental psychology show. These studies also highlight the importance of
symbolic systems for numbers for the acquisition of numerical competence, and particularly
the role of the counting procedure in giving rise to our concept of number.
In Chapter  , the focus is on the historical origins of number concepts. Since, as shown
in Chapter  , number concepts originate from symbolic techniques passed down across gen-
erations through cultural transmission, there must have been a time when people without
number concepts invented the symbolic techniques that gave rise to them for the rst time in
history. Linguistic and ethnographic evidence reviewed in Chapter   suggest that counting
was created from earlier non-numerical one-to-one correspondence techniques.
All things considered, the conclusion that emerges from these chapters is that numeri-
cal competence results from the acquisition of human-made symbolic techniques. That is,
we acquire number concepts not by obtaining information about a certain class of objects,
but by mastering a toolkit of techniques. The piece of the puzzle still missing is how we
move from these techniques, which engender in us number concepts, to the idea that these
concepts are about existing entities, namely numbers. I address this question in Chapter  .
We will see that this transition takes place through a process of rei cation in which we start
speaking of the counting procedure and its outcomes by means of the linguistic framework
we use to talk about ordinary objects. Chapter   explores Sfard’s (    ) theory of rei ca-
tion in the  eld of mathematics education to explain how this happens. In the bottom-up
approach adopted here, the observation that the idea that numbers exist originates from a
process of rei cation suggests nominalism: numbers do not exist, although we speak of them
as if they do.
In order to make this hypothesis philosophically plausible, in Chapter   I provide a
nominalistic account of the semantics and epistemology of arithmetic in which counting
procedures play the role traditionally ascribed to numbers as existing objects in ensuring
the epistemic attributes of arithmetic, such as truth and objectivity. In this account, instead
of describing the properties of a non-spatiotemporal realm of existing numbers, arithmetic
describes structural properties of the cognitive tools that constitute it.
In the  nal pages of this dissertation I provide a glossary where the reader can  nd
de nitions of some concepts and less familiar terms used in the work.
Chapter  
A methodological shortcoming in the
philosophical literature on numbers
T   recent decades have seen many tentative answers to the question of the existence ofnumbers. Most of them rely chie y on aprioristic methods. By ‘aprioristic methods’ I
mean those methods of investigation that neither produce nor rely on empirical data. Some
examples are conceptual analyses that rely mostly on linguistic intuitions, instead of using
data about language usage gathered scienti cally; philosophical considerations justi ed by
appeal to theoretical virtues such as simplicity and uniformity; and appeal to logical, math-
ematical, or semantic principles and results. The prevalence of aprioristic approaches to the
question of the ontological status of numbers is perhaps an in uence of the view that “if
numbers exist, they exist outside of space and time”—case in which empirical data is irrele-
vant to addressing this question.
Contrary to this view, in this chapter I show that aprioristic methods are not suited to
establish whether numbers exist in a conclusive way. The most we can do with aprioristic
methods, I argue, is to advance hypotheses about the existence (or nonexistence) of numbers.
However, these hypotheses can never be conclusively con rmed or rejected by purely a priori
arguments. The reason is simple and it is concisely expressed in the Azzouni quotation which
is the epigraph to this dissertation: “we cannot dictate a priori the ontology of the universe”
(Azzouni,     , p.     ). A priori considerations are introspective; by de nition, they do
not take into account worldly facts, whereas whether or not numbers exist is a worldly fact
(even if it is not a fact about this world, but about a non-spatiotemporal reality). By a priori
re ection, therefore, we can only speculate about how the world might be. Without access to
the relevant facts we cannot decide whether our preferred speculative account of the world
corresponds to the way the world is. 
It may be that the existence of numbers is dependent on human minds, or social insti-
tutions; or it may be that numbers exist independently, in a platonic realm; or, rather, it
 This limitation does not a ect only the investigation into the ontological status ofmathematical entities but
other metaphysical investigations too. Nolan (    , p.    ) writes: “Some contemporary metaphysicians (myself
included)  nd it strange that it should ever have seemed plausible that metaphysics was an a priori discipline.
Why suppose we could tell general and deep facts about what the world as a whole is like without evidence from
our senses?”
 
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may be that they exist in a completely di erent manner, or even that they do not exist at all.
Either way, there is an objective fact to be discovered by the philosopher. The di culty the
philosopher who relies exclusively on aprioristic methods has to face, then, is that whenever
one gives an account of what is supposed to be an objective reality, she is required to provide
evidence that her account is correct about that reality, or at least show how such evidence
could be obtained. Importantly, this evidence should be independent, at least to a certain
degree, of the given account, on pain of circularity. As we will see, aprioristic methods can-
not provide such independent evidence. Equipped only with aprioristic methods, we are
necessarily con ned to our human, internal, rational faculties. Pace Descartes, from within
ourselves we cannot dictate, nor discover, what exists out there.
For certain, philosophers arewell aware of this di culty, and have advancedmany strate-
gies to deal with it. Because di erent strategies fail for di erent reasons, I do not have a gen-
eral argument to show that, in every case, aprioristic methods will not do. For this reason,
in this chapter I proceed case by case, and consider a limited but representative sample of
philosophical accounts of the ontology of mathematics proposed in the last decades. On the
platonist side, I examineHale andWright’s neo-Fregeanism (Hale &Wright,     ), Shapiro’s
ante rem structuralism (Shapiro,     ) and Resnik’s structuralism (Resnik,     ). On the
anti-platonist side, I consider Hellman’s modal-structuralist nominalism(Hellman,     ),
Bueno’s two forms of  ctionalism (Bueno,     ), and Leng’s  ctionalism (Leng,     ). I also
consider two de ationist approaches that deny that there is a deep philosophical problem
to be solved about the ontology of mathematics: Thomasson’s simple realism (Thomasson,
    ) andMaddy’s thin realism (Maddy,     ). I do not have knock-down arguments against
these philosophical approaches, but I will show that they are inconclusive. The inconclusive-
ness of each approach taken in isolation, and, consequently, the seemingly inconclusiveness
of the a priori program as a whole is perhaps the best reason we have to suspect that a priori
methods are not suited to answer the question of the existence of numbers. In the following
sections I discuss each of these accounts in turn.
 .  Neo-Fregean platonism
Crispin Wright and Bob Hale are the leading  gures in neo-Fregeanism. Their argument
for the existence of numbers is straightforward. Its central premise is that the occurrence
of singular terms in true statements implies the existence of their referents. For example,
from the truth of ‘Mars has two moons,’ we can safely infer that Mars exists, since Mars is
the referent of the singular term ‘Mars.’ Now, insofar as there are true numerical statements
where numerals occur as singular terms, we can safely infer (or so they argue) that numbers
exist.
Provided, then (as certainly appears to be the case), there are true extensional state-
ments so featuring numerical singular terms, there are objects—numbers—to which
they make reference. This train of thought constitutes the core of the style of platon-
ism we  nd in Frege—at any rate, the style of platonism we wish to defend (Hale &
Wright,     , p.  ).
It is important to note that, as they see it, numbers enjoy full existence, i.e., they are
“furnishings of the world every bit as objective as mountains, rivers and trees” (Wright,     ,
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p.   ). Mountains, rivers and trees exist independently of our linguistic expressions. The
existence of trees on the top of a mountain does not depend on someone naming them, or
referring to them in any sense. We can con rm this by climbing the mountain and seeing
that there are trees there. This is the kind of independent existence they claim for numbers.
However, their argument for the existence of numbers does not rely on a direct inspection
of the “top of the mountain,” so to speak, but on an analysis of our discourse about “the trees
on the top of the mountain,” so to speak.
Indeed, Hale and Wright acknowledge that “th[eir] argument must succeed unless either
the apparent singular terms of arithmetic do not really function as such or the apparently
true ‘appropriate’ contexts in which they feature are not really true” (Hale & Wright,     ,
p.    ). Both alternatives have found advocates. Hofweber (    ), for example, claims that
number words are not genuine singular terms, but determiners that, occasionally, can occur
syntactically as singular terms. Fictionalists, as we will see below, accept that numerals are
singular terms, but deny that numerical statements are true. Furthermore, contrary to what
the above quote suggests, these are not the only ways in which the neo-Fregeans’ argument
can be wrong. As we will see below, it may be that numerals are genuine singular terms but
that they refer to positions in a structure, rather than to objects, as Shapiro (    ) argues,
or that they refer to possible, rather than actual, objects, as Hellman (    ) argues. In face
of so many alternatives, how can we  gure out which analysis of numerical statements is the
correct one?
The usual a priori strategy to compare competing accounts is to focus on their con-
ceptual and logical details. The inference of an unwelcome consequence, the existence of
counterexamples, the presence of theoretical shortcomings; these can be signals that the pro-
posed analysis of numerical statements is defective. A quick look at the philosophical debate,
however, su ces to show that this strategy has been inconclusive. Advocates of a particu-
lar “failed” proposal do not abandon it, but modify it in a way that avoids the undesirable
consequence and preserves its central ontological claims. Neo-Fregeanism is a well-known
example of the rehabilitation of a program that was thought to be irremediably defeated by
the presence of a contradiction. The contradiction was eliminated and the ontological status
of numbers implied by the original program remained unaltered.
A more conclusive way of adjudicating between competing accounts could follow the
scienti c practice of crucial tests: if there are theories A and B such that A predicts that x
exists and B predicts that x does not, an experiment designed to detect the existence of x
can be crucial to decide which is correct. Platonist accounts of arithmetic, however, cannot
be put to such a test, since their advocates carefully add that numbers are outside of space
and time and, therefore, inaccessible to any experimental approach by definition. I emphasize
‘by de nition’ because the non-spatiotemporality of numbers is not implied by platonists’
analyses of numerical statements. For example, the neo-Fregean argument for the existence
of numbers only implies that numbers exist, but says nothing about their mode of existence.
Their non-spatiotemporality is an additional postulation, apparently aimed at making the
existence of numbers more plausible. “Since it appears to make no sense to ask where num-
bers or sets are located, or when they came into existence and how long they will last, the
platonist concludes that they are abstract objects, lying outside space and time” (Hale &
Wright,     , p.    ).
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The transference of numbers to an inaccessible, non-spatiotemporal realm can be seen
as an ad hoc way of dismissing requests for independent evidence for their existence. Neo-
Fregeans, though, are ready to respond to this objection. Wright argues that demands for
independent evidence for the existence of numbers are not only dispensable, but also illegiti-
mate: they are forbidden by Frege’s Context Principle. InWright’s reading of it, the Context
Principle states that we should never ask after the referent of a term in isolation, only in the
context of a proposition. “To suppose that such a question [whether a numerical expression
denotes any genuine constituent of the world] does arise is exactly to suppose that it is legit-
imate to inquire whether such an expression genuinely denotes anything in isolation from
consideration of the part which it standardly plays in whole propositions” (Wright,     ,
p.   ). Since no such question can be posed without violating the Context Principle (or so
he argues), Wright derives from it an important ontological corollary:
the thesis of the priority of syntactic over ontological categories. According to this
thesis, the question whether a particular expression is a candidate to refer to an object
is entirely a matter of the sort of syntactic role which it plays in whole sentences. If it
plays that sort of role, then the truth of appropriate sentences in which it so features
will be su cient to confer on it an objectual reference (Wright,     , p.   -  ).
This has become known as the syntactic priority thesis. Wright invokes this thesis with
the intention of lending further support to his conclusion about the existence of numbers.
Given the relevant facts about syntactic structure and truth, there is simply no fur-
ther coherent question about the matter; there is no independent philosophical issue
whether there really is such a thing as the number  , still less any possibility of an
independent resolution of such an issue (Wright,     , p.   ).
The idea seems to be that the ban on requests for independent evidence for the existence
of numbers can provide support for his account. However, the syntactic priority thesis, if
true, is neutral about which is the correct account of numerical discourse. Di erent accounts
of numerical discourse may identify di erent syntactic categories in numerical expressions.
All of them will be equally backed by the syntactic priority thesis with respect to their on-
tological implications. The relevant point, for which the syntactic priority thesis is of no
help, is to  gure out which is the correct syntactic account of numerical statements. Now,
if the Context Principle really forbids any independent crucial test of competing accounts,
this is also bad news: we cannot hope to solve this question by recruiting what is a famil-
iar method in other  elds. At any rate, Wright’s overly strict interpretation of the Context
Principle can be seen as a further ad hocway of dismissing requests for independent evidence
for neo-Fregeans’ existential claims.
Another way of bypassing requests for independent evidence is to claim that the exis-
tence of numbers is an analytic truth. If this is the case, as neo-Fregeans claim, then no
further evidence would be needed. According to them, the existence of numbers can be
proven in second-order logic fromHume’s Principle, whichmight be analytic (Wright,     ).
Putting concerns about second order logic and the notion of analyticity aside, their deriva-
tion of numbers from Hume’s Principle is  awless. However, it cannot be overlooked that
Hume’s Principle is not the only premise of this proof. Their own account of the syntax of
numerical expressions also plays a central role in it. Let me further clarify this point.
 . . SHAPIRO’S ANTE REM STRUCTURALISM   
Hume’s Principle states that the number of Fs is equal to the number of Gs i  F and G are
equinumerous. The  rst step to obtaining the existence of numbers fromHume’s Principle, as
Wright (    , p.  ) explains, is to obtain the existence of zero. To obtain zero, let F and G be
the set of xs such that x 6= x. It is a logical truth that thus given, F and G are equinumerous.
Therefore, we have the right-hand side of Hume’s Principle, and can immediately infer its
left-hand side: the number of Fs is equal to the number of Gs. This, then, is an analytically
proven statement. Now comes the decisive step: to infer the existence of zero from the
left-hand side of this instance of Hume’s Principle we must assume that the expression ‘the
number of Fs’ (or Gs) is referential. Because Wright formalizes this expression in second
order logic as a referring term, he obtains the existence of zero. But it is by no means an
analytic truth that expressions of the form ‘the number of xs’ are referring expressions. They
are in neo-Fregeans’ analysis, but neo-Fregeans’ analysis is precisely what is under scrutiny
here. Therefore, even if Hume’s Principle is analytic, the existence of numbers does not
follow analytically from it.
We are not required to accept the ontological consequences of neo-Fregeanism as long
as it remains undemonstrated, in a non-circular and non-ad-hoc way, that its account of
numerical expressions is the correct one, and that the ontology its proponents derive from
it really exists. Although neo-Fregeans are unable to provide independent evidence for these
claims, nothing that was said above implies that neo-Fregeanism is wrong. Thus, let us take it
as a hypothesis that makes uncon rmed ontological predictions, for which we cannot devise
any a posteriori way of testing, nor any a priori way that does not beg the question.
 .  Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism
Some philosophers resort to structuralism in order to obtain nominalism. This is what Hell-
man does (see section  . ). Shapiro (    ), by contrast, resorts to structuralism to obtain
an ampli ed form of platonism. Shapiro’s platonic heaven is more populated than Hale and
Wright’s. For Shapiro, the structuralist motto according to which “mathematics is concerned
with the study of structures” does not imply that particular mathematical objects do not ex-
ist; rather, it implies that structures and particular objects exist. Let us examine Shapiro’s
account.
Similarly to neo-Fregeans’ platonism, Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism relies on a logical
analysis of mathematical discourse carried out in second order logic. His analysis is quite
similar to neo-Fregeans’. He agrees with neo-Fregeans that, insofar as singular terms that
refer to numbers occur in numerical statements held to be true, numbers must exist. How-
ever, Shapiro points out the fact that nonalgebraic  theories formalized in second order logic
have multiple isomorphic—but not identical—models. This is the case for arithmetic, and
this makes the task of determining the identity of the referents of numerical terms quite
di cult.
Awell-known illustration of this point is presented in Benacerraf (    b). As Benacerraf
 In Shapiro’s terminology, a theory is algebraic if it is not intended to be about a single structure, unique up
to isomorphism. Group theory is an example. For algebraic theories, there is no point in identifying the unique
objects which the terms of the theory refer to. Nonalgebraic theories, by contrast, are intended to be about a
single structure or isomorphism type (Shapiro,     , p.   -  ).
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remarks, both Zermelo’s and von Neumann’s ordinals are isomorphic models of arithmetic.
In both models, ‘ ’ refers to ? and ‘ ’ refers to {?}. However, from two onward, the mod-
els start to di er. In Zermelo’s approach ‘ ’ refers to {{?}}, whereas in von Neumann’s
approach ‘ ’ refers to {?, {?}}. This means that in von Neumann’s model,   belongs to
 , whereas in Zermelo’s, it does not. Which one is the real  ? Because both models equally
satisfy Peano’s Axioms, we do not have any reason to prefer one over the other. This result
suggests that it does not matter which particular object plays the role of a number, provided
that the relations between this object and the objects that play the role of the other num-
bers are preserved. The conclusion that Benacerraf draws from this is that numbers are not
objects at all. Shapiro, however, rejects Benacerraf’s conclusion and tries to reconcile the
suggestions that numbers are objects and that it does not matter which object plays the role
of each particular number.
Roughly put, Shapiro’s idea is that each model of a mathematical theory is an instance
of the structure described by the theory. Structures are characterized by implicit de ni-
tions that take the form of axioms. In arithmetic, for example, Peano’s Axioms characterize
the natural-number structure. In Shapiro’s view, there is only one, unique, natural-number
structure, but there are in nitely many systems that instantiate it. Zermelo’s and von Neu-
mann’s ordinals are two of these systems. For Shapiro, structures are like universals, whereas
the systems that instantiate them are like particulars. “The di erence between structures
and the more usual kind of universal, such as properties, is that structures are the forms, not
of individual objects, but of systems, collections of objects organized with certain relations”
(Shapiro,     , p.    ). Moreover, structures and platonic universals share the characteristic
of being ante rem, i.e., they exist prior to and independently of any items that may instantiate
them (Shapiro,     , p.   ).
Thus, in Shapiro’s platonic heaven there are both ante rem structures and the systems
that instantiate them. Particular numbers still cannot be identi ed with objects of a certain
system, but because the natural-number structure is ante rem, particular numbers can be
identi ed with places in this structure. For Shapiro, places in structures are objects in their
own right. He explains this point by making an analogy between places in a structure and
o ces in an organization. The o ce of the vice president, for example, exists even if it is
vacant, and is distinguishable from the person who holds that o ce at a particular moment.
“Similarly, we can distinguish an object that plays the role of   in an exempli cation of the
natural-number structure from the number itself. The number is the o ce, the place in
the structure” (Shapiro,     , p.   ). In doing so, Shapiro can treat numerical expressions
as singular terms: ‘ ’ denotes the  rst place in the natural-number structure, ‘ ’ denotes the
second place, and so on.
Now we have two competing platonist accounts. In Shapiro’s account, the platonic
heaven contains ante rem structures; in the neo-Fregeans’, it does not (or, if it does, this
is not particularly relevant for an account of the ontology of arithmetic). Which one is true
of the way things are in this heaven? Shapiro’s argument for the existence of ante rem struc-
tures, just like neo-Fregeans’ argument for the existence of numbers, does not rely on a direct
inspection of the the platonic heaven (which is impossible to do, by de nition) but on an
analysis of mathematical discourse.
Despite the absence of direct evidence of this sort, Shapiro argues that there is no reason
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for concern: his analysis cannot be wrong about what exists in the platonic heaven, since his
analysis is “coherent.” Shapiro understands ‘coherence,’ roughly, as satis ability (Shapiro,
    , p.    ) and his idea is that the “ability to coherently discuss a structure is evidence
that the structure exists” (Shapiro,     , p.    ). Let us call this the coherence-implies-existence
thesis. As we have seen above, neo-Fregeans’ syntactic priority thesis implies the existence of
the referent of a singular term only if there is a true statement in which that singular term
occurs. The coherence-implies-existence thesis is more liberal in this regard. For a structure
to exist, it is not required that the axioms be true, only satis able.
The problem, again, is that an independent reality can always be uncooperative with re-
gard to our theories about it. Thuswe have to askwhat evidence can support the claim that to
every satis able axiomatization we devise in this world there corresponds a structure in the
platonic heaven. Without independent evidence for this, the coherence-implies-existence
thesis is no more than a hypothesis.
In response to this challenge, Shapiro recognizes that traditional platonism is subject to
such risks, but denies that his coherence-implies-existence thesis would fail in this respect.
The di erence is that, “on the traditional Platonist view, there is an important autonomy
between the axioms and the subject matter,” whereas “[w]e structuralists reject this auton-
omy” (Shapiro,     , p.    ). It is worthwhile to go through his explanation of this point in
full:
Because on the traditional Platonist view, the axioms are statements about a particular
realm of objects, it is possible that the axioms can be mistaken. Perhaps there are nat-
ural numbers other than zero that have no successors. Perhaps the successor function
is not one-to-one. As a thought experiment, try to consider the skeptical possibility
that all of the Peano axioms are false of the natural numbers. A traditional Platonist is
faced with such a possibility. Because the referent of “the natural numbers” is somehow
independent of the characterization in the language of arithmetic, any given belief and,
indeed, every (nonlogical) belief we have about numbers might be false. For the struc-
turalist, on the other hand, this extreme skeptical possibility can be dismissed out of
hand. It is conceivable, barely, that arithmetic is incoherent, in which case no structure
is characterized. Perhaps the theory of arithmetic is not categorical, in which case more
than one structure is characterized. But it is nonsense to claim that the theory of arith-
metic does successfully refer to a single,  xed structure (or a  xed class of structures)
but says hardly anything true about it (or them). On our view, the language character-
izes or determines a structure (or class of structures) if it characterizes anything at all
(Shapiro,     , p.    ).
Shapiro’s notion of ‘characterization’ is the key to understanding his claim that Peano’s
Axioms cannot be wrong about the natural-number structure. To characterize a structure,
for Shapiro, is not the same as to describe it. If we understood Peano’s Axioms as giving a
description of the natural-number structure, then they could be wrong about it. To charac-
terize a structure is not the same as to stipulate its properties either, Shapiro claims, because
in this case the existence of the structure would be dependent on our stipulations. This
would amount to a kind of conventionalism, but
[s]tructuralism is not a general skepticism nor a conventionalism. Mathematics is ob-
jective if anything is. The natural-number structure has objective existence and facts
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about it are not of our making. The point is that the way humans apprehend structures
and the way we ‘divide’ the mathematical universe into structures, systems, and objects
depends on our linguistic resources. Through successful language use, we structure the
objective subject matter. Thus, language provides our epistemic access tomathematical
structures (Shapiro,     , p.    ).
Thus, to characterize a structure, in Shapiro’s view, is to “divide” the mathematical uni-
verse using our linguistic resources. The claim seems to be that there is an objective subject
matter, but the way we structure it depends on our linguistic resources. Insofar as the only
requirement imposed by our linguistic resources is coherence, in Shapiro’s view, coherence
implies existence.
If this is so, though, it is hard to see how the putative objective subject matter plays
any role in Shapiro’s account. If the only constraint on the speci cation of mathematical
structures comes from language, the way the mathematical universe is organized turns out
to be irrelevant. Given that mathematicians are free to specify any structure that results
from successful language use, it does not matter how things are in the putative independent
mathematical universe. It is hard to see why Shapiro’s account would not be conventionalist.
Azzouni (    , p.    ) has something to say about this:
Some philosophers of mathematics marry an ontologically independent mathematical
realm to a stipulationist epistemology. The result is unstable if only because such a
union still craves explanation for why the stipulations in question correspond to the
properties of the ontologically independent items they are stipulations about.
If conventionalism is to be avoided, Shapiro must provide an explanation of why co-
herent characterizations of mathematical structures carve the mathematical universe at its
joints. However, it is not even clear whether Shapiro’s platonic heaven has “joints.” His al-
legation that “the way we ‘divide’ the mathematical universe into structures . . . depends on
our linguistic resources” (as quoted above; emphases added) seems to suggest that the math-
ematical universe is originally amorphous and unstructured, and thus compatible with any
coherent structure we impose on it. On the other hand, his a rmation that “[t]he natural-
number structure has objective existence and facts about it are not of our making” (as quoted
above) seems to suggest the opposite, i.e., that the mathematical universe has a structure that
is independent of the way we divide it. These claims hardly seem compatible; a clear signal
of the unstable marriage that Azzouni refers to.
In the absence of independent evidence for the existence of ante rem structures, then, the
coherence-implies-existence thesis remains a puzzling metaphysical hypothesis.
 .  Resnik’s structuralism
Resnik, as Shapiro, combines platonism and structuralism. His structuralist account of
mathematics is quite similar to Shapiro’s. For Resnik, “[t]he objects of mathematics, that
is, the entities which our mathematical constants and quanti ers denote, are themselves
atoms, structureless points, or positions in structures” (Resnik,     , p.    ). Thus, Resnik,
as Shapiro, preserves the standard reading of mathematical statements by identifying the
referents of mathematical terms with places in structures. Moreover, Resnik, as Shapiro,
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believes that structures and their positions exist independently of us in a platonic realm. He
characterizes his realism in this way:
My realism consists in three theses: ( ) that mathematical objects exist independently
of us and our constructions, ( ) that much of contemporary mathematics is true, and
( ) that mathematical truths obtain independently of our beliefs, theories, and proofs
(Resnik,     , p.  ).
Resnik di ers from Shapiro, however, in the argument he uses to support platonism.
Resnik is admittedly a stipulationist, and he recognizes that combining stipulationism and
realism is not an easy task. The basic idea of his approach
is that humans brought mathematical objects into their ken by positing them. Now to
posit a new kind of object one need only introduce a new predicate P (or, as happens
frequently, begin to use an old one with a new sense) and claim that P exists. Thus, it
is plain that realists who claim that mathematical objects are posits invite a variety of
worries and objections. Postulational approaches seem better suited to conventional-
ists, who may claim that we make truths, than to realists, who must hold that we can
only recognize independently obtaining truths (Resnik,     , p.    ).
As a realist, he admits that “it is essential to establish that a postulational epistemology
is compatible with realism” (Resnik,     , p.    ), and he believes that this is feasible. His
point is that we do not need direct access to the independent realm of mathematical objects
in order to check whether our posits are really there. The justi cation for believing that, e.g.,
numbers, whose existence we postulate, really exist in the platonic realm can be established
through other means that do not require any access to the numbers themselves; namely,
through the indispensable use of numbers in science. Resnik endorses the Quine-Putnam
Indispensability Argument (Putnam,     ; Quine,     ). Naturally, this rationale justi es
only belief in those parts of mathematics that are applied in science. Resnik consistently
follows Quine in this regard and also denies ontological rights to parts of pure mathematics.
Resnik’s argument stands out from the other platonist positions I consider in this chap-
ter because he attempts to provide the kind of independent evidence for the existence of
mathematical entities I am asking for. The observation that arithmetic and other mathe-
matical theories are indispensable to science is independent of any logical analysis of math-
ematical statements. However, this very independence should prevent us from assuming
that the indispensability of mathematics provides evidence for a particular logical analysis
of mathematical theories. Let me unpack this point.
For the sake of argument, let us concede that the indispensability thesis provides evi-
dence for believing in the truth of mathematical theories. Can we infer from the truth of
mathematical theories that mathematical entities exist? The answer is a rmative only if we
assume the standard reading of mathematical statements, as Resnik does. However, given
that the correct reading of mathematical statements is controversial and many reject the
standard reading, this assumption is not trivial. One may hold that mathematics is true
but deny that it makes existential claims by reinterpreting mathematical statements. This
is what Hellman (    ) does, just to mention an account I consider in this chapter. Because
evidence for the truth of mathematical theories does not carry over to philosophical inter-
pretations of mathematical statements, the indispensability thesis by itself cannot be seen as
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providing evidence for the existence of mathematical entities. If correct, the indispensability
thesis only establishes that mathematical theories applied in science are true. Although this
can be seen as a  rst step towards platonism, it is not a conclusive step.
 .  Hellman’s nominalism
To avoid untestable hypotheses about a non-spatiotemporal world, perhaps we should em-
brace a form of nominalism. Many nominalist approaches adopt a common strategy: they
reformulate mathematical discourse in a way that eliminates any reference to abstract ob-
jects. To achieve this, some of them make use of modal notions. This is the strategy adopted
by Hellman (    ).
Hellman proposes a modal-structuralist reconstruction of mathematical language. In con-
trast to neo-Fregeans’ and Shapiro’s analyses of mathematical discourse, Hellman’s recon-
struction is not intended to reveal the true syntax of mathematical statements, but to pro-
vide an alternative way of reading them. He recognizes that “if one simply reads ordinary
mathematical discourse literally, i.e. takes it ‘at face value’, one arrives at a platonist interpre-
tation” (Hellman,     , p.  ). Once this is admitted, the  rst thing one has to do in order to
make room for nominalism is to dismiss neo-Fregeans’ syntactic priority thesis. To this end,
Hellman relies on a kind of “bad-company argument.” The idea is that we cannot assume
that the truth of statements wherein a singular term occurs implies the existence of its ref-
erent because there are many apparently true statements about things that do not exist—the
bad companies. Hellman’s examples:
[T]here are hordes of counterexamples [to the syntactic priority thesis]: “Thor was the
Nordic god of thunder”, “Odysseus charted a safe course between Scylla andCharybdis”
etc. But how does one distinguish the relevant from irrelevant truths? Surely not on
any straightforward syntactic grounds (Hellman,     , p.    ).
Even if the syntactic priority thesis is applied to abstraction principles only, there are
still counterexamples. Hellman (    , p.    ) mentions this: “The god of person P = The god
of person Q i  P and Q are coreligionists,” which could entail the existence of the god of
persons P and Q. Hellman concludes: “I see no non-circular way of restricting the ‘syntactic
priority thesis’ for it to have a prayer” (Hellman,     , p.    ).
The rejection of the syntactic priority thesis makes room for the claim that the occur-
rence of singular terms in true mathematical statements does not entail the existence of their
referents. But a residual ontological implication still remains: those who read mathematical
statements literally are still committed to the existence of mathematical entities. To avoid
such ontological commitment, Hellman o ers a way of paraphrasingmathematical discourse
that precludes reference to any abstract entity.
Hellman’s paraphrasing strategy starts with a structuralist conception, similar to Shapiro’s
and Resnik’s. However, where the latter see structuralism as giving reasons to postulate the
existence of structures and their positions, Hellman sees structuralism as allowing the nom-
inalist to get rid of commitment to non-spatiotemporal entities altogether. His strategy is
smart. Since any object can perform the role of a number, we do not need to select any par-
ticular object or position in a structure to call, say, the number one. Rather, we can simply
 . . BUENO’S FICTIONALISMS   
say that, if a natural-number structure existed, there would be a number one (Hellman,     ,
Ch.  ).
In this way, he proposes the reformulation of statements about actual structures into
statements about possible structures. For arithmetic, he provides a translation pattern that
converts any sentence S in the language of arithmetic into a modalized sentence. Instead of
asserting S simpliciter, the nominalist asserts: “if there were any natural-number structure, S
would hold in it.” The formalization of this translation pattern is made in two steps. First,
we have the schema:
⇤8X(X is a natural-number structure ! S holds inX)
This is not su cient, though, since the possibility of there existing a natural-number struc-
ture must be secured. Otherwise the antecedent of the conditional in the formula above
would be necessarily false, and hence any S would yield a true modalized sentence. There-
fore, besides embedding arithmetical statements into the schema above, the nominalist has
to assert:
⌃9X(X is a natural-number structure)
Summing up: for every arithmetical statement S, the nominalist refrains from asserting
S simpliciter and, instead, asserts:
⇤8X(X is a natural-number structure ! S holds inX)^
⌃9X(X is a natural-number structure)
By applying this translation schema, the nominalist manages to preserve the truth of arith-
metic without committing to the actual existence of any number or structure. In this regard,
Hellman’s modal-structuralist reconstruction of mathematics  provides a real gain: it shows
that the postulation of the existence of mathematical objects and structures is, after all, dis-
pensable, even if the truth of mathematics is held to be indispensable.
However, it is easy to see that Hellman’s account is intentionally inconclusive about
the existence of mathematical entities; he admits that they may exist, as the formula above
illustrates, but he does not provide any clue about their actual existence or nonexistence.
As a nominalist, Hellman is better seen as preaching to the converted. His only aim is to
provide for the nominalist a way to avoid ontological commitment to mathematical entities,
but he does not o er any argument to the e ect that nominalism is more faithful to the facts
than platonism. In contrast to the accounts discussed in the previous sections, Hellman does
not even provide an untestable hypothesis about whether there is any reality underlying
mathematics.
 .  Bueno’s  ctionalisms
Nominalist accounts do not make claims about a non-spatiotemporal realm, and therefore
do not face the challenge of having to provide direct evidence that their claims are true about
 In Hellman (    ), he also provides a modal-structuralist reconstruction of set theory, allowing for the
application of his account to mathematics in general.
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an inaccessible reality. However, this is not an automatic advantage for the nominalist inso-
far as the nonexistence of mathematical entities is still considered to be an objective fact.
Hellman’s account proved to be incapable of shedding light on this issue. Can  ctionalism
be more successful in this task? Judging from Bueno’s characterization of  ctionalism, the
prospect is discouraging.
What is the di erence between fictionalism and nominalism? As developed here,  ction-
alism is an agnostic view; it doesn’t state that mathematical objects don’t exist. Rather,
the issue of their existence is left open. Perhaps these objects exist, perhaps they don’t.
But, according to the  ctionalist, we need not settle the issue to make sense of mathe-
matics and mathematical practice (Bueno,     , p.   ).
Bueno understands nominalism, in turn, as the “skeptical view” that categorically denies
the existence of mathematical objects. This does not correspond to Hellman’s nominalism,
given that he acknowledges that mathematical entities may exist, as we have seen above. Ter-
minological issues aside, the signi cant point here is that Bueno’s  ctionalism is intention-
ally as irrelevant for those interested in the objective fact of the existence of mathematical
entities as Hellman’s nominalism.
Bueno’s only point is to make a case for agnosticism. To this end, he introduces two
 ctionalist approaches to mathematics intended to show that it is possible to preserve the
literal reading of mathematical statements while simultaneously remaining agnostic about
the existence of mathematical entities.
The  rst approach builds on van Fraassen’s (    ) constructive empiricism. Bueno sug-
gests that mathematical entities can be treated in the same way that van Fraassen treats
unobservable physical entities. According to van Fraassen, “X is observable if there are cir-
cumstances which are such that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we
observe it” (van Fraassen,     , p.   ), and X is unobservable if it is not observable. Mathe-
matical entities, conceived of as non-spatiotemporal objects,  t the de nition of unobserv-
ables perfectly. Since, according to van Fraassen, scienti c theories are only required to be
true about the observable features of the world they describe, the empiricist may remain
agnostic about the truth value of scienti c statements about unobservables. According to
Bueno, the same applies to mathematical statements embedded in scienti c theories.
The crucial idea of the empiricist  ctionalist strategy to applied mathematics is to
insist that (applied) mathematical theories need not be true to be good. They only
need to be part of an empirically adequate package. . . . The whole package is never asserted
to be true; it’s only required to be empirically adequate, that is, to accommodate the
observable phenomena (Bueno,     , p.   ).
Now, because the mathematics recruited by scienti c theories does not need to be true,
the empiricist does not need to commit to the existence of the entities presupposed by the
literal reading of mathematical statements. In this approach, singular terms occurring in
mathematical statements still intend to refer to some object, but we simply do not know,
and also should not care, whether the reference is felicitous or not. “In the end, the existence
of unobservable objects is not required to make sense of scienti c or mathematical practice.
As a result, unobservable objects can be taken as fictional” (Bueno,     , p.   ).
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Bueno’s other  ctionalist approach builds on Amie Thomasson’s treatment of  ctional
characters (Thomasson,     ) andAzzouni’s treatment of logical quanti ers (Azzouni,     ).
Bueno starts with the idea that mathematical entities are similar to  ctional characters in
that both are kinds of abstract artifacts. According to Thomasson (    , p.   -  ), an abstract
artifact is “an object created by the purposeful activity of humans” that lacks spatiotemporal
location. Being human creations, abstract artifacts are dependent on a creator and, accord-
ing to Thomasson, they remain in existence only as long as there are copies of the works that
describe them (or memories in someone’s mind, or some other register) and a community of
interpreters who are able to understand these registers.
Similar points apply to mathematical entities. First, these entities are also created, in
a particular context, in a particular time. They are artifacts. Mathematical entities
are created when comprehension principles are put forward to describe their behavior,
and when consequences are drawn from such principles. Second, mathematical entities
thus introduced are also dependent on (i) the existence of particular copies of the works
in which such comprehension principles have been presented (or memories of these
works), and (ii) the existence of a community who is able to understand these works.
It’s a perfectly  ne way to describe the mathematics of a particular community as being
lost if all the copies of their mathematical works have been lost and there’s no memory
of them (Bueno,     , p.   ).
Bueno does not explain why it is “perfectly  ne” to describe mathematical entities as
analogous to  ctional characters in that they are created and can be lost. This claim seems
to go beyond agnosticism; it is a genuine hypothesis about the mode of existence of mathe-
matical entities.
To regain agnosticism, Bueno recruits Azzouni’s (    ) distinction between quantifier
and ontological commitment. Azzouni claims that we can assert an existentially quanti ed
statement without committing to the existence of any object, because ontological commit-
ment only takes place when we explicitly assert that the entities we quantify over ful ll
necessary and su cient conditions for existence. For example, if we take observability to
be a necessary and su cient condition for existence, we may assert both that (a) ‘There is
a  ctional detective called Sherlock Holmes’ and that (b) ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist,’
without contradiction. In (a), we incur quanti er commitment to a candidate entity. In (b),
we deny that this candidate entity meets necessary and su cient conditions for existence.
In this account of quanti cation, the only thing the  ctionalist has to do to remain
agnostic about the existence ofmathematical entities is to lay down only su cient conditions
for existence. One such condition may be access: objects to which we have visual access, for
example, can be said to exist. Abstract artifacts such as mathematical entities clearly do not
meet this condition.
But recall that these are only su cient, and not necessary, conditions. Thus, the re-
sulting view turns out to be agnostic about the existence of the mathematical entities
the platonist takes to exist . . . The fact that mathematical objects fail to satisfy some of
these conditions doesn’t entail that these objects don’t exist. Perhaps these entities do
exist after all; perhaps they don’t. What matters for the  ctionalist is that it’s possible
to make sense of signi cant features of mathematics without settling this issue.
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Agnosticism is not a satisfactory position for those who want this issue settled, but it
would be a comfortable position in the meantime. The problem is that agnosticism comes
with a price. In Bueno’s two  ctionalist approaches, mathematical statements turn out to
have unknown truth values. For instance, take the sentence (c) ‘There are in nitely many
prime numbers.’ As Bueno (    , p.   ) puts it, (c) “is true as long as there are in nitely many
prime numbers.” But since the  ctionalist does not knowwhether numbers exist, he does not
know the truth value of (c) either. Recall that in Hellman’s reconstruction, (c) is translated
into the following true statement: ‘if there were a natural-number structure, there would be
in nitely many primes in it.’ Before adhering to  ctionalism, then, the anti-platonist needs
to weigh what is more important: to preserve the truth of mathematical statements, or to
preserve their literal reading.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Bueno’s approaches do preserve the literal reading of
mathematical statements. The problem is brought to the fore when we attempt to  gure out
what the epistemic content ofmathematical statements is in Bueno’s versions of ctionalism.
Knowledge requires truth, but in his approaches mathematical statements have unknown
truth values. How can knowledge be possible in such an agnostic scenario?
According to Bueno, in the van Fraassen-inspired proposal, the  ctionalist can claim
knowledge of how the worldmay be if mathematical existential claims are true (Bueno,     ,
p.   ). For example, the  ctionalist cannot claim knowledge of (c) taken literally, because
numbers are unobservable. But, Bueno argues, he can claim knowledge of (c’): ‘If there were
numbers, there would be in nitely many prime numbers.’ This closely resembles Hellman’s
modal reinterpretation of the same statement. Since some rephrasing is required in order to
grasp its epistemic content, it seems that Bueno’s  ctionalism also involves some alteration
of the reading of mathematical statements.
His other  ctionalist strategy also involves rephrasing. In this approach, “knowledge of
mathematical entities, just as knowledge of  ctional entities in general, is the result of pro-
ducing suitable descriptions of the objects in question and drawing consequences from the
assumptions that are made” (Bueno,     , p.   ). Thus, mathematical knowledge amounts
to knowledge of what deductively follows from what. This, however, should require the pre-
 xation of every mathematical statement with a  ctional operator. Thus, (c) should become
(c”): ‘In arithmetic, there are in nitely many prime numbers.’ Bueno is aware of this, but he
thinks that it is no alteration, since a covert  ctional operator was always there:
The  ctionalist is not introducing a  ction operator to mathematical statements. The
statements are used in the context of principles that characterize the properties of
the relevant mathematical objects. In this sense, the  ction operator—in the form of
the comprehension principles that specify a certain domain of objects—is already in
place as part of mathematical practice. The  ctionalist is not adding a new item to
the language of mathematics. Properly conceptualized, the  ction operator is already
there (Bueno,     , p.   ).
PerhapsHellman could also claim that, properly conceptualized, a covertmodal operator
was always there. In this case, we have distinct factual claims about mathematical language.
Which is right? How can we  gure out whether mathematical sentences really have such
hidden operators? Bueno suggests that the use of such operators is “part of mathematical
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practice.” If this is so, the con rmation of this hypothesis seems to require an empirical in-
vestigation of mathematical practice, which Bueno does not do. For now, let us take these
claims as yet uncon rmed hypotheses about mathematical language, which cannot be inves-
tigated on the basis of purely a priori methods.
 .  Leng’s  ctionalism
In contrast to Bueno’s, Leng’s  ctionalism does not lead to agnosticism. Leng categorically
denies the existence of mathematical entities. Her argument for the nonexistence of mathe-
matical entities involves three steps:  rst, the rejection of the indispensability thesis; second,
the interpretation ofmathematics as a useful ction; third, the invocation ofOckham’s razor.
Let us see each in turn.
Leng’s point against the indispensability thesis as a reason to assume platonism is that
the con rmation of scienti c theories is not holistic, as Quine holds. According to her, the
falsehood of con rmational holism is a fact of scienti c practice:
taking a closer look at the kind of theoretical statements that are generally considered
as receiving con rmation from our theoretical successes, it appears that scientists do
not in general take all the hypotheses of their best empirical theories to be equally
con rmed by their theoretical successes (Leng,     , p.  ).
An example of this is the use of idealizations in science. Idealizations are literally false or
empirically unsupported assumptions that, despite their falsehood, play an important role
in simplifying or even making possible some scienti c calculations. In  uid mechanics, for
example,  uids are idealized as continuous substances because the mathematics involved in
dealing with this idealized scenario is more tractable than the mathematics that would be
required to deal with the realistic scenario wherein  uids are made up of discrete molecules.
Now, “from the successful application of this hypothesis all that is concluded is that the
hypothesis of continuity is good enough, not that it is true” (Leng,     , p.    ). The same
goes for the mathematics applied in scienti c theories, or so she argues. The con rmation
of scienti c theories as a whole need not be seen as implying the truth of the mathematics
involved; mathematics may be no more than a useful fiction.
Leng’s account of mathematics as  ction builds on Walton’s pretense theory of  ction
(Walton,     ). For Walton,  ctional stories are similar to games of make-believe in that
both involve prescriptions to imagine. In one of Walton’s examples, children engage in a
game of make-believe where they pretend that stumps in a forest are bears. Naturally, bears
in this child’s game are only imagined, they do not exist in any way. Analogously, in  ctional
stories such as Conan Doyle’s novels, readers are prescribed to imagine that there is a detec-
tive called Sherlock Holmes who lives on Baker Street. To Walton, Sherlock Holmes, just
as the bears in the child’s game, does not exist. As a result, in Walton’s account,  ctional
propositions are neither false assertions about the real world nor true assertions about a  c-
tional, abstract world. Rather, they are an invitation to engage in a game of make-believe,
where the author and the reader pretend that those propositions are true.
For Leng, a similar process can explain the role of mathematics in science. According to
her, mathematical posits in scienti c theories are analogous to the bears in the child’s game.
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For example, the idealization that  uids are continuous can be seen as “a prescription to
imagine of real fluids that they are continuous substances” (Leng,     , p.    ), just as in the
game, where children are prescribed to imagine of stumps that they are bears.
This kind of pretense is useful because statements asserted in the context of a make-
believe game can convey true information about the world. For example, when a child in the
make-believe game says “there is a bear at the top of the hill,” this statement, though literally
false, conveys the information that there is a stump at the top of the hill. Leng claims that the
same happenswith idealized uses ofmathematics in science, just like literally false statements
about continuous  uids in  uid dynamics convey true information about real discrete  uids.
Even in cases where no idealization is involved, the role of mathematics in modeling
physical phenomena may be accounted for in the same way. “Thus, to take an elementary
example, taking my  ngers as objects, it is fictional . . . that there is a  - , onto function f from
the set of  ngers of my left hand to the set of  ngers on my right” (Leng,     , p.    ). The
literal truth of this statement would require the existence of functions and sets. However,
by conceiving of this statement as  ctional, rather than true, we have the same epistemic
bene t: the prescription to imagine that there is such a  -  function conveys true information
about her  ngers, viz., that they can be arranged pairwise.
Once mathematical propositions are seen as useful prescriptions to imagine, it is time
to invoke Ockham’s razor:
if we can account for our successful scienti c practiceswithout assuming that our math-
ematically stated empirical theories assert truths about mathematical objects, then this
provides us with a positive reason to reject the claim that there are any mathemati-
cal objects. For, although we cannot conclusively prove that there are no mathemat-
ical objects, and although our uses of mathematics are consistent with the possibility
that there are mathematical objects satisfying the existentially quanti ed claims of our
mathematically stated empirical theories, adopting our ordinary scienti c standards
of inquiry surely requires us to adopt the principle of Ockham’s razor, according to
which we ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity . . . Thus, I conclude, adopt-
ing a naturalistic trust of our ordinary scienti c methods of con rmation requires us
to reject the existence of mathematical objects (Leng,     , p.    -   ).
By handling Ockham’s razor, Leng asserts an objective fact about reality: there is no
thing we are prepared to call a mathematical object. This is a negation of platonism and faces
the same di culty that haunts its competitor: reality can be uncooperative. Despite Leng’s
e orts to show that mathematics can be seen as a useful  ction, despite the methodological
appropriateness of Ockham’s razor, it may be that mathematical entities really exist out
there and that mathematical statements are true about them. What evidence do we have to
the contrary? Rejection of the indispensability thesis does not amount to evidence for the
nonexistence of mathematical entities. In the passage from which I took the epigraph to this
dissertation, Azzouni writes:
Some nominalistically-inclined philosophers may invoke—at this juncture [i.e., after
rejecting the indispensability thesis]—an a priori methodological principle, such asOc-
cam’s razor. The proponent of this distasteful maneuver has overlooked that we can’t
a priori dictate the ontology of the universe (Azzouni,     , p.     ).
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This is what Leng does. Although Azzouni is right in complaining that it is a “distasteful
maneuver,” the nominalistically-inclined philosopher is not to blame. If the platonist made
testable existential claims, the anti-platonist could base her negative existential claims on a
direct refutation of those claims. But the existential claims of the platonist cannot be refuted
by any direct approach. As we have seen, they are carefully formulated so as to avoid any
possibility of independent validation. Therefore, the only alternative for the nominalist is to
advance an explanation of mathematics that dispenses with mathematical posits altogether
and, then, recruit Ockham’s razor to categorically deny that such entities exist. Against
“distasteful” a priori maneuvers, only other “distasteful” a priori maneuvers will do. Conse-
quently, we cannot expect a validation of Leng’s account coming from independent evidence
that mathematical entities do not exist.
However, we can still ask whether Leng’s account is correct about mathematical practice.
If it turns out to be correct, this means that, in fact, mathematicians are concerned with cre-
ating useful  ctions, rather than describing an independent reality of non-spatiotemporal
entities, and this can count as evidence (though still indirect) for the nonexistence of mathe-
matical entities. But Leng denies that her account is intended to be correct about mathemat-
ical practice. Indeed, she holds that hermeneutic  ctionalism, i.e., the position according to
which  ctionalism is a correct interpretation of what mathematicians do, “is not supported
by the evidence of mathematical practice” (Leng,     , p.    ). If this is so, there is no hope
of con rming her negative existential claims via evidence from mathematical practice.
But then what is the point of Leng’s account? Burgess suggests that  ctionalisms that are
not hermeneuticmust be revolutionary. Revolutionary ctionalists “concede that their recon-
structions of mathematics are not analyses of current mathematics, but amendments to it;
not exegeses, but emendations” (Burgess,     , p.   ). In this case, Leng would be suggesting
that, although mathematics as currently done does not involve make-believe games, it should
be done in this way. Burgess thinks that revolutionary  ctionalism is untenable: “given the
comparative historical records of success and failure of philosophy on the one hand, and of
mathematics on the other, to propose philosophical ‘corrections’ to mathematics is comically
immodest” (Burgess,     , p.   ). Leng sees her  ctionalism as revolutionary, but denies that
she is immodestly proposing any correction to mathematical practice.
The revolutionary  ctionalist is not, after all, advocating the abandonment of math-
ematics, even though, according to  ctionalism, the correct understanding of mathe-
matical assertions is not as literal assertions of truth. . . . There is room, then, for a weak
form of modesty, according to which we hold back from advocating revisions in suc-
cessful practices that we do not believe to be truth-stating, by seeking to explain how
such practices may be successful even if practitioners are involved in making assertions
that we do not believe are literally true (Leng,     , p.    -   ).
Thus, her point is not that mathematics should change, that mathematicians should
stop making existential claims and instead start making prescriptions to imagine. For Leng,
nothing has to change in mathematical practice; only our way of understanding what is
going on in mathematics “from the outside” should change (Leng,     , p.   ). “The re-
sult is a bloodless revolution, since mathematical and scienti c practice is left undisturbed,
but a revolution nonetheless” (Leng,     , p.    ). In other words, what Leng is propos-
ing is a philosophical explanation of mathematics, according to which “regardless of what
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mathematicians actually mean by their assertions, the best interpretation of the assertions
of mathematical theories is as literally false, and at most true only in some  ctional sense”
(Leng,     , p.    ).
But what evidence do we have that Leng’s  ctionalism is “the best interpretation,” or
“the correct understanding” (as quoted above) of mathematical theories? Admittedly, her
interpretation is possible, but there are many other possible interpretations, some of which
we have seen in the above sections. In which aspects is Leng’s  ctionalism better or more
correct than Bueno’s  ctionalisms or even platonism? What are the criteria for adjudicat-
ing between philosophical explanations of mathematics if compliance with mathematical
practice is not one? Anyone who takes mathematical statements to be true will immediately
reject  ctionalism as a correct account of mathematics, let alone the best one. Even a nomi-
nalist like Hellman takes the preservation of the truth of mathematical statements to be an
important desideratum (Hellman,     , p.  ).
In my view, there is a tension between Leng’s intention to give a correct account of math-
ematics and her denial that her account is hermeneutic. Revolutionary  ctionalisms are not
classi able as correct or incorrect, since they intend to change, rather than account for, a
given state of a airs; they advance proposals. Leng is not recommending changes in mathe-
matical practice, but she is still recommending changes in the waywe interpretmathematical
theories. Apparently, she wants us to change the way we interpret mathematical theories be-
cause her brand of  ctionalism is the correct way of doing it. An account that avows to be
correct must be correct about something. If mathematical entities do not exist, and if Leng’s
account is not intended to be correct about mathematical practice (which is what remains
after the platonic realm of mathematical entities is dismissed), it is intended to be correct
about what. exactly? Perhaps Leng could say that her  ctionalist account is correct about
how the world is, since it does not postulate the existence of nonexistent entities; but this
would beg the question against platonism.
Leng’s denial that her account is hermeneutic protects it against refutation, but also im-
pedes its con rmation. Is this an ad hocway of dismissing requests for independent evidence?
If her account were hermeneutic, evidence to the e ect that mathematical practice does in-
volve prescriptions to imagine, even if to a limited extent, even if covertly, would count as a
con rmation of Leng’s  ctionalism. But, given that her account is not hermeneutic, I cannot
see any way it could be con rmed or refuted.
 .  Thomasson’s and Maddy’s de ationisms
All the di culties we saw above concerning the question of the existence of mathematical
entities may be a sign that this question is unanswerable, or that it misses the point, or that it
is meaningless. If this is so, we had better de ate the debate: leave this question behind and
move forward in other directions. While they propose di erent strategies, this is roughly
the point of Thomasson (    ) and Maddy (    , ch.  ). Let us examine each in turn.
In Thomasson (    ), the question of the real existence of mathematical entities is ren-
dered meaningless. To achieve this result, Thomasson endorses the Carnapian distinction
between internal and external existence questions relative to a linguistic framework (Car-
nap,     ). According to Carnap, only internal questions are meaningful and answerable.
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For example, the question ‘Is there a prime number greater than   ?’ is straightforwardly
answered within arithmetic with a “yes.” On the other hand, the external question ‘Does   
really exist?’ is thought of as meaningless. Thomasson explains why this is so. The premise
is that a linguistic framework sets the rules of the use of its terms, which amounts to setting
the meaning of these terms. Then, when terms are used within the framework, i.e., in ac-
cordance with their rules of use, they are meaningful. In this case, existence questions have
straightforward answers because, to answer them, we need only apply the rules of use of the
terms that occur in the question. Now, if one rejects a straightforward internal answer and
still asks whether something really exists, then she is no longer using the terms in accordance
with their rules, otherwise she would have accepted the straightforward internal answer. In
this case, she is using terms externally, hence detached from their rules of use. “But if [she]
attempt[s] to use the terms while severing them from these rules of use, [she] make[s] the
terms meaningless, and the questions pseudo-questions” (Thomasson,     , p.   -  ).
Accordingly, in Thomasson’s approach, we can infer the existence of numbers and other
mathematical entities trivially frommathematical language, and there is no deep philosoph-
ical question about their real existence. The putative “deep philosophical question” is seen as
a meaningless pseudo-question. If asked about the mode of existence of the entities implied
by mathematical linguistic frameworks, Thomasson may answer with her simple realism: “we
should simply say that such entities exist—full stop—and adopt a simple realist view of them”
(Thomasson,     , p.    ). That is, we cannot say anything more about such entities than
what is allowed by the rules of use of the linguistic framework. In particular, we cannot say
that mathematical entities exist in a platonic realm, because this cannot be inferred from
mathematical language.
Thomasson’s simple realism is a direct consequence of the Carnapian distinction be-
tween meaningful internal and meaningless external existence questions. But what evidence do
we have that this distinction is correct? Taken at face value, in ordinary language, external
existence questions are meaningful. Indeed, it is easy to make sense of external existence
questions even if one assumes Carnap’s linguistic frameworks and the corresponding inter-
nal/external distinction.
Both Carnap and Thomasson acknowledge that external questions can be charitably in-
terpreted as pragmatic questions about the bene ts of adopting a linguistic framework. Prag-
matic questions are still external but nonetheless meaningful. For example, in the question
‘Is number language useful?’, terms are being used outside of the linguistic framework of
arithmetic; the language of arithmetic does not even contain the term ‘useful.’ If this ques-
tion is to be meaningful, it must be asked within some other linguistic framework. Then,
we must suppose that this question is asked within a broader linguistic framework—a meta-
language—that is able to refer to the language of arithmetic and, say, to theoretical virtues.
Pragmatic questions are, then, internal questions of broader linguistic frameworks.
Now, once this is admitted, we can introduce a linguistic framework that is able to re-
fer to number language, thing language, mental-state language, platonist language, and ask
whether numbers are things, mental states, or platonic entities. All of these will be internal
and, hence, meaningful questions; and they allow us to go far beyond Thomasson’s simple
realism. As long as adequate de nitions and rules of use are provided, we can even reha-
bilitate the original external question ‘Do numbers really exist?’. To this end, we need only
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introduce suitable rules of use for the term ‘really.’ For example, we can stipulate that, when
‘really’ occurs in a question of the form ‘DoXs really exist?’, the question can be read as asking
whether Xs are things, mental states, platonic entities, or none of these alternatives. Con-
clusion: even if Thomasson’s Carnapian account of meaning is right, the ontological debate
about the existence of mathematical entities is not de ated. Properly interpreted, originally
external existence questions can be re-posed in higher-order linguistic frameworks that are
able to refer to lower-order ones, in which case they become internal questions. And then
all the di culties involved in the philosophical debate about the ontology of mathematics
are back.
The other attempt to de ate the debate about the existence of mathematical entities I
consider here is Maddy’s thin realism. Maddy claims that existence questions about mathe-
matical entities should be, and in fact are, answered in mathematics itself. If the philosophi-
cal concern about the ontology of mathematics is motivated by a suspicion that those things
whose existence is proved in mathematics might actually not exist, Maddy claims that this
suspicion is unfounded. According to Maddy’s naturalism or second philosophy, “a successful
enterprise, be it science or mathematics, should be understood and evaluated on its own
terms, [and] should not be subject to criticism from . . . some external, supposedly higher
point of view” (Maddy,     , p.    ). For Maddy, when philosophers ask for the justi cation
of mathematical methods, or whether mathematical entities really exist, they are violating
this naturalist recommendation. Thin realism, by contrast, is a philosophical position that
takes the second philosopher’s mandate to judge mathematics in its own terms seriously.
Maddy formulates thin realism as a philosophical position about the ontology of set
theory. The thin realist lemma is: “sets just are the sort of thing set theory describes; this
is all there is to them; for questions about sets, set theory is the only relevant authority”
(Maddy,     , p.   ). Hence, since the existence of sets is explicitly asserted and proved in
set theory, sets exist—full stop. Whether sets exist independently of us as eternal platonic
entities or are our creations is not a proper question in set theory, and, therefore, this is not
a proper question at all. This is what makes Maddy’s realism thin: “[i]n contrast with the
entities posited by the various rich metaphysical and epistemological theories of the Robust
Realists—which all go well beyond ‘the positive things asserted by set theory’—these sets will
seem rather insubstantial” (Maddy,     , p.   ). In Maddy’s view, those who ask for further
evidence (other than the evidence provided bymathematics itself) thatmathematical entities
exist are posing an undue challenge to a successful rational practice:
if the Robust Realist is right, if the goal of set theory is to describe an independently-
existing reality of some kind, then it appears that Cantor’s evidence needs supplemen-
tation, and not supplementation of the same sort, like adding in Dedekind’s grounds
and so on, but supplementation of an entirely di erent kind: we need an account of
how the fact that sets serve this or that particular mathematical goal makes it more
likely that they exist. Without this account we have no way of ruling out the possibility
that reality is sadly uncooperative, that much as we’d like to use sets in our mathemati-
cal pursuits, they just don’t happen to exist. To the Second Philosopher, this hesitation
seems misplaced: why should perfectly sound mathematical reasoning require supple-
mentation? Hasn’t something gone wrong when rational mathematical methods are
called into question in this way? (Maddy,     , p.   ).
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Thus, both Maddy and Thomasson agree that the question about the real existence of
mathematical entities is misplaced. In contrast with Thomasson, though, Maddy does not
see it as a pseudo-question. ForMaddy, this question is completely meaningful. The problem
is that it is asked from an epistemically inferior position—philosophy—towards an epistemi-
cally superior discipline—mathematics. At least, this is the so-called “naturalist” or “second-
philosophical” assumption in action here.
If philosopherswere attempting to philosophically answer amathematical question about
mathematics, I would agree with the Second Philosopher. We had better leave this work to
the mathematician. However, the philosophical question about the existence of mathemati-
cal entities is not a mathematical question; it cannot be answered with a mathematical proof.
As I pointed out above, this question can be understood as asking whether mathematical en-
tities can be identi ed as things in the physical world, or thoughts in our minds, or things
in a platonic realm, or something else, or nothing at all. We cannot expect an answer from
mathematics to this question, because this is not a question about mathematics alone; it is a
question about the relationships between mathematical posits and other kinds of things or
posits.
Questions about the relationships between apparently di erent kinds of mathematical
entities are commonly asked within mathematics itself. A classic example: can numbers be
sets? This question cannot be answered in arithmetic alone. If we adopt a position like thin
realism and assume that “numbers just are the sort of thing arithmetic describes; this is all
there is to them,” we have no means to address this question. But by taking arithmetic and
set theory together, and doing some philosophy, we can formulate an answer (Benacerraf,
    b). It would be quite arbitrary to forbid this question by decreeing that “numbers just
are the sort of thing arithmetic describes,” without providing compelling reasons to deny
that they are sets. In the same way, asking about the relations between sets and, say, physical
things does not challenge the adequacy of set theory to address set-theoretic questions about
sets. Conclusion: surely philosophy is epistemically inferior to mathematics when it comes
to mathematical matters, but this has no impact on what philosophical questions philosophers
can pose about mathematics.
Thomasson’s claim that external questions aremeaningless andMaddy’s claim thatmath-
ematics cannot be critically questioned from a philosophical point of view can be seen as
belonging to the same supply of ad hoc maneuvers intended to ban requests for indepen-
dent evidence for existential claims. These maneuvers can protect the accounts that adopt
them from refutation, but also make them unveri able. How could Thomasson and Maddy
demonstrate that mathematical entities simply are what mathematics says about them with-
out resorting to extra-mathematical reasons?
 .  Conclusion
A priori speculation about the existence of numbers and other mathematical entities may be
a good way of putting forward hypotheses, but it is certainly not the proper way of verifying
them. In this regard, themost one can do by speculation only is to advance philosophical the-
ses or methodological principles intended to show that no independent veri cation would
be needed. However, as I argue in this chapter, such theses and principles can be seen as ad
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hocmaneuvers intended to ban requests for independent evidence. Except for Hellman’s and
Bueno’s approaches, which overtly refuse to assert anything objective about the existence or
nonexistence of mathematical entities, all the other approaches considered here make use of
these maneuvers to some degree.
Although the approaches discussed here do not exhaust all a priori strategies that may
be available to philosophers, it is quite unlikely that some other a priori procedure could
perform better than those examined here. Deductive formal proofs are the most e ective
and reliable a priori methods we have, the existence of mathematical entities is provable
in this way, but philosophers do not take these proofs at face value. Even de ationists feel
pressed to supply these proofs with further arguments for their conclusions. Why would less
reliable a priori methods do better?
If my arguments are correct, the prospects for investigating the metaphysics of math-
ematics by purely a priori methods are discouraging. On the other hand, if it is the case
that, if mathematical entities exist, they exist outside of space and time, the prospects for
investigating the metaphysics of mathematics by means of a posteriori methods are even
more discouraging. But we do not need to assume that this is the case. Indeed, we should
not assume this. The very claim that mathematical entities, if they exist, must necessarily be
non-spatiotemporal is dependent on philosophical accounts for which we do not have any
conclusive evidence. Thus, we can leave open the question of the nature of mathematical
entities, in case they exist, and try to make progress with a posteriori methods.
The inconclusiveness of a priori methods for investigating the metaphysics of mathe-
matics can be seen as progress: it shows that, if we want more conclusive results, we need
to broaden the scope of the investigation. A starting point for this broader investigation
may be an inquiry into how we, human beings, actually acquire and produce mathematical
knowledge. I start this investigation in the next chapter.
Chapter  
A methodological alternative:
an empirically informed approach to numbers
A      discussed topic in the contemporary literature on the philosophy of mathemat-ics is the so-called Benacerraf’s problem (Benacerraf,     a). The problem consists
of explaining how human beings living in a spatiotemporal world can have knowledge of
non-spatiotemporal mathematical entities. Although I am not particularly concerned with
Benacerraf’s problem here, referring to it helps illustrate the methodological approach I will
adopt to investigate the ontological status of numbers.
Attempts to solve Benacerraf’s problem usually involve denying that we need access to
non-spatiotemporal entities in order to obtain knowledge of them (e.g., Shapiro (    )) or
denying that mathematical entities are non-spatiotemporal (e.g., Maddy (    )). These ap-
proaches assume in advance both a premise about the mode of existence of mathematical
entities and that there is arithmetical knowledge. From these assumptions, they go on to
explain how knowledge of that kind of entity is possible.
What I am proposing here with respect to arithmetic is a third strategy, whose  rst step
is to suspend judgment about: (a) the existence and the mode of existence of numbers, and
(b) the existence of numerical knowledge. Because I am still assuming the literal reading of
numerical statements, suspension of judgment about (b) is a consequence of suspension of
judgment about (a). Knowledge requires truth. If we suspend judgment about the existence
of numbers, we cannot assert whether numerical statements are true or false, and therefore
cannot claim knowledge of them. Once we have suspended judgment about the existence of
these things, what remains are numerals (sometimes occurring within sentences) and certain
mental contents that are activated by them. These mental contents I call “number concepts,”
and what people say about these concepts and do by relying on them, I call “numerical com-
petence” (instead of “numerical knowledge”).
It is worth noting that here I am using the term ‘concept’ to refer to psychological en-
tities. This is in line with experimental philosophers’ approach to concepts. For example,
Machery sees concepts as “bodies of information [people have] about individuals, classes,
substances, or events” (Machery,     , p.    ). However, this should not be taken as imply-
ing that numbers are mental entities. Concepts as mental contents may still be about non-
  
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mental objects, including platonic entities (e.g., my concept of three may be about the pla-
tonic, non-spatiotemporal object three). In the course of this investigation we will  nd out
whether number concepts are about platonic objects, physical objects, classes, substances,
events, something else, or nothing at all.
With these caveats in place, we can start investigating how human beings acquire numer-
ical competence in real life. Regardless of Benacerraf’s challenge, which is aimed atmathemat-
ical knowledge, it is certain that people do have numerical competence, and therefore we can
investigate how they obtain it. This investigation can follow a “reverse engineering” strategy:
starting with the assumption that certain humans have numerical competence, go back to a
time when they did not, and observe what happened in the meantime. This involves answer-
ing two questions: what does a human being experience during cognitive development so as
to acquire numerical competence, and what, in the history of the human species, enabled
us to acquire it? Hopefully, data about our experiences as individuals and as a species will
suggest a hypothesis about what entities—objects, classes, substances, events, platonic enti-
ties, something else, or nothing at all—underlie our number concepts. In other words, what
I am proposing is a bottom-up approach wherein we assume a neutral stance regarding the
existence and nature of numbers and numerical knowledge and “let the data speak for itself,”
as it were. If this approach succeeds, at the end of this investigation we will have understood
how numerical competence emerges, what numbers are (if anything), and whether and how
numerical knowledge is possible.
The basis of this strategy is the belief that the fundamental phenomenon to be explained
in an investigation of the metaphysics of mathematics is a class of human experiences. Hu-
mans do mathematics and use it to help them solve practical and theoretical problems.
When investigating the metaphysics of mathematics, we are looking for a set of entities
that can account for the main features displayed by these human experiences. Whether non-
spatiotemporal entities are required to make sense of the arithmetical experience of human
beings is something we will  nd out in the course of this investigation. This should never be
assumed in advance.
Data relevant for this investigation comes from several sources, such as numerical cog-
nition, linguistics, and mathematics education. Most of this data is reviewed in Chapters  
to  . In the  rst section of this chapter (section  . ), I start reviewing data from numeri-
cal cognition that shows that numerical competence is inseparable from the use of symbolic
systems for numbers; i.e., numerals seem to be indispensable for the acquisition of number
concepts. The discussion in section  .  brings to the fore the instrumental role of numerals
as cognitive tools and sets the direction for the rest of the investigation. Cognitive tools are an
important topic in the psychological and philosophical literature on cognition. In sections
 .  to  . , I review some topics from this literature that will inform the discussion in this and
following chapters. In section  . , I discuss what cognitive tools are. In section  . , I present
Vygotsky’s (    ) concept of internalization and Menary’s (    b;     ) concept of encultur-
ation, which help explain how cognitive tools transform our brain and give us new abilities
(such as numerical competence). In section  . , I explore the concepts of de-semanti cation
and re-semanti cation (Dutilh Novaes,     ; Krämer,     ) to show how symbolic cognitive
tools help us overcome cognitive shortcomings and obtain contents that we could not obtain
without their aid (such as number concepts).
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All this discussion of cognition and cognitive tools may seem odd, or even irrelevant,
for those used to more traditional philosophy of mathematics, but I encourage the reader to
stay with me until section  . , where I sketch a hypothesis about the existence and nature of
numbers suggested by the data and theories reviewed in this chapter. This is the hypothesis
I will further elaborate on and defend in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
 .  Quantical and numerical cognition
One of the most remarkable  ndings from numerical cognition is the fact that the most
basic cognitive foundations of numerical competence are neither learned nor exclusively
human. Human beings and many other animals share an inborn set of abilities to identify
and discriminate between discrete quantities (Kadosh & Dowker,     ). In human beings,
for example, these abilities are already present in neonates during their  rst hours of life,
long before any mathematical training could have taken place. Antell and Keating (    )
showed that, when presented with a collection of two items and then a collection of three
items,   -hour-old newborns can notice the numerical di erence between them. Likewise,
newly hatched chicks show surprising abilities. Rugani, Fontanari, Simoni, Regolin, and
Vallortigara (    ) exploited chicks’ willingness to be together with their siblings to investi-
gate their ability to “count” and “calculate.” They hid a chick’s siblings behind one occluder
and started moving some of the chicks, one by one, to behind another occluder. The tested
chicks were allowed to see their siblings being placed behind the  rst occluder and then be-
ing moved to behind the other. When allowed to join their siblings, the tested chicks joined
the larger group, which suggests that they were able to “count” how many of their siblings
were moved and to “subtract” the resulting number from the number of chicks originally
placed behind the  rst occluder. Fish, bees, and several other species have been shown to
possess similar abilities (Agrillo,     ). The fact that these abilities seem to be innate in all
the studied species suggests that they have genetic evolutionary roots (Brannon & Merritt,
    ).
Another important  nding is that these abilities are accurate only up to a point. For
example, chicks tested in Rugani, Regolin, and Vallortigara (    ) were able to accurately
identify the larger group only when groups consisted of one, two or three individuals. For
larger groups (of four,  ve, or six individuals), their precision was lower. Human infants and
other animals face a similar limitation. Above the limit of three or four items, the larger
the quantities involved, the greater the numerical di erence between them must be for the
subjects to perceive a di erence. For example, in Brannon and Terrace (    ), monkeys were
more accurate when discriminating collections of four items from collections of nine items
(a numerical di erence of  ve), than collections of seven items from collections of nine items
(a numerical di erence of two).
In general terms, the abilities of infants and non-human animals to discriminate dis-
crete quantities consist of the ability to subitize, i.e., to identify and distinguish the size of
collections of up to three or four items quickly and accurately; the ability to estimate, i.e.,
to identify and distinguish the size of larger collections quickly but only approximately, de-
manding ever-increasing numerical di erences so that the perceiver can notice them; and
the ability to perform operations analogous to sums and subtractions over the sizes of col-
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Figure  . : In (A), it is easy to tell which is the larger group at a glance with full certainty without
counting. The ability to do so is called subitizing. In (B), without counting it is possible to guess, by
estimation, which is the larger group, but certainty is obtained only by counting both collections and
comparing the numbers.
lections perceived through subitizing and estimation. Naturally, human adults also display
these abilities. Figure  .  provides two simple tasks intended to elicit the reader’s abilities
to subitize and estimate. I discuss these abilities in more detail in Chapter  . For now, two
points are important. First, these abilities are non-symbolic, since infants, monkeys, and
chicks do not have at their disposal culturally created symbolic systems, such as number
words, on which they could rely for counting. Second, these non-symbolic abilities face con-
straints that are not likely to apply to the analogous operations performed with the aid of
culturally created symbolic systems.
Following Núñez (    ), I will call the set of inborn non-symbolic abilities shared by
humans and non-human animals quantical cognition. In the literature on numerical cogni-
tion, these abilities are usually called non-symbolic numerical cognition, but for reasons that
will be made clear in Chapter  , the adjective ‘numerical’ is inadequate here. I will reserve
the term numerical cognition to refer to the set of cognitive skills to deal with symbolic nu-
merical information found in numerate humans (these abilities are usually referred to as
“symbolic numerical cognition” in the literature). In addition to the role of symbols, nu-
merical and quantical cognition are clearly distinguished from each other by performance
indicators: numerical cognition is more likely to deliver exact and accurate outcomes no
matter the quantities involved, but it demands longer response times that increase as the in-
volved quantities become larger, whereas quantical cognition displays faster response times,
but is accurate only up to the subitizing limit (around three), becoming increasingly fuzzy
as quantities grow.
The relationship between quantical cognition and numerical cognition is not fully un-
derstood yet (I address their relationship in section  . ), but it is believed that quantical
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cognition provides the genetically evolved preconditions for the development of numerical
cognition in humans. However, as shown by the fact that non-human animals endowed with
quantical skills do not develop numerical cognition, the mere presence of quantical skills is
not su cient for the emergence of numerical cognition. This is where the human ability
to use culturally created symbolic systems comes in. The use of systems of numerals and
other notations is believed to give us new capacities by extending and improving our innate
quantical abilities.
A study conducted by Barth et al. (    ) helps further illustrate the di erence between
quantical and numerical cognition and the indispensable role of symbols in the latter. Barth
and colleagues tested adults and  ve-year-old children on non-symbolic operations analo-
gous to arithmetic operations performed over collections of physical objects. In symbolic
arithmetic operations, the operands are conveyed in symbolic format—e.g.,  + —and the
agent is allowed to use all her competence with school arithmetic to calculate the result. In a
non-symbolic operation, by contrast, the input is provided in the form of particular discrete
quantities—e.g., arrays of dots presented on a screen—and the agent is not allowed to use
symbolic resources to execute the operation, either because the agent does not know such
resources (as in the case of infants and non-human animals) or because the experimental set
up is especially designed for this purpose. For example, experimenters can present stimuli
for a very short period of time, enough to allow estimation, but too short to allow counting.
Figure  .  illustrates some of the experimental setups used in Barth et al. (    ).
As results presented in Barth et al. (    ) show, both adults and children are similarly
able to perform non-symbolic operations, but adults’ performance in operations with quan-
tities above the subitizing limit fell short of what could have been expected if they had been
allowed to count and calculate symbolically. For example, in the addition task (Figure  . A),
adults succeeded in   % of the trials; in the subtraction task (Figure  . C), adults succeeded
in only   % of the trials. For a rough comparison, LeFevre, DeStefano, Penner-Wilger, and
Daley (    ) report that in symbolic subtraction, where the input was provided in Arabic
digits and participants were asked to calculate mentally, adults succeeded in   % of the tri-
als. The di erence in performance between non-symbolic and symbolic subtraction re ects
the di erent degrees of accuracy of quantical and numerical cognition.
Barth and colleagues also found that some non-symbolic operations were more di cult
than others, an e ect consistent with the limitations of quantical cognition. Performance
dropped signi cantly as the di erence between the displayed outcome and the correct out-
come decreased. For example, participants were less accurate in noticing that the result of
adding    dots to    dots is not    dots (di erence of four dots), than in noticing that the re-
sult of adding    dots to    dots is not    dots (di erence of nine dots). Quantical estimates
are fuzzy, and thus tend to overlap when the di erence is relatively small. By contrast, by
counting we are able to detect a di erence of just one unit no matter the size of the involved
collections, provided that time and expertise are available.
Another di erence between counting and estimation is that, to estimate, we just look at
the target collection as a whole and after a fewmilliseconds we guess its cardinal size, whereas
to count we need to follow a systematic procedure, extended in time, governed by clear rules
and involving an ordered sequence ofwords. It is surprising that inmany cases, estimates that
recruit only non-symbolic skills are approximately right, but it is clear that only by counting
   CHAPTER  . A METHODOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE
Figure  . : Stimuli used in Barth et al. (    ) to test adults’ and children’s ability to perform non-
symbolic operations analogous to additions and subtractions. (A) In the animated addition task,
participants were presented with an animation in which an array of dots was displayed for a short
time and subsequently occluded by a panel. Then, another array of dots was moved to behind the
occluder, joining the previously occluded initial array. When the occluder was removed, participants
were asked whether the revealed array had fewer or more dots than expected. (B) The animated
subtraction task was similar, but after the  rst array being occluded, a number of dots was removed
from behind the panel. (C) In the not animated subtraction task, three arrays of dots were presented
sequentially, and participants were asked whether the third array had fewer or more dots than the
subtraction of the second array from the  rst. In the three tasks, stimuli in which the revealed array
had exactly the correct number of dots were not tested. Children were tested only in the animated
tasks, with smaller adaptations, such as the inclusion of engaging narration. (Figure adapted from
Barth et al. (    , p.    ,    ).)
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can we accurately determine the cardinal size of any collection with more than three or four
items. The same goes for operations such as additions and subtractions. Participants in Barth
and colleagues’ experiments just observed dots coming in and out from behind the occluder
and guessed the outcome after a few milliseconds. If they were to calculate accurately, they
would have to count the dots and add or subtract the results symbolically, a time-consuming
complex operation.
These di erences in overt behavior are taken to re ect di erences in the way symbolic
and non-symbolic operations are implemented in the brain. I address the cerebral imple-
mentation of quantical skills in sections  .  and  . . Next, I present a cognitive model of
the implementation of numerical competence in the brain in which the instrumental role of
symbols is made clear.
According to the Triple Code Model (Dehaene,     ; Dehaene & Cohen,     ,     ),
the leading model of mental arithmetic processing, the most reliable strategies for mental
calculation depend on symbolic resources typically learned at school. The gist of the Triple
CodeModel is the claim that numerical information is encoded in the brain in three formats.
Two of these formats directly mirror the two numeral systems we commonly use: a system
of oral number words and their corresponding written forms (in English, ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’
etc.) and the decimal place-value system of Arabic digits (‘ ,’ ‘ ,’ ‘ ,’ etc). These two sym-
bolic systems give rise to two modules of arithmetical processing in the brain: one module
that contains representations of the visual forms of Arabic digits (let us call it M ); and one
module that contains representations of both phonological and graphemic forms of number
words and arithmetical facts encoded in verbal format, such as addition and multiplication
tables (let us call it M ). Naturally, the presence of these modules and their contents are rel-
ative to cultural practice; people who did not learn, say, multiplication tables will not have
them encoded in phonological format in M ; people who do not use Arabic digits will not
have M  (or will have a corresponding module encoding the visual form of the symbols they
use). It is worth noting that, according to the model, in both M  and M  representations are
asemantic, i.e., they do not have meanings stored together with phonological and graphemic
forms. These modules store only verbal and graphic representations of the symbols them-
selves and phonological representations of the arithmetical facts conveyed in verbal format
that we learn by heart.
Meanings are provided by the third module (let us call it M ). M  encodes numerical in-
formation by means of analog representations of discrete quantities. These representations
give us the cardinal values associated with Arabic digits and number words. In Dehaene and
Cohen’s original model, the exact cardinal values that we associate with number words and
digits are believed to result from the sharpening of rougher, approximate innate representa-
tions of numerosities that are part of the mechanisms that implement quantical cognition.
According to the model, what sharpens these vague numerosity representations, converting
them into exact cardinal values, is the very number words and digits codi ed in M  and M 
(more on this in section  . ). In other words, it is the process of learning a numeral system
that generates number concepts (exact cardinal values) in the brain by sharpening vague ana-
log representations of discrete quantities innately provided by quantical cognition. There
are other models of how we acquire number concepts, but in all of them (except for nativist
accounts) they come from learning a numeral system (more on this in Chapter  ).
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If the Triple Code Model is correct, the three sources of numerical information in the
brain originate from culturally created symbolic systems, with a contribution from the in-
nate mechanisms of quantical cognition for M . That is, numerical cognition is a blend of
quantical cognition plus culturally created symbolic systems. The cognitive function of sym-
bols is to provide exactness and accuracy in operations involving collections of more than
three or four items. For very small collections, the quantical ability to subitize su ces; for
larger collections, though, if we want the same levels of exactness and accuracy, we need to
make use of techniques involving numerals and other symbolic resources. This is illustrated
in task B of Figure  . : the exact number of stars in each group can be found only by counting.
In this sense, the counting procedure functions as a cognitive tool that enables us to regain
the accuracy of subitizing in the evaluation of the size of collections that otherwise we could
only estimate. According to Dehaene and Cohen’s model, over time, practice with counting
“sharpens” the approximate representations of numerosity we recruit for estimation and give
us the exact cardinal values we associate with numerals. (Notice that this departs from the
traditional view according to which the primary function of symbols is the communication
of previously given contents. Here, symbols themselves give rise to the contents that they
communicate. I elaborate on this point in section  . .)
More generally, the suggestion is that the symbolic systems of school arithmetic are cog-
nitive tools that allow us to overcome the limitations of innate quantical skills, thus obtain-
ing truly numerical competence. It is surprising that animals from  sh to monkeys share
with human infants abilities such as subitizing; but it is also surprising that, even sharing
these abilities, only humans are able to display truly numerical competence. Between an in-
fant whose capacity to discriminate discrete quantities accurately, although remarkable, is
limited to three or four items, and a child at school age who is able to count up to more than
one thousand, there is a long period of training in culturally created techniques. The child
was born with some capacity to deal with quantities; training in these techniques launched
her from those limited capacities to truly numerical competence.
In the “reverse engineering strategy” I propose in the introduction to this chapter, this
suggests that these culturally created techniques, as well as inborn quantical skills, may be key
elements in the ontology underlying numerical competence. This suggestion is one of the
central claims behind the ontological hypothesis I formulate in section  . . The overview
of the role of symbols in numerical cognition given above was intended to provide initial
evidential support for this claim. More evidence for this will be presented in Chapters   and
 . In the next section, I introduce the concept of a cognitive tool.
 .  Cognitive tools
Hand tools, such as hammers, shovels, and saws, are prototypical examples of tools. They
are human creations whose primary function is to facilitate or enable the performance of
certain operations. They do so by enhancing, extending, or adding new features to the innate,
genetically evolved power of our hands. For example, the genetic con guration of our hands
and arms is such that we are able to dig a hole in beach sand without using tools. However,
bare hands are too fragile to accomplish digging harder soils. By using a shovel, though, we
are able to overcome this limitation. The shovel’s hard blade enables us to cut into the soil,
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and the shovel’s handle ampli es the force of our arms, making it easier to lift and toss the
shovel’s content. The shovel adds to our genetically developed skills features that we lack:
hardness, sharpness and incremented force.
Cognitive tools are like hand tools in many aspects. They are also culturally created
instruments that facilitate, improve or enable the performance of certain operations for
which our “bare brains” are limited or are not completely suitable. Think of an abacus, a
prototypical example of a cognitive tool. An abacus enables its user to perform arithmetical
operations faster and more accurately than she could by relying only on mental operations.
Like a shovel that enables its user to dig in harder soils, an abacus enables its user to calculate
with larger, and therefore harder,  numbers. Cognitive tools, just like hand tools, build upon
genetically evolved features of our body to enhance or extend our cognitive skills. Abacuses,
like hammers and screwdrivers, are designed to exploit the human capacity to make precise
movements with hands and  ngers. Cognitively, abacuses rely on our innate quantical skills.
Users of abacuses can move the correct number of beads fast and accurately because they
subitize. They do not count “one, two, three” to move groups of one, two or three beads;
they just “see” the number of beads they are moving.
Despite these similarities, however, cognitive tools are unlike hand tools in a key aspect:
they do not need to be three-dimensional, handleable external objects. Cognitive tools can
be techniques, i.e., rule-based methods of performance that facilitate the ful lment of cogni-
tive tasks. Usually these techniques involve the use of symbols, which can be manipulated
either on external media (e.g., on paper) or mentally. What justi es calling these techniques
“tools” is that, similar to handleable external tools, they are human creations that boost our
capacities. 
Take, for example, shopping lists, an oft-cited example of a cognitive tool. The chief
function of shopping lists is to aid memory. Various aspects of shopping lists contribute to
the ful lment of this function, especially the enduring character of their materials (e.g., ink
and paper). But another central aspect of shopping lists is that they carry symbols inscribed
on paper. A blank piece of paper, or one whereupon only random marks are inscribed, is
not a shopping list. In order to ful l its role as a memory aid, a shopping list must contain
inscriptions produced in accordance with a system of codi cation previously known by its
users, so that they can correctly and easily interpret the marks. In this sense, the writing
system—a technique for encoding information in permanent media—used in a shopping list
counts as a cognitive tool in its own right. Writing is a technology per se, which can be
combined with other elements to produce other cognitive technologies, such as shopping
lists, books and smartphones.
By the same token, symbolic systems for numbers, including verbal lists of number
words, can be seen as cognitive tools in their own right. These systems can be used in com-
 As a rule, calculations involving larger numbers are harder. In the literature on numerical cognition, this is
called the problem size e ect: “people take longer and make more errors to solve problems like   +   =    with large
digits and large answers than to solve problems like   +   =   with small digits and small answers” (Zbrodo  &
Logan,     , p.    ).
 For de nitions of cognitive tools in accordance with the way I am using the term here, see Dascal (    ),
who de nes cognitive technologies as “every systematic means—material or mental—created by humans that is
signi cantly and routinely used for the performance of cognitive aims,” and Heersmink (    ).
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bination with other elements to produce more obvious cognitive tools, such as abacuses
and calculators, but the very list of number words, or the notation system of Arabic dig-
its, quali es as a cognitive technology in itself. We make use of number words as cognitive
tools, for example, when we recite them in ascending order to determine the cardinal size
of a collection—in other words, when we count. The same goes for the exploitation of the
properties of the decimal place-value system of Arabic digits for mental or pencil-and-paper
calculations. These symbolic systems provide rule-based methods of performance that not
only facilitate, but indeed make possible exact calculations and the determination of the ex-
act cardinal size of collections with more than three or four items. As hand tools do with
respect to our hands, these techniques enhance, extend, and add new features to the innate,
genetically evolved power of our brains.
Another di erence between cognitive tools and hand tools is that some cognitive tools
can be internalized, whereas hand tools cannot. By repeatedly using a saw, a carpenter pro-
gressively becomes more skillful at sawing, making the process faster, more e cient, and
more precise, but the carpenter will never acquire abilities that will allow her to dispense
with external saws. By contrast, when it comes to symbolic cognitive tools, repeated use can
have the e ect of enabling the user to simulate the operation of the tool in her mind. Thus,
under certain conditions the user may replace the use of external instantiations of the tool
by mental simulations in order to perform operations which, initially, she could perform
only with the help of the tool in its external format. One example is the decimal place-value
system of Arabic digits. It is a systematic means created by humans to represent numbers
and facilitate cognitive tasks such as calculating with pencil and paper. Initially we learn
the decimal place-value system as an external means of representing numbers and calculat-
ing on paper. Over time, however, we internalize the system and start to use it in mental
calculations. Notice that this does not amount to becoming able to dispense with the use of
the tool; only its external use becomes dispensable (for the execution of easier operations, at
least). As mentioned above, mental calculations still rely on brain mechanisms that encode
Arabic digits. Internalization of cognitive tools is possible because our brain, as opposed to
our hands, is plastic: it can be reshaped through learning (more on this in section  . ).
Numeral systems illustrate a characteristic that cognitive tools share with other kinds
of tools. There are certain tools, such as saws, that are indispensable for certain activities.
We cannot saw a board without the aid of a saw. Under certain conditions, we can tear
or break a piece of wood by using only our hands, but to saw it, we need a saw. The same
happens in the cognitive realm: to count and to calculate precisely, we need numerals; to
predict solstices and equinoxes, we need calendars; to  nd very high prime numbers, we
need computers. With respect to this, Dascal (    ) distinguishes “constitutive” from “non-
constitutive” cognitive tools. Constitutive cognitive tools are those “such that without them
certain cognitive operations cannot be performed,” whereas non-constitutive cognitive tools,
“although extremely useful for the facilitation of the achievement of certain cognitive aims,
are not a sine qua non for that” (Dascal,     , p.   ). While numeral systems, calendars, and
computers are cognitive tools constitutive of certain cognitive tasks, a shopping list with
only ten items is not constitutive of the activity of remembering what we need to buy. The
list facilitates remembering, but we can do without it.
In the literature on the extended mind thesis, the adjective ‘constitutive’ has been used
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to mean that external devices are an integral part of the cognitive processes in which they
are used, which has led to intense debate (see Kirchho  (    )). I do not want to take sides
on this issue. The important point here is that there are certain tools (or certain classes of
tools) whose use is indispensable if we are to ful ll a certain cognitive task.
To sum up, cognitive tools are human creations that aim at facilitating or enabling the
execution of certain cognitive tasks. They do not need to take the form of three-dimensional
devices; they may be rule-based methods of performance. They may be indispensable for
the completion of a cognitive task. And, most remarkably, as opposed to hand tools, some
cognitive tools can be internalized.
 .  Internalization
Internalization, as I am using the term here, refers to the process through which an agent
acquires new cognitive skills by using internally a symbolic cognitive tool that was initially
used only externally. In developmental psychology, the concept of internalization was coined
by Vygotsky, who introduced it to explain the development of higher cognitive capacities.
Roughly put, according to Vygotsky, higher cognitive functions, such as the ability to read
and write, result from the internalization of certain interpersonal practices. A child learning
to read is guided by a tutor, who reads to her, shows her the letters, explains how they sound,
and helps her read her rst words. At the beginning of the learning process, the childmay not
be able to read longer words by herself, but she is more likely to get through them with the
tutor’s assistance. For the child, this is the stage at which reading is an interpersonal practice.
The learning process is completed when the child becomes able to read by herself, dispensing
with the tutor’s assistance. At this point, the child has already internalized what started as an
interpersonal practice. In Vygotsky’s words, during the process of internalization
[a]n operation that initially represents an external activity is reconstructed and begins
to occur internally . . . An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal
one. Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice:  rst it appears
on the social level, and later, on the individual level;  rst between people (interpsycho-
logical), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This applies equally to voluntary
attention, to logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All the higher func-
tions originate as actual relations between human individuals (Vygotsky,     , p.   -  ;
some emphases removed).
Numerical competence is one of these higher functions. Think of a child learning to add
and subtract. Initially, the child is introduced to the algorithms of addition and subtraction
in external space. The teacher shows how these operations are done with paper and pencil,
and guides the child in her  rst attempts to add and subtract. The child learns by means of
this interpersonal process. Later on, the child becomes able to add and subtract with paper
and pencil without the teacher’s assistance. At this point, what started as an interpersonal
process has become an intrapersonal one, and a first stage of internalization is concluded.
In the case of arithmetical operations, though, there is yet a second stage of internalization,
which takes place when the child no longer needs paper and pencil for calculations, because
she can simulate the operations in her mind (at least in easy cases).
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Recently, Vygotsky’s conception of internalization has found new developments and in-
terpretations in Menary’s conception of enculturation (Menary,     a,     ). Enculturation
is the thesis according to which our cognitive capabilities for abstract symbolic thought, such
as reading, writing, and mathematics, are due to the acquisition of cultural practices that
exploit evolutionarily older neural circuits and transform them through the mechanisms of
neuronal recycling (Fabry,     ; Menary,     ). The idea is that the enculturation of cogni-
tive tools for symbolic thought changes the brain, creating new neuronal structures (i.e., new
neuronal networks) that implement new cognitive functions. To o er a rough analogy, it is
as if by learning how to skillfully use a saw, a carpenter could end up developing saw teeth on
their hands. This will never happen with hands, of course, but internalization/enculturation
is possible in the brain because the brain is plastic.
Brain plasticity is best illustrated by responses to brain lesions. Just to mention one
among the many studies of the e ects of lesions on the reorganization of the brain, there is
the case of a boy who had his left cerebral hemisphere removed at the age of two and a half
years (Danelli et al.,     ). Before the removal, he was already able to speak. However, as pre-
dicted, the removal of the left hemisphere resulted in his losing the ability to speak, since the
neural architecture of language is normally located in the left hemisphere. Thanks to brain
plasticity, though, after an intensive language rehabilitation program, his language skills re-
covered within two years, with the right hemisphere taking over the linguistic functions
that were originally implemented in the left hemisphere. Over the years, the boy developed
near-normal linguistic competence.
This is a striking example of plasticity, but this case also shows that neural plasticity has
limits. The areas of the boy’s right hemisphere that were recruited for language mirrored the
organization that linguistic areas usually take on the left hemisphere. Furthermore, although
the boy recovered pretty good linguistic competence, he did not manage to overcome some
obstacles, such as di culties with a few syntactic structures and words. The brain is plastic,
but it is not a blank slate: there are some structural factors that constrain neural plasticity.
The degree to which neural plasticity is constrained, and by which factors, is a matter of
debate, but there seems to be consensus on the idea that there are some functional and
organizational principles already encoded in the brain, which we owe to genetic evolution,
and which in uence how the brain will respond to lesions or other external factors such as
learning (Plebe & Mazzone,     ).
The way enculturation changes the brain is subject to similar constraints. This is re-
 ected by the fact that the neuronal networks that are believed to implement higher cog-
nitive functions acquired through enculturation—such as the abilities to write, read, and
calculate—are often localized in the same brain regions, regardless of the educational history
of each individual. This regularity is explained by the principle of neural reuse (Anderson,
    ) or neuronal recycling (Dehaene,     ,     b; Dehaene & Cohen,     ). According
to this principle, “neural circuits established for one purpose [can be] exapted (exploited,
recycled, redeployed) during evolution or normal development, and be put to di erent uses,
often without losing their original functions” (Anderson,     , p.    ). Or, as Dehaene de-
scribes it, neuronal recycling is
the partial or total invasion of a cortical territory initially devoted to a di erent func-
tion, by a cultural invention . . . Neuronal recycling is also a form of reorientation or
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retraining: it transforms an ancient function, one that evolved for a speci c domain in
our evolutionary past, into a novel function that is more useful in the present cultural
context (Dehaene,     b, chapter  , section  , para.  ).
The principle of neural recycling/reuse  determines which previously existing neural cir-
cuits will be re-exploited to support new, learned skills. The criterion is that the new func-
tions will be built upon neural circuits whose original function is close to the new function.
For example, the acquisition of reading transforms a cortical area whose original function
was related to the recognition of the shapes of objects and human faces. This prior function
is re-exploited for the recognition of the shapes of letters and words (Dehaene & Cohen,
    ). As we will see in Chapter  , the acquisition of numerical competence is believed to
recycle neuronal networks originally devoted to the implementation of quantical skills. The
process of learning a symbolic system for numbers is believed to “sharpen” neurons localized
in these neuronal networks (Dehaene,     ).
Neuronal recycling also imposes constraints on the invention of cognitive tools. If a
cognitive tool is to be internalizable, there must be a brain area responsible for similar func-
tions that will be functionally transformed by the cognitive tool. In other words, culturally
created cognitive tools must  nd their neuronal niche: “[e]ducation-induced changes must
 t within the fringe of plasticity left open” by genetic constraints (Dehaene & Cohen,     ,
p.    ). In fact, there is a feedback loop between brain organization and culturally created in-
ternalizable cognitive tools. A newly created cognitive tool that  ts within the brain’s fringe
of plasticity provokes transformations in the brain, which give rise to higher cognitive func-
tions and possibly to new cultural inventions, which in turn will lead to new reorganization
of the brain, and new cultural inventions, and so on. In this feedback loop between brain
and cultural environment, neuronal recycling is an endogenous force that shapes cultural
creations, whereas education and training are exogenous forces that drive transformations
in the brain. These exogenous forces are exerted by parents, caregivers, teachers, and other
tutors who create a learning environment with the kind of stimuli children need to have
their brains transformed in the desired way (Menary,     ).
It is worth contrasting enculturation with folk conceptions of mathematical learning
found in the literature on the philosophy of mathematics. Building on  ndings such as
those reviewed in section  . , the main tenet of the enculturation thesis in this regard is
that mathematical competence in general, and numerical competence in particular, come
from the internalization of interpersonal practices mediated by symbolic systems (Menary,
    ). This means that numerical competence is neither innate nor acquired autonomously.
To acquire numerical competence, a child needs a structured learning environment where
symbolic systems for numbers are already available, and tutors who will guide her through
 There are minor di erences between the concepts of neuronal recycling and neural reuse as de ned by
Dehaene & Cohen and Anderson, respectively. For example, the former say that “we use the term ‘neuronal
recycling’ speci cally to refer to educational changes that occur in developmental time and without any change
in the human genetic make-up” (Dehaene & Cohen,     , p.    ), whereas Anderson includes the reuse of neural
structures carried out by genetic processes as well, as stated in the quotation above. Given that both expressions
refer to very similar processes, I will not distinguish between the two notions here. Jones (    ) claims that the
concept of neuronal recycling implies that the recycled brain area loses its previous function, whereas neural
reuse does not. However, this is not the case. Dehaene explicitly acknowledges that only parts of the original
neuronal network are recycled, so that both the previous and new functions may coexist (Dehaene,     ).
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this environment. This contrasts with the view attributed to Plato according to which we are
born with mathematical concepts already encoded in the mind, even though these concepts
may not be readily available and must be “remembered” or “intuited.” This Platonist view
 nds resonance in nativist accounts in contemporary cognitive science. According to con-
temporary nativism, the brain mechanisms responsible for numerical competence are genet-
ically speci ed andmany of our numerical abilities result solely from thematuration of these
inborn brain structures (Gallistel & Gelman,     ). For the nativist, interpersonal practices
mediated by symbolic systems for numbers do not engender numerical competence, as the
enculturation thesis holds, but are rather an externalization of innate numerical competence.
The existence of innate quantical skills gives prima facie empirical plausibility to the nativist
view. However, as I hinted above and as we will see in more detail in Chapter  , quantical
skills are non-numerical, and therefore the origins of numerical competence are likely to be
external, in line with the enculturation thesis.
Another conception of mathematical learning that is in con ict with the enculturation
thesis is the oversimpli ed view held by some philosophers according to which children learn
numbers by means of their individual experience with collections or patterns. Two examples
are Kitcher (    ), for whom the  rst insights a child gets into concepts such as set and
number come from her experiences with collecting and segregating objects such as “blocks
on the  oor;” and Shapiro (    ), for whom we acquire knowledge of ante rem structures
such as the natural-number structure by means of sensory recognition of patterns. As held
by the enculturation thesis, though, and as the results from developmental psychology that
we will see in Chapter   clearly show, children do not learn numbers through direct and
autonomous experience with collections or patterns. It is the other way around: to become
able to segregate and collect accurately, as well as to recognize numerical patterns larger than
three or four elements/repetitions, a child must be taught to count.
In the reverse engineering strategy I am adopting here, the observation that numerical
competence results from the enculturation of interpersonal practices mediated by numerals
and other symbolic systems suggests that these practices and symbols may be key elements
of the reality underlying number concepts. In order words, the suggestion is that number
concepts are about these practices and symbols. I return to this hypothesis in section  . .
 .  De-semanti cation and re-semanti cation
I have been arguing that number concepts and numerical competence in general originate
from the process of learning symbolic systems such as the sequence of counting words. If
this is so, children learn the symbols before they know their meanings, since symbols will
become meaningful for them only after they have mastered the relevant symbolic systems
and related practices. But how is it possible to master a symbolic system without knowing
what its symbolsmean? And how can symbols whosemeanings are unknown give rise to their
own meanings? The concepts of de-semanti cation and re-semanti cation, as introduced
by Krämer (    ) and Dutilh Novaes (    ) respectively, help answer these questions.
The main idea behind de- and re-semanti cation is the operational function of symbols.
The denotational and communicational functions of symbols are well known. These two
functions presuppose the prior existence of something to be denoted or somemental content
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to be communicated. When symbols are used to perform operations, though, there is no need
to refer to something previously available; symbols can be “de-semanticized” and become
mere tokens that are manipulated according to certain rules.
Krämer (    ) introduces the concept of de-semanti cation in the context of what she
calls “operative writing.” Some examples of systems of operative writing are the formal lan-
guages of logic, the programming languages of computer science, and the language of school
arithmetic. Di erent from other systems of writing, the primary function of systems of
operative writing is not the composition of texts for communication, but the solution of
problems or the ful lment of cognitive tasks.
Systems of operative writing are truly cognitive tools. Besides syntactic and semantic
rules, these systems also include operational rules.  Operational rules specify all or some
of the actions that must or can be performed in order to solve a problem. For example, in
multiplications with pencil and paper, symbols are written following not only the syntactic
rules of the decimal place-value system, but also operational rules codi ed in multiplication
tables and in the multiplication algorithm. These rules determine which symbols must be
written at each step and where they must be placed on paper, so that at the end of the process
the correct solution is obtained. Other examples of operational rules are the inference rules
of formal systems of logic. These rules specify which symbolic transformations are allowed in
the system. Formulas that are obtainable exclusively bymeans of authorized transformations
are theorems of the system. Finding a chain of authorized transformations that starts with
the axioms and  nishes with a target formula is a way of showing that this formula is a
theorem of the system. As Krämer puts it, systems of operative writing are at the same time
“amedium for representing a realm of cognitive phenomena” and “a tool for operating hands-
on with these phenomena in order to solve problems or to prove theories pertaining to this
cognitive realm” (Krämer,     , p.    ).
A remarkable property of operational rules is that they can be operated mechanically,
i.e., without the agent needing to pay attention either to the purpose of the rules or to the
meaning of the symbols she is performing the operations with. Usually, both the operational
rules and the symbols have intended semantics, but the agent can temporarily “turn o ”
their semantic content and just make the symbolic transformations prescribed by the rules.
This is where de-semanti cation comes in: when manipulated mechanically, symbols are no
longer seen as signs standing for something else, but become self-contained objects, mere
links in the chain of steps that are required to ful l a cognitive task.
De-semanti cation is a common phenomenon in the execution of arithmetical opera-
tions by human agents. As we saw in section  . , according to the Triple Code Model, the
brain stores de-semanticized arithmetical information in the form of visual representations
of Arabic digits (M ) and phonological and graphemic forms of number words as well as
rote arithmetical facts (M ). The circumstances in which de-semanticized calculations take
place are experimentally identi able. A number of studies have investigated the strategies
people use to mentally solve arithmetical operations (e.g., Caviola, Mammarella, Pastore,
and LeFevre (    ); LeFevre et al. (    ); Lemaire and Brun (    )). These studies have
 Operational rules may also be syntactic in the sense that they specify how symbols must or can be combined.
However, they go beyond syntactic rules that merely determine how expressions in the language are formed and
say nothing about how to operate with them to solve a problem.
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identi ed that the favorite strategy for addition and subtraction of numbers smaller than
ten is retrieval of the solution from memory. For instance, when asked to calculate  +  and
explain how they arrived at the answer, participants in these studies report that they “simply
know” that  +  is  . According to the Triple Code Model, in simple operations such as this,
people simply retrieve rote, de-semanticized arithmetical facts stored in M  and M . If the
input is presented in Arabic digits,  rst the visual form ‘ + ’ is transcoded in verbal format,
and then the relevant arithmetical fact is recovered from M . There is no semantic content
involved. De-semanti ed calculations are even more common on paper. Dehaene illustrates
a de-semanti ed calculation on paper as follows:
Suppose that you have to compute    +    . . . You will have to go carefully through a
series of steps: Isolate the rightmost digits (  and  ), add them up (  +   =   ), write
down the  , carry the  , isolate the leftmost digits (  and  ), add them up (  +   =  ),
add the carry over (  +   =  ), and  nally write down the   . . . At no time during
such a calculation does the meaning of the unfolding operations seem to be taken into
account. Why did you carry the   over to the leftmost column? Perhaps you now realize
that this   stands for    units and that itmust therefore land in the tens column. Yet this
thought never crossed your mind while you were computing. In order to calculate fast,
the brain is forced to ignore the meaning of the computations it performs (Dehaene,
    , p.    ).
As Dehaene points out, one of the cognitive bene ts of de-semanti cation is that, freed
of the cognitive load of taking meaning into account at every step, the brain can operate
faster. But de-semanti cation has yet another cognitive bene t: it is through the mechanical
application of operational rules that systems of operative writing can give rise to new con-
tents hardly achievable otherwise. Dutilh Novaes (    ) investigates this point with regard
to formal languages in logic. She holds that de-semanticized formalisms have a debiasing
e ect on reasoning, which enables us to draw conclusions that we could hardly draw with
our “bare brains.”
Arguing against traditional conceptions of human reasoning, Dutilh Novaes (    ) re-
views a number of studies that show that our spontaneous ways of reasoning tend to deviate
from the normative canons of logic. These studies show that, if people are not explicitly con-
cerned with following strict logical rules, they are likely to fall prey to “belief bias,” i.e., the
tendency to accept arguments whose conclusion is in line with one’s beliefs and reject argu-
ments whose conclusion confronts one’s beliefs, regardless of the validity of the arguments.
Under the in uence of belief bias, an invalid argument can pass as valid if its conclusion is
in line with one’s beliefs. Dutilh Novaes maintains that a way of mitigating belief bias is
by relying on formal tools. One of the main features of formalisms is the fact that, within
formal systems, symbols can be de-semanticized, i.e., manipulated in accordance with the
rules of the formal system regardless of any interpretation. When interpretations are laid
aside, prior beliefs cannot be invoked, and belief bias is mitigated. Freed from the in uence
of belief bias, we can achieve a level of rigor in the evaluation of validity that was not possible
under its in uence.
When not assisted by formal tools, mathematicians and logicians, just like everyone else,
are subject to belief bias. This can make the task of proving theorems, especially when it
comes to long proofs, very tricky. A sympathy for a tacit principle, or the belief in a yet
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unproven result, may a ect mathematical and logical reasoning and back invalid proofs.
This is one reason why formalisms have been so important to promote rigor in contemporary
mathematics and logic. Frege seemed to be aware of the debiasing e ect of his Begri sschrift
when he pointed out that its  rst purpose was “to provide us with themost reliable test of the
validity of a chain of inferences and to point out every presupposition that tries to sneak in
unnoticed, so that its origin can be investigated” (Frege,     , p.  ). Without having a tool
to make explicit all the presuppositions involved in a proof, the evaluation of its validity
becomes a much more complex task.
If formalisms are essential to counter belief bias in mathematics and logic—i.e., to pre-
vent previously held beliefs from “sneaking in unnoticed” inmathematical and logical proofs—
they can be seen, as Dutilh Novaes does, as indispensable tools for the task of proving math-
ematical and logical theorems, at least when long and complex proofs are demanded. Such
proofs could not be brought about, at least not with the same level of certainty, without the
use of formal tools. If this is so, “rather than mere expressions of cognitive processes that
take place independently, formal languages are constitutive of these very processes” (Du-
tilh Novaes,     , p.    ). In other words, formal languages do not merely express previously
known proofs; they are an indispensable part of the processes through which certain proofs
are brought about.
In sum, formal languages are cognitive tools. As unassisted reasoning is not apt for
deductions involving long chains of inference, we need to rely on formal techniques. These
techniques comprise operational rules that allow us to manipulate de-semanticized symbols
mechanically. At the end of the manipulation, we obtain a content (in this case, a proof)
that was not previously available. In other words, initially de-semanticized symbols create
the content they themselves express.
The same process takes place in arithmetic. We saw in section  .  that, prevented from
using symbolic resources to treat numerical information, we have to proceed exclusively with
our quantical capacities. But our quantical capacities are imprecise: the larger the involved
quantities, the larger the errors in estimating and calculating. Equipped only with quantical
skills, how could we  nd the result of     +    ? At best, if the input were provided via visual
clouds of dots, we could have a very rough, only approximate idea of the result, probably
far from the correct result. Unassisted reasoning is not apt for exact calculations involving
quantities larger than three or four. To overcome this limitation, we use a symbolic cognitive
tool such as the system of operative writing consisting of Arabic digits and the algorithm for
addition. The mechanical manipulation of digits according to the operational rules of this
system gives us the exact result. At the end of the manipulation, we obtain a content that
was not previously available and that is not obtainable without the assistance of a cognitive
tool. Again, de-semanticized symbols manipulated according to operational rules create the
content they themselves express.
Dutilh Novaes and other philosophers with a cognitivist leaning have observed that sys-
tems of numerals and other mathematical symbolic systems are not mere vehicles for the
communication of previously available contents, but rather “constitutive” of the very con-
tents they convey. The following are some quotes that capture the gist of the perspective I
am endorsing here.
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[E]ven if at speci c occasions . . . ‘doing math’ does not require the act of manipulating
external symbols . . . , from a diachronic, developmental point of view, external symbols
appear to be a necessary condition for the emergence of mathematical concepts and
mathematical reasoning (Dutilh Novaes,     , p.   ).
[M]ore ore than language-dependent, exact numerical cognition is external-symbol-
dependent; it presupposes the very concept of exact quantities, which may only emerge
by means of explicit association to external symbols and the practice of counting be-
yond very small amounts (Dutilh Novaes,     , p.   ).
Symbols have unique properties that allow for operations—addition, subtraction, mul-
tiplication, division, and so on that are much harder (if not unlikely) without them
(Menary,     , p.   ).
Symbol systems, such as those for written language andmathematics, are not imperma-
nent sca olds thatwe shrug o  in adulthood, but are permanent sca olds that indelibly
alter the architecture of cognition (Menary,     , p.   ).
[M]athematical symbols are intimately linked to the concepts they represent . . . sym-
bols are not merely used to express mathematical concepts, but . . . they are constitutive
of the concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols enable us to perform mathemati-
cal operations that we would not be able to do in the mind alone, they are epistemic
actions (De Cruz & De Smedt,     , p.  ).
[A]n advanced understanding of arithmetic, which includes performing number com-
parisons and mental arithmetic, is mediated by symbolic reasoning with external rep-
resentations. . . . [E]xternal representations are not just some arbitrary way of express-
ing thoughts, but they are constitutive of our thoughts themselves (Schlimm,     ,
pp.    ,    ).
It is hardly controversial that, from the perspective of an individual, the symbolic cogni-
tive tools of arithmetic are indispensable for the acquisition of contents that the individual
herself could not obtain by other means. However, whereas it is impossible for me to obtain
by myself the result of adding     to     without operating with symbols (either mentally
or with pencil and paper), the result of this addition is not an original idea at the historical
level in any sense. I personally may never have entertained this particular addition, but the
symbolic system I use and its semantics were already in place many centuries before I was
born. Thus, even if the decimal place-value system of number notation is indispensable for
my arithmetical concepts, this does not imply that it is indispensable for the emergence of
numerical concepts in historical terms. The decimal place-value system was created at some
time in the past by people who certainly already knew numbers and arithmetic operations.
These people probably used a more ancient notation system (Yong & Se,     ), which gave
them numerical competence. But if we ask about the origins of this more ancient numeral
system, this can easily lead to an in nite regress. At some point, it seems, there should be
someone who invented the very  rst notation system without having acquired numerical
competence from experience with any symbolic system for numbers (Pelland,     a). But
how was this possible, if numerical competence, as we saw in section  . , is unavoidably
symbolic?
Dutilh Novaes’s (    ) concept of re-semantification can help answer this question. Re-
semanti cation refers to the action of giving a formalism a semantic interpretation that
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was not the one intended when the formalism was  rst developed. Simply put, “[t]he idea
behind re-semanti cation is that a formalism which is developed to characterize a speci c
phenomenon A can then be reinterpreted on another phenomenon B” (Dutilh Novaes,     ,
p.    ). Reinterpretation of formal systems is a common practice in mathematics and logic,
especially in model theory, where the many models that a given axiomatic system can have
besides its intended one (if any) is a topic of investigation. But the cases of re-semanti cation
that I am interested in here are signi cantly di erent from mere cases of reinterpretation,
in that it is the de-semanti cation of the formalism under consideration and the mechanical
computations that ensue, that make room for the creation of a new, original model.
Dutilh Novaes illustrates how re-semanti cation can give rise to novelties through an
example from the history of physics: the development of Maxwell’s theory of electromag-
netism. Maxwell’s initial goal was to give a mathematical formulation of Faraday’s account
of electromagnetism. As Dutilh Novaes points out, his  rst two mathematical models in-
cluded the hypothesis that electromagnetic waves propagated through ether. However, when
Maxwell was elaborating his third and  nal mathematical formulation of electromagnetic
waves, he realized that the mathematical formalism could be made simpler by excluding
from it the assumption about the existence of a medium through which waves propagated.
“Maxwell let ‘the mathematics speak for itself’ . . . He treated the mathematical formalism
as ‘de-semanticized’ rather than letting himself be guided by his own preferred interpreta-
tion” (Dutilh Novaes,     , p.    -   ). By doing so, he made his model neutral regarding
the existence of ether, even if he himself believed in its existence. This episode illustrates
the power of formalisms to counter belief bias: the formalism suggested, against Maxwell’s
own beliefs, that the ether hypothesis was dispensable. Maxwell’s de-semanti cation of the
formalism ended up suggesting a surprising original interpretation of it. This was the re-
semanti cation step, whereby a new “model”—one wherein ether does not exist—was cre-
ated.
In this example, the di erence between the two models can be regarded as small, even
if extremely signi cant and with striking consequences. Furthermore, it does not seem that
Maxwell’s formalisms were indispensable, in any sense, for the emergence of the hypothe-
sis that electromagnetic waves can propagate without a medium. Sooner or later this fact
might have been discovered by other means. Even so, this case shows the potential of re-
semanti cation to give rise to original contents.
Re-semanti cation (in cases like this) is a process of de-semanti cation in which the
mechanical operation of a formalism ends up giving rise to a new model for the same for-
malism. When re-semanti cation takes place, the symbols that were originally used to refer
to a domain are reinterpreted as referring to another domain, which was not available pre-
viously but was instead suggested by the use of the symbolic system itself. This may explain
how the very  rst numeral systems may have emerged in the absence of anyone with numer-
ical competence: it is su cient that there was a symbolic system already in use to deal with
another domain that, through re-semanti cation, gave rise to a numerical domain. Making
this possibility historically plausible demands a whole chapter. I develop this proposal in
Chapter  .
Now we are in a position to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of this sec-
tion. The  rst was: how is it possible to master a symbolic system without knowing what its
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symbols mean? From the perspective of one individual, in systems of operative writing this
is possible if one masters the operational rules  rst. By manipulating symbols mechanically,
one acquires experience with them and then becomes able to appreciate the contents that
these manipulations deliver. The details of how this happens during the acquisition of nu-
merical competence are addressed in Chapter  . The second was: how can symbols give rise
to their own meanings? In historical terms, re-semanti cation is the process that explains
how symbols initially applied in one context can give rise to their own new meanings in a
new context.
If de- and re-semanti cation can answer these questions, then the hypothesis according
to which numerical competence results from the internalization of symbolic cognitive tools
becomes more plausible, and so does the hypothesis according to which number concepts
are about these cognitive tools. I elaborate on these hypotheses in the next section.
 .  The hypotheses
What does all this discussion about cognition and cognitive tools tell us about the existence
of numbers? In order to tie things together, I  rst need to distinguish three di erent but
interrelated questions about numbers that I am addressing in this dissertation. First, there
is the cognitive question, which asks for a description of the cognitive processes underlying
human numerical competence. This is the question I have focused on in the previous sections.
Second, there is the epistemic question, which asks whether numerical competence amounts to
some kind of propositional knowledge. Surely, numerical competence is a kind of know-how,
but in the epistemic question we are concerned with determining whether a statement such
as ‘ + = ’ is true and, if so, true of what. This leads us to the third and, here, most important
question—the ontological question—which asks what exists in the domain of arithmetic.
The results and theories brie y reviewed above suggest an answer to the cognitive ques-
tion according to which numerical competence originates from the internalization of exter-
nal symbolic cognitive tools and associated practices, with some contributions from quan-
tical cognition. In the reverse engineering strategy I proposed in the introduction to this
chapter, this suggests answers to both the epistemic and ontological questions.
As for the epistemic question, the suggestion is that propositional knowledge in arith-
metic is nothing more than knowledge of descriptions of the workings of the very same
cognitive tools that give rise to numerical competence. In the least controversial cases of
knowledge, the beliefs we label as ‘knowledge’ come from direct experiences with particular
objects or situations. For example, I can claim that I know that my father’s dog bubbles
with excitement when she sees her walking harness because I have seen her do this daily.
Knowledge claims such as this hinge on the causal theory of knowledge, so often criticized
in attempts to solve Benacerraf’s problem. But, if one assumes a causal theory of knowledge
in the case of arithmetic and remains neutral about the existence and nature of numbers
(as my reverse engineering strategy recommends), the fact that numerical competence origi-
nates from mastering certain cognitive tools naturally suggests that arithmetical statements
may be true of these very same cognitive tools and practices. In other words, the sugges-
tion is that arithmetical statements may be seen as describing features of these cognitive tools
and practices. A simple example helps illustrate this point. According to this suggestion, the
 . . THE HYPOTHESES   
statement ‘ + = ’ describes what happens if one starts counting at ‘three’ and moves forward
four positions in the counting sequence. Thus, ‘ + = ’ would be true of this very operation.
I develop the details of this account in Chapter  .
This possible answer to the epistemic question naturally suggests an answer to the onto-
logical question. Insofar as arithmetical statements are seen as describing features of certain
cognitive tools and practices, these cognitive tools and practices can be seen as the reality
underlying arithmetic. In this view, rather than being about a realm of non-spatiotemporal
objects, arithmetic is about the cognitive tools and practices that give rise to numerical com-
petence. For example, the objective reality underlying ‘ + = ’ is no longer seen as a realm
of abstract objects, but rather as the counting procedure conceived of as a human practice
(more on this in Chapter  ).
There are many loose ends in the answers to the cognitive, epistemic, and ontological
questions brie y sketched above. At this point, they are to be taken as hypotheses. These
hypotheses will guide the investigation in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
Most of the loose ends in my answer to the cognitive question are addressed in the next
three chapters. One of the main points in need of further investigation is the non-numerical
nature of quantical cognition. I address this point in Chapter  . Another key point in need of
further support is the claim that we acquire numerical competence by experiencing numerals
initially as de-semanticized symbols governed by operational rules. In Chapter   I review
 ndings from developmental psychology and numerical cognition that provide empirical
support for this claim. A third point that deserves further investigation is the historical
origins of the  rst numeral systems and counting procedures in the absence of anyone with
numerical competence. I address this point in Chapter  .
A di culty that I have not mentioned so far concerns the consequences for the syntax
and semantics of arithmetical statements when replacing an ontology of objects with an on-
tology of cognitive tools and human practices. How can a statement such as ‘ + = ’ be true
of symbolic systems and procedures if its literal reading seems to refer to objects? My an-
swer to this relies on Sfard’s (    ) account of mathematical learning, according to which,
during the process of learning arithmetical operations, we need to reify initial segments of
the counting procedure so as to make operations with larger numbers cognitively easier. Ac-
cording to Sfard, children start learning operations such as addition and multiplication as
higher-order counting procedures. For example, to add four to three, a beginner will count
four  ngers, then count three  ngers, and then count all of them in order to obtain the  nal
result. This strategy quickly becomes cumbersome as the involved numbers grow. Thus, to
succeed in operations involving larger numbers, the child has to encapsulate initial segments
of the counting procedure into discursive objects so that she can operate directly with these
discursive objects, thus reducing the complexity of the operations she has to perform. By do-
ing so, numerical statements that were initially experienced as commands to perform succes-
sive counting operations start to be seen as statements referring to numbers—i.e., discursive
objects produced by the rei cation of segments of the counting procedure. This explains
why numerical terms are seen, and should be seen, as singular terms. The referents of these
singular terms—discursive objects produced by rei cation—function as truly cognitive tools
that make complex arithmetical operations cognitively easier. The various loose ends of this
story are addressed in Chapter   and section  . .
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Finally, the role of rei cation in mathematical learning suggests a fourth hypothesis:
numbers as platonic entities do not exist; what is really important is the thought that num-
bers exist (i.e., the process of rei cation). Once numbers—the referents of numerical sin-
gular terms—are explained away as useful rei cations, we have an account of arithmetic in
which arithmetical statements describe properties of certain cognitive tools and there are
no existing numbers. In Chapter   I explain how this nominalistic hypothesis allows for an
explanation of the epistemic properties of arithmetic such as truth and objectivity, making
super uous the postulation of non-spatiotemporal numbers.
 .  Conclusion
In this chapter, I started reviewing some  ndings from numerical cognition that track the
origins of numerical competence to symbolic cognitive tools. I also introduced concepts
and theories from the psychological and philosophical literature on cognitive tools that will
inform the discussion in the next chapters. Finally, based on these results and theories, I
introduced a hypothesis about the nature of numbers according to which numbers are cog-
nitively useful rei cations, and arithmetical knowledge is, in fact, knowledge about the suite
of techniques that make up the cognitive tools of arithmetic.
Chapter  
Quantical cognition
A     element of the hypotheses suggested in section  .  is the observation that numer-ical competence originates from the internalization of external symbolic cognitive
tools such as the counting procedure. If this is so, numerical competence is not innate.
However, we saw in section  .  that one of the most remarkable  ndings from numerical
cognition is the fact that human infants and non-human animals share an inborn set of
abilities to identify and discriminate between discrete quantities. What these infants and
non-human animals are able to do, we, numerate adults, usually do by relying on numerical
symbols. For example, when we subitize or estimate the cardinal size of a collection, we ex-
press the outcome by uttering a numeral (“three”) or a numerical expression (“about ten”).
Infants and non-human animals cannot express the outcome of their assessments of cardinal
size in this way, since they do not know culturally-created numerals, but it may be that they
rely on some innate, non-symbolic kind of numerical competence. This is what the nativist
hypothesis on numerical cognition holds. This hypothesis has been supported by in uential
psychologists such as Gallistel and Gelman (    ) and Butterworth (    ).
On the other hand, the externalist hypothesis—according to which truly numerical com-
petence originates from familiarity with external symbolic systems—also has strong advo-
cates, such as Carey (    ) and, to some extent, Dehaene (    ). Following Núñez (    ),
I already anticipated in section  .  that the abilities to subitize and estimate are best seen
as non-numerical. I called these inborn non-symbolic abilities quantical cognition. In this
chapter, I substantiate this claim.
There are two possible lines of argumentation for the view that non-symbolic numerical
cognition is non-numerical. Some cognitive scientists have argued that non-symbolic nu-
merical cognition is not really numerical because the abilities to subitize and estimate may
be guided by non-numerical cues whose variation is hardly distinguishable from cardinal
size, such as surface area, density, and total amount of matter (Leibovich, Katzin, Harel, &
Henik,     ). For example, it may be that in order to distinguish a collection of two from
a collection of three puppets, infants observe the total amount of matter, which varies with
number, rather than the number of puppets. To tackle this issue, almost all recent studies in-
clude controls for number-correlated magnitudes so that their e ect on the observed results
can be isolated. However, these measures have not yet been su cient to settle the debate
  
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(Henik,     ). This is not the line of argumentation I will follow in this chapter. My point
is that, even if this debate is eventually settled in favor of the hypothesis that subjects are
really guided by cardinal size, the implementation of subitizing and estimation in the brain
is unlikely to rely on any numerical resource, as the very models advanced by the cognitive
scientists who view these abilities as numerical show. The misattribution of numerical com-
petence to subjects endowed with quantical abilities comes from the loose use of technical
terminology already noted by Núñez (    ). I will show that, once three key concepts are
carefully distinguished—numerosity, cardinality, and number—it becomes clear that quan-
tical abilities can track numerosities even if they do not rely on numerical resources.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section  . , I describe the di erent kinds of
quantical skills that humans share with non-human animals. I pay special attention to the
disparity between the outcomes produced by quantical abilities and those that should be
expected from symbolic counting and arithmetic. This will be useful not only for the discus-
sion in this chapter—this disparity is one of themain reasons why number concepts must not
be involved in quantical cognition—but also for the following chapters, where I show how
the introduction of symbols (numerals) enables us to overcome the limitations of our inborn
quantical skills and obtain number concepts. In section  . , I provide an outline of the cog-
nitive models intended to explain the mechanisms underlying quantical abilities, namely,
the Object File System (OFS) and the so-called “Approximate Number System” (ANS). In
section  . , I brie y present neuroscienti c  ndings that have shed light on where and how
theOFS and the ANS are implemented in the brain. In section  . , I outline the evolutionary
origins of quantical cognition. Section  .  is where I argue that quantical cognition does not
involve numbers in any sense. Finally, in section  .  I bring to light what the discussion in
this chapter tells us about the nature of numbers: numbers are neither a perceivable property
of the environment nor a genetically evolved cognitive resource. This conclusion reinforces
the view—to be defended in Chapters   and  —that numerical cognition results from the
internalization of culturally-created cognitive tools.
 .  Quantical abilities
The literature on numerical cognition distinguishes between two broad categories of abil-
ities: the ability to calculate, i.e., the ability to perform operations such as addition and
multiplication, and the ability to enumerate, i.e., the ability to assess the cardinal size of a
collection. Both calculation and enumeration can involve symbolic manipulation or not. In
this chapter, I focus exclusively on the non-symbolic manifestations of these abilities. As an-
ticipated in the introduction, in section  .  I will argue that non-symbolic calculation and
non-symbolic enumeration do not involve numbers, and so it seems inadequate to call these
abilities “calculation” and “enumeration.” However, for lack of more suitable terms in the
literature, I will use the conventional terminology.
Many of the studies I consider next were conducted with infants or non-human animals,
which completely lack number words and cannot rely on other culturally-created symbolic
resources. In studies with numerate human adults aimed at identifying quantical abilities,
experimenters usually make use of techniques that prevent participants from using linguis-
tic resources, such as presenting test stimuli too brie y to be counted. When reviewing the
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relevant literature in the following sections, I will not mention the multiple strategies ex-
perimenters employed to prevent the use of symbols, nor the controls they introduced to
isolate the e ect of numerical variation from the e ect of co-occurring variations in con-
tinuous magnitudes. But keep in mind that these controls are present in almost all studies
cited.
 . .  Non-symbolic enumeration
Enumeration (or quanti cation, such as in Dehaene (    )) is the ability to determine the
numerical size of a collection. Counting is the most common symbolic method of enumera-
tion for numerate humans, but it is by no means a synonym of enumeration, at least when it
comes to the way these terms are used in the  eld of numerical cognition. In order to count,
we need to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the items to be counted and a
initial segment of the sequence of counting words. This process demands several smaller
operations, such as shifting the attentional focus from one item to the next, keeping track of
which objects have already been counted, and so on. However, there are situations where we
are able to grasp the number of objects in a collection without needing to go through these
serial steps which characterize counting. We just seem to instantaneously grasp the total
amount of items at a glance, even if only approximately on certain occasions. Despite the
fact that we can express the result of such an operation by reporting a numeral, we do not
explicitly count in these “at a glance” cases. The term ‘enumeration’ encompasses the mul-
tiple operations through which we can grasp or determine the size of collections, whether
involving symbols or not; counting is just one of these methods. 
The property of collections related to their cardinal size that we can grasp at a glance by
non-symbolic means is usually called numerosity. I will give a precise de nition of numerosity
in section  . . For the time being, we can understand numerosity as the perceivable cardi-
nality of a collection of objects, such as an array of dots or a sequence of tones, the kinds
of stimuli most commonly used in the experiments I cite in this section. In terms of the
concept of numerosity, non-symbolic enumeration may be de ned as the ability to grasp the
numerosity of a perceivable collection without explicitly counting its items.
At least twomodes of non-symbolic enumeration have been reported. Themost paradig-
matic one is subitizing. We are able to quickly and accurately “see” the numerosity of small
collections comprising up to three or four objects, without having to count them. Although
we cannot subitize larger collections, when prevented from counting we can still estimate
their sizes. Estimation is much less accurate than subitizing, but it is very far from being a
wild guess, as we will see. Let us examine subitizing and estimation in turn.
Subitizing Subitizing is de ned as the fast and accurate enumeration of collections of up
to three or four elements without active verbal counting.  Kaufman, Lord, Reese, and Volk-
 Some authors do not follow this distinction. For example, Dacke and Srinivasan (    ) and Skorupski,
MaBouDi, Dona, and Chittka (    ) speak of “counting insects,” although they do not intend to claim that
insects are really able to engage in symbolic counting.
 Most of the terms I present de nitions of here do not have widely accepted standard de nitions in the
literature. For example, Nieder (    , p.    ) de nes subitizing in terms of the mechanism that is believed
to implement it: “[s]ubitizing (also known as object  le representation or object tracking system). The rapid
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mann (    ) proposed the neologism ‘subitizing’ to name this phenomenon so as to highlight
the apparent immediateness of enumeration. In Latin, the verb subitaremeans to arrive sud-
denly. However, subitizing is not really instantaneous. In numerate adults, the enumeration
of a visual stimulus comprising one dot takes about    ms—the lapse between presentation
of the stimulus and reporting of the numeral. For each added dot, the enumeration time
increases by about    to     ms (Trick & Pylyshyn,     ). Besides being fast, subitizing
is errorless (Kaufman et al.,     ; Mandler & Shebo,     ). These are its most remarkable
characteristics.
Gallistel and Gelman (    ) defend the view that subitizing is no more than a kind of
fast, non-symbolic counting, carried out by a mental mechanism that uses non-verbal tokens
instead of countingwords. Regardless of the internalmechanism underlying subitizing being
similar to counting or not, subitizing is clearly distinguishable from active verbal counting in
terms of reaction time, since verbal counting is much slower. Figure  .  plots mean values of
reaction time for the enumeration of arrays of dots ranging from one to eight items. As can
be seen in the graph, the relationship between reaction time and numerosity is described by
a bilinear function, in which the subitizing slope is less steep than the counting slope. The
discontinuity in the slope at four items indicates the change in the enumeration regimen
from subitizing to active verbal counting.
Figure  . : The graph plots the reaction time of
numerate people asked to say howmany dots there
are in a given stimulus as fast as they can. Subitiz-
ing takes   -    ms/item, whereas counting takes
   -    ms/item. (Figure adapted from Trick and
Pylyshyn (    , p.   ).)
Subitizing was  rst detected in numer-
ate adults, who can verbally report the num-
ber of elements they see. The detection of
subitizing in infants, young children, and
non-human animals demands di erent ex-
perimental setups, since they cannot do the
same. Because subitizing requires the sub-
ject to report a numeral, there has been
some debate about whether it is appropri-
ate to speak of subitizing in non-human an-
imals (see Agrillo (    ); Davis and Pérusse
(    ); Miller (    )). Notwithstanding
this debate, the point I want to highlight is
that infants and animals are able to accu-
rately distinguish numerosities within the
subitizing range, despite the fact that they
cannot verbally report it. There is plenty
of evidence for this in the literature. I will
mention just a small sample of it.
Most of the experiments with infants
use the method of habituation/dishabituation, also known as violation of expectations. In
this kind of experiment, infants are  rst habituated to a stimulus; for example, a certain
number of dots is presented repeatedly. As the infant becomes habituated, looking time de-
tracking for up to approximately four items by assigning ‘ les’ or ‘pointers’ to individual items.” I will adopt
de nitions which characterize quantical abilities exclusively in terms of their behavioral features, independently
of the underlying processes proposed to explain them.
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creases. Then, a di erent number of dots is presented. If the infant looks longer at the new
stimulus, it is taken as a sign that she recognized the di erence in the number of dots. Starkey
and Cooper (    ) used this method to probe the abilities of   -week-old human infants to
distinguish small numerosities. They habituated infants to a stimulus containing two dots,
and then presented a stimulus with three dots; infants looked longer at the new stimulus.
Antell and Keating (    ) replicated the same result with   -hour-old neonates. Using a
di erent experimental setup which allowed for more reliable control of non-numerical vari-
ables, Starkey and Cooper (    ) tested  -year-old children who had not yet mastered num-
ber words and counting in a numerosity comparison task. Presented with a pair of stimulus
arrays for only    ms, children were asked to judge whether the stimuli were “the same” or
“not the same” regarding numerosity. Children exhibited high accuracy in the comparisons
between numerosities within the subitizing range. Results such as these have consistently
demonstrated that subitizing is in place long before children learn to count.
Another indication that the ability to subitize is innate is that non-human animals also
exhibit accurate perception of numerosity within the subitizing range. In an experiment
conducted with rhesus monkeys, Hauser, Carey, and Hauser (    ) showed that, when con-
fronted with two containers with di erent quantities of apple slices, monkeys successfully
choose the greater quantity if both quantities are within the subitizing range, but fail more
often when at least one collection is above four. Hunt, Low, and Burns (    ) showed that
the New Zealand robin exhibits the same ability when confronted with di erent numbers
of mealworms. More human-like subitizing has been observed in chimpanzees trained to use
numerals. Murofushi (    ) trained a female chimpanzee to match arrays of dots with Ara-
bic numerals representing their numerosity. The chimpanzee was able to label arrays with up
to seven dots quite accurately. Reaction time and error rate suggested that her performance
was based on subitizing for up to three dots. For four or more dots, her performance was
consistent with estimation.
The ability to accurately enumerate small collections of objects has also been observed in
insects. Dacke and Srinivasan (    ) showed that bees are able to keep track of the position
of a food reward by enumerating the landmarks they passed, provided that the number of
prominent landmarks does not exceed four. Non-symbolic enumeration has also been ob-
served in other invertebrate species, such as cuttle sh, ants, and spiders (Skorupski et al.,
    ).
Estimation Above the limit of subitizing, when prevented from or unable to count, sub-
jects estimate. Estimation is de ned as the ability to produce an approximate appraisal of the
number of items in a collection, without active verbal counting. In contrast to the outcomes
of subitizing, estimates are highly imprecise and vary greatly across individuals. Minturn and
Reese (    ) asked participants to assess the number of dots in a display. Figure  .  shows
the dispersion of their responses. Up to  ve dots, responses coincide perfectly among partic-
ipants and are completely accurate. In this interval, participants likely used subitizing or a
combination of subitizing and counting. Above  ve, however, the variability in the median
responses increased steadily. For a display with     dots, for example, estimates ranged from
   to    . These results exemplify how inaccurate estimates are.
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Figure  . : Dispersion of estimates. Minturn and
Reese (    ) tested    participants. Each point
represents the median estimate of a participant
over  ve trials. (Figure adapted fromMinturn and
Reese (    , p.    ).)
However, the data depicted in Figure
 .  also shows that estimates are far from
being random. They follow a regular pat-
tern: the dispersion of the responses in-
creases in direct proportion to the pre-
sented number of items. It is as if there is
an increasing occurrence of “noise” in the
perception of numerosity. The larger the
numerosity, the larger the noise, and there-
fore the larger the dispersion of responses
across individuals. The statistical pattern
that governs this increment in the disper-
sion of estimates was dubbed scalar vari-
ability by Whalen, Gallistel, and Gelman
(    ). The so-called “law of scalar vari-
ability” states that the mean estimate of the
number of items in a given collection and
its standard deviation  increase proportion-
ally to each other as the number of items in-
creases, so that the coe cient of variation
is constant across the presented number of
items.  Figure  .  depicts this e ect for the
seven participants of Whalen’s et al. (    )
experiment.
This regular increase in the dispersion of estimates is thought to be caused by increasing
imprecision in the subjects’ internal representation of numerosity, as we will see in the next
section. For now, what is important to highlight is that, although the ability to estimate
is highly imprecise, it produces consistent estimates—i.e., the mean response increases with
the number of presented items—and these estimates vary within a proportional range of
dispersion. Scalar variability is just one among other regularities that can be observed in
estimation noise. The perception of numerosities above subitizing range is also subject to the
in uence of two other psychophysical e ects, namely, Weber’s law and sensory adaptation.
These e ects also a ect the perception of many other physical magnitudes. Let us consider
each in turn.
In loose terms, Weber’s law states that our capacity to discriminate two stimuli of dif-
ferent intensities is inversely proportional to their ratio. For example, when it comes to
our perception of weight, it is easier to discriminate a one-kilo object from a two-kilo ob-
ject (ratio  :  or  . ) than a three-kilo object from a four-kilo object (ratio  :  or  .  ). In
more precise terms, Weber’s law is de ned in terms of the concept of just noticeable di er-
ence (JND), also known as the discrimination threshold. The value of the JND for a given
sensible magnitude is experimentally determined as the smallest variation in the intensity
 The standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of the responses around the mean.
 The coe cient of variation (cv) is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation (sd) to the mean (m):
cv = sd/m. It measures the extent of variability in relation to the mean.
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Figure  . : In the experiment reported inWhalen et al. (    ), numerate human adults were asked to
press a key a predetermined number of times as fast as they could, without counting. This required
participants to estimate the number of times they pressed the key. Themean responses of each partic-
ipant over    trials as a function of the target number of pressings and their standard deviations are
depicted in the graphs above. Notice that means and standard deviations were plotted in di erent
scales to emphasize that they increase proportionally to each other. The almost constant values of the
coe cient of variation demonstrate that the estimates of all participants presented scalar variability.
(Figure adapted from Whalen et al. (    , p.    ).)
of the stimulus that is noticeable to the tested subjects above chance level. For example,
the JND for the perception of a one-kilo weight will be the smallest increase or decrease in
weight that subjects can notice. Weber’s law, then, states that the ratio between JND and
the intensity of the original stimulus is constant. In a formula: K = JND/I , where K is
a constant, known as the Weber fraction, and I is the intensity of the original stimulus. As
a result, JND = K.I , which means that the just noticeable di erence in the intensity of
a magnitude increases linearly as a function of the intensity of the original stimulus (I) and
the Weber fraction (K). Then, once the Weber fraction for a sensible magnitude is deter-
mined, the threshold of discrimination can be predicted for any other intensity of this kind
of stimulus in the mid-range levels of stimulation. 
When it comes to numerosity, the intensity of stimulation is measured in cardinal num-
bers. For numerate adult humans, Oe elen and Vos (    ) found a Weber fraction of  .   .
This means that for a stimulus of intensity, say,   , the threshold of discrimination will be
 .  . Therefore, an array of    dots will be almost indistinguishable from an array of    dots
when subjects are prevented from counting, because the di erence between them—two—is
bellow the threshold of discrimination— .  . When an array of    dots is compared to an
array of    dots, though, subjects are likely to notice the di erence above chance level, since
the di erence—four—is above the threshold of discrimination.
The e ects of Weber’s law on numerosity discrimination are often presented as com-
prising two aspects, dubbed distance and size e ects (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen,
    ). The distance e ect refers to the fact that the discrimination of numerosities that are
numerically distant from each other is easier and more accurate. The size e ect refers to the
fact that, when numerical distance is kept constant, pairs of smaller numerosities are more
easily discriminated from each other. Some examples: the distance e ect is observed in the
 Weber’s law breaks down for very low- or very high-intensity stimuli. For an overview of the discussion
about Weber’s law in psychology, see Laming (    ).
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Figure  . : Distance e ect in numerosity discrimination as observed in pigeons (A), chimpanzees
(B), and humans (C, D). In humans, the distance e ect appears not only in the discrimination of
non-symbolic numerosities, as depicted in (C), but also in the discrimination of Arabic numerals, as
depicted in (D). In all species, error rates decrease as numerical distance increases. (Figure adapted
from Dehaene et al. (    , p.    ).)
fact that it is easier to discriminate an array of    dots from an array of    dots—a numerical
distance of   —than an array of    dots from an array of    dots—a numerical distance of
two. When the numerical distance is kept constant, the size e ect is observed in the fact
that it is easier to discriminate an array of    dots from an array of    dots, than an array
of    dots from an array of     dots. Figure  .  illustrates the distance e ect as observed in
humans and non-human animals.
Sensory adaptation, another psychophysical e ect a ecting numerosity perception, is
de ned as the adjusted—diminished or increased—sensitivity to a stimulus as a result of con-
stant exposure to that stimulus (Sutherland,     , p.  ). Like Weber’s law, adaptation also
a ects many sensible properties, such as the perception of light, smell, and sound (Roeck-
elein,     , p.  ). Adaptation is seen, for example, when after long exposure to the roar of a
running air conditioner, we no longer hear it with the same intensity; we adapt to the noise
and our sensitivity diminishes. By contrast, when we are in a very silent place, we can hear
very low sounds such as the one produced by our heart beating; we adapt to silence and our
sensitivity increases.
Burr and Ross (    ) showed how the perception of numerosity is also susceptible to
adaptation. After    seconds of exposure to a large numerosity (without receiving any in-
formation about how many items it contained), participants in their experiment tended to
perceive subsequent numerosities as smaller than they did in the control experiment where
no adaptation took place. In the opposite direction, after adaptation to a small numeros-
ity, participants tended to perceive subsequent numerosities as greater in comparison to
the control experiment. As a rule, estimates become smaller after adaptation to a large nu-
merosity and become larger after adaptation to a small numerosity, resulting in a tendency
to underestimate and overestimate respectively (see Figure  . ). Aagten-Murphy and Burr
(    ) demonstrated that adaptation to visual numerosity is spatially speci c, i.e., di erent
regions of the visual  eld can be adapted to high, low or neutral stimuli, and this can occur
after only very brief exposure to adapting stimuli. With only one second of exposure, they
obtained almost the same adaptation e ect that Burr and Ross (    ) had obtained with   
seconds of exposure.
The distinct behavioral characteristics of estimation and subitizing suggest that they
are produced by di erent underlying cognitive processes. The fact that estimation is subject
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to the same psychophysical laws that govern perception in general has led many to suggest
that humans and non-human animals share a number sense, i.e., a sensory system dedicated
to the perception of “number” (e.g., Dehaene (    ) and Burr, Anobile, and Arrighi (    )).
Not being subject to the same laws, subitizing is thought to result from a di erent underly-
ing mechanism. Before addressing the mechanisms underlying non-symbolic enumeration,
though, let us take a look at another kind of quantical ability.
 . .  Non-symbolic calculation
Figure  . : Apparent numerosity of an array of
   dots as a function of di erent adapting stim-
uli, ranging from   to     dots. The perceived nu-
merosity of the   -dot array increased after adap-
tation to lower numerosities, decreased after adap-
tation to higher numerosities, andwas not a ected
after adaptation to the same numerosity. (Figure
adapted from Burr et al. (    , p.  ).)
In addition to the ability to subitize and es-
timate, human adults, human infants and
non-human animals also share the abil-
ity to perform simple non-symbolic opera-
tions analogous to arithmetic operations. In
arithmetic, symbolic calculations are usually
seen as operations performed with num-
bers. In numerical cognition studies, how-
ever, calculation is most often seen as op-
erations performed by an agent with physi-
cal objects with a practical purpose. In this
manner, Dehaene (    , p.  ) de nes sym-
bolic calculation as “the ability . . . to pre-
dict by symbolic manipulation the result
of a physical regrouping or partitioning act
without having to execute it.” Calculation is
prediction: an agent who is able to calculate
is able to anticipate that three items added
to  ve items will make eight items without
needing to see all items together.
An explicit de nition of non-symbolic calculation is rarely given in the literature, but
we can easily obtain one by appropriately modifying Dehaene’s de nition of symbolic calcu-
lation. Thus, non-symbolic calculationmay be de ned as the ability to predict the numerosity
resulting from a physical regrouping or partitioning act without having to execute it (nor to
see it being executed) and without using any symbolic resources.
The locus classicus for studies in non-symbolic calculation in infants is Wynn (    a).
Using violation-of-expectation experiments, she showed that  ve-month-old human infants
can predict the outcome of analogues of the arithmetical operations  +  and  -  performed
with physical objects. In the experimental setting she used to probe infants ability to “calcu-
late”  + , infants were presented with one doll, which was subsequently occluded by a panel.
Then, infants saw the experimenter placing a second doll behind the occluder. When the
panel was removed, infants could see either one or two dolls. Wynn observed that infants
looked longer at the wrong outcome— + = —, suggesting that they had formed the expec-
tation of seeing two dolls. Similarly, in the scenario to test  - , infants were presented with
two dolls, which were subsequently occluded by a panel, and then they saw the experimenter
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removing one doll from behind the occluder. Again, infants looked longer at the incorrect
outcome— – = —suggesting that they had predicted the correct result. Subsequent experi-
ments were conducted to con rm that infants respond to the number of items, rather than
to other features of the stimuli. For example, McCrink andWynn (    ,     ) used a similar
violation-of-expectation experiment, but they presented stimuli in video format, allowing
them to control for variables correlated with number, such as area and contour length of the
presented objects, so that a possible in uence of these variables could be ruled out. With
these controls in place, they showed that  -month-old infants form expectations about the
outcomes of physical analogues of the operations  + ,   - ,  + , and   - . This shows that
infants’ ability to calculate goes even beyond the subitizing range.
Unsurprisingly, non-symbolic calculation involving numerosities above the subitizing
range is only approximate. In Barth’s et al. (    ) experiment I already mentioned in section
 . , the performance of participants in non-symbolic calculation was subject to Weber’s law.
In one experimental setting, they presented participants with three arrays of dots and asked
whether the third array had more or fewer dots than the sum of the  rst two arrays. Correct
answers increased as the ratio between the actual result and the proposed outcome increased,
in line with distance and size e ects.
Noise due to estimation is not the only phenomenon that a ects non-symbolic calcula-
tion. McCrink, Dehaene, and Dehaene-Lambertz (    ) showed that non-symbolic calcula-
tion is biased by what they call operational momentum. They presented adults with hundreds
of short videos where collections of objects were added or subtracted from one another, and
asked whether the  nal number of items was correct or not. Participants’ responses dis-
played a systematic bias toward larger values in addition and smaller values in subtraction.
In other words, answers for addition problems were overestimated, whereas answers for sub-
traction problems were underestimated. For example, for the operation  + , subjects tended
to consider the displayed outcome as correct when it had about    items, thus overestimat-
ing the result of the non-symbolic operation. By contrast, for the operation   - , subjects
tended to consider the displayed outcome as correct when it had about    items, thus un-
derestimating the result of the subtraction. They also con rmed that participants’ responses
displayed scalar variability. In the aforementioned study with  -month old infants, McCrink
and Wynn (    ) found that infants’ expectations about the outcome of additions and sub-
tractions also present operational momentum, suggesting that adults and infants recruit the
same underlying mechanisms for non-symbolic calculation.
Animals are also able to performnon-symbolic calculations. In a violation-of-expectation
experiment similar to those conducted byWynn (    a) with infants, Flombaum, Junge, and
Hauser (    ) showed that rhesus monkeys that had not received any training formed ex-
pectations about the outcome of physical analogues of arithmetical operations such as  + ,
 + , and  + . Many other species, such as chickens (Rugani et al.,     ), pigeons (Bran-
non,Wustho , Gallistel, &Gibbon,     ) and honeybees (Howard, Avarguès-Weber, Garcia,
Greentree, & Dyer,     ) have also been reported to be able to calculate sums and subtrac-
tions performed over collections of physical items.
Summing up, in this section we have seen that quantical abilities comprise the abilities to
subitize, to estimate, and to non-symbolically calculate. Subitizing is fast and accurate, but
 . . THE MECHANISMS UNDERLYING QUANTICAL ABILITIES   
limited to collections of up to three or four items. Estimation, in turn, does not have an upper
limit, but is increasingly imprecise and is subject to Weber’s law and adaptation, two psy-
chophysical factors that a ect the perception of many sensible magnitudes. Non-symbolic
calculation, when involving small collections, can be as precise as subitizing, but with larger
collections behaves as estimation.
There is a latent tension in quantical cognition. On the one hand, quantical cognition
gives us subitizing, by means of which we can perceive small numerosities accurately. On the
other hand, quantical cognition gives us estimation, which reveals that there are numerosities
larger than the ones we perceive through subitizing, but of which it permits only a blurred
perception. The challenge that pre-numerate humans who felt this tension had to face was
how to extend the reliability of subitizing to treat the larger numerosities blurred by the
psychophysical laws of perception.
 .  The mechanisms underlying quantical abilities
Several cognitive models have been proposed to account for the non-symbolic numerical
abilities displayed by humans and non-human animals. To date, the prevailing view is that
humans and non-humans animals share two basic non-verbal mechanisms to process discrete
quantities: a precise system for small quantities, called the Object Tracking System (OTS)
or the Object File System (OFS) or parallel individuation, and an imprecise system for large
quantities, called the Approximate Number System (ANS) (Knops,     ).
The ANS is a domain-speci c mechanism dedicated to the perception of numerosities,
sometimes also called “the number sense” (Burr et al.,     ; Dehaene,     ). There are many
competing mathematical models of the ANS. The two most often cited are the linear model,
proposed by Gallistel and Gelman (    ), and the logarithmic model, proposed by Dehaene
and Changeux (    ). Both models make highly similar behavioral predictions (Dehaene,
    ) and possess equal ability to account for e ects such asWeber’s law, distance and size ef-
fects, and scalar variability. In both models, numerosities are represented as Gaussian curves
on a metaphorical “mental number line,” in which larger numerosities are represented by
distributions that overlap increasingly with nearby numerosities. This increasing overlap is
intended to account for the increasing noise that is observed in numerosity discrimination
as numerosities grow. For example, in both models it is more di cult to distinguish nine
from eight than four from three because the curves representing nine and eight overlap more
than the curves representing four and three.
The twomodels di er, however, in the way they produce the increasing overlap of nearby
numerosities. In the linearmodel, the number line is represented in the conventional fashion,
as a series of equally spaced numbers, but the curves associated with each number become
more and more stretched as numbers increase. In the logarithmic model, by contrast, the
curves associated with each number have the same shape, but the number line is represented
on a logarithmic scale, so that the space between numbers decreases as numbers increase,
yielding a “compressed” number line. Figure  .  graphically compares both models.
As is evident from the graphs in Figure  . , in both models the curves of activation asso-
ciated with small collections (less than four items) are easier to distinguish, allowing for the
more precise enumeration of collections with one, two, or three items. This means that the
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Figure  . : Twomodels of the ANS. In both models, the Gaussian curve associated with each number
represents the mental activation produced by perceiving a collection with that number of objects. As
numbers grow, the resulting mental activation becomes increasingly more similar, giving rise to an
increasingly vague perception of numerosity. (Figure reproduced from Feigenson et al. (    , p.    ).)
ANS could, at least in principle, account for both subitizing and estimation. However, as we
have seen, behavioral evidence suggests that subitizing is produced by a di erentmechanism,
since the psychophysical laws that govern estimation seem to play no role in subitizing. This
was con rmed by Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, and Dehaene (    ) in an experiment de-
signed specially to probe whether the ANS could account for the perception of numerosities
within the subitizing range. They hypothesized that, if the ANS accounted for both small
and large numerosities, then distinguishing    from   , and    from   , should be as easy as
distinguishing three from two, and two from one, since in the ANS any two discrete quan-
tities with the same ratio are equally easily distinguishable. But their results showed that it
is much easier to distinguish between collections of one, two, and three items than between
collections of   ,   , and    items. There is virtually no error in numerosity discrimination
within the subitizing range, whereas discrimination between collections of   ,   , and   
items is much more error-prone. Besides behavioral data, brain imaging studies have also
detected di erent brain processes for small and large numerosities (see next section). These
results have lent increasing support to the hypothesis that subitizing is not implemented by
the ANS.
The accurate perception of small numerosities is often attributed to the Object File Sys-
tem (Trick & Pylyshyn,     ). In contrast to the ANS, the OFS is not dedicated exclusively
to the perception of numerosities. It is a domain-general mechanism for tracking multiple
objects in space and time (also known as MOT: Multiple Object Tracking system) (Chesney
&Haladjian,     ). The OFS represents collections of objects by creating a workingmemory
model in which each object is represented by a unique mental symbol. The OFS is believed
to have a limited storage capacity, comprising only three or four “slots” for objects—and this
is why subitizing is limited to three or four items.
Trick and Pylyshyn (    ) propose an explanation of how visual subitizing might take
place in the OFS. They call each slot in the OFS a FINST (FINgers of INSTantiation). Each
FINST acts as a pointer variable that points to an object in the visual display. Subitizing
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occurs in two steps. First, each object in the visual display is matched to a FINST, until all
objects are matched or no more free FINSTs are available. This step is thought to be com-
mon to all non-verbal exact enumeration observed in infants, animals, and adults within the
subitizing range. In numerate humans’ verbal subitizing—when the subject utters a number
word corresponding to the perceived numerosity—there is a second step, in which each oc-
cupied FINST is matched with a mental representation of a number word, in the usual order.
In Trick and Pylyshyn’s model, this second step accounts for the slight increase in reaction
time observed from one to four in Figure  . .
A consequence of there being two systems responsible for numerosity perception is that
numerosities with one to four items may be represented twice in the brain. Although the
ANS alone cannot account for subitizing due to the aforementioned reasons, some argue
that, at least in some situations, the ANS may take over the responsibility for representing
small numerosities, or both systemsmay cooperate. Dehaene (    , p.    )maintains that the
fact that monkeys trained to order collections of one to four items immediately generalize
their methods to larger collections of up to nine items, as demonstrated by Brannon and
Terrace (    ), counts as evidence for the double representation of small numerosities. Izard,
Dehaene-Lambertz, and Dehaene (    ) showed in a neuroimaging study that both small
( - ) and large ( -  ) numerosities can recruit the ANS in some situations. Hyde (    )
suggests that constraints on attentional and working memory resources might determine
whether the OFS or the ANS is recruited for the enumeration of small numerosities. He
proposes that when small collections of objects are presented in a way that precludes theOFS
from encoding each object individually—e.g., too close together and under high attentional
load—the ANS comes into play. Chesney and Haladjian (    , p.     ) propose that the
visual indexes occupied in the OFS in a given moment could serve as an input for the ANS.
 .  The neuronal bases of quantical cognition
There is limited knowledge about the neuronal mechanisms that implement theOFS and the
ANS. However, there is plenty of evidence about where these systems are believed to be im-
plemented in the brain. The parietal cortex, in particular the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and
regions in the prefrontal cortex have been identi ed as the most important areas for numer-
ical processing in the human brain, both within and above the subitizing range (Castaldi,
Vignaud, & Eger,     ; Nieder,     ) (see Figure  . ). Various other regions of the brain,
such as the inferior temporal lobe, inferior frontal regions, the medial temporal lobe, and
the early visual cortex have also been related to the processing of quantical and numerical
information (Wilkey & Ansari,     , p.   ).
Studies with infants and children have shown that most of the brain’s quantical network
is already in place from early infancy. Cantlon, Brannon, Carter, and Pelphrey (    ) found
that the IPS responds to numerosity similarly in  -year-old children as in adults, showing
that the most important locus of numerical cognition in adults takes form prior to sophis-
ticated symbolic numerical experience. Hyde, Boas, Blair, and Carey (    ) observed that
the right inferior parietal occipital region in the brains of  -month-old infants is already re-
sponsive to numerosity, showing that the specialization of this region for numerosity occurs
before the acquisition of language.
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Figure  . : Number network in the human brain.
The highlighted areas are regularly activated when
subjects are performing numerical tasks during
brain imaging studies. IPS: intraparietal sul-
cus; lPFC: lateral pre-frontal cortex; mPFC: me-
dial pre-frontal cortex. (Figure reproduced from
Nieder (    , p.    ).)
In line with the behavioral evidence
we have seen above, there is growing neu-
roimaging evidence that the processing of
small and large numerosities is also func-
tionally dissociated in the brain. Hyde and
Spelke (    ) showed that small collections
( -  items) evoke an early response in the
posterior parietal area, whereas large collec-
tions ( -   items) evoke a later response in
this same area. Hyde and Spelke (    ) de-
tected the engagement of anatomically dis-
tinct regions of the parietal cortex in pro-
cessing small and large numerosities. Cu-
tini, Scatturin, Moro, and Zorzi (    ) also
observed a di erent pattern of activation in
the parietal cortex for numerosities within
and above the subitizing range, but only in
terms of amplitude and temporal pro le.
Bloechle et al. (    ) showed that increase
in numerosity within the subitizing range
has no impact on the amplitude of the IPS
response, whereas increase in numerosity above the subitizing range also increases the neural
response in the IPS.
Regarding the neural implementation of the ANS “mental number line,” Hyde and
Spelke (    ) observed that neural responses for large numerosities accord with Weber’s
law. Lyons, Ansari, and Beilock (    ) showed that the curves of activation of neurons in
IPS areas increasingly overlap as numerosity grows, con rming a prediction of ANS models.
Perhaps the most impressive  ndings on the neural implementation of the ANS come from
studies of the monkey brain. Recordings of the activity of single neurons in monkeys re-
vealed that these neurons are attuned to speci c numerosities (Nieder,     ). The so-called
“number neurons” respond most strongly to a preferred numerosity and also respond to a
lesser extent to adjacent numerosities, in accordance with the predictions of ANS models.
For example, a number neuron that responds with greatest intensity to an array of three dots,
also responds with less intensity to two dots and four dots. Kutter, Bostroem, Elger, Mor-
mann, and Nieder (    ) identi ed “number neurons” in the human brain. Harvey, Klein,
Petridou, and Dumoulin (    ) identi ed populations of neurons in the right parietal cor-
tex tuned to speci c visual numerosities. These neurons are topographically organized, with
populations tuned to smaller numerosities occupying a larger region than those tuned to
larger numerosities.
In sum, investigations into the neuronal bases of quantical cognition have con rmed
that there are two systems in the brain responsible for the implementation of quantical
skills, and that these two systems are already in place before mathematical learning takes
place. Moreover, similar structures have been found in non-human animals.
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 .  The evolutionary roots of quantical cognition
The fact that specialized brain structures associated with quantical cognition are in place at
birth, along with the fact that quantical abilities are observed in many species—from honey-
bees to human beings—suggest that quantical cognition has evolutionary origins (Brannon
& Merritt,     ). Di erences in the architecture of the brains of the species studied so far,
on the other hand, suggest that quantical competence may not be due to a common ancestor,
but rather to convergent evolution (Nieder,     ). “The parallel co-evolution of numeros-
ity sensitivity in these species underlines the idea that numerosity represents an important
natural category to adapt behavior to environmental factors” (Knops,     , p.   ).
Many studies have shown that being able to perceive numerosity enhances animals’ abil-
ity to survive, reproduce and compete for resources. Just a few examples: the ability to
perceive numerosity helps mosquito sh to join the larger shoal and maximize the bene ts
of group protection against predators (Dadda, Pi er, Agrillo, & Bisazza,     ); American
coots have been shown to enumerate their own eggs in order to separate them from parasitic
eggs laid by other birds in their nests (Lyon,     ); the New Zealand robin’s ability to per-
ceive numerosity enables this food-hoarding bird to prioritize cache sites where more pieces
of food are stored (Armstrong, Garland, & Burns,     ; Hunt et al.,     ). Studies such as
these support a general consensus in the literature on numerical cognition that the ability
to perceive numerosity is adaptive (Nieder,     ).
When it comes to primates, besides the obvious survival advantages of quantical abilities,
Cantlon (    ) proposes that primates’ abilities result from the joint satisfaction of two evo-
lutionary constraints. First, she claims, “number” is the optimal solution to the problem of
integrating quantity information across modalities. Other quantitative dimensions, such as
length, surface area, weight, rate, and loudness, are modality-speci c and, therefore, cannot
be readily used to compare collections of objects across di erent modalities. For example, it
is not possible to assess length by hearing, or loudness by seeing. Numerosity, by contrast, can
be perceived and compared over di erent modalities. Second, primates’ perceptual systems’
tendency to segment stimuli in discrete objects might have made numerosity a salient trait
of the environment for them. In her words, numerosity perception is “an object-based repre-
sentation ideally suited to the object-based nature of primates’ visual processing” (Cantlon,
    , p.   ).
It is easy to imagine that the same constraints may have contributed to the emergence of
numerosity perception in other species. Corvids, for example, have highly developed capaci-
ties to represent objects (Ho mann, Rüttler, & Nieder,     ) which could make numerosity
a dimension as salient for them as it is for primates. Although dissimilarities between the
corvid and the primate brains suggest that numerical competence in corvids and primates is
not due to a common ancestor, behavioral and neuroimaging data show not only that both
species share very similar abilities, but also that both have developed a similar strategy to
compute numerosity, captured by ANS models (Nieder,     ). This “suggests that this way
of coding numerical information has evolved based on convergent evolution because it ex-
hibits a superior solution to a common computational problem” (Nieder,     , p.  ).
Paying attention to the evolutionary roots of quantical cognition may help philosophers
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avoid misinterpreting the philosophical signi cance of the fact that these abilities are in-
nate. Based on Wynn’s studies of non-symbolic calculation in infants (mentioned above in
section  . . ), Gaeta (    ) claims that  ndings from numerical cognition vindicate the ra-
tionalist thesis according to which mathematical knowledge is a priori. Gaeta writes:
Benacerraf (    ) has raised a problem about mathematical knowledge: how can the
abstract entities that are the subject matter of mathematical knowledge can [sic] be
known to human beings of  esh and blood if it is impossible for those entities to exert
any causal relation on them? The question presupposes a causal theory of knowledge,
like Locke’s doctrine about the e ect on the subject by external objects. But the sci-
enti c results outlined in the preceding section show that this is not the only way,
and not the most correct one, to formulate the question. Apart from experience and
physical causality there may be other ways of forming beliefs that, in principle, consti-
tute knowledge: they work perfectly in our dealings with the world and are universally
recognized. Nevertheless, its origins are not located in the external material objects
that stimulate our senses but in our genes. Perhaps the old rationalist philosophers
would make a face of resignation in front of a situation that is still paradoxical. After
so many centuries, the new generations of their eternal rivals, the empiricists, seem to
have discovered by just taking advantage of the own methods of the empirical sciences
that innate knowledge, that is, a priori knowledge, could be more than a mere illusion
(Gaeta,     , p.    ).
Although Gaeta is right in claiming that quantical cognition is codi ed in the genes and
hence innate, this does notmean that quantical cognition gives us any kind of a priori knowl-
edge. ‘Innate’ means present at birth. ‘A priori’ means independent of experience. Quantical
cognition is innate but not a priori because it was shaped by environmental pressures act-
ing upon our ancestors. Traits evolutionarily selected because of their adaptive advantages
are not independent of experience. Quantical cognition evolved in the way it did because
the experiences of our ancestors were such that they favored the survival and reproduction
of individuals who had those abilities. Quantical cognition is the product of experiences
accumulated through generations and it is, therefore, a posteriori.
Philosophical misinterpretations of  ndings from numerical cognition are not uncom-
mon. Sometimes, however, philosophers’ mistakes might be motivated by the loose way
scientists use philosophically-relevant terms such as number, cardinality, and numerosity.
In the next section, I carefully disentangle these three concepts so that we have a clearer idea
of what things and concepts are involved in quantical cognition.
 .  The ontology of quantical cognition
In the previous sections, I have used expressions such as “number sense,” “approximate num-
ber system,” “mental number line,” and “number neurons.” These expressions, whose use
is widespread in the literature on quantical cognition, give a sample of how pervasive the
idea is that the abilities described above are genuine numerical abilities. These abilities are
believed to be numerical in two senses. On the one hand, some cognitive scientists speak as
if subitizing and estimation enable us (and infants and honeybees) to see numbers; numbers
would be a perceptible property of the environment. Some examples:
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Newborn infants perceive abstract numbers (Izard, Sann, Spelke, & Streri,     , title,
emphasis added).
[A] great deal of evidence suggests that humans perceive number spontaneously, with
dedicated mechanisms (Burr et al.,     , p.  , emphasis added).
Ample evidence from single-cell recordings, psychophysics, and brain imaging studies
suggests that humans and animals perceive numbers innately (Nieder,     , p.    -   ,
emphasis added).
We and animals can represent cardinal numbers because they are a signi cant feature
of the world, and assessing number increases  tness and survival (Nieder,     , p.   ,
emphasis added).
NumberAs a Primary Perceptual Attribute: AReview (Anobile, Cicchini, & Burr,     ,
title, emphasis added).
On the other hand, some cognitive scientists speak as if the cerebral implementation of
subitizing and estimation involves numbers or representations of numbers in the brain. In
this view, numbers (or representations thereof) would be innate brain resources.
Behavioural and electrophysiological data now convincingly establish the existence of
numbers in the brain—in animals from insects to humans (Gallistel,     , p.  , emphasis
added).
Although humans may be the only species with a linguistically mediated code for num-
bers, we share an approximate, non-verbal representation of number with many animal
species, as many papers in this special issue make amply clear (Burr et al.,     , p.  ,
emphasis added).
Representation of Number in Animals and Humans: A Neural Model (Verguts & Fias,
    , title, emphasis added).
Many times these two ways of thinking of numbers as involved in quantical cognition
appear together: the existence of numbers in the environment would give rise to represen-
tations of numbers in the brain. This is how Nieder conceives of “number neurons,” the
“neurobiological foundations” of the ability to perceive numbers, which are (or so he claims)
“a property of real objects and events” (Nieder,     , p.  ;   ).
Philosophers of mathematics with a platonist leaning would be appalled in face of these
declarations. Philosophically, the distinction between having numbers in the brain and hav-
ing number representations in the brain is highly relevant. If we have only number repre-
sentations in the brain, then numbers themselves must be somewhere else; whereas if we
have numbers themselves in the brain, this means that numbers are mental entities. This
latter claim is untenable, as Frege (    ) has already shown. The claim that there are rep-
resentations of numbers in the brain is philosophically less problematic, but these cannot
be representations of a property of the environment, because number is not a property of
aggregates of matter, as Frege (    ) also argued (I present Frege’s arguments below).
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There is another term commonly used in the literature on numerical cognition that can
help make sense, from a philosophical point of view, of what is really involved in quanti-
cal cognition. The term numerosity was originally introduced to allow cognitive scientists to
“[make] ne distinctions to properly evaluate andmeasure stimuli—especially when studying
rats, pigeons, and infants—without having to necessarily assume the presence of conceptual
understanding such as that involved in the notion of number” (Núñez,     , p.    ). Nu-
merosity is usually de ned as a synonym of cardinality:
Cardinality (also known as numerosity) corresponds to the empirical property of quan-
tity, and is the number of countable elements in a given group (for example,  ve run-
ners) (Nieder,     , p.    ).
Numerosity, the cardinality of a set, is a property that applies to any set of individual
objects (Piazza & Izard,     , p.    ).
... the number of things in a set—the numerosity of a set. (The term ‘numerosity’ is
used here as the cognitive counterpart to the term ‘cardinality’ used by mathematicians
and logicians) (Butterworth,     , p.  ).
The de nition of numerosity as cardinality is inadequate, as I will argue in section  . . ,
but at least the distinction between numerosity and number allows for a more careful way
of speaking, according to which infants, pigeons, and honeybees perceive numerosities, have
innate representations of numerosities, and thus are not necessarily held to be competent with
numbers. However, as Núñez notices, the term “numerosity” (and other terms originally
introduced to allow for  ner conceptual distinctions) is not consistently employed:
the  eld of numerical cognition has been notorious for not employing precise termi-
nology when dealing with the concept of number. Already three decades ago scholars
investigating ‘numerical competence’ in nonhuman animals and children spoke of the
‘terminological chaos’ ([  ] p.    ), the lack of ‘clari cation of terms’ ([  ] p.    ),
and the unnecessary su ering ‘from the misapplication of terms’ ([  ] p.    ) that
existed in the  eld. The situation is no better today because relatively precise de -
nitions of various number-related terms—some of which were carefully coined by the
psychophysicists of the mid-  th century [  ,  ]—are routinely blurred (Box  ). Some-
times ‘number’ is used to mean ‘numeral’ (e.g., [  ]), or sometimes ‘numerousness’ (e.g.,
[  ]), despite warnings that ‘numerousness discrimination . . . represents a simple per-
ceptual ability that bears no obvious relation to number’ ([  ] p.     ). More impor-
tantly, ‘number’ is often loosely used in place of ‘numerosity’. Articles in developmental
(e.g., [  ] p. B  ) and comparative (e.g., [  ] p.   ) psychology while properly dis-
cussing ‘numerosity’ when describing stimuli, leap to ‘number’ in conclusions. Similar
loose inter-changeability can be found in neuroscience publications (e.g., [  ] p.    )
(Núñez,     , p.    ).
This loose and misleading use of terminology prevents us from reading from the scien-
ti c texts an ontology of quantical cognition. Scientists themselves seem to be confused not
only about the use of the relevant technical terms of their  eld, but also about the entities
that are involved in quantical cognition. This “chaos” is a unique opportunity for philosoph-
ical conceptual analysis to contribute to scienti c understanding by improving conceptual
clarity, and a sine qua non for the account of the nature of numbers I am pursuing here.
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In the remainder of this section, I seek the conceptual clarity necessary to understand
quantical cognition and its relation with numbers and arithmetic in general. In doing so, I
will not question the empirical  ndings of the  eld, nor discuss the suitability of the pro-
posed models. These are empirical matters, not subject to objections from conceptual anal-
ysis. I will instead question the scienti c discourse about these  ndings and models. The
following are the questions I want answered:
 . What do we perceive through subitizing and estimation? Do we perceive numbers?
 . What is involved in the internal mechanisms that implement quantical skills? Do we
have numbers in the brain?
In the following two subsections I address each question in turn.
 . .  What we perceive through quantical skills
In scienti c texts, as exempli ed above, it is said that subitizing and estimation enable us to
perceive numbers, numerosities, or the cardinality of collections. Notwithstanding the fact
that scientists carelessly use these terms interchangeably, they have di erent meanings. ‘Nu-
merosity’ is a technical term from numerical cognition. The terms ‘number’ and ‘cardinality,’
in turn, belong to mathematics, where they refer to di erent concepts. In mathematics, the
cardinality of a set refers to its “size,” and it is a trivial fact that the cardinal size of a set can
be determined without even mentioning numbers. This is easily illustrated as follows. Imag-
ine we want to know whether the cardinality of the set of people in a room is equal to the
cardinality of the set of chairs in that room. We do not need to count people and chairs. We
can just ask people to sit down, each person in a single chair. If no person remains standing
and no chair remains empty, we conclude immediately that both sets have the same size. If
someone remains standing, then the set of people is larger than the set of chairs; inversely, if
any chair remains empty, then the set of chairs is larger than the set of people. No number
is involved in this procedure. It can be carried out recruiting only the notion of one-to-one
correspondence or equinumerosity which, despite its name, is de ned without invoking any
numerical concept (Enderton,     , p.    ).
True enough, numbers are used to evaluate and express cardinality. But in principle we
can use any set as a “yardstick” to do the same by establishing one-to-one mappings between
its elements and the elements of the set we want to evaluate the cardinality of. For example,
I can use the set of pens on my desk—let us call it P—for this purpose. Because there is an
injective and non-surjective mapping between P and the set of sections in this chapter, I can
say that the cardinality of the set of sections in this chapter is greater than P’s. The existence
of a bijective mapping between P and the set of pens on my table allows me to say that the
cardinality of the set of pens on my table is equal to P’s. P is not a number, but I just used
it to express cardinalities in the same way I could have used the number two. One obvious
advantage of using numbers is that almost everyone knows which cardinality corresponds to
two, whereas only I know the cardinality of P. Moreover, P can express only one cardinality
with precision, whereas we have numbers to express every cardinality with precision. These
shortcomings, however, do not prevent P from working as a cardinality ruler.
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Mathematically, the concept of cardinality is independent of the concept of number.
This is not to imply that these concepts are completely unrelated, of course. On the contrary,
the cardinal value expressed by each number has served as inspiration for strategies to de ne
them. Thus, in von Neumann’s approach, each number is de ned as a set whose cardinality
corresponds to the cardinal value of the number. For example, two is the set {;, {;}}, whose
cardinality is two. In Frege’s (failed) approach, each number is de ned (roughly) as the class
of all sets whose cardinality corresponds to the cardinal value of the number. For example,
two is de ned as the class of all sets that, for some distinct x and y, have as members x and y
and nothing else (Enderton,     , p.    ). But notice that in both von Neumann’s and Frege’s
de nitions the concept of cardinality does not appear in the de niens; the idea that to each
number there corresponds a cardinal value only intuitivelymotivates the de nitions. It is not
indispensable for a de nition of number in any sense. There are other approaches, such as
Zermelo’s, in which the cardinality of the set that de nes a number, as well as the cardinality
of the elements of this set, simply does not matter. For example, in Zermelo’s approach two
is de ned as {{;}}, three is de ned as {{{;}}}, although both sets have cardinality one. In
sum, although number and cardinality are related, they are independent from each other in
terms of their mathematical de nitions.
With this distinction in place, it is easy to see that in quantical cognition experiments,
what is tested is participants’ ability to perceive cardinalities (the size of a collection) or
numerosities, not numbers. Subjects tested in these studies are shown to perceive the number
of things they are presented with, not number simpliciter. The expression ‘the number of
things,’ despite containing the word ‘number,’ is not a synonym of number, but a synonym
of cardinality. If a participant is shown to be able to distinguish ⌥⌥ from ⌥⌥⌥, then we
may conclude that she can perceive a property of these collections, namely, their cardinality
(provided that the experiment controlled for other variables, such as length). We do not have
any reason to believe that she saw numbers.
The confusion here is understandable. Because we use numbers to measure cardinalities,
we usually refer to cardinalities indirectly, via their numerical measurements. For example,
in the sentence ‘the number of planets is eight,’ the expression ‘the number of planets’ is
used in place of ‘the cardinality of the set of planets.’ This is a clear case of metonymy, the
 gure of speech in which a word is used in place of another associated with it. A similar case
of metonymy occurs when we say that “the square footage of the house is  ,    sq ft.” In
this case, the expression ‘the square footage of the house’ is used in place of ‘the area of the
house,’ which is the property that is being measured in square feet. Thus, when an infant is
said to be able to perceive “the number of dots on the screen,” what this really means is that
the infant is able to perceive the cardinality (or, more precisely, the numerosity, as we will
see below) of the set of dots on the screen, which is the property that is being tested in the
experiment. It may be that the infant is using numbers to evaluate cardinality, but certainly
she is not seeing numbers, as we do not see square feet when we attend to the area of a house.
Some philosophers have contested the distinction between cardinality and number, or
between numerosity and number. Against the latter, Jones (    , p.    ) argues that
one might object that the ANS is not a system for numerical perception, since most
“cognitive scientists distinguish between numerosities, the concrete, discrete magni-
tudes that animals represent, and numbers, the abstract entities that are studied by
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mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics” (De Cruz,     ,  ). In other words,
we perceive numerosities, not numbers. However, this distinction is not tenable in the
current context since assuming that there is a distinction between concrete numerosi-
ties and abstract numbers involves assuming the impossibility of numerical perception
from the outset.
Certainly, we should not assume from the outset, as I have argued in Chapter  , that
numbers are abstract. But the hypothetical non-spatiotemporality of numbers is not the
problem here. The problem is that, even if numbers are perceivable in any sense, they do
not show up in the experimental setups used in quantical cognition studies. Consider, for
example, the stimuli presented in Figure  . , used in Izard’s et al. (    ) study with infants.
The stimuli consist of geometrical  gures with small faces depicted in them. If infants see
these as making up a collection, then this collection has cardinality as one of its properties,
and infants can grasp it. That is what there is to be seen in such a situation. Perhaps infants
are using some numerical understanding in doing so, but they are de nitely not perceiving
numbers.
The only way to maintain that participants are seeing numbers themselves in such sit-
uations would be by con ating the concepts of cardinality and number. However, this not
only  ies in the face of mathematics but would also back re, since the con ated property
number/cardinality would have to be non-spatiotemporal and, hence, unobservable. This is
made clear in Giaquinto’s (    ;     ) platonist account of numbers. In Giaquinto’s view,
cardinal numbers are set sizes (i.e., cardinalities), but he acknowledges that
the set-size view of cardinal numbers runs into the cognitive access problem . . . If
numbers were set sizes, they would lack space-time location; they could not undergo
any change; they could neither emit nor re ect signals; they could leave no traces; they
could not a ect the behaviour of other things. So they could have no causal e ect on
us, even remotely. So we could have no cognitive access to them (Giaquinto,     , p.  ).
In the same paper, Giaquinto argues that numerical cognition allows us to circumvent
Benacerraf’s Problem. An evaluation of Giaquinto’s arguments is beyond the scope of this
section, but it is relevant for us to see why the set-size view of cardinal numbers implies that
numbers are non-spatiotemporal. The reasoning goes as follows.
Consider again the set of pens on my desk, P. The elements of P are localized in space
and time. But where is P, the set, and its properties? If the set and its properties are localized
in the same place and time as its elements, then its number is localized on my desk. Since P
Figure  . : Stimuli used in experiment testing numerosity perception in newborns. (Figure repro-
duced from Izard et al. (    , p.      ).)
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has two elements, I have a number two onmy desk. But I also have a number two onmy face,
given that I have two eyes, and yet another number two in my ears. This means that there are
as many numbers two as collections with two elements in the universe. This conclusion is
plainly unacceptable. It runs against mathematics, where there is only one of each number. 
Moreover, numbers do not have geographical and temporal properties. Therefore, we must
reject the assumption that sets and its properties are localized in space and time. As a result,
we have to accept that sets and their properties are non-spatiotemporal. This leads to the
well-known view according to which numbers are abstract universals, and each particular
set or collection of physical things instantiates the universal corresponding to its number.
In this case, P would be an instance of two, but two itself would be a non-spatiotemporal
universal. In this case, at most, we could perceive instances of numbers, but not numbers
directly.
However, we do not have any reason to assume this con ation and its consequences. It
leads us back to platonist puzzles we are trying to avoid. Furthermore, from the outset, the
con ation of number and cardinality goes against the mathematical distinction between the
two concepts, thus it is not surprising that it gives rise to philosophical troubles. This is
su cient reason to keep cardinality and numbers as distinct concepts.
With this distinction in place, it becomes clear that numbers are not perceived through
quantical skills, even if numbers were perceivable in any sense. It is still too premature to
make this a rmation here, but my point is that numbers, as symbolic cognitive tools, are
not like objects we can look at. They are involved in a method—counting—we use to assess
cardinalities precisely, but counting is not the only method of doing so. We can also assess
cardinalities by one-to-one correspondence (tallying) and by subitizing. We have at least
three methods of assessing cardinalities at our disposal, each one with its own advantages
and limitations.
So far, it seems that cardinalities are what we perceive through our quantical skills. This
is not so, however, since there are good reasons to distinguish between cardinality and nu-
merosity. One reason is that the latter is a clear-cut attribute, whereas the former is not.
The cardinality of a set with    elements is clearly distinguishable from the cardinality of a
set with    elements. However, our quantical skills do not enable us to tell the di erence
between the cardinalities of these sets. For this reason, above the subitizing range it is not
adequate to say that we can perceive cardinality. At best, we can perceive approximate car-
dinalities, and approximate cardinality is numerosity. This point is suggested by Dehaene
(    , p.   ).
The di erence with our verbal counting is so enormous that we should perhaps not
talk about “number” in animals at all, because by number we often imply a discrete
symbol. This is why scientists, when they describe perception of numerical quantities,
speak of “numerosity” or “numerousness” rather than number. The accumulator [the
ANS] enables animals to estimate how numerous some events are, but does not allow
 As Giaquinto (    , p.  ) observes, “this can be seen from the use [in mathematics] of number-counting
functions, the de nitions of which make no sense unless it is assumed that there is just one number per numeral.”
Giaquinto mentions as an example Euler’s   function, which counts the positive integers up to a given integer
n that are co-prime to n (i.e.,  (1) = 1 and  (n) = the number of positive integers less than and co-prime to
n, for n > 1).
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them to compute their exact number. The animal mind can retain only fuzzy numbers.
In this passage, Dehaene uses ‘number’ in the metonymic sense I discussed above. His
point seems to be that we should not talk about perception of cardinality in animals because
cardinality implies an exact discrete quantity, but animals can perceive only fuzzy numerosi-
ties. Numerosity is vague. Cardinality is exact. This is not to deny that numerosity and
cardinality are intimately related. Up to the subitizing limit, perception of numerosity and
evaluation of cardinality coincide. Above this point, they start diverging, and the divergence
is governed by the psychophysical laws of perception which a ect numerosity perception.
Thus, we can provisionally say that numerosity is “perceived cardinality,” i.e., a subjective,
relative, approximate judgment of cardinality.
The above considerations recommend restoring the unequivocal use of the term ‘nu-
merosity’ to refer to what we can perceive through our quantical skills. In section  . . , I
give a more adequate de nition of numerosities, but  rst we have to consider the role of
numbers in the implementation of numerosity perception in the brain.
 . .  Numbers in the internal mechanisms of quantical cognition?
In the previous subsection I concluded that we do not see numbers through quantical skills,
but I left open the question of whether or not our quantical skills use numbers to assess nu-
merosities. As we saw above, scientists’ explanations of the models proposed to account for
the mechanisms underlying quantical skills usually mention numbers or number represen-
tations in the brain. In this subsection, we will see that, in spite of scientists’ discourse, the
very models they propose make clear that neither numbers nor number representations are
involved in the implementation of quantical cognition.
First of all, it is important to notice that, conceptually, the perception of numerosity
does not require numerical competence. Insofar as numerosity is perceived cardinality, it
can be evaluated by one-to-one correspondence. And this is exactly how the OFS tracks
numerosities, according to Trick and Pylyshyn’s (    ) model mentioned in section  . . The
OFS represents numerosities by establishing a one-to-one mapping between the perceived
objects and its memory slots, following a procedure similar to the one I exempli ed above
with the set of pens on my table. Cognitive scientists acknowledge that such mappings
cannot count as number representations.
The object tracking system . . . is thought to represent numerical information only in
an implicit way: in this system, there is no summary representation of ‘two’; instead,
infants form a mental model of two objects by recruiting two attentional indexes or
‘object  les’ (Izard et al.,     , p.    ).
Based on this feature of the OFS, Simon (    ) contends that subitizing in infants and
non-human animals is best conceived of as non-numerical, because the discrimination of nu-
merosities within the subitizing range demands nothing more than establishing one-to-one
mappings and making same/di erent discriminations. To illustrate Simon’s point, let these
signs represent the OFS’s memory slots of a subject: ⌃⌃⌃⌃. When the subject is presented
with a collection of two objects, two slots are occupied and this information is stored in its
memory: ⌥⌥⌃⌃. After that, when presented with a collection of three objects, three slots
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are occupied: ⌥⌥⌥⌃. To tell the di erence between their numerosities, the only thing the
subject has to do is to compare whether ⌥⌥⌃⌃ and ⌥⌥⌥⌃ are the same or di erent. The
subject does not need to have any numerical understanding to do so. Thus, strictly speaking,
subitizing is non-numerical. Subitizing becomes numerical only when numerate humans
map OFS’s working memory representations into number words and express the evaluated
cardinality by uttering a numeral. But for innumerate humans and non-human animals,
which do not take this last step, subitizing is non-numerical.
As for the ANS, Dehaene (    , p.    ) literally speaks of a “logarithmic mental number
line” in which “mental representations of number” are to be found: “this approximation
mode is the natural way that number is encoded in a brain without language” (Dehaene,     ,
p.    , emphasis added). Gallistel and Gelman (    , p.   ) suggest that “the non-verbal
representatives of number are mental magnitudes (real numbers) with scalar variability.”
The claim that there are numbers or representations of numbers in the internal mechanisms
of the ANS, however, does not seem plausible. A basic property of numbers is that, given
any number and its successor, the di erence between them is exactly one. This feature is
not preserved in the logarithmic mental number line proposed by Dehaene. Furthermore, if
numberswere used to evaluate numerosities (by counting), outcomeswould be fully accurate,
except for occasional mistakes. However, ANS estimates are systematically inaccurate and
subject to disturbances that do not a ect numerical counting, such as the e ects of Weber’s
law and sensory adaptation. Because numbers are exact by de nition, Núñez (    ) regards
the phrase ‘Approximate Number System’ as an oxymoron; he proposes instead naming this
cognitive mechanism as Large Quantity Discrimination (LQD).
The fact that the ANS delivers fuzzy estimates suggests that it uses a continuous mech-
anism to assess numerosity, which does not square with the discreteness of natural numbers.
That is why Gallistel and Gelman say, in the passage quoted a few lines above, that the men-
tal magnitudes believed to represent numbers in the brain are “real numbers.” The point,
however, is that the continuous mechanisms underlying the ANS do not need to be numeri-
cal in any sense. The very explanation Gallistel and Gelman give of these mechanisms shows
that it is non-numerical. According to them, numerosities are represented in the brain by
means of analog representations similar to histograms.
A histogram is a familiar example of the use of magnitudes to represent numerosities:
the higher the column in a histogram, the greater the numerosity of the set represented
by that column ... The column that represents the combined numerosity of sets   and  
is the column you get by placing the column for set   on top of the column for set  . The
column that represents the more numerous of two sets is the  rst column contacted
by a horizontal line lowered from the top of the graph. If you form a rectangle whose
height is that of column   andwhosewidth is the height of column  , then hold constant
the area of the rectangle while adjusting its width to the standard column width, you
get a column whose height represents the numerosity of the set formed by multiplying
the numerosities represented by columns   and  .
The system just described—histogram arithmetic or the histogrammic calculator—is
an analog system isomorphic to arithmetic. Its symbols are magnitudes, the heights
of the columns. Its operations are processes involving magnitudes ... We want to sug-
gest, on the basis of both animal and the human data, that the preverbal processes that
underlie both the animal and the human capacity to represent numerosities and rea-
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son arithmetically are analogous to histogram arithmetic. These preverbal processes
generate analog mental variables (ultimately, of course, neurophysiological variables)
that function as the mental/neural representatives of numerosity (Gallistel & Gelman,
    , p.   ).
In the above passage, Gallistel and Gelman explain an ingenious non-numeric method
of calculation. Basically, instead of using cardinal numbers to represent cardinalities or nu-
merosities, one can use columns on a histogram; instead of performing arithmetical opera-
tions such as additions and multiplications, one can manipulate the columns. The mecha-
nism that produces a column to represent a given numerosity is also non-numerical. This
mechanism, an accumulator, was originally proposed by Meck and Church (    ). Roughly,
as Gallistel andGelman (    ) explain it, the accumulator is like a beaker into which one cup
of water is poured for each item in a given numerosity. The  nal level of the column of water
in the beaker represents the size of the collection. Clearly, the accumulator implements a
non-numerical process of one-to-one correspondence. 
Dehaene (    , p.   -  ) also uses the accumulator mechanism to explain how the ANS
works. In contrast to Gallistel and Gelman’s accumulator, though, Dehaene’s accumulator
introduces “noise” in the representation of numerosities from the outset. To each item in
the to-be-evaluated numerosity, a slightly variable amount of water is poured in the beaker.
The larger the collection, the larger the accumulated noise, and therefore the one-to-one
correspondence between “cups” in the beaker and items in the collections is progressively
blurred. Thus, Dehaene’s ANS can be seen as implementing a third way of approximately
assessing numerosities, which does not rely on either numbers or one-to-one correspondence.
If these models are correct, then what cognitive scientists call “number sense” is, in fact,
non-numerical. All its processes are explained, in the scienti c models themselves, by mech-
anisms that do not involve any conceptual contribution of numbers. The irony is that the
very same cognitive scientists who have advanced these models talk as if they involved num-
bers, or as if they enabled us to see numbers. In my opinion, this is due to the fact that we
are so used to relying on numbers to assess cardinalities that we cannot help talking about
numbers when speaking of evaluation of cardinalities (or numerosities). But once it is clear
that there are non-numerical methods of assessing cardinalities, it becomes evident that the
mechanisms underlying the OFS and the ANS may be non-numerical. Núñez proposes the
neologism “quantical”—which I have been using since Chapter  —to qualify these processes
and the corresponding abilities they give rise to.
The English language (like others) does not have an adjective to label phenomena
that are quantity-related but lack the properties [of numbers]. One possibility would
be to call them quantitative capacities [  ], but this term—usually contrasted with
‘qualitative’—relates to measurements and their numerical and mathematical treat-
ment. I propose to refer to these biologically endowed capacities as quantical—in con-
trast to ‘numerical’ (Núñez,     , p.    ).
 In non-numerical one-to-one correspondence, a correspondence is established between two collections
whose elements are not numbers. In the accumulator, these are “cups of water” and the elements of a collec-
tion of physical objects. Counting is also a form of one-to-one correspondence, but a numerical one, in which
the elements of the given collection are paired with numbers.
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In Núñez’s terminology, preverbal or non-symbolic numerical cognition becomes quan-
tical cognition, and non-symbolic numerical skills, such as those displayed by infants and
non-human animals, become quantical skills.
Before concluding this section, we have to consider another way in which numbers could
be seen as crucially involved in quantical cognition. It is a fact that all the scienti c mod-
els of the ANS use numbers and other mathematical resources in their formulations. For
example, in both models we considered in section  . , numbers label the activation curves
associated with the perception of numerosities. Does this not show that numbers and other
mathematical resources are indispensable for modeling quantical cognition? Does this not
show that even quantical cognition, with its non-numerical methods of assessing numerosity,
must presuppose the existence of numbers?
This question does not seem to concern scientists, but philosophers have pondered it.
De Cruz (    ) makes a case for realism about numbers based exactly on this. She men-
tions the fact that “[s]cienti c practice suggests a crucial explanatory role for numbers in
research on numerical cognition” (De Cruz,     , p.  ), providing “a prima facie realist case
for numbers, since neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists are interested in isolating nu-
merical properties of the environment, and since they refer to numbers in their explanations”
(De Cruz,     , p.  ). However, De Cruz recognizes that it is highly unlikely that numbers
themselves take part in the implementation of the cognitive processes that support quantical
abilities. She views numbers as acausal abstract entities, and thus they cannot take part in
causal explanations of cognitive mechanisms. However, she argues, scientists have to assume
the existence of these acausal entities in order to explain numerosity perception. In other
words, numbers are indispensable for the scienti c models of quantical cognition. De Cruz’s
realist case for numbers is an instance of the traditional Quine-Putnam Indispensability Ar-
gument.
Even if De Cruz might be right in claiming that numbers are indispensable for scienti c
models of quantical cognition, such indispensability is not capable of supporting a stronger
case for number realism than other indispensable uses of numbers in science. Numbers are
as indispensable for the explanation of quantical cognition as they are for the explanation of
the movement of the stars. To the extent that the indispensability of numbers in quantical
cognition models can also be reconciled with nominalistic or  ctionalistic reinterpretations
of mathematical language, De Cruz’s case for realism is as inconclusive as the approaches we
saw in Chapter  . Now, if numbers are cognitive tools, as I am proposing, there is nothing
special about the use of numbers in scienti c models of quantical cognition. As cognitive
tools, numbers can be used to model any kind of phenomena, from the movement of the
stars to quantical cognition.
 . .  A closer look into numerosities
At the end of subsection  . . , I provisionally de ned numerosity as perceived cardinality.
For reasons that I will make clear in this section, this de nition is unsatisfactory. The prob-
lem is that this de nition does not take into account a very basic, well-known fact about the
concept of cardinality already pointed out by Frege: there is no unique characteristic manner
in which an aggregate of matter can be separated into discrete parts so as to be counted.
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If I give someone a stone with the words: Find the weight of this, I have given him
precisely the object he is to investigate. But if I place a pile of playing cards in his
hands with the words: Find the Number of these, this does not tell him whether I wish
to know the number of cards, or of complete packs of cards, or even say of honour
cards at skat. To have given him the pile in his hands is not yet to have given him
completely the object he is to investigate; I must add some further word—cards, or
packs, or honours (Frege,     , §  , p.   ).
A deck of cards does not have number as a property of its own in the same way that it
has weight as a property of its own. This has an important consequence for how we should
interpret the results of experiments probing infants’ ability to perceive numerosity. When an
experimenter presents an infant with stimuli like the ones reproduced in Figure  . , there is
no cardinality to be perceived in the stimuli themselves. The cardinality attributed to them
will depend on what is to be counted as a unit. In the leftmost picture, for example, one can
count four triangles, or eight eyes, or twelve eyes and mouths. If newborns attribute some
particular cardinality to such a stimulus, this will depend on what they are counting as a
unit. It may well be that infants will count each geometrical  gure as a unit, as it seems to be
the experimenter’s intended criterion of individuation. However, when cognitive scientists
say that numerosity—viewed as a synonym of cardinality—is a perceptible property of the
environment, they are downplaying the role of cognitive agents in determining a criterion
of individuation. A cardinality cannot be attributed to a stimulus unless an agent has already
determinedwhat is to be counted as the relevant unit. But then the cardinality so determined
will not be a property of the stimulus, but a property of how the agent processed the stimulus.
In fact, cognitive scientists are aware of this. Here again we encounter a careless use
of terminology, rather than a real conceptual mistake. For example, Wynn addresses this
point, citing Frege explicitly, when she notices the necessity of a sortal to individuate and
subsequently enumerate events or actions:
actions are interesting to study because Frege’s (    /    ) point that number is not
an inherent property of portions of the world applies every bit as much to actions as it
does to physical matter. Just as a given physical aggregate may accurately be described
as    cards,   deck, or      molecules, if I walk across a room it counts as   “crossing-the-
room” action, but may count as   “taking-a-step” actions. Number of actions is only
determinate relative to a sortal term that identi es a speci c kind of action. There is no
inherent, objective fact of the matter as to where, in the continuously evolving scene,
one ‘action’ ends and the next ‘action’ begins. The individuation of discrete actions
from this continuous scene is a cognitive imposition (Wynn,     , p.    ).
[T]he enumerationmechanismmay take as input conceptually speci ed entities—entities
that the cognitive system conceptualizes as individuals (Wynn,     , p.    ).
When it comes to events, the need for a sortal is still more self-evident than in the case
of static stimuli. But in this case as well, cognitive scientists recognize, albeit less explic-
itly, that some process of individuation is needed before numerosity can be assessed. For
example, Cantlon (    , p.   ) says that “an object is a cognitive construct recognized across
modalities” (emphasis added), and Fornaciai, Cicchini, and Burr (    , p.   ) write that
“numerosity perception depends on segmentation of the elements in perceptual objects, fol-
lowing several rules such similar shape, orientation, common fate, and connectedness.” In
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Dehaene and Changeux’s (    ) model of the ANS, as can be noticed in the schema depicted
in Figure  . , between the input “retina,” as the authors call it, and “numerosity detectors,”
there is a layer in which visual or auditory stimuli are segmented into objects. Notice that
the authors represent the visual input as a continuous wave, suggesting that collections of
discrete items do not come directly from sensory stimuli. It is the intermediate layer that
segregates input stimuli into objects and groups them into collections. Only then can these
collections, formed in the mind, have their numerosity assessed.
Figure  . : The intermediate layer between stim-
ulus input and numerosity detection is where the
individuation of objects takes place. (Figure repro-
duced fromDehaene andChangeux (    , p.    ).)
As opposed to the freedom we have to
choose a sortal when evaluating cardinality,
when it comes to numerosity perception we
have limited control of the processes of in-
dividuation and grouping of objects carried
out by our perceptual system. The extent
to which perception of numerosity is unre-
sponsive to attempts to control it is illus-
trated by the e ects of adaptation. After
adaptation to a larger numerosity, we can-
not help underestimating subsequent stim-
uli, even if we are informed about their cor-
rect numerosity (Burr & Ross,     ). The
e ects of adaptation are even more striking
when di erent regions of the visual  eld are adapted to di erent numerosities. For example,
if the left region of the visual  eld is adapted to a smaller numerosity, and the right region
is adapted to a larger one (by staring at a mid-point between two clouds of dots, the smaller
on the left and the larger on the right), subsequent numerosities presented on the left will
be perceived as larger (overestimated), whereas subsequent numerosities presented on the
right will be perceived as smaller (underestimated), even in the case that both numerosities
are equal and the subject is informed about that. Dehaene (    a, p.    ) comments on this
result:
the fact that numerical percepts impose themselves upon us so immediately, automat-
ically, and without conscious control (even if we know that the numbers are equal)
points to the operation of a special and largely automatic processing system. As noted
by Burr and colleagues, “Just as we have a direct visual sense of the reddishness of half
a dozen ripe cherries, so we do of their sixishness.”
This similarity between the perception of color and the perception of numerosity is
very illustrative of how numerosity di ers from cardinality. Comparing number with color,
Frege writes: “while I am not in a position, simply by thinking of it di erently, to alter the
colour or hardness of a thing in the slightest, I am able to think of the Iliad either as one
poem, or as    Books, or as some large Number of verses” (Frege,     , §  , p.   ). What
Dehaene is pointing out in the above passage is that, when it comes to numerosity, we are
just as unable to change it, “simply by thinking of it di erently,” as we are unable to change
color, especially when stimulus is presented quickly.  This marks a fundamental di erence
 If su cient time is provided, we can change our perception of numerosity by shifting the attentional focus.
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between perception of numerosity and assessment of cardinality.
Numerosity is perceived as if it were a mind-independent property of the environment
because the detection of numerosity is conducted by automatic processes that are out of our
active control. But numerosity is not a genuine mind-independent property of the environ-
ment, since in principle our perceptual system could parse stimuli di erently, resulting in
di erent numerosity evaluations of the same physical phenomenon. If it is the perceptual
system that imposes the segmentation of stimuli into objects and the grouping of them into
collections, then numerosity is a property of these internally concocted collections.
This does not mean, however, that numerosity is a purely psychological construct. Some
studies have shown that objective characteristics of the input a ect our perception of nu-
merosity. For example, Fornaciai et al. (    ) and Burr et al. (    ) cite studies that show
that the presence of items connected to each other in stimuli decreases the perception of
numerosity. In these studies, experimenters presented participants with clouds of dots in
which some pairs of dots were connected by a line. This modi cation inclined participants
to identify connected pairs of dots as a single unit. “At modest numerosities, connecting
  % of dots led to a   % reduction in apparent number” (Burr et al.,     , p.  ). This shows
that the segmentation of stimuli into objects is not arbitrary; rather, it relies on genuine
properties of the environment.
Numerosity is an internally built psychological property, but one that is responsive to
external physical properties of the environment. Numerosity seems to emerge in the inter-
play between subjects and the environment. If this is so, numerosity perception bears more
similarities with color perception than merely the fact that both are not subject to delib-
erate modi cation by the perceiver. At this point, it is worth brie y digressing into color
perception, so that we can draw a closer parallel between it and numerosity perception. For
this digression, I rely mostly on Chirimuuta (    ).
Although our everyday experience suggests that color is a property of objects we see in
the external world, there are at least two sources of concern regarding this naïve view. First,
color is subject to perceptual variation: depending on the angle of view, background, and
lighting conditions, among other factors, the perceived color changes, and there is no prin-
cipled way of determining which is the “real” color of the object in question. The following
famous passage by Russell illustrates this point:
Although I believe that the table is “really” of the same colour all over, the parts that
re ect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white
because of re ected light. I know that, if I move, the parts that re ect the light will
be di erent, so that the apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. . . .
It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently
appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table—it
appears to be of di erent colours from di erent points of view, and there is no reason
for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others (Russell,     , p.  - ).
Variations in perceived color, along with the lack of a principled way to select the “cor-
rect” variation, suggest that there may be an unavoidable mismatch between the colors we
For example, regarding two connected dots, initially subitized as one single object, we can shift the attention to
the dots only, and then subitize two items.
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perceive from our personal standpoint and the underlying reality where objects could have
a real color, inaccessible to us. However, the second source of concern for naïve realism
about colors threatens precisely the idea that objects are, in reality, intrinsically colored. In
the scienti c description of the world, the fundamental constituents of matter—atoms and
subatomic particles—are colorless; color does not appear among the properties of the world
as described by physics (Chirimuuta,     , section  . . ). Russell’s brown wooden table is
intrinsically colorless, since it is made out of colorless atoms. Taken together, variation of
color perception and the physical description of the world suggest that color is an illusion,
an attribute our perceptual system projects onto reality. But this is not the whole story.
Against the anti-realism suggested by the above considerations, realists about color claim
that color perception amounts to the detection of a property of surfaces called spectral sur-
face re ectance (SSR). Roughly, SSR has to do with how a given surface absorbs and re ects
di erent light wavelengths. Anti-realists, however, retort that light perception is not fully
reducible to SSR. One problem is that SSR is a property that a surface has independent of
the objects neighboring it, whereas the perception of the color of a given surface varies ac-
cording to the objects around it. For example, a gray surface will be perceived as darker if
surrounded by lighter gray surfaces, whereas it will be perceived as lighter if surrounded by
darker surfaces (Chirimuuta,     , section  . . ).
In light of these problems, some have suggested that color is a relational property, i.e.,
a property of the relation between perceivers and their environment. Chirimuuta endorses
this view. According to her, “colors are not properties of things (minds or extra-dermal
objects) but of speci c kinds of events, namely perceptual interactions” (Chirimuuta,     ,
section  . , para.  ). Color is not a property of the environment, nor a projection from
subjects onto reality, but a phenomenon that emerges in the interplay between perceivers
and the environment. Chirimuuta characterizes color as follows:
Colors are properties of perceptual interactions involving a perceiver (P) endowedwith
a spectrally discriminating visual system (V) and a stimulus (S) with spectral contrast
of the sort that can be exploited by V (Chirimuuta,     , section  . , para.  ).
In line with the realist view, in Chirimuuta’s de nition, the objective part of color per-
ception, (S), also comes from the external world. It is composed of the SSR of surfaces and
other external factors that in uence color perception. But these external factors are not ev-
erything. The perceiver’s perceptual system elaborates on top of (S) in order to produce the
full experience of color perception. In Chirimuuta’s words, “[c]olors are ways stimuli appear
to certain kinds of individuals” (Chirimuuta,     , section  . , para.  ).
Now, the parallel between color and numerosity perception can easily be drawn. As
we saw, numerosity is not a property of the environment because there is no characteristic
manner in which physical aggregates can be parsed into discrete elements and grouped into
collections. At the same time, perception of numerosity is not fully arbitrary, since there are
some genuine properties of the external world that in uence numerosity perception (e.g.,
connectedness). Thus, full-blown anti-realism about numerosities is not satisfactory, since
numerosity perception does re ect aspects of the external world. But realism is not satisfac-
tory either, since numerosity perception depends on how our perceptual system individuates
and groups objects. Thus, a version of themidway relationist position about color perception
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seems to  t nicely here. Paraphrasing Chirimuuta’s relationist characterization of colors, we
can characterize numerosity as follows:
Numerosity is a property of perceptual interactions involving a perceiver (P) endowed
with quantical cognition (Q) and a stimulus (S) liable to segmentation into discrete
objects of the sort that can be exploited by Q.
Numerosity is a property of perceptual interactions because itmay vary across perceptual
events and across individuals, just like perception of colors. Under the e ect of adaptation,
for example, perception of numerosity may vary across trials within the same individual.
These variations cannot be regarded as mere “noise,” as if they were the result of a kind of
malfunctioning of our cognitive system that would prevent us from having clear sight of
the discrete quantities before us, simply because there are no discrete quantities before us,
given Frege’s argument. Numerosity emerges only in the course of a perceptual interaction,
when the perceiver receives the input stimulus and elaborates on it. This elaboration aims at
ascribing a sense of magnitude to the stimulus as a function of the number of discrete items
the agent’s perceptual system identi es and collects in it.
For the perceptual interactions that give rise to numerosity perception, the quality of
the stimulus (S) is not irrelevant. As speci ed in the characterization of numerosity given
above, the stimulus must be liable to segmentation into discrete objects. For example, if
the stimulus is completely homogeneous, like a continuous tone or a blank screen, there
are no discontinuities—e.g., pauses, contrasting colors, shapes—which could be exploited
for its segmentation into discrete items, and therefore perception of numerosity will not
take place. It has been experimentally demonstrated that stimuli where objects are densely
packed—where items become “crowded”—do not elicit numerosity perception (Anobile et
al.,     ; Burr et al.,     ). Another indication that features of the stimulus signi cantly
in uence numerosity perception is the fact that the spatial organization of elements in a
scene determines how collections will be formed. I mentioned above that whether items
are connected or not makes a di erence in numerosity perception. Gestalt psychologists
have identi ed a number of other principles that govern the segmentation and grouping of
objects in the visual  eld (Wagemans et al.,     ). One of these is proximity, according to
which items that are closer to each other than to other elements of the scene tend to be
grouped together. For example, compare the following strings of stars:
FFFFF
FF FF FF
In the top row, we tend to group all the stars together, whereas in the bottom row we
tend to see three groups of two stars each. Proximity is a relation that objects have amongst
themselves, independent of the perceiver. Again, this is clear evidence that numerosity per-
ception is not detached from properties of the external world, although we cannot regard
numerosity itself as a property of the external world. Again, it is a property of perceptual
interactions.
Metaphysically speaking, we might say that perception of numerosity is only possible
because we live in a world that produces stimuli in such a way that our perceptual system
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can segment them into discrete objects and group these objects into collections. In a sense,
perception of numerosity is possible because we live in a world that “a ords” segregation
and collection (Gibson,     ; Jones,     ). If we lived in a liquid world, where there were
no clear and enduring borders between objects, or in a world where ephemeral objects kept
popping out and vanishing away all the time (like rain drops permanently  oating in the air
and fusing with each other or breaking apart continually) perception of numerosity would
most likely not emerge.
At this point, the di erences and similarities between numerosity and cardinality should
be clear. Numerosity is a property of perceptual interactions. It can be thought of as a layer
of information that our cognitive system adds to raw stimuli. Cardinality, on the other hand,
is a property of collections of items, perceived or not, which we freely create. Cardinality
is not a property of perceptual interactions—since we cannot apprehend cardinality sim-
ply by sight or hearing—but it is also a relational property: just as numerosity, cardinality
emerges only after a cognitive agent has individuated and collected items. To assess cardinal-
ity, we do not simply interact perceptually with the collection thus created, but rather exe-
cute a procedure over its items, i.e., we count them. Since cardinality and numerosity emerge
through di erent relationships—di erent ways of interacting with the environment—they
correspond to two di erent relational properties. Figure  .   illustrates this point. Nu-
merosity and cardinality may coincide when we deliberately count collections of up to three
or four objects following the instinctive way our perceptual system parses the environment.
Above this limit, however, perception of numerosity and evaluation of cardinality tend to
diverge, even if, for the assessment of cardinality, we individuate objects in the instinctive
way our perceptual system does. This marks another di erence between numerosity and
cardinality: the latter is a clear-cut property, whereas the former is vague.
In light of the conceptual distinctions I am drawing here, a cognitive scientist probing
the quantical skills of a monkey can say, using the terminology proposed here, that the mon-
key perceives collections with di erent cardinalities as having the same numerosity (pro-
vided, of course, that the experimenter is parsing the stimulus using the same “sortal” used
by the monkey’s perceptual system). This is di erent from saying that the monkey perceives
collections with di erent cardinalities as having the same cardinality. If the monkey is not
able to count, the relational property “cardinality” never appears to it.
Numerosity is perceivable at a glance. Cardinality, by contrast, is not; its determination
requires the execution of a deliberate sequence of steps: one has to deliberately choose a
sortal, individuate objects according to this sortal, group them into a collection, and count
the collection. Assessments of cardinality above the subitizing range require mastery of a
technique. Non-human animals and innumerate humans cannot determine the cardinality
of collections with more than three or four items, since they have not mastered the relevant
technique.  The distinction Frege draws, in the following passage, between color and “Num-
ber” gives the lines of the distinction we should draw between numerosity and cardinality:
It marks, therefore, an important di erence between colour and Number, that a colour
such as blue belongs to a surface independently of any choice of ours. . . . The Number
 The distinction made here between numerosity and cardinality is similar to the distinction that the psy-
chophysicist S. S. Stevens proposed more than eighty years ago (Stevens,     /    ). The main di erence is that
Stevens uses the term ‘numerousness’ where I use ‘numerosity,’ and ‘numerosity’ where I use ‘cardinality.’
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Figure  .  : In (A) there is no observer, and therefore no numerosity or cardinality. Surely, the
reader is able to see two palm trees or three trees, a few fruits, etc. In this case, though, an observer is
present (the reader), which corresponds to the situation illustrated in (B). In (B), an observer focuses
her gaze on the fruits, groups them into a collection, and thus perceives a certain numerosity. The
emerging relational property is numerosity since she simply looks at the fruits, without counting
them; this property emerges through a perceptual interaction handled by quantical cognition. In (C),
the observer focuses her attention on the fruits and counts them. The emerging relational property,
in this case, is cardinality, since it emerges through a procedural interaction in which the agent pairs
each fruit with a counting word in the conventional fashion. This procedural interaction is handled
by numerical (as distinct from quantical) cognition. This explains why numerosity is not “noisy” or
“approximate” cardinality: without the participation of an observer, there is no cardinality out there
to be seen (A); when the observer focuses on certain features of the stimulus, then numerosity (a vague
sense of discrete magnitudes) emerges (B); only later, if the observer is able to count, can she follow a
rule-based procedure with the features of the stimulus that elicited numerosity perception and thus
determine cardinality (an exact assessment of discrete magnitudes) (C). Roughly, cardinality is better
described as “exact numerosity” than numerosity as “approximate cardinality.”
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 , on the other hand, or     or any other Number, cannot be said to belong to the pile
of playing cards in its own right, but at most to belong to it in view of the way in which
we have chosen to regard it (Frege,     , §  , p.   ).
‘Choice’ is the key word here. Numerosity belongs to a stimulus, by and large, regard-
less of our choice. The mechanisms of our perceptual and cognitive systems that determine
numerosity are mostly out of our active control, whereas the techniques we use to evaluate
cardinality are mostly under our active control. This might re ect the fact that the cognitive
mechanisms underlying numerosity perception have genetic roots—i.e., are “instinctive”—
whereas the cognitive mechanisms underlying our understanding of cardinalities and cardi-
nal numbers—our favorite yardstick for cardinality—are acquired only after extensive train-
ing.
All things considered, a concise de nition of numerosity may run as follows:
Numerosity is a property of perceptual interactions, evaluated by means of quantical
skills, that refers to the perceived cardinal magnitude of the stimulus as a function of
the sortal used by the agent’s perceptual system to identify and collect discrete items
in the stimulus.
Notice that the “sortal” here is not necessarily linguistic. Pre- and nonverbal agents will not
individuate objects based on linguistic concepts, but can do so by relying on perceivable
characteristics of the stimulus. For example, Feigenson and Halberda (    ) and Moher,
Tuerk, and Feigenson (    ) have shown that infants can individuate and group objects in
di erent manners guided by spatial and featural cues of visual stimuli.
 .  A  rst hint on the nature of numbers
Quantical cognition is non-numerical because it neither allows those who possess it to see
numbers in the environment nor relies on numbers to assess numerosity. Although quanti-
cal cognition is non-numerical, the discussion above can shed some light on the nature of
numbers. First, we have seen that there is nothing in the  ndings from numerical cogni-
tion that contradicts Frege’s claim that number (and cardinality) is not a property of the
environment. Rather, Frege’s observation helps illuminate what is really perceived through
quantical abilities. Again in line with Frege’s observations, we have seen that the internal
mechanisms of quantical cognition do not make use of numbers—there are no numbers in
the brain—nor representations of numbers. Given that innate number concepts have not
been reported in other cognitive systems, we can conclude that number concepts are not
innate. In sum, numbers are not to be found in the environment nor in the mind as innate
cognitive resources.
These are negative conclusions: they say what numbers are not and where they are not
to be found. However, from them we can also gain a more positive insight into the nature
of numbers. Since number concepts are not a product of genetic evolution, everything we
know about numbers, from counting to formal arithmetic, has to be learned from other
human beings and, therefore, is a product of socio-cultural processes. This is in line with the
hypothesis that numbers are human creations. However, the evidence gathered so far, from
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studies on quantical cognition only, is not su cient to make a convincing case for this. We
still need to investigate the way human beings acquire number concepts and how number
concepts have emerged in history. I address these issues in the next two chapters.
 .  Conclusion
Conceptual clarity is key to a well-informed philosophical account of any topic. More often
than not, scientists do not use philosophically relevant terms carefully. This is exactly what
we have seen in the literature on non-symbolic numerical cognition. In this conclusion, it is
worth summarizing the most signi cant de nitions and distinctions I have put forward in
this chapter.
We saw that scientists usually mix up the concepts of cardinality, number, and numeros-
ity. This confusion underlies the claim that quantical cognition is numerical. A crucial
di erence between cardinality and numerosity on the one hand, and numbers on the other,
is that the former are properties, whereas the latter provide a method for evaluating one of
these properties (cardinality). There are other, non-numerical ways of evaluating the size of
discrete magnitudes. Cardinality can be assessed by one-to-one correspondence, in which
case no numbers are involved. The same goes for numerosity. The mechanisms that imple-
ment subitizing assess the numerosity of small collections by one-to-one correspondence.
The mechanisms that implement the perception of larger numerosities also rely on non-
numerical means, which may be either one-to-one correspondence (in the linear model of
the ANS) or an imprecise correspondence between elements of the to-be-enumerated collec-
tion and intervals of a continuous “stream” (in the logarithmic model). Thus, both subitizing
and estimation rely on non-numerical means for the assessment of numerosity.
Both numerosity and cardinality are relational properties, i.e, properties that emerge in
the relationship between cognitive agents and their environment. However, a crucial dif-
ference between numerosity and cardinality lies in the means through which they emerge:
numerosity emerges in perceptual interactions handled by quantical cognition, whereas car-
dinality emerges in procedural interactions (counting) handled by numerical cognition. In
other words, numerosity di ers from cardinality in that the latter is not a perceptual prop-
erty—it cannot be evaluated at a glance. Although numerosity is perceived as if it were a
property of the external world, it is not. It emerges only when a perceiver, equipped with
quantical skills, receives an input stimulus with certain properties. The perceiver’s percep-
tual system exploits objective properties of the stimulus to parse it into discrete items, which
are subsequently grouped in collections, which then have their numerosity assessed. Nu-
merosity is a layer of information that our cognitive system adds to raw stimuli.
The observation that “number” is not a property of the environment nor an innate cog-
nitive resource suggests that numerical competence is a product of cultural processes. The
cultural processes underlying number learning are the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter  
Numerical cognition
N      concepts are not innate, as we saw in the previous chapter. If we are not bornwith number concepts, we have to acquire them somehow. We also saw in Chapter  
that there are no numbers to be perceived in the environment, and thus the acquisition of
number concepts cannot be like the acquisition of other concepts such as dog, cat, or table,
which are acquired by means of direct contact with the things they refer to. But then, where
do number concepts come from? In Chapter  , based on a brief review of some  ndings
from numerical cognition, I suggested the hypothesis that we acquire number concepts by
initially experiencing numerals as de-semanticized symbols governed by operational rules.
In other words, the suggestion is that numerals themselves, in conjunction with the practices
wherein they are involved, such as the counting procedure, engender in us their meanings.
In this chapter, I discuss in more detail results from numerical cognition and developmental
psychology that give further support to this hypothesis.
I start this chapter with a preliminary discussion, in section  . , about what it means
to possess number concepts. In section  . , I review correlational studies which show that,
although quantical and numerical cognition seem to be positively correlated, the contribu-
tion of quantical skills to the development of numerical skills is modest. Exposure to number
talk and experience with numerical symbols seem to be much more relevant for the devel-
opment of numerical competence than quantical skills. In section  . , I review studies in
developmental psychology that investigate how children learn to count. These studies show
that  rst, children learn the sequence of counting words by rote, without associating nu-
merical meanings to the words. Only later, when they have already mastered the counting
principles, do they start to associate the right cardinal value with each word, clearly indicat-
ing that the acquisition of number concepts (for numbers larger than three or four, at least)
is a consequence of learning to count. These results o er strong support to the hypothe-
sis that we acquire number concepts by initially experiencing numerals as de-semanticized
symbols governed by operational rules. In sections  .  and  . , I review the two most widely
accepted accounts of the internal processes that take place when children build number con-
cepts. In both accounts, the process of the formation of number concepts is triggered by the
acquisition of number words and starts with collaboration from quantical skills. These two
competing approaches disagree, however, about the importance of each of the quantical cog-
  
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nitive systems (ANS and OFS) in this process. As we will see, this debate is still ongoing.
In section  . , I review results that show that mental cardinal values bear marks of the par-
ticular symbolic system through which they were learned, lending additional support to the
thesis that numeral systems, conjointly with the counting procedure, give rise to number
concepts. In section  . , I explain why counting is a cognitive tool indispensable for the
acquisition of concepts for numbers larger than three or four.
 .  Number concepts
As already noted in Chapter  , I am using the term ‘concept’ to refer to psychological entities
and this should not be taken as implying that numbers are mental entities. A concept, un-
derstood as a mental entity, may still be about external non-mental entities. In this chapter,
I will not address the question of what number concepts are about. Rather, I will be con-
cerned only with the ontogenetic (i.e., regarding the developmental history of an individual)
origins of number concepts.
People’s number concepts may vary considerably. This variation, however, is not neces-
sarily in quality, but in quantity. Some people know much more about numbers than others.
A mathematician can spend her whole life investigating numbers. As a result, her concept
of number (i.e., her mental contents about numbers) will be very vast. However, we ascribe
numerical understanding to people who know much less about numbers than mathemati-
cians do. What is the minimum level of understanding of numbers that one must display in
order to count as having some numerical competence?
In numerical cognition studies, the minimum requirement for a child being classi ed as
a “number-knower” at some level is to pass the so-called Give-a-Number test (Wynn,     ). 
In this test, a certain number of objects—e.g., toy dinosaurs—is made available in a large
bowl placed near the child being tested. Then the experimenter asks: “Could you give me
one dinosaur?” If the child succeeds in giving exactly one dinosaur and does not give the
same quantity when another number is asked for, she is said to be a “one-knower.” Next, the
experimenter asks: “Could you give me two dinosaurs?” If she succeeds, giving exactly two
dinosaurs and not giving the same quantity when another number is asked for, she is a “two-
knower.” This process is repeated for the next numbers. As we will see below, children go
through these levels, from one-knower to three- or four-knower, step by step, until they have
 nally learned to count arbitrarily larger numbers. This stepwise progress shows that it is
possible to be familiar with the number one only, and after that with one and two only, and
then with one, two and three only, before one has mastered a general method of counting.
A similar observation can be made about people in few-number cultures.  As we will see
in Chapter  , in cultures in which the upper limit of the numeral system is very low (four
or less), people do not know a general method for counting, but even so they are able to
consistently and accurately use their number words for one, two, and three.
Following this convention established in developmental studies, I will assume that the
 A number-knower is not necessarily one who has justi ed true beliefs about numbers. A number-knower
simply is one who knows the meaning of number words.
 Few-number cultures are small-scale cultures whose language has only a small list of numberwords (DeCruz,
Neth, & Schlimm,     ).
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minimum level of number understanding is “one-knower.” In other words, number under-
standing starts with the comprehension of “one” as referring to an exact quantity comprising
a single item. This convention is far from being arbitrary: both cognitively and logically, the
number one can be seen as the basis fromwhich children generate all the subsequent number
concepts (Buijsman,     ).
If people may know only some numbers, then we have to distinguish between the con-
cepts of each number—   ,    ,      , etc.—and the concept of        or, more pre-
cisely,               . The concept of natural number involves the idea that the sequence
of numbers is in nite. In mathematics, the standard de nition of natural number is given
through the Peano Axioms and only an in nity sequence can satisfy them. In mathematics,
each number also has its own de nition. If the concepts of one and successor are taken as
primitive, then two is de ned as the successor of one, three as the successor of two, and so on.
Consequently, in mathematical terms, knowing the concept of, say, two, entails knowing all
the numbers, since in order to know two one has to know the successor function. However,
this is not how people really learn numbers in practice. As indicated above, children  rst
learn the  rst numbers of the sequence individually, and only much later do they generalize
the successor function and then realize that the sequence of numbers is in nite. In cognitive
terms, then, having the concept of n does not entail having the concept of the successor of n.
Whatmust one know about a number n in order to count as having the concept of n? The
number one has many properties—e.g., it is odd, it is the smallest positive number, etc.—but
a one-knower is not required to be aware of these properties. In the Give-a-Number task,
when the experimenter asks “Could you give me one dinosaur?”, what is being observed is
whether the child is able to produce a collection of things with cardinality one, i.e., it is
su cient for her to know the cardinal value of the word /one/. Thus, according to the Give-
a-Number task parameter of success, the minimum one must know about a number n to
count as having the concept of n is its cardinal value.
We saw in section  . .  that the cardinality of a collection can be determined and ex-
pressed with or without numbers. Numbers provide amethod of precisely assessing cardinal-
ity, but there is another, viz., one-to-one correspondence, which does not involve numbers.
Based on this, I claimed there that the concept of cardinality is independent of the concept
of number. Now, we see that, cognitively, number concepts are in fact dependent on the ap-
prehension of cardinalities: the minimum content of a number concept is its cardinal value.
A cardinal value can be conceived of as an “abstract cardinality,” i.e., the idea of the size of
a collection that is composed of items whose identities do not matter or have been omitted.
In other words, someone who knows the cardinal value of n knows what a collection with n
items should “look like” in terms of size.
The introduction of cardinal values illuminates what we gain by using numbers in com-
parison to one-to-one correspondence. By means of one-to-one correspondence, we can
compare particular cardinalities only. We always need another particular collection—amodel
collection—to express the cardinality of the target collection. For example, if we want to know
how many people there are in a room—the target collection—by means of non-numerical
one-to-one correspondence, we need another collection to model the collection of people in
the room. One option may be the collection of chairs in the room. If there is a one-to-one
correspondence between people and chairs, then we know that (a) “there are as many people
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as chairs in the room.” However, someone who is not familiar with this model collection
(chairs) cannot have any idea about how big the group of people in the room is after being
informed of (a). Are there hundreds of people in the room or only a small group? Without
using numerical means, one can only by inspecting the model collection or the target col-
lection directly have an idea of their sizes. In contrast, by using a numeral we can convey
information about the size of these collections without needing to present them. We can
simply say “the number of people in the room is three.” When a three-knower hears or reads
this sentence, she knows what the collection of people in the room “looks like” in terms of
size. ‘Three’ elicits in her mind the idea of a collection consisting of distinct items a, b, and
c. This idea plays the role of a model collection—it works as a mental “model collection”—
with the advantage of being a shared way of referring to cardinalities, facilitating mutual
understanding, since most people associate a similar representation with ‘three’. The car-
dinal value of a number is like a “standard model collection” that represents a cardinality.
In Chapter  , we will see that a strategy like this—the selection of a paradigmatic model
collection to represent a cardinality—is behind the origin of numbers words for one, two,
and three in some languages.
Above, I said that cardinal values can be conceived of as abstract cardinalities. In phi-
losophy, there are di erent ways of spelling out what abstractness is. One way, which is
compatible with concepts being psychological entities, is the Aristotelian way, according to
which an abstract idea is one that is obtained by considering several experiences and omit-
ting the features that distinguish them. Cognitive scientists claim that number concepts are
abstract in an Aristotelian sense. In the literature on numerical cognition, a number concept
is said to be abstract if it is recruited regardless of the modality (e.g., visual or auditory) or
code format (e.g., symbolic or iconic) of the stimuli (Campbell,     ). Or, as Dehaene et al.
(    , p.    ) put it, “[a]dults can be said to rely on an abstract representation of number if
their behavior depends only on the size of the numbers involved, not on the speci c verbal
or non-verbal means of denoting them.” However, the abstractness of psychological num-
ber concepts in this sense is controversial. There is mounting evidence that there might be
several distinct instances of the same numerical facts—and, possibly, of the same cardinal
values—in the brain. These di erent instances are likely to be recruited depending on the
modality and format of the stimuli, resulting in alterations in behavioral parameters such
as accuracy and reaction time (Campbell,     ; Kadosh & Walsh,     ; Kutter et al.,     ).
However, even if number concepts are not abstract in the sense of being independent of
modality and code format, these modality- or format-speci c instances of numerical facts
are still abstract in a broader sense. For example, even if reading ‘ ,’ hearing /three/, and
seeing ⌃⌃⌃ activate di erent instances of the cardinal value of three, the fact that di erent
episodes of hearing /three/ brings to the mind of the hearer the same cardinal value regard-
less of the context in which this symbol is heard, the collection which it refers to, etc., shows
that it is still abstract with regard to context, identity of the objects in the collection, etc.
This is the sense in which I am saying that cardinal values are abstract cardinalities.
The next sections  esh out the details of how the minimal content of the  rst number
concepts—their cardinal values—are acquired by individuals.
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 .  The relationship between quantical and numerical cognition
Quantical cognition is non-numerical, as we saw in the previous chapter. This does notmean,
however, that quantical and numerical cognition are not related. The prevailing view is that
quantical cognition provides the genetically evolved preconditions for numerical cognition. 
Perhaps the most often cited experimental result that supports this view is the observation
of distance and size e ects—the hallmarks of the ANS—in the comparison of numerals. This
observation was  rst made by Moyer and Landauer (    ). They presented numerate adults
with two Arabic digits and asked which one represented the larger value. The reaction time
and error rate of participants increased as the numerical distance of the presented digits
decreased. For example, the comparison ‘ ’ vs. ‘ ’ took longer and was more error prone
than the comparison ‘ ’ vs. ‘ .’ “Considering this evidence,” Holloway and Ansari (    ,
p.    ) write, “it seems clear that the semantic referents of numerical symbols are built upon
the approximate representations of numerical magnitude seen in non-human animals and
illiterate humans.”
The relation between quantical and numerical cognition is hardly deniable. However,
the contents that numerals activate in the mind cannot be fully equated to numerosity repre-
sentations for at least two reasons. First, distance and size e ects are less intense in symbolic
number comparison than in numerosity comparison (Verguts & Fias,     ). Second, the
neuronal populations that encode numerosity representations and number concepts barely
overlap. In a recent study, Kutter et al. (    ) recorded the activity of single neurons of
neurosurgical patients who had intracranial electrodes implanted in their medial tempo-
ral lobe (MTL) while they performed calculation tasks with numerosities or Arabic digits.
The authors observed that neurons responsive to numerosities or Arabic digits “are largely
segregated in the MTL; abstract neurons that encode the same numerical value in both non-
symbolic and symbolic formats were rarely found” (Kutter et al.,     , p.    ). However, they
also observed that the activity of neurons exclusively tuned to Arabic digits displayed the
distance e ect too, though it was less intense than the e ect displayed by numerosity-tuned
neurons, as predicted by behavioral studies.
Taken together, these two observations—separate neuronal populations both displaying
the distance e ect—suggest that either number concepts are the product of the re nement
and specialization of neurons previously responsive to numerosities; or they constitute an
entirely new web of mental contents built under the in uence of numerosity perception, but
not exactly upon it. Roughly, these two hypotheses correspond, respectively, to Dehaene and
Carey’s accounts of the ontogenetic development of numerical cognition I address below. For
now, the important message is that, in either case, numerosity representations and number
concepts are clearly distinguishable in the brain, although related in some way.
Correlational studies have investigated the connection between quantical skills and nu-
merical competence. Usually, in these studies, children have the accuracy of their quantical
 Even the nativist would agree with this view if ‘quantical cognition’ were replaced with ‘non-symbolic nu-
merical cognition.’ The contentious point is how much of symbolic numerical cognition is already present in
non-symbolic numerical/quantical cognition. Those who prefer the term ‘quantical cognition’ hold that the an-
swer to this question is “very little.” Nativists, in contrast, believe that number concepts are already in place at
birth, and thus children only have to learn the right symbols to express the concepts they already have.
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abilities measured and statistically compared to their performance on standardized arith-
metic tests. In one of the pioneering studies of this kind, Halberda, Mazzocco, and Feigenson
(    ) showed that the ANS accuracy of adolescents retrospectively predicted their perfor-
mance on arithmetic tests from as early as kindergarten. In their study, students with a
smaller Weber fraction (i.e., with a more accurate ANS) at the age of    achieved better
scores in standardized arithmetic tests administered annually in their previous school years.
However, such a signi cant correlation between quantical cognition and arithmetic skills
was not con rmed in subsequent studies (e.g, Holloway and Ansari (    ); Lyons, Price,
Vaessen, Blomert, and Ansari (    ); Sasanguie, Defever, and Reynvoet (    )).
In a review of studies of this kind, De Smedt, Noël, Gilmore, and Ansari (    ) analyzed
   studies that found a signi cant correlation betweenANS accuracy andmathematical com-
petence, and    that did not. They propose that di erences in the sample size, the age of
the participants, and the tests used to measure both quantical and numerical skills may at
least partially explain these con icting results. Despite methodological issues, however, they
point out that
the di culty in nding relationships between non-symbolic numerical magnitude pro-
cessing and mathematics achievement may indicate that the kinds of representations
and processes measured by these tasks are not particularly critical for children’s devel-
opment of school-relevant mathematical competencies (De Smedt et al.,     , p.   ).
In other words, the explanation for these con icting results may lie in the fact that the
in uence of the abilities to estimate and to perform non-symbolic calculations on the ac-
quisition of arithmetic competence is weak. De Smedt and colleagues’ observations were
con rmed by Schneider et al. (    ), who conducted a meta-analysis of    correlational
studies of this kind. Overall, they found only a weak correlation between quantical skills
and arithmetical competence. More recent studies continue to provide mixed evidence. For
example, Elliott, Feigenson, Halberda, and Libertus (    ) found a signi cant correlation
between ANS accuracy and arithmetic abilities, whereas Hyde, Simon, Berteletti, and Mou
(    ) did not. Bulthé, Smedt, and Beeck (    ) found that arithmetic skills correlate neg-
atively with the overlap of numerosity representations and number concepts in the brain.
In other words, “individuals with higher arithmetic skills have weaker associations between
symbolic and non-symbolic representations compared to individuals with lower arithmetic
skills” (Bulthé et al.,     , p.    ).
The relation between the acquisition of arithmetical competence and the OFS has not
received the same attention as the relation between the former and the ANS, but the few
studies available on this topic also found con icting results. Hyde et al. (    ) measured the
spontaneous neural activity of the OFS when children were presented with small numerosi-
ties and tested with standardized arithmetic tests to evaluate their numerical competence.
They found a signi cant positive correlation between OFS neural activity and numerical
competence. By contrast, Anobile, Arrighi, and Burr (    ) took a di erent approach and
found a di erent result. They measured children’s subitizing limit in the conventional fash-
ion, i.e., by presenting them with arrays of dots and asking how many dots they see, and
compared this to their performance on standardized arithmetic tests. Their conclusion was
that “subitizing limits do not correlate with mental calculation or digit magnitude knowl-
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edge pro ciency . . . subitizing does not seem to be related to numerical abilities” (Anobile
et al.,     , p.   ).
All things considered, these con icting results bring a twofold message: the in uence of
quantical abilities on the acquisition of arithmetic competence cannot be dismissed, but it
seems to be only a small part of the story. There must be other factors whose contribution
to the acquisition of number concepts and arithmetic competence is more decisive.
In fact, many studies that did not  nd a signi cant association between arithmetic skills
and quantical cognition, did nd a stronger correlation between the former and performance
in symbolic magnitude comparison. A typical symbolic magnitude comparison task consists
of presenting participants with two digits or two number words and asking which has the
larger numerical value. In Schneider’s et al. (    ) meta-analysis, the correlation between
performance on arithmetic tests and performance on the symbolic comparison taskwasmore
signi cant than the correlation between the former and ANS accuracy. In De Smedt’s et al.
(    ) review,    (  %) out of the    reviewed studies that investigated this relation found
a signi cant correlation between symbolic magnitude comparison and arithmetic compe-
tence. Bulthé et al. (    , p.    ), who found a negative correlation between arithmetic
skills and quantical cognition, suggest that
[i]ndividuals with more skills and experience in arithmetic symbols might have sym-
bolic representations [number concepts] that are more de ned in terms of their rela-
tions with other numerical symbols than in terms of a reference to a  xed, concrete or
perceptual quantity [numerosity representations].
What these results show is that a solid understanding of the symbolic system of numerals
can boost the acquisition of more complex numerical competences. True enough, this is to be
expected, since familiarity with numerical symbols is a prerequisite to perform calculations
with symbols. But the puzzle lies in how children acquire the meaning of numerals in the
 rst place, since it seems not to be signi cantly driven by inborn quantical abilities.
Some studies have shown that exposure to numerals themselves being used in every-
day situations seems to play a major role in the acquisition of number concepts. Levine,
Suriyakham, Rowe, Huttenlocher, and Gunderson (    ) observed several episodes of spon-
taneous interactions between children and their caregivers during a period of   months, and
counted how frequently number words appeared in these interactions. Another    months
later, when children were three years and ten months old, they assessed children’s knowledge
of the cardinal values of number words. They concluded that variation in the amount of
number talk in the observed period was strongly correlated with children’s number knowl-
edge by this age. In a follow-up study, Gunderson and Levine (    ) investigated which
types of number talk are most signi cant for children’s number learning. They found that
“number talk in which parents either count or label perceptually present sets of objects is
more related to children’s development of cardinal-number knowledge than number talk
that does not,” and especially “talk about sets that fall outside the range governed by the
small-exact-number system (i.e., sets of size   to   ) is the strongest predictor of children’s
later cardinal-number knowledge” (Gunderson & Levine,     , p.     ). Among the types
of number talk strongly correlated with children’s number learning are those present in sit-
uations where parents count collections of objects for children, explicitly showing how the
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counting process works. The authors give as an example a situation in which a parent counts
blocks with pictures of hats on them while saying “[w]e got one, two, three, four,  ve, six,
seven, eight more hats” (Gunderson & Levine,     , p.     ).
In the same vein, Ramani, Rowe, Eason, and Leech (    ) showed that the frequencywith
which caregivers engage in activities involving numbers with their children correlates pos-
itively with children’s numerical knowledge. Among the activities with the highest impact,
they identi ed proper teaching activities, where caregivers directly teach children to count,
and situations in which children engage with their caregivers in daily activities where num-
bers are used, such as measuring ingredients while cooking or timing an activity. Purpura
and Reid (    ) showed that three-to- ve-year-olds from families where both parents have
a lower level of education lag behind their peers from families where at least one parent has
a higher level of education in mathematical language pro ciency, suggesting that “parents
with higher levels of education more often provide richer home numeracy environments for
their children” (Purpura & Reid,     , p.    ). In an intervention study, Niklas, Cohrssen,
and Tayler (    ) showed that enhancement of the “home numeracy environment” improves
four-year-old children’s numerical abilities. Intervention measures included instructing par-
ents on how to boost children’s understanding of the counting principles and introducing a
dice game.
Altogether, these results indicate that a process of enculturation, rather than innate
quantical skills, is likely to be the main force driving children’s development of numerical
competence. The more parents and caregivers structure the environment in numerical terms
(number talk, demonstrations of the counting method, daily activities involving numbers),
the faster children acquire number concepts. In the next section, we will see what children
must learn from their parents and caregivers in order to master the counting procedure and
the steps through which they progress in the learning process.
 .  Learning to count
In one of the pioneering major studies on the ontogenetic development of numerical com-
petence, Gelman and Gallistel (    ) proposed a model of counting abilities that is still
standard in numerical cognition. According to their model, in order to learn how to count,
a child has to master the following principles: 
 . One-to-one Correspondence: each item of the counted collection must be paired with
one and only one number word.
 . Stable Order of Counting Words: the order in which number words are used for tagging
items must follow a stable order, i.e., the order must be kept constant across di erent
 Gelman and Gallistel’s formulation of the counting principles is slightly di erent from the one given here.
Instead of referring to number words, they refer to tags. In their formulation, tags may be either numerlogs or
numerons. Number words and digits are numerlogs, whereas numerons are “any distinct and arbitrary tags that
a mind (human or nonhuman) uses in enumerating a set of objects” (Gelman & Gallistel,     , p.   ). Thus, in
their formulation, the counting principles are general enough to allow nonverbal counting. The assumption that
non-verbal counting is possible is a consequence of their nativist view, according to which children are born
with “numerons” already in place. Formulations of the counting principles in non-nativist terms, i.e., in terms
of numbers words, are widely found in the literature (e.g., in Gilmore, Göbel, and Inglis (    ).
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counting events.
 . Order Irrelevance of Items: the order in which items are paired with number words is
irrelevant, i.e., the order may change across di erent counting events.
 . Abstraction: counting applies to any collection of all sorts of objects, including sets
formed by physical objects or ideas, and heterogeneous sets, formed by a combination
of di erent kinds of objects.
 . Cardinality: the number word used for tagging the last item of a collection represents
the cardinality of the whole collection.
These  ve rules are known as the counting principles. They are the norms that regulate
the cognitive practice of counting. The  rst four principles determine how to count. They
summarize the procedural knowledge one must have in order to count. The last principle
refers to the information one obtains by counting, namely, the cardinality of the counted
collection. In order to be able to appreciate this information, one must know not only that
the last number word refers to the cardinality of the whole collection, but also the cardinal
value of that number word. Thus, learning to count requires the acquisition of new words,
the command of a procedure, and the acquisition of cardinal values, in this order, as we will
see next.
Learning to count starts with the acquisition of what is initially experienced as a mean-
ingless sequence of words. It is well documented that children  rst learn the sequence “one,
two, three, four, etc.” by rote, without knowing what these words mean. “Until the age of
about   years, infants will predominantly sing-song numbers without attaching anymeaning
to them” (Knops,     , p.    ). At about three years of age, typically developing children are
able to recite an initial segment of the sequence of counting words in the correct order and
start to display satisfactory control of the  rst four counting principles. However, they still
lack conceptual understanding of number words and the counting routine. “In fact, over
several years during development, there may exist this gap between procedural knowledge
(i.e. reciting the count words) and conceptual knowledge (i.e. the understanding of numeral
meaning)” (Knops,     , p.    ). That is, children start learning to count by executing the
counting procedure mechanically. Conceptual understanding comes much later.
Wynn (    ) demonstrated this gap during the  rst stages of learning to count. In
Wynn’s experiments, young children who were able to count up to  ve and could estab-
lish a one-to-one correspondence between number words from ‘one’ to ‘ ve’ and a collection
of  ve items failed systematically in the Give-a-Number task. When asked to give two, three,
or  ve items, they simply grabbed a handful. If asked to count the objects, they counted sat-
isfactorily, showing command of the four procedural counting principles. However, when
asked how many objects they had just counted, they did not answer with the last word they
had used; they preferred to recount the set, clearly showing that they had not yet understood
the cardinality principle.
Children start to understand that the last number word used in a counting episode refers
to the cardinality of the whole collection in a piecemeal manner. First, around two to two-
and-a-half years of age, they learn that ‘one’ refers to a collection consisting of only one
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object. At this point, when asked to give one object, they answer correctly, but when asked
to give two or more, they still answer randomly by just grabbing a handful. This shows that
they already know that the meaning of other number words contrasts with the meaning of
‘one,’ even though they still do not know the exact meaning of other number words. About
four to vemonths later, they realize that ‘two’ refers to a collection consisting of two objects,
and then they succeed at Give-a-One and Give-a-Two tasks, but still fail when asked to give
three or more objects. Another four to  ve months elapse until they realize the meaning
of ‘three.’ Another four months later they realize the meaning of ‘four,’ and then a major
realization takes place: they  nally understand the cardinality principle, and then become
able to succeed at Give-a-Number tests for arbitrarily larger numbers up to the limit of
their already-memorized list of number words (Gilmore et al.,     ; Le Corre, Van deWalle,
Brannon, & Carey,     ; Wynn,     b).
Le Corre et al. (    ) established the now standard classi cation of the milestones in the
process of learning to count. After the earliest stage in which children simply sing-song num-
ber words, they start acquiring conceptual understanding of number words as one-knowers
(when they know the meaning of /one/ only), and then they successively become two-knowers
(know themeaning of /one/ and /two/), three-knowers (know themeaning of /one/, /two/, and
/three/), and four-knowers (know the meaning of /one/, /two/, /three/, and /four/). Children
at these stages are collectively called subset-knowers. Finally, they become CP-knowers, that
is, they understand the cardinality principle and, as a result, can pass the Give-a-Number
test for all the number words in the initial segment of the counting sequence they already
know. For typically developing children in industrialized societies, it takes about one and a
half years to go from one-knower to CP-knower. As Le Corre and colleagues point out, this
prolonged process suggests that
the acquisition of the verbal count list may involve the construction of a system of rep-
resentation that is not innately available . . . children’s representational resources un-
dergo a drastic, qualitative change when they acquire the counting principles (Le Corre
et al.,     , p.    ).
If learning numbers were only a matter of mapping number words onto previously exist-
ing, innate concepts, once a child has realized that numerals refer to cardinal values—what
happens once she becomes a one-knower; recall that one-knowers know that other numer-
als contrast with /one/—she would be expected to map all her memorized number words
at once. But this does not happen. Children have to build the  rst number concepts one
by one.  This, along with the observation that children start learning to count by reciting
(to them) meaningless words within a rule-based procedure, constitutes strong evidence for
the hypothesis advanced in Chapter   according to which number concepts originate from
initially de-semanticized symbols whose use is regulated by operational rules.
Leaving nativists aside, the outline of the number learning process given above is a con-
sensus among developmental psychologists and cognitive scientists. However, debate per-
 Nativists counter-argue that the observed extended time lapse between the acquisition of procedural and
conceptual knowledge of counting may be the result of excessive performance demands on young children. For
example, Cordes and Gelman (    ) argue that children’s failure in Give-a-Number tasks is not a sign that they
are not CP-knowers, but that they do not understand “how many” questions.
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sists regarding how the ingredients of quantical cognition and numerical symbols and pro-
cedural command of the counting principles are combined in the construction of number
concepts. Two major proposals have been advanced about this point. One, which I call the
ANS-based account of number acquisition, holds that number concepts are built upon ANS
representations of numerosities. The other, which I call the OFS-based account of number
acquisition, holds that the OFS plays the central role in providing the  rst numerals with
meaning, and that only much later numerals are mapped onto the ANS. In both accounts
the role of numerals in shaping number concepts is decisive. Let us examine each account in
turn.
 .  The ANS-based account of number acquisition
The main proponent of the ANS-based account of the acquisition of number concepts is
Stanislas Dehaene (e.g., Dehaene (    a,     )). The gist of his account is the idea that
children learn the cardinal meaning of number words by mapping them onto the ANS. Ini-
tially, this mapping might provide number words with an approximate meaning only. Over
time, as children become pro cient in using number words and counting, this mapping is
believed to induce deep changes in innate numerosity representations, by means of neuronal
recycling, giving rise to a new system of exact cardinal values.
The terminology with which the ANS-based account is presented is nativist: numerals
are said to be mapped onto “approximate representations of numbers” that were in place
since birth, which are said to be responsible for “non-symbolic numerical skills.” As I have
argued in section  . , though, this can be seen as a careless way of speaking; representations
of numbers are not likely to be involved in Dehaene’s model of the ANS. In fact, Dehaene’s
proposal is not genuinely nativist, since in his account, exact number concepts are not avail-
able before the acquisition of number words. Rather, it is the very acquisition of number
words that sharpens ANS numerosity representations transforming them into exact cardinal
values.
How such a transformation could take place has been demonstrated by Verguts and Fias
(    ). They built a neural network to show that the association of symbols for numbers
with numerosity representations has the potential to sharpen the latter. First, they trained
the neural network to recognize numerosities by feeding it with collections of di erent car-
dinalities. At this stage, the network built numerosity representations quite similar to the
ANS’s, displaying distance and size e ects. Then, they further trained the neural network
by feeding it with collections paired with digits representing their exact cardinality. Then,
they observed that the original numerosity representations became substantially more pre-
cise. The symbols had the e ect of  ne-tuning numerosity representations, so that the once
ANS-like compressed “number” line gave rise to a linear number line with  xed variabil-
ity, i.e., a system of representations where the di erence between any neighbor quantity is
constant, and thus more suitable for encoding cardinal values.
The process that leads from numerosity representations to cardinal values in children’s
brains may be similar. However, in contrast to what happened to Verguts and Fias’s neural
network, in the human brain the new number line with  xed variability does not replace
the innate compressed “number” line. The two systems coexist throughout our life span. In
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an fMRI study with numerate adults, Piazza, Pinel, Bihan, and Dehaene (    ) showed that
there are areas in the intraparietal cortex that respond to both digits and sets of dots—this
indicates that amapping of digits ontoANS representations really does take place—but there
is also an area in the left intraparietal cortex that seems to be tuned exclusively to digits—
these may be the neurons that were transformed and became specialized in encoding exact
cardinal values. “[I]t is tempting to speculate that this sharpening and linearization e ect
only occurs in the left but not in the right parietal cortex” (Dehaene,     a, p.    ). More
recently, as mentioned above, Kutter et al. (    ) found neuronal populations in the medial
temporal lobe which are selectively tuned to either numerosity or number, which reinforces
the claim that the two systems coexist. The pattern of activation Piazza et al. (    ) found in
the left intraparietal cortex and Kutter et al. (    ) found in the neurons exclusively tuned
to numbers is compatible with the linear number line with  xed variability in Verguts and
Fias’s (    ) model.
The transformation of numerosity representations into cardinal values in the left parietal
cortex is an instance of neuronal recycling. As discussed in section  . , according to the
neuronal recycling hypothesis, the learning of new cognitive skills takes place by recycling
pre-existing brain circuitry that originally served a similar but simpler purpose. Because
the recycling potential of neurons is limited, cultural acquisitions must take place within
the bounded plasticity of their neuronal evolutionary precursors, and therefore the learned
abilities still display features of their predecessors. This would explain why distance and size
e ects are also found in the comparison of numerals, as detected by Moyer and Landauer
(    ) (Dehaene,     ).
The ANS-based account predicts that children who start with a more precise ANS learn
numbers faster. However, as mentioned above, evidence for this is mixed. Another of this
model’s predictions is that the acquisition of number words gradually enhances ANS accu-
racy. In a longitudinal study with three- to  ve-year-olds, Elliott et al. (    ) found a corre-
lation between earlier numerical ability and later ANS precision after controlling for earlier
ANS precision; that is, children experienced a signi cant enhancement in ANS precision
after learning to count. This seems to con rm the e ect of number words on sharpening
numerosity representations. In another longitudinal study with three- to four-year-olds,
Shusterman, Slusser, Halberda, and Odic (    ) investigated which stage of the initial de-
velopment of numerical competence has the greatest correlation with enhancement in ANS
accuracy. They observed that transitions across subset-knower levels were not accompanied
by increments in ANS accuracy; only the acquisition of the cardinality principle coincided
with improvement in the ANS. This observation calls into question the role of the ANS at
the earliest stages of number learning.
In connection with this, Carey, Shusterman, Haward, and Distefano (    ) investigated
whether subset-knowers learn the meaning of numbers words by mapping them onto the
ANS. According to them, one idea that seems to be behind the ANS-based account is that,
when children start to realize the meaning of number words—i.e., when they become one-
knowers—they form the general hypothesis that number words map onto ANS represen-
tations. Then, to learn other number words, one thing they must  nd out is where each
word falls in the ANS “number” line. The more often they see a number word being used
in association with a certain numerosity, the faster they should infer where this word falls.
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Carey et al. tested this claim by trying to interfere with this process. First, they taught
three-knowers the meaning of ‘four’ by presenting them with several pairings of this word
and collections of four objects. They observed that children quickly and robustly learned
to apply the word ‘four’ to collections of four objects when contrasted with other set sizes.
Then, they hypothesized that, if children had learned ‘four’ by mapping it onto the ANS, the
same training strategy would work for teaching other number words, such as ‘ten.’ However,
this hypothesis was not con rmed. They trained young CP-knowers to associate the word
‘ten’ with collections of    without counting, just by estimating, as adults can do. However,
children learned to associate the word ‘ten’ only with the particular collections used in the
training phase. The young CP-knowers failed when confronted with collections of    with
other objects and con gurations. They failed even to apply the word ‘ten’ to a collection
of    when contrasted with a collection of   , whose ratio is well above ANS resolution.
Carey et al. concluded that this failure shows that children do not have an overall hypothe-
sis that number words map onto the ANS. In the absence of this overall hypothesis, Carey
and colleagues suggested that the children had learned the meaning of ‘four’ through other
means, not relying on the ANS. In a previous study, Le Corre and Carey (    ) had already
shown that young CP-Knowers fail to apply an appropriate number word to describe their
estimates of collections with more than four items, even though they are able to count such
collections. This, along with the fact that perception of small numerosities in the majority
of cases recruits the OFS, rather than the ANS, suggests that the ANS plays a minor role, if
any, in the acquisition of the  rst number words.
Even if the ANS does not play an important role in the beginning of the acquisition
of number concepts, it is undeniable that, eventually, subjects map number words onto the
ANS, otherwise they would not be able to express their estimations of numerosity in num-
bers. Izard and Dehaene (    ) provide a model of what the  nal con guration of this
mapping may be. The controversy lies in when this mapping is established and whether it
helps the acquisition of number concepts.
 .  The OFS-based account of number acquisition
The main proponent of the OFS-based account of the acquisition of number concepts is
SusanCarey (Carey,     ). The gist of her account is the idea that children learn themeaning
of the  rst number words by mapping them onto representations provided by a module that
she calls “enriched parallel individuation.” Enriched parallel individuation comprises the
OFS (or “parallel individuation,” as Carey calls it) and “set-based quanti cation,” another
innate system of prelinguistic quantity representation postulated by Carey. 
According to Carey, set-based quanti cation is responsible for providingmeaning to the
singular/plural distinction and to natural language quanti ers such as ‘some,’ ‘each,’ ‘every,’
and ‘many.’ Carey postulates the existence of this system because neither the OFS nor the
ANS can supply representations for grounding the meaning of the singular/plural distinc-
tion and quanti ers. For example, the word ‘some’ represents a vague plurality that cannot
 Carey et al. (    ) propose another account of enriched parallel individuation in which set-based quanti -
cation plays no role. In this account, enriched parallel individuation is just the OFS enriched with the capacity
to build long-term memory representations of collections of one to four items.
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be mapped either to the exact numerosity representations of the OFS or to the approximate
representations of the ANS (‘some’ is not approximately two, nor approximately three, and
so on). Carey claims that the OFS and the ANS provide inputs to set-based quanti cation,
which “regroups” them to produce representations that ground the meaning of the singu-
lar/plural distinction and quanti ers (Carey,     , p.     .).
The role of the OFS in number learning is suggested by the discontinuity observed in
the process of number acquisition, in which children learn the numbers that fall within the
limit of the OFS (from one to three or four) in a manner markedly di erent from the way
they learn the subsequent numbers, as we saw in section  . .
If we accept that children in the subset-knower period do not know the signi cance
of counting, it follows the cardinal content of the words “one” through “four” in the
subset-knower cannot be provided by their role in a counting procedure constrained by
the counting principles (e.g., the numeral “four” cannot receive its meaning by virtue of
being the fourth word in the count list). This conclusion raises an important question:
if the meaning of the  rst verbal numerals is not provided by their role in counting,
how do they get their numerical content? (Carey et al.,     , p.    ).
The OFS would be a natural candidate source of meaning for the  rst number words, if
it were not for the fact that the OFS represents numerosities only in working memory and
only implicitly (by one-to-one correspondence). Because the OFS does not provide enduring
representations of numerosities onto which number words can be mapped, Carey proposes
that these representations can be supplied by the interaction between the OFS and set-based
quanti cation (Carey,     , p.    -   ).
There is some evidence from studies in developmental psychology that seemingly sup-
ports the claim that set-based quanti cation and the OFS cooperate in the acquisition of
the  rst number words. Kouider, Halberda, Wood, and Carey (    ) showed that English-
learning children start to realize the contrast between singular words in sentences such as
“there is a cookie” and plural words in sentences such as “there are some cookies” around
the age of two. This is the same age at which children begin to understand the meaning
of ‘one.’ Based on this coincidence, Carey (    , p.    ) hypothesizes that the meaning of
‘one’ is initially derived from the meaning of the singular marker ‘a’/‘an.’ This hypothesis
is further supported by studies that show that in languages without singular/plural mark-
ers, such as Japanese and Mandarin, children become one-knowers later relative to English
speakers (Le Corre, Li, Huang, Jia, & Carey,     ; Sarnecka, Kamenskaya, Yamana, Ogura,
& Yudovina,     ). In addition to this, there is the observation that when children learn
the meaning of ‘one,’ they contrast it with all the other number words: when asked to give
any greater-than-one number of items, they just grab a handful. According to Carey, one-
knowers respond in this way because they see all number words after ‘one’ as meaning some.
Thus, at this early stage, children supposedly con ate ‘one’ with the singular (a/an) and the
other number words with the plural (some). The acquisition of the next numbers would
come with familiarity with other linguistic quanti ers: the meaning of the word for two
would be derived from dual markers, and for three from trial markers, in languages that
have these markers.  Maru i  et al. (    )  nd that children learning a dual dialect of Slove-
nian learn the meaning of the word for two quicker than children learning a non-dual dialect
 English and many other modern European languages have only singular (one) and plural (more than one)
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of the same language. In languages that do not have dual markers, like English, Carey claims
that set-based quanti cation still plays a role in the acquisition of numbers from two to four,
since cardinal numerals used in adjectival position (like in “there are two cookies”) can be
analyzed as quanti ers (Carey,     , p.    ).
Carey (    , p.    ) emphasizes that set-based quanti cation does not have innate repre-
sentations that can ground the meaning of singular/dual/trial/plural markers or the  rst nu-
merals. These representations must be built in the course of language learning. The process
starts in the OFS, where each item of an observed collection is ascribed to one of its memory
slots. In this way, collections of one, two, and three items are represented inworkingmemory
as something like ⌥, ⌥⌥, and ⌥⌥⌥, respectively. These representations are non-numerical,
as explained in Chapter  . Set-based quanti cation receives such representations as inputs
from theOFS in situations where singular/dual/trial/plural markers, quanti ers or numerals
are heard. Over time, set-based quanti cation stores these inputs in long-term memory as
the meaning of singular markers or ‘one,’ dual markers or ‘two,’ and trial markers or ‘three,’
respectively. Once these long-term memory representations are in place and associated with
number words, in the presence of a new collection the child searches through them to  nd
one that can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the OFS working memory represen-
tation of the collection under consideration, and in this way she selects the number word
that applies to it.
What makes these long-termmemory representations cardinal values is their association
with number words. The set-based quanti cation’s representation {⌥⌥⌥}, initially without
any numerical content, becomes a cardinal value when it is stored as a paradigm of ‘three’
(“‘three’ means a collection like this”). Here I used a generic symbol (⌥) to depict enriched
parallel individuation representations, which may suggest that these representations are ab-
stract from the outset. However, as Carey (    , p.    ) points out, “they could simply be
long-term memory models of particular sets of individuals ({Mommy}, {Daddy Johnnie}...).
What makes these models represent ‘one’ ‘two’ and so forth is their computational role.”
Carey et al. (    , p.    ) give an illustrative example:
Upon hearing this idea explained in a class, a colleague reported that for a couple of
months, his  -year-old daughter always commented on sets of three thus: “there are
three kittens, mommy, daddy, me, three;” “Look, three cement mixers, mommy, daddy,
me, three.”
The learning strategy based on enriched parallel individuation reaches its limit when
children become four- or three-knowers. From this phase onward, another process must
account for the acquisition of subsequent number words, since for larger collections, the
OFS cannot provide inputs to set-based quanti cation. According to Carey, in order to go
on, children have to “bootstrap.”
Bootstrapping is a metaphor used by psychologists “to explain learning of a particularly
di cult sort—those cases in which the endpoint of the process transcends in some qualita-
tive way the starting point” (Carey,     , p.   ). This is what happens with number learning
in Carey’s account. The starting point is provided by enriched parallel individuation, but it
markers. However, there are other languages, such as Slovenian and Arabic, which may distinguish between
singular (one), dual (two), trial (three) and plural (more than two or three).
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cannot go beyond three or four. The end point is the acquisition of the idea of a potentially
in nite series of natural numbers. According to Carey (    , p.     ), children bridge the
gap between starting and end points by getting familiar with the list of number words as
used in the counting procedure and by relying on a few other cues, as follows.
When children learn the words from ‘one’ to ‘four,’ they receive several cues regarding
the meaning of the other number words. First, the use of plural words both for collections
falling within and above the OFS limit suggests that all numbers words should be applied in
a uniform manner. Second, the experiences children have with the  rst three or four num-
ber words might have already allowed them to grasp the essential procedural and semantic
features of the counting process. They have already had the chance to observe that sets of
two elements are counted “one, two;” sets of three are counted “one, two, three;” and sets of
four are counted “one, two, three, four.” At least for these numbers, they may have already
noticed the regularity with which the last word used in an instance of counting refers to
the cardinality of the whole collection (i.e., they may have a partial understanding of the
cardinality principle). Furthermore, they might have already understood that by adding one
element to a collection of one, they obtain a collection of two; and by adding one element
to a collection of two, they obtain a collection of three. Thus, for the  rst three or four
words, they might have already noticed that the next word in the counting sequence means
the cardinal value of the previous one plus one. Now, the only thing they need to do in order
to become CP-knowers is to link this information to the uniform treatment of all number
words suggested by plural markers. At this point, children may have all the elements they
need to generalize this rule:
if a word ‘x’ is followed by the word ‘y’ in the counting sequence, its meaning is the
result of adding one to the cardinal value of‘ ‘x.’
Following this general rule, children can infer the meaning of ‘ ve’ from the meaning of
‘four,’ the meaning of ‘six’ from the meaning of ‘ ve,’ and so on, for all the number words in
their already-memorized counting list. This is supposedly the “bootstrapping step.”
Notice that children’s previous knowledge of the numeral list as meaningless words is
essential for bootstrapping. If they knew the numerals from ‘one’ to ‘four,’ but did not recite
them alongwith other, still meaningless (for them) number words in the counting procedure,
they would not have any reason to generalize. What invites them to generalize is the fact that
they know that the sequence of number words starts with ‘one’ and continues after ‘four,’ and
that the other number words in the list are used similarly to the words up to ‘four.’
In Carey’s account, neuronal recycling does not play any role. Number representations
are not built upon previously existing numerosity representations. They are new mental
contents, initially created with the aid of the OFS, and subsequently generalized to provide
meaning to number words above four. This makes numerical competence an even more
radical case of enculturation, in which the enculturated abilities exploit a previously existing
cognitive system not to recycle it, but to build new contents.
Carey’s account has been shown to be computationally viable by Piantadosi, Tenenbaum,
and Goodman (    ). They built a computational model that learns numbers by relying on
a few primitive computational functions corresponding to the features of enriched parallel
individuation, plus a probabilistic module responsible for statistical inferences. They fed the
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model with pairs of number words and collections of objects distributed over the frequency
in which English-learning children are exposed to number words in real life. With this input,
[t]he model . . . successively learns the meaning of “one”, then “two”, “three”,  nally
transitioning to a CP-knower which correctly represents meaning of all number words.
That is, with very little data the “best” hypothesis is one which looks like a  -knower,
and as more and more data is accumulated, the model transitions through subset-
knowers. Eventually, the model accumulates enough evidence to justify the CP-knower
lexicon that recursively de nes all number words on the count list. At that point,
the model exhibits a conceptual re-organization, changing to a hypothesis in which all
number word meanings are de ned recursively (Piantadosi et al.,     , p.    -   ).
A study by Davidson, Eng, and Barner (    ) casts doubt on the nature of the general-
ization children make when they bootstrap. Their point is that the bootstrapping step can
be decomposed into two generalizations: (i) the child generalizes the procedural rule accord-
ing to which the last number used in a count is the answer to the question ‘how many?’;
and (ii) the child generalizes the semantic rule according to which the meaning of the next
number word is the cardinal value of the previous one plus one. If this is so, it is possible for
a child who has made only the  rst generalization to pass Give-a-Number tests by applying
a mechanical procedure, without having really made a semantic generalization.
In order to test whether becoming a CP-knower really involves a semantic induction,
Davidson et al. conducted two tests. In what they called the “more task,” recently turned
CP-knowers were presented with two boxes and asked: “This box has N stickers and this
box hasM stickers. Which box has more stickers?” Results for this task showed that children
did not yet have full command of the cardinal values corresponding to number words. For
comparisons as small as ‘ ve’ vs. ‘six’ and ‘eight’ vs. ‘nine,’ young CP knowers made correct
judgments only   % of the time. In the other test, which they called the “unit task,” recently
turned CP-knowers’ performance was even worse. This task was intended to test children’s
understanding of the idea that the meaning of the next number word is the cardinal value of
the previous one plus one. To this end, the experimenter put some beads in a boxwhile saying
“I am putting N beads in the box,” and then asked the child: “How many beads are in the
box?” After the child had given the right answer, the experimenter said “Good! Nowwatch!”
and then added, one at a time, either one or two beads to the box. Then the experimenter
asked: “Now are there N+  or N+  beads in the box?” (using the proper number words, not
additions). Young CP-knowers’ performance on this task did not di er from chance even
for numbers as small as four and  ve.
It is possible that factors other than the absence of a semantic generalization in the
bootstrapping step may have interfered with children’s performance, but it is also possible
that full command of the meaning of number words does not come immediately after the
acquisition of the cardinality principle.
Our results . . . suggest that the semantic induction may take place later. Therefore, at
least on these grounds, it remains possible that the semantic induction is, in fact, driven
by a mapping between the count list and the approximate number system (Davidson
et al.,     , p.    ).
The hypothesis that recently turned CP-knowers have just mastered a purely procedural
rule, instead of making a semantic generalization, has been con rmed in several subsequent
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studies (Cheung, Rubenson, & Barner,     ; Schneider et al.,     ; Spaepen, Gunderson,
Gibson, Goldin-Meadow, & Levine,     ; Wagner, Cheung, Kimura, & Barner,     ). Carey
herself has recently admitted that, di erently from her original proposal, a semantic gen-
eralization is not what causes children to become CP-knowers. These new  ndings suggest
that it is the other way around: becoming a “mechanical” CP-knower is a prerequisite for
making a semantic generalization (Carey & Barner,     , p.    ). In other words, procedural
command of the  ve counting principles comes before the acquisition of number concepts.
Before moving on, a  nal remark about the dispute between ANS- and OFS-based ac-
counts of the acquisition of number concepts. I did not address mixed accounts here. It may
be that children learn the  rst number words with the aid of the OFS, then they bootstrap
the cardinality principle as a mechanical procedure, and only later is a mapping established
onto the ANS, endowing words for numbers larger than four with meaning. Accounts of
number learning that combine contributions from both the ANS and OFS have been put
forward by Spelke (    , p.    -   ), Pantsar (    ,     ), and vanMarle et al. (    ).
 .  Marks of numeral systems in the encoding of cardinal values
We have seen that, according to  ndings from developmental psychology, numerals used in
the counting procedure are the main elements responsible for engendering in us the idea of
exact cardinal values, which constitute the initial meanings we associate to numerals them-
selves. That is, numerals produce their own meanings.  In the ANS-based account, symbols
for numbers have the power of sharpening ANS representations of numerosity, transform-
ing them into proper cardinal values. In the OFS-based account, symbols for numbers play
a double role:  rst, they promote the  xation of the OFS’s implicit representations of nu-
merosity in long-term memory, where they become cardinal values associated to numerals
from ‘one’ to ‘four’; second, they promote bootstrapping. In this section, we will see other ex-
perimental results that lend further support to the view that numerals engender their own
meanings. These experimental results show that the particular symbolic system through
which we learn numbers leaves permanent marks on the way we encode cardinal values.
Perhaps the most notable mark of symbolic systems on the encoding of number con-
cepts is the so-called SNARC e ect (SNARC stands for Spatial-Numerical Association of
Response Codes). Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (    ) found the SNARC e ect in a parity
judgment task, where participants were presented with a digit and asked to press one of two
buttons depending on whether the digit referred to an even or odd number. The buttons
were placed side by side, and the assignment of odd and even to the right and left buttons
was systematically varied, so that participants were tested both in situations left-even/right-
odd and left-odd/right-even. The authors found that, in French participants, larger numbers
elicited faster responses with the right-hand button, whereas smaller numbers elicited faster
responses with the left-hand button (regardless of the numbers being even or odd). By con-
trast, amongst Iranian participants, who were raised in a right-to-left writing culture, the
e ect reversed. They concluded: “[t]he particular direction of the spatial-numerical associ-
ation seems to be determined by the direction of writing” (Dehaene et al.,     , p.    ).
 Following the practice in cognitive science, I am using the term ‘meaning’ to designate the mental content
activated by a symbol.
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The association between direction of writing and direction of the SNARC e ect has
been con rmed in several studies since then. Zebian (    ) tested literate Arabic speakers,
who write from right to left, and illiterate Arabic speakers, who were not able to read and
write butwere able to recognize digits. LiterateArabic speakers showed a reverse SNARC ef-
fect, whereas no e ect was observed in illiterates. Shaki, Fischer, and Petrusic (    ) showed
that Palestinians, who read Arabic words and Eastern Arabic digits from right to left, dis-
play a reversed SNARC e ect (small-right/large-left), whereas Israelis, who read Hebrew
words from right to left but Arabic digits from left to right, display no reliable association
between number and space. Li, Zhang, Zhang, Fanga, and Li (    ) tested Chinese speakers
with di erent number notations they were familiar with (Arabic digits, simpli ed Chinese,
and complex Chinese numerals) and concluded that the direction of the SNARC e ect is
notation-speci c.
The dominant explanation of the SNARC e ect holds that cardinal values are encoded
along a “mental number line” whose orientation is determined by reading and writing habits
(Dehaene et al.,     ). An alternative hypothesis holds that the spatial orientation is not
encoded in the mental number line, but is rather constructed in working memory, during
task execution (van Dijck & Fias,     ). Either way, the existence of the SNARC e ect
shows that mathematically irrelevant features of numeral systems—broadly conceived, also
encompassing the writing tradition in which they are embedded—interfere with the way we
encode or process numerical information.
Other mathematically irrelevant features of the decimal place-value system of Arabic
digits also in uence the encoding of number concepts. This is illustrated by the unit-decade
compatibility e ect, which appears in digit magnitude comparisons. A two-digit number com-
parison is said to be compatible if both the decades and the units of the involved numerals
bear the same less-than (or greater-than) relation to each other. For example, the compar-
ison    vs.    is compatible because   <   and   <  ; by contrast, the comparison    vs.   
is incompatible, because   >   but   <  . Nuerk, Weger, and Willmes (    ) found that in-
compatible comparisons are slower andmore error-prone than compatible ones. This means
that, when comparing two numbers, we do not simply compare cardinal values encoded in
a notationally irrelevant way. Nuerk and colleagues suggest that, under the in uence of the
decimal system through which we learn numbers, the mental number line is decomposed
into di erent segments for tens and units.
Nuerk, Moeller, Klein, Willmes, and Fischer (    ) list    other e ects observed in men-
tal operations with numbers whose explanations might hinge on characteristics of the deci-
mal place-value system. These e ects range from the observation that mental computations
with multiples of ten are easier than computations with other numbers, to less obvious ef-
fects such as the decade crossing e ect, which appears in the number bisection task. In this task,
participants are presented with a number triplet and are asked to evaluate whether the cen-
tral number of the triplet bisects the interval de ned by the outer numbers. For example,
in the triplet         ,    bisects the interval between    and   , whereas in the triplet      
  ,    does not. Mathematically, this problem can be solved in a uniform way to any given
triplet (e.g, one can subtract the outer numbers from the central, and compare the results).
However, it has been observed that, when the triplet crosses a decade boundary (e.g.,      
   crosses the decade boundary   ), participants perform more poorly than when the triplet
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is within the same decade (e.g.,         ). Again, this result indicates that features of the
notational system, and not just the cardinal values of the numbers, are involved in solving
the task.
The existence of e ects such as these demonstrates that mathematically irrelevant fea-
tures of the symbolic system we use interfere with the way cardinal numbers are encoded.
Conversely, when the symbolic system lacks the required mathematically relevant features,
number concepts are unlikely to arise. Mundurucu is a language spoken by an Amerindian
group that lives in the Amazon forest in Brazil. Mundurucu is described as having numerals
only for numbers from one to  ve. Above this limit, Mundurucu speakers use approximate
quanti ers that could be translated as “some,” “many,” or “a small quantity.” However, even
their numerals (with the exception of the words for one and two) are not used consistently
to refer to exact quantities.
For instance, the word for  , which can be translated as “one hand” or “a handful”, was
used for   but also  ,  ,  , or   dots. Conversely, when  ve dots were presented, the
word for   was uttered on only   % of trials, whereas the words for   and “few” were
each used on about   % of trials (Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene,     , p.    ).
Pica and colleagues also report that Mundurucu speakers do not attribute a numeral to
a collection based on the outcome of a counting procedure. Rather, “[o]ur measures con rm
that they selected their verbal response on the basis of an apprehension of approximate num-
ber rather than on an exact count” (Pica et al.,     , p.    ). Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, and Pica
(    ) tested monolingual speakers of Mundurucu and native speakers of Mundurucu who
also spoke Portuguese in a number line positioning task. Participants were presented with
di erent kinds of numerical stimuli—clouds of dots, Mundurucu numerals, and Portuguese
numerals—and then asked to indicate on a line segment, with one dot at the left end and ten
dots at the right end, where that numerical stimulus should be placed. For both Mundurucu
numerals and clouds of dots, participants placed stimuli in the line segment according to
a logarithmically compressed scale, consistent with ANS representations of numerosities.
Bilingual participants, though, placed stimuli conveyed in Portuguese number words accord-
ing to a linear scale with  xed variability, consistent with the arithmetical number line, but
they still placed stimuli conveyed in Mundurucu numerals according to a logarithmic scale.
These results show that “neither linguistic competence per se, nor numerical vocabulary
and verbal counting su ce to induce the log-to-linear shift” (Dehaene et al.,     , p.     ).
The point is that the numeral system of Mundurucu is approximate and “does not empha-
size measurement or invariance by addition and subtraction as de ning features of number,
contrary to Western numeral systems” (Dehaene et al.,     , p.     ). Mundurucu “numer-
als” seemingly refer to ANS representations of numerosities, rather than to exact quantities.
The fact that even bilinguals who have number concepts (acquired through Portuguese nu-
merals) understandMundurucu “numerals” as referring to approximate quantities reinforces
this conclusion. Approximate “numerals” cannot sharpen numerosity representations.
Taken together, the observations that mathematically irrelevant features of numeral sys-
tems leave marks on the mental encoding of number concepts and that the absence of a
mathematically relevant feature—exactness—precludes the emergence of number concepts
further support the view that number concepts are, to a signi cant extent, a product of
numeral systems.
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 .  Counting as a cognitive tool
The results reviewed above show that the practice of counting is indispensable for the ac-
quisition of concepts for numbers larger than three or four. The counting procedure makes
use of a list of symbols for numbers but, as we have seen, numerals for numbers above three
or four will become meaningful for those who are learning to count only after they have
mastered the counting procedure. In section  . , I recruited Krämer’s (    ) description
of operative writing and de-semanti cation to explain how it is possible to master a sym-
bolic system without knowing what its symbols mean. Now, we are in a position to better
understand how this happens during the process of learning numbers.
Counting can be described as a symbolic system of operation similar to Krämer’s systems
of operative writing, with the di erence that counting is oral. When counting, we do not
write down symbols, but utter words as a means to ful ll a cognitive task. Similar to systems
of operative writing, the counting procedure can be seen as consisting of two parts: a set of
symbols and a set of rules that govern how the symbols should be manipulated (operational
rules). The set of symbols consists of an ordered list of words. The operational rules are
those codi ed in Gelman and Gallistel’s counting principles, as presented in section  . .
Recall that operational rules, as de ned in section  . , specify the actions that must (or can)
be performed so as to solve a problem. In the case of counting, the target problem is the
determination of the cardinality of collections. The counting principles specify how this
can be done.
Importantly, operational rules can be operated mechanically with de-semanticized sym-
bols, without the agent needing to know either the intended meaning of the symbols or the
purpose of the rules she is operating with. This is why children can master the counting
principles before they have conceptual understanding of what they are doing. At earlier
stages, they simply “sing-song” counting words while pointing to objects. As we have seen,
children start mastering the procedural rules of counting (principles   to  ) when they barely
understand what ‘one’ means. And, as Davidson et al. (    ) and several other studies point
out, even the cardinality principle is  rst learned as a mechanical procedure.
The importance of counting for the acquisition of number concepts becomesmore salient
for values larger than three or four. In principle, the meaning of the  rst three or four num-
ber words can be acquired without the aid of the counting procedure (as noted by Carey et
al. (    , p.    ), quoted above). Perception of numerosities up to three or four is accurate.
Thus, children “merely” need to learn to associate the words ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’ and ‘four’
with their corresponding numerosities. In fact, as we have seen, subset-knowers correctly
understand the cardinal values associated with the  rst three or four number words even
though they have not yet mastered the counting procedure. Above four, however, percep-
tion of numerosities is vague. There are no clearly distinguishable numerosities with which
the words ‘ ve,’ ‘six,’ ‘seven,’ etc., could be associated. This is where the counting procedure
becomes indispensable.
What children need to carry on the formation of number concepts is a method to eval-
uate larger cardinalities as accurately as subitizing. Numerate adults use numbers for this.
But children who are just starting to learn the  rst numbers do not know larger numbers
yet. A method of determining cardinality that is available to agents who do not understand
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numbers is one-to-one correspondence. And counting with de-semanticized symbols is, in
fact, a method of one-to-one correspondence.
If we view counting words as de-semanticized, self-contained words that do not refer
to anything besides themselves, then the list of counting words becomes a model collection
similar to any other collection of objects used for this purpose. Recall that subset-knowers,
when asked howmany objects there are in a collection they have just counted, do not answer
with the last word they had used; instead, they recount the set (Wynn,     ). This is tanta-
mount to displaying the whole model collection in order to convey information about the
size of the target collection, which is exactly what one needs to do if she is using one-to-one
correspondence.
Counting becomes di erent from mere one-to-one correspondence when the cardinal-
ity principle is in place. In this case, the last word used in a counting episode gains a proper
meaning; it refers to the size of the whole collection. And this size is exact, since the count-
ing of collections with one more or one less item results in di erent last words. Over time,
the recurring association of a word with the same cardinal size endows the previously mean-
ingless word with meaning (how this happens is explained by the ANS- or the OFS-based
accounts of the acquisition of number concepts).
We begin the journey of learning numbers equipped only with subitizing and estimation.
Subitizing helps us learn themeaning of the rst numberwords. To go on, though, we have to
learn a mechanical procedure of one-to-one correspondence (counting with de-semanticized
number words) that allows us to extend the accuracy of subitizing to larger collections (more
on this in section  . . ). Without this intermediate step where we use counting as a mechan-
ical, de-semanticized procedure, we could not obtain the idea of exact cardinal values above
the subitizing range. In this sense, counting, the cognitive tool composed of a list of words
and a set of operational rules, is constitutive of concepts for numbers above three or four.
Now we can see that counting is constitutive of number concepts in ontogeny precisely be-
cause it can be de-semanticized. De-semanticized, the counting procedure can be learned by
those who do not know numbers, giving them the opportunity to develop number concepts.
 .  Conclusion
We have seen that the ontogenetic development of numerical cognition could not take place
without the involvement of numerals and counting. In the ANS-based account of number
acquisition, the acquisition of symbols for numbers has the e ect of sharpening numerosity
representations to the point of transforming them into exact cardinal values. In the OFS-
based account of number acquisition, symbols for the  rst three or four numbers have the
e ect of promoting the storage of long-term representations of small numerosities, which
become the meanings of the  rst number words. At a second stage, when the counting
procedure is mastered, children generalize their knowledge about the  rst number words to
build cardinal values for the subsequent number words.
Children do not discover numbers by themselves, through their personal experiences
with the world or through the maturation of their quantical skills. Rather, they learn num-
bers from other people. Numeral systems and counting techniques are cultural creations.
Learning numbers is a process of enculturation. Phrased in Vygotsky’s terms, a child learns
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to count when an interpersonal process—a tutor explicitly using numerals, showing how to
count and inviting the child to count together—is converted into an intrapersonal one—
the child becoming able to count by herself. Innate quantical abilities may help children
understand what is going on, but the crucial ingredients for numerical cognition—number
words and the counting procedure—come from the interpersonal relationship with tutors.
This means that number concepts are passed on through cultural transmission: those who
already have number concepts transmit them to the next generation by teaching numerals
and the associated techniques. But this leads to a natural question: from whom did the  rst
generation of number-knowers learn numbers? The historical origins of number concepts
are the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter  
The historical origins of number
concepts
C        create a new conceptual system when they acquire number concepts. Nativistaccounts and terminological confusions aside, this is a consensus view in developmen-
tal psychology, as we saw in Chapter  . It is also widely accepted that the creation of this new
conceptual system relies on the availability of a symbolic system for numbers in children’s
environments. If children are not taught a symbolic system with the right features—words
referring to exact discrete quantities—they will not develop number concepts. This poses a
problem for the explanation of the historical origins of numeral systems. When no numeral
system had been created yet, people did not have the opportunity to acquire number con-
cepts. But, if people did not have number concepts, how could they ever create a symbolic
system for numbers?
It seems that at some point in the past, there must have been someone who somehow
managed to acquire number concepts in the absence of any previously available numeral sys-
tem and then invented the very  rst symbolic system for numbers. But developing number
concepts in the absence of a previously available numeral system is unlikely according to on-
togenetic theories of number acquisition, and inventing a numeral systemwithout previously
available number knowledge seems equally unlikely. Pelland (    a) calls this paradoxical
situation “the origins problem.”
I start this Chapter, in section  . , by presenting Pelland’s formulation of the origins
problem. Then, drawing onDutilhNovaes’s (    ) account of re-semanti cation, I advance a
hypothesis about how the  rst numeral systems may have been created by anumeric peoples.
The remaining sections of this chapter bring evidence from linguistic studies with anumeric
and few-number cultures to provide evidence for the hypothesis proposed in section  . . In
section  . , I give an account of the emergence of the words for one, two, and three in which
people’s need to refer to the numerosities they perceive through subitizing paves the way
for the emergence of the  rst pairs of number words/number concepts. The etymology of
the words for one to three used in a family of Amazonian languages, known as Nadahup or
Maku, illustrates this point. In section  . , I discuss how people who only know numbers
up to three or four could have invented the  rst one-to-one matching techniques to assess
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the cardinality of larger collections. Tallying systems used by contemporary few-number
cultures illustrate the practical needs that may have motivated the creation of tallies. In
section  . , I discuss the body-part tallying systems used by speakers of Nadahup languages
which illustrate how the re-semanti cation of words used to describe tallying gestures gave
rise to number words and number concepts in these cultures. In section  . , I explain how
verbal counting systems with a low upper bound can grow towards in nity.
 .  The origins problem
Since Chapter  , I have been emphasizing that there is a gap between quantical and nu-
merical cognition. As Núñez (    , p.    ) puts it, “quantical phenomena, being the prod-
uct of natural selection alone, cannot scale up to numerical phenomena (i.e., exact, rela-
tional, operational) across the symbolic reference gap.” The gap problem, as Pelland (    ,
p.     - ) describes it, is the question of how we “we bridge the gap between the rudimen-
tary numerical [quantical] content produced by our evolutionarily ancient brains and the
arithmetically-viable numerical content that comes to be associated with numeration sys-
tems like Indo-Arabic or Roman numerals.” ln ontogeny, as we saw in the previous chapter,
this gap is bridged by the acquisition of numerals and the counting procedure. This is what
explains, at the individual level, what makes an individual equipped only with quantical
skills, and therefore unable to clearly distinguish ten from eleven, become competent with
numbers and therefore able to distinguish between any given cardinal sizes (if su cient time
for counting is provided). But numerals and the counting procedure are cultural creations
and, as such, must have been created at some point in the past. Pelland’s (    a;     b)
point is that externalist explanations of how the gap is bridged in ontogeny (i.e., explanations
that rely on the availability of culturally-created symbols and techniques in the cultural en-
vironment where individuals are raised) do not explain how the gap was bridged in history.
The origins problem is the historical side of the gap problem: “how . . . can we rely on external
symbols for numbers in our explanation of the development of numerical content when the
existence of such symbols in turn depends on the existence of number concepts?” (Pelland,
    b, p.    ). For Pelland, the di culty externalist accounts face in explaining the histori-
cal origins of numerical competence should count as counterevidence against the externalist
explanation in ontogeny as well.
if we are trying to explain the ontogeny of number concepts, our theory should apply to
everyone capable of thinking about numbers. But since some people seem to have been
able to think about numbers without external aids in the (distant) past, any account
that depends on such support will not apply to every case of numerical cognition. At
best, such externalist accounts could describe how numerical cognition emerges in a
numeral-enriched environment. Even so, the fact that it is possible to develop some
basic number concepts without external support seems to suggest that cases that do
involve external support might somehow appeal to a more fundamental process, which
the externalist framework is leaving out. . . . the ontogeny of number concepts in a
world where symbols for numbers abound cannot be completely separated from past
cases of numeral-free ontogeny since the former depends on the latter in important
ways (Pelland,     b, p.    -   ).
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Pelland is right to require that explanations of the ontogenetic development of numerical
cognition be compatible with explanations of the historical emergence of number concepts.
These stories are not independent of each other, since the pioneers of numerical cognition
must have experienced an ontogenetic process at least similar in crucial aspects to the one
today’s children undergo. In face of this, Pelland suggest that the
externalist approach needs to be replaced by one that focuses more on internal cog-
nitive processes, since any appeal to external symbols for numbers must come after
we have explained the emergence of numerical cognition internally, given that exter-
nal symbols for numbers depend on the construction of internal representations with
numerical content for their existence (Pelland,     b, p.    ).
The problem with Pelland’s suggestion is that such an internal cognitive capacity to
engender number concepts in the absence of external aids has never been detected.  On
the contrary, it is a well-established fact that numerical cognition does not arise without
the aid of external symbols and practices. To be in accordance with the available evidence,
then, any explanation of the historical emergence of numerical cognition should be built
around this fact. However, the possibility of giving a purely externalist historical account of
the origins of numerical cognition is a non-starter if “external symbols for numbers depend
on the construction of internal representations with numerical content for their existence”
(Pelland, quoted above). How can we get out of this paradoxical situation?
The  rst thing we have to take into account is that symbols are not only a means of
expression and denotation. If we think of symbols only as a means to express ideas that were
previously engendered in someone’s mind or to denote things that exist “out there,” then it
seems impossible that a symbol could come into existence before the emergence of the idea
or thing it refers to. But, as we saw in section  . , symbols can also be used for operational
purposes and, used in this way, symbols have the potential of giving rise to new contents that
are inaccessible otherwise. Thus, it is at least in principle possible that symbols for numbers
preceded number concepts.
Re-semanti cation (Dutilh Novaes,     ) is one of the processes through which sym-
bolic systems can give rise to new contents. Through re-semanti cation, a symbolic system
originally dedicated to one conceptual domain can give rise, under certain conditions, to a
new conceptual domain whose emergence was suggested by the operational use of the very
same symbolic system. This opens up the possibility that the symbols that eventually gave
rise to numerals were not symbols for numbers since the beginning. It may be that originally
non-numerical symbols have been used for cognitive operations that ended up engendering
number concepts. These initially non-numerical symbols might have come from other con-
texts, where they had other meanings. For the emergence of number concepts, it is su cient
that these symbols and the cognitive operations they facilitated produced in our ancestors
the same kind of stimuli that triggers the development of number concepts in today’s chil-
dren. Once these originally non-numerical symbols had given rise to number concepts, they
may have been co-opted to express the novel ideas they had helped bring up. In other words,
numerals and number concepts may have appeared together, but the symbols that ended up
becoming numerals likely preceded number concepts.
 Unless one assumes a nativist stance. For the nativist, there are no gap nor origins problems.
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The operation of a mechanical procedure following the  ve counting principles is what
triggers the development of concepts for numbers above three or four in today’s children. We
saw in Chapter   that children  rst learn to execute the counting procedure mechanically;
only later does conceptual understanding of numbers come about. A cognitive task similar
to counting, but one that does not require prior competence with numbers for its invention,
might have served the same function for our ancestors. The natural candidates are tallying
techniques based on the principle of one-to-one correspondence. It is easy to see that tallies
are regulated by at least three of the counting principles: one-to-one correspondence, order
irrelevance of pairing acts, and abstraction. The two remaining principles—stable order and
cardinality—may have been suggested by a particular kind of tally, viz., body-part tallies, as
we will see in section  . . The suggestion is that, by using purely mechanical tallying proce-
dures regulated by the  ve counting principles, our ancestors may have ended up activating
the cognitive processes that engender number concepts. Then the symbols they used for
tallying were re-semanticized to refer to number concepts.
When it comes to the  rst three or four pairs of numerals/number concepts, the solution
may be a bit simpler. We saw in Chapter   that the acquisition of the  rst three or four num-
ber concepts takes place before the counting procedure is fully mastered. This means that,
in a hypothetical historical picture of the  rst emergence of number concepts, the concepts
for one, two, and three may have emerged even before the invention of tallying techniques,
although they cannot have emerged independently of symbols to refer to the corresponding
numerosities. One possibility is that words that originally designated particular collections
with the relevant numerosity ended up being co-opted to refer to the size of these collections,
thus giving rise to the  rst number concepts.
In this way, the emergence of number concepts in history is made compatible with the
emergence of number concepts in ontogeny without needing to postulate hitherto unde-
tected internal faculties. In both cases, the gap is bridged by external symbolic systems and
practices.
These are hypotheses about historical processes and, as such, are in need of empirical
support. To provide the required evidence, however, is not a simple task, since the history of
today’s fully- edged numeral systems is lost to the past. AsHurford (    , p.   ) puts it “[t]he
remoteness in time and space of the origins of numeral systems, together with the possible
e ects of cultural and linguistic mixing and borrowing, make the evolutionary picture hard,
if not impossible, to discern by any method resembling direct observation.” Where direct
observation fails us, we need to recruit other methods. Linguistic studies of contemporary
anumeric or few-number cultures, such as the Pirahã (D. Everett,     ) and the speakers
of Nadahup (aka Maku) languages (Epps,     ,     ), are a valuable source of data for this
task. As we will see in the next sections, evidence gathered from these and other peoples and
languages lends support to the hypotheses outlined above.
 .  The  rst number words: one, two, three
Sometimes it is claimed that the faculty of subitizing could deliver the  rst number concepts
without extra e ort. However, evidence from developmental psychology suggests otherwise.
As we saw in Chapter  , children take about one year to acquire themeaning of the words for
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two and three after they have already acquired the meaning of the word for one, even though
they have had the ability to subitize since their  rst hours of life. If the  rst number concepts
were provided by the faculty of subitizing alone, it would be expected that children could
attach number words and number concepts more easily, at least after the crucial realization
that numbers words refer to quantities, which takes place when they grasp the meaning of
‘one.’ The OFS (and possibly the ANS too) plays a central role in the acquisition of concepts
for the smallest numbers, but it does not deliver these concepts “for free.”
This is further corroborated by studies with the anumeric Pirahã. The Pirahã are an
indigenous people who live in the Amazon forest in Brazil. They speak the only known
language (also called Pirahã) that lacks number words completely. The most numeral-like
words they have are the words hói, hoí, and baágiso. At  rst sight, their use of these words
would suggest a “one, two, many” system, where hói and hoí would denote exactly one and
two, respectively. But closer inspection refutes this interpretation. Gordon (    , p.    )
reports:
Whereas the word for “two” [hoí] always denoted a larger quantity than the word for
“one” [hói] (when used in the same context), the word for “one” was sometimes used to
denote just a small quantity such as two or three or sometimes more.
In another study, Frank et al. (    ) con rmed that the words hói, hoí, and baágiso do
not denote precise numbers by testing adult Pirahã speakers in a numeral elicitation task.
They presented participants with varying quantities of objects successively, starting with
one object and ending with ten, and vice-versa. In each trial, participants were asked “how
many?”. Whereas in the ascending order the candidate word for one, hói, was used only to
refer to collections of one object, in the descending order participants started applying hói to
collections of six items and continued doing so all the way down to collections of one item.
In the ascending order, the candidate word for two, hoí, was applied to quantities ranging
from two to ten items; in the descending order, it was applied to quantities ranging from
four to ten items. “Because each of the three words was used for a dramatically di erent
range of values in the ascending and the descending elicitations, these words are much more
likely to be relative or comparative terms like ‘few’ or ‘fewer’ than absolute terms like ‘one’”
(Frank et al.,     , p.    ). D. Everett (    ) proposes that the words hói, hoí, and baágiso
translate into English as “small size or amount,” “a couple or a few,” and “many,” respectively.
Other results reported in Gordon (    ) and Frank et al. (    ) show that the Pirahã
can subitize as accurately as everyone else. Therefore, the conclusion must be that subitizing
is not a su cient condition for the emergence of words for the  rst cardinal values. But one
could still argue that, even missing the words, they could have the concepts. However, this is
highly unlikely, since theOFS by itself cannot provide such concepts, as we saw in section  . .
Lacking symbols for numbers, they cannot undergo the conventional ontogenetic process
of number acquisition. Perhaps non-verbal symbols, such as gestures, would do, but the
Pirahã also lack gestures for precise small quantities (D. Everett,     ). All this suggests that
monolingual Pirahã speakers lack not only symbols for, but also the concepts of one, two,
and three. Therefore, an explanation of how it was possible for people living in an anumeric
culture to devise number concepts without previously having symbols for them must start
with the concept of one.
    CHAPTER  . THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF NUMBER CONCEPTS
The details of the creation of words for and concepts of the smallest numbers are lost
to the remote past, but there are some clues that can help us tell a plausible story of their
creation. A  rst insightful observation is that, in many languages, words for the smallest
numbers in ect, i.e., agree in gender or case with other words in their syntactic environment.
According to Hurford (    , p.    ),
[i]t is of the essence of a rote-learnt sequence of words that each word have a single
form . . . So numeral words which originate in the recited rote-learnt sequence would
be expected to be unin ected. The occurrence of variant in ected forms of words for
 ,  ,   (and  ) suggests that these words originate in ways more closely integrated with
their eventual use as modi ers of nouns indicating collections of things.
This is in line with the observation that subset-knowers learn the meaning of words for
one, two, three, and possibly four before they have full command of the counting principles.
Besides languages in which words for the smallest numbers in ect, there are also some lan-
guages in which the words used for small numbers in the counting sequence are completely
di erent from the words used for the same numbers in other contexts. For example, in Kom-
bai, a language spoken in New Guinea, the words for one and two are, respectively, mofenadi
andmolumo (or lumo), whereas in their body-based counting sequence the words for one and
two are raga and ragaragu, respectively (De Vries,     ). This reinforces Hurford’s suggestion
that the origin of words for the smallest numbers may not be related to the development of
tallying and counting procedures.
Following Hurford’s suggestion, Carey proposes that words for the smallest numbers
may have been derived from grammatical number. Grammatical number di ers from the
word class of numerals. Grammatical number is a category of in ections that distinguish
references to one item (singular) from references to more than one item (plural). Some lan-
guages also have in ections to distinguish references to collections of two items (dual) and
three items (trial). In English, grammatical number is marked, e.g., by the use of the plural
su x -s and by the singular article ‘a’/‘an.’ Carey proposes that
historically, the initial meaning of “one” overlapped substantially that of the singular
determiner “a,” and . . . the initial meaning of “two” overlapped substantially that for
dualmarkers in languages that have them, and the initial meaning of “three” overlapped
substantially that for a trial marker (Carey,     , p.    ).
Carey’s suggestion is cognitively viable, since the use of singular/dual/trial/plural mark-
ers does not require familiarity with numbers. To see why, consider how duals are used in
Arabic. In this language, the dual form is obtained by the addition of a su x to the singular
form. Thus, in Arabic it is possible to say “I read two books” without using the Arabic num-
ber word for two by saying something such as “I read book.dual” (FCLangMedia,     ). The
concept of two—i.e., the idea of an abstract cardinal value, as described in section  . —is not
required in order to understand the use of the dual su x because it always appears attached
to a noun, thus referring to a speci c collection of objects. What is required from the user
of a dual marker is only the ability to perceive collections of a and b distinct objects pre-
cisely, which is innately provided by subitizing. In fact, the same goes for the singular/plural
distinction in English: because quantical cognition allows us to clearly distinguish a single
object from collections of two or more, plural and singular nouns can be used independently
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of number concepts. Thus, cognitively speaking, grammatical number is non-numerical.
However, users of grammatical number are halfway through developing number concepts,
since they are already paying attention and referring to cardinalities.
Therefore, it is no surprise that Pirahã lacks not only numerals, but also grammatical
number in ections completely. There is nothing like the singular/plural distinction or other
manners of expressing numerical distinctions in Pirahã grammar. According to Everett, Pi-
rahã sentences are intrinsically ambiguous with regard to number. For example, the sentence
hiaitíihí hi kaoáíbogi baiaagá translates into English as “The Pirahã are afraid of evil spirits,” or
“A Pirahã is afraid of an evil spirit,” or “The Pirahã are afraid of an evil spirit,” or “A Pirahã
is afraid of evil spirits” (D. Everett,     , p.    ).
The double lack of numerals and grammatical number in Pirahã can be seen as corrobo-
rating Carey’s claim that grammatical number in ections can give rise to numerals/number
concepts. Nevertheless, this cannot be the only way of creating words/concepts for the small-
est numbers, since there are languages, such as Chinese, that have numerals but do not have
the singular/plural distinction.
Another process of creation for concepts/words for the smallest numbers is suggested
by Epps’s (    ) studies of the development of numeral systems in Nadahup languages.
The Nadahup family includes four documented languages—Nadëb, Dâw, Hup, and Yuhup—
whose numeral systems’ upper limits range from three to   . Interestingly, Nadahup numer-
als still preserve transparent etymologies, “a cross-linguistically unusual feature suggestive of
their relatively recent development” (Epps,     , p.    ). Nadahup numerals for the small-
est numbers are not derived from quanti ers or grammatical number markers, but from
words with other, non-numerical, meanings. In Hup, the number word for one—ºayǔp—
seems to be derived from the demonstrative pronoun ‘yúp’ (meaning “that”), which is used
for abstract, absent or intangible entities. In Yuhup, the number word for one—c´̄ah—also
means “other,” and a variant of it—cãhy´̄apã—means “other individual.” The words for two
and three reveal even more interesting etymologies. In Hup, one of the variants of the word
for two—k ew eg-ºap—literally means “eye quantity,” and one of the variants of the word for
three—m c̀t-w1g-ºap—literallymeans “rubber tree seed quantity.” Eyes are a universal paradig-
matic case of a collection that always comes in pairs, whereas rubber tree seeds are familiar
triplets in Hup speakers’ environment.
The rubber tree (hevea sp.) has a large, distinctive, three-lobed seed or nut (in Hup,
m c̀t-w1g) which is culturally highly salient, being used among the Hupd’ eh and other
peoples of the region to make a popular children’s toy, and associated with an edible
fruit (Epps,     , p.    ).
The Hupd’ eh are the people who speak Hup. A rubber tree seed is depicted in Figure
 . . But how could rubber tree seeds and pairs of eyes give rise to number concepts? Decock
(    , p.    ) suggests that anumeric societies could use immutable collections of permanent
objects—which he calls “canonical collections”—as standards against which other collections
can be compared by one-to-one correspondence. This seems to be exactly whatHup speakers
have done. The distinct lobes a, b, and c of a rubber tree seed can be put in one-to-one
correspondence with the distinct objects d, e, and f of another collection, and then the phrase
“rubber tree seed quantity” can be used to refer to the cardinality of the latter. It must be
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noted that this one-to-one correspondence operation does not need to be actively conducted
by the agent. The OFS can do this automatically. The only thing agents needed to actively
do was to select the rubber tree seed as a canonical collection.
Figure  . : A rubber tree fruit (in Hup, m c̀t-w1g)
with its three distinctive lobes. The Hup word for
three is m c̀t-w1g-ºap, where the su x -ºap means
quantity, showing that Hup speakers clearly dis-
tinguish the fruit from the cardinal value repre-
sented by it. (Photo from ProjetoPETRA (    ).)
In doing so, over time, the association
between the phrase “rubber tree seed quan-
tity” and collections of three, according to
the OFS-based account of number acqui-
sition, would cause enriched parallel indi-
viduation to store a long term representa-
tion of a collection of the three lobes of
rubber tree seeds, which thus becomes the
meaning of the phrase/word “rubber-tree-
seed-quantity.” Later, this representation
becomes fully abstract, and then the con-
cept of three emerges. In the ANS-based
account of number acquisition, the ANS
representation of numerosities consisting of
approximately three items would be sharp-
ened by the association of the phrase “rub-
ber tree seed quantity” with collections of
three, giving rise to the concept of three.
The emergence of new numerical mean-
ings left detectable marks on the corre-
sponding words. The  rst thing to notice is that the Hup words for two and three are not
simply “eyes” and “rubber tree seed;” they have the su x -ºap, which means quantity. This
shows that Hup speakers clearly distinguish pairs of eyes and rubber tree seeds from the
quantities they represent. Epps points out that a similar process of abstraction also occurs
in the formation of words for colors.
Especially for cultures where color reference carries a low functional load, color terms
may come about via a gradual delinking and generalization of the abstract notion of
color from speci c objects—but thismay be a slow process (Lyons,     ; Kay andMa ,
    ; Levinson,     ). In the Papuan language Yélî Dnye, for example, the two dialectal
variants of terms for ‘red’ correspond to the two di erent words for a species of red
parrot that exist in these dialects; as Levinson points out, the co-existence of these
terms suggests “that the reference to the bird is still salient, that these are partially live rather
than fully dead metaphors” (Levinson,     :   ) (Epps,     , p.    ).
Again, we see numerosities and colors involved in similar phenomena. In Hup, although
the references to eyes and rubber tree seeds are still visible in some variants of the words
for two and three, other variants are already showing signs of detachment from their roots,
becoming “dead metaphors.” For example, k ew eg-ºap (literally “eye-quantity”) has the short-
ened form kaºap. Phonological reduction, the process of lexicalization that is at play here,
is the same process that in English produced the word ‘goodbye’ from the sentence ‘God be
with you’ (“Goodbye”, n.d.). In modern English, the concept of goodbye is completely de-
tached from its roots, as inHup the concept of two, expressed by the word kaºap, is becoming
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detached from “eye-quantity.”
The use of canonical collections to designate the numbers two and three is also present
in the other Nadahup languages (except for Nadëb) and in other Amazonian languages.
For example, in Xerénte, a language of the Je family, spoken thousands of kilometers away
from the region where Nadahup languages are spoken, the etymology of the word for two—
ponkwanẽ—traces back to a phrase that translates into English as “deer footprint,” and the
etymology of the word for three—mrẽpranẽ— traces back to a phrase for “rhea bird footprint”
(Melo,     , p.    ). Deer footprints have two distinctive toes, and rhea birds’ footprints
have three toes.
The strategy of using canonical collections is less evocative for one, since each clearly
distinguishable individual object may be as salient as every other when it comes to quantity.
In Nadahup languages, the etymology of the words for one refers to “that” or “other individ-
ual,” as mentioned above. Epps, Bowern, Hansen, Hill, and Zentz (    , p.   ) report that in
many Australian languages, the word for one also means “alone” or “together” (no parts); in
the Amazonian language Xerénte, the word for one—smĩsi—also means “alone” (Melo,     ,
p.    ). Although the meaning of all of these words involves some reference to the idea of
unit, notice that such ideas do not presuppose, and are di erent from, the concept of one.
Recall that the minimum content of a number concept is a cardinal value—in the case of
one, the idea of the cardinal size of a singleton consisting of a generic individual. We do
not need this concept to be able to distinguish individuals we refer to by “that” or qualify
as “together” or “alone.” Only when one of these words is selected to refer to the perceived
numerosity of singletons does the process of number concept formation take place and the
concept of one arise.
Subitizing makes small quantities salient in the environment and this may be seen as a
natural invitation to refer to these quantities in everyday situations. However, the salience
of small quantities alone is not su cient to elicit the creation of the  rst pairs of number
concepts/words, as the existence of the anumeric Pirahã demonstrates. In fact, we do not feel
compelled to refer to everything we are able to perceive. There must be other environmental
factors that also drive the creation of number concepts, including factors from the social
environment.
The emergence of number concepts/words is often viewed as being associated with the
need to quantify scarce resources. A tension between multiple ends and limited supplies is
believed to be what encourages people to engage in acts of quanti cation (Harper,     ,
p.    ). In a cross-cultural study involving data from more than     societies, Divale (    )
established a correlation between susceptibility to periodical starvation—which requires
storing food for the future—and the upper limit of numeral systems. Generally speaking,
the more food a society has to store, the higher the limit of its numeral system. Thus, a
society that does not use numbers at all must be a society with no need to store food at all.
The Pirahã habits seem to be in total agreement with Divale’s  ndings. D. Everett (    ,
p.   ) reports that “[t]he Pirahã consume everything as soon as it is hunted or gathered.” In
fact, most of the features of the Pirahã’s small-scale society—only    people in      and    
in      (Gonçalves,     )—and simple material culture are compatible with not needing
numbers. However, there is an additional di culty in the case of the Pirahã. They have
been in contact with Brazilian mainstream culture for more than     years, and they engage
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in barter frequently with Portuguese speaking traders who regularly come to their villages. It
is well-documented that many cultures have acquired numeral systems through contact with
other groups with which they maintain trade relations. This phenomenon is also common
among Amazonian cultures. Epps (    ) points out that increased trade relations among
Hupd’ eh, Yuhup, and Tukanoan people has contributed to the di usion of numerical strate-
gies among them. More recently, these languages have also begun borrowing Portuguese
numerals to refer to numbers above the limit of their original systems. Despite the long
time the Pirahã have been in trade contact with numerate cultures, they have never bor-
rowed numerals. According to D. Everett (    ), this points to a more fundamental char-
acteristic of Pirahã culture: the Pirahã value referring only to immediate experience over
abstract, unwitnessed topics. The Pirahã’s limited interest in planning for the future, due to
their attachment to immediate experience, might make them less interested in developing
or adopting techniques to keep track of numerosities and, to the extent that the concept of
number involves abstract generalizations that go beyond immediate experience, it might be
experienced as a unfamiliar way of thinking in their culture.  If Everett is right, then, not
only the material environment and the practical needs linked to it, but also other cultural
traits can promote or preclude the emergence of number concepts.
Under the pressures of increasing practical or cultural needs, cultures that have broken
the barrier of words/concepts for the  rst three or four numbers will be motivated to ex-
pand their list of numerals. However, this cannot be done by relying on the same strategies.
Grammatical number is not apt for making precise distinctions above the subitizing range,
since it is bounded by the OFS’s limits. For the same reason, the selection of canonical col-
lections of four or more items is not viable without the development of an active one-to-one
correspondence procedure. The creation of tallying techniques is the answer.
 .  Tallies: active one-to-one correspondence
In the Nadahup family, as we will see in section  . , words for numbers above three are
derived from words recited during the operation of body-part tallies. Before addressing
the emergence of words for numbers above three, though, we have to consider how tallying
techniques in general, including non-verbal ones, might have emerged. A tally is a means
of keeping track of discrete quantities by one-to-one correspondences without necessarily
using number words or numbers. Ifrah (    , p.   ) gives a graphic example of how people
living in few-number or anumeric cultures can keep track of large quantities by tallying.
Imagine a shepherd in charge of a  ock of sheep which is brought back to shelter every
night in a cave. There are  fty- ve sheep in this  ock. But the shepherd doesn’t know
that he has  fty- ve of them since he does not know the number “  ”: all he knows is
that he has “many sheep”. Even so, he wants to be sure that all his sheep are back in
 The link that Everett establishes between the Pirahã’s attachment to immediate experience and their lack
of numbers is contested by Nevins, Pesetsky, and Rodrigues (    ). Their point is that there is nothing in the
experience of seeing two canoes in the river and reporting “two canoes” that would violate an attachment to
immediate experience. Although this may be the case, the absence of number words in Pirahã still demands an
explanation that goes beyond the material/economical features of the Pirahã’s lives, since they have been engaged
in commerce for a long time and, even so, never developed nor adopted a numeral system.
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the cave each night. So he has an idea—the idea of a concrete device which prehistoric
humanity used for manymillennia. He sits at the mouth of his cave and lets the animals
in one by one. He takes a  int and an old bone, and cuts a notch in the bone for every
sheep that goes in. So, without realising the mathematical meaning of it, he has made
exactly  fty- ve incisions on the bone by the time the last animal is inside the cave.
Henceforth the shepherd can check whether any sheep in his  ock are missing. Every
time he comes back from grazing, he lets the sheep into the cave one by one, and moves
his  nger over one indentation in the tally stick for each one. If there are any marks
left on the bone after the last sheep is in the cave, that means he has lost some sheep.
If not, all is in order. And if meanwhile a new lamb comes along, all he has to do is to
make another notch in the tally bone.
Tallying techniques, implemented with materials such as bones, sticks, knotted cords,
pebbles,  ngers, and toes, have been used by many cultures across the world. Virtually any-
thing that lends itself to be seen as a collection of discrete, easily individualizable objects
or marks can be used as a tally. Tallies may have been one of the earliest non-verbal and
non-numerical cognitive tools. As aptly illustrated by Ifrah, to operate a tally, one has only
to master the mechanical procedure of establishing one-to-one correspondence. In his ex-
ample, the model collection consists of the notches cut in the bone, and the target collection
is the  ock of sheep. To tally notches with sheep, the shepherd has to master the rule that
governs one-to-one correspondence, namely: each item of the target has to be mapped onto
a single item of the model, and for any a and b distinct items of the target, they must be
mapped onto distinct items of the model. This means that he cannot assign a sheep to two
notches, nor assign two sheep to the same notch. He also has to understand why this rule
must be followed, otherwise he cannot appreciate its outcome. He has to be aware that each
notch represents a single sheep, and that the collection of all notches represents the size of
his  ock.
As number concepts are not required for tallying, it is natural to suppose that anumeric
people might be able to operate a tally. However, as tallying demands operational and con-
ceptual knowledge of a procedure, and its execution requires a certain level of attention and
control, we need to investigate whether humans are able to engage in tallying practices spon-
taneously or if previous training is required. The Pirahã are again a case in point. Frank et
al. (    ) claim that, in spite of the Pirahã’s anumeracy, they are able to establish one-to-one
correspondences successfully if required to do so. Others, however, have not replicated their
results. Let me brie y review the main points of contention in this issue.
Gordon (    ) tested some Pirahã on various one-to-one matching tasks. In the linear
matching task, a number of AA batteries were placed in a line, and he asked participants to
produce another row of batteries exactly below the presented one, with the same number of
batteries. The orthogonal matching task was similar, but participants were asked to produce
the other row of batteries in an orthogonal position, forming an angle of   ° with the pre-
sented one. In both tasks, participants performed accurately with up to two or three items,
but beyond this performance deteriorated. Even though the orthogonal task proved to be
more di cult for the tested Pirahã, performance on the linear task was also poor. Gordon’s
overall conclusion was that “[p]erformance with quantities greater than three was remark-
ably poor, but showed a constant coe cient of variation, which is suggestive of an analog
estimation process” (Gordon,     , p.    ). That is, participants seemingly relied on their
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quantical abilities, rather than anything like a one-to-one correspondence procedure.
Frank et al. (    ) tested some Pirahã on the same one-to-one matching tasks, but found
a di erent result in the linear task. In their experiment, participants performed almost
at ceiling level when asked to produce another row of items exactly below the presented
one, suggesting that they indeed applied a one-to-one correspondence procedure. Frank and
colleagues claimed that Gordon’s di erent result might be due to the AA batteries mov-
ing around inadvertently, which may have distracted the participants. To avoid distraction,
Frank and colleagues used spools of thread placed vertically and unin ated rubber balloons.
With these materials, the tested Pirahã performed much better on the linear task. However,
they still performed badly on the orthogonal task. To explain participants’ di erent per-
formances on the linear and the orthogonal tasks, Frank and colleagues hypothesized that
the orthogonal task demands more memory to transfer information across space. Lacking
number words to encode the required information precisely, they had to rely on their ANS
alone, and performed less accurately.
Frank and colleagues’ results were contested in a follow-up study conducted by C. Ev-
erett andMadora (    ). They tested some Pirahã who lived in another village (further away
from the one where Frank and colleagues had selected their participants) using the same pro-
cedures and materials, and obtained results consistent with those found by Gordon (    ).
In their tests, participants failed on both linear and orthogonal matching tasks for collec-
tions with more than three items. C. Everett and Madora provide a plausible explanation
for the disparate results. Besides the fact that the village where Frank and colleagues applied
their tests (called Xagiopai) is more exposed to mainstream Brazilian culture—they report
that there used to be a government-run clinic in the village—, they also reveal that
in the   years preceding the  eld experiments of Frank et al. (    ), K.M. [K. Madora]
spent months in the village. During this period, she sought to teach basic arithmetic
to the people at their request. K.M. also used one-to-one matching tasks in her arith-
metic sessions with the Pirahã at the Xagiopai village. . . . All of the adults at Xagiopai
participated in such tasks numerous times in     , in the months leading up to the
 eld research on which the  ndings in Frank et al. were based. (K.M.’s presence in
the village during this period is documented via  ight logs.) We are able to catalog
the names of the tribe members in question and have corroborated their participation
in the research conducted for Frank et al. The Pirahãs’ heightened performance on
the one-to-one matching task in that study can plausibly be explained because of their
exposure to the task in question (C. Everett & Madora,     , p.    -   ).
If C. Everett and Madora (    ) are right, participants in Frank’s et al. (    ) exper-
iments succeeded at the line matching task because they had been previously trained. Al-
though Frank was not impressed by C. Everett and Madora’s arguments (see Frank (    ,
p.    )), another study conducted by his group can be interpreted (against their own inter-
pretation) as con rming the hypothesis that success on one-to-one matching does require
training in a mechanical, non-linguistic procedure.
Frank, Fedorenko, Lai, Saxe, and Gibson (    ) tested numerate US citizens recruited
among the MIT community on the same tasks Pirahã participants were tested on in Frank
et al. (    ). To prevent participants from counting and relying on number words to encode
and memorize information, they required participants to repeat the words of a radio news
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broadcast aloud while performing the tasks. They hypothesized that, without being able to
count, English speakers’ performance should mirror Pirahã speakers’ performance.
On the line matching task, English speakers performed as well as the Pirahã did in Frank
et al. (    ). However, in the orthogonal matching task, where the Pirahã had failed mis-
erably, English speakers performed with almost perfect accuracy. Frank et al. (    ) explain
English speakers’ superior performance by the fact that, in this task, they did not rely only
on estimation (as the Pirahã did) but also on “ad-hoc non-linguistic strategies” (Frank et al.,
    , p.   ). They say that, during debrie ng, participants reported “trying to co-register
objects one by one across sets in the orthogonal match task” (Frank et al.,     , p.   ).
This clearly shows that English speaking participants used a non-linguistic tool—one-to-
one correspondence—in this task which the Pirahã did not know how to use in a similar
situation. Altogether, the results from Frank et al. (    ) and Frank et al. (    ) make the
curious suggestion that success at linear matching does not require training, whereas success
at orthogonal matching does.
In face of this, C. Everett andMadora’s explanation of the con icting results in the linear
task becomes more compelling. It is more natural to suppose that, rather than revealing a
natural ability to establish linear, but not orthogonal, one-to-one matchings, Pirahã speak-
ers’ success on the linear task in Frank et al. (    ) was due to training they had previously
received. It is likely that Madora used parallel rows of objects to illustrate one-to-one map-
pings, rather than orthogonal ones. The limited experience of the Pirahã with the recently
learned technique prevented them from generalizing the procedure to other spatial arrange-
ments. 
Even if more studies are needed to settle this debate, the currently available results do
not allow us to assume that the ability to perform one-to-one correspondence arises without
training. In historical terms, this means that one-to-one correspondence techniques had
to be invented. Therefore, we cannot avoid the challenge of explaining how techniques of
one-to-one correspondence could have been created from scratch.
 Although I focused this discussion on the linear and orthogonal matching tasks only, the experiments cited
involve a number of other tasks. One of the questions underlying the debate among Frank and colleagues and
C. Everett and Madora is whether their lack of number words would prevent the Pirahã from recognizing exact
quantities above the subitizing limit. What they do not seem to take into account is that one-to-one matching
tasks where both target and model collections are visible throughout the process are not the most appropriate
method to investigate this question, given that these tasks can be solved mechanically and non-verbally. To
my mind, the success or failure of the Pirahã in these tasks is irrelevant for the debate about the importance
of number words for the recognition of larger quantities. The “nuts-in-a-can” task, in which Gordon (    )
and Frank et al. (    ) also tested Pirahã speakers, is much more e ective for this purpose. In this task, the
experimenter drops nuts one by one into a can in view of the participant. Then, the experimenter withdraws
the nuts again one by one, asking the participant after each withdrawal whether any nuts remain in the can.
The accuracy of Pirahã participants on this task decreased as the number of nuts increased, displaying a pattern
consistent with the use of quantical abilities only. The English speaking participants in Frank et al. (    ),
tested on this same task under the condition that prevented them from counting, performed quite similarly to
the Pirahã. These results conclusively show that, lacking both number words to encode numerical information
in memory and an external, mechanical and non-verbal one-to-one correspondence strategy, exact quantities cannot
be recognized. If English speaking participants in Frank et al. (    ) were provided with pencil and paper, they
would probably have performed better by using tally marks.
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 . .  The invention of tallying systems
Tallies, such as the notched bone in Ifrah’s example quoted above, are genuine cognitive
technologies. Not only do tallies such as that work as a memory aid, by recording the tal-
lied quantity in an enduring material, but they also expand our ability to evaluate cardinal
sizes precisely. The mechanical execution of a series of repetitive simple steps following the
principle of one-to-one correspondence enables us to extend the precision of subitizing to
cardinal values above three or four. As suggested above, tallying systems that originally did
not involve numerical concepts may have been the precursors to counting. But how could
anumeric people, or people who only know numbers from one to three or four, have invented
this cognitive technology?
Anthropologists who study processes of innovation in human cultures and biologists
who study non-human animals’ capacity to innovate concur that inventions usually result
from the recombination of preexisting elementsmotivated by necessity (Laland,     ; O’Brien
& Shennan,     ; Reader, Morand-Ferron, & Flynn,     ). “Necessity is the mother of inno-
vation” is an often cited motto in the area, although there are other factors, such as oppor-
tunity and luck, which can prompt innovation as well. The invention of tallying techniques,
however, does not seem to be an exception to the rule; it was probablymotivated by necessity.
The  rst thing to notice is that quantical abilities themselves can pose a problem for
which the search for solutions may lead to the invention of tallies. Some have suggested
that the exact perception of numerosities provided by the OFS can be felt as con icting
with the fuzzy perception of numerosities provided by the ANS. Thus, “[a]s we apply these
di erent systems to the same objects, events and scenes, we appear to be driven to reconcile
the representations that they yield” (Feigenson et al.,     , p.    ). Barner (    , p.    )
elaborates on this point:
perception provides humans with an explanatory problem that the creation of sym-
bolic number systems is meant to solve. This problem, confronted by humans from
the beginning of our shared cultural history, can be expressed as follows: whereas our
perception of quantity is noisy and subject to error, our perception of individual things
is not. Consequently, despite our noisy representation of number, we have a strong in-
tuition that collections in the world are made up of distinct individuals, such that they
must contain determinate numbers of things that are subject to precise measurement.
. . . Counting systems, I propose, were constructed by our ancestors to resolve this ex-
planatory gap—to measure and keep track of the precise quantities that we knew to
exist in the world, but otherwise are unable to precisely quantify.
Although the disparity between the exactness of subitizing and the fuzziness of esti-
mation may, in itself, be seen as a problem to be solved, it is unlikely that, without other
practical needs, our ancestors would have bothered to solve this problem. As the existence
of an anumeric culture shows, this internal “con ict” is not su cient to prompt the inven-
tion of counting. The natural attitude towards large collections is estimation, and estimation
usually su ces, unless there is a real need for exactness. Once such a necessity appears, then
people probably will notice the internal “con ict” and try to extend the exactness of subitiz-
ing to the range of estimation.
There are a number of activities in small-scale societies whichmay ask for exactness. One
of the most obvious is the tracking of time, and many small-scale societies have developed
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tallying systems specially for this purpose. For example, the Korowai from New Guinea use
a simple tallying device, called a saündal, to keep track of the passing days. De Vries (    ,
p.    ) describes it.
It consists of the rib of a leaf of the sago palm tree, into which a number of pegs or
bits of wood have been inserted. When somebody invites someone else to a feast, for
example, he will hand over [a] saündal together with the invitation; the person invited
will take one peg out of the saündal every day, and when he has reached the last peg,
which is twice as long as the others, the day of the feast will have arrived.
The Korowai are far from being anumeric (they use a body-part counting system whose
upper limit is   ), but it is easy to see that anumeric people could operate devices such as
the saündal. To operate it, it is su cient to understand that to each peg corresponds a day,
and to be able to take one peg out every day. Both abilities are provided by the OFS. Recall
that the OFS allows infants and non-human animals to judge whether two small collections
are the same or di erent with respect to their cardinal sizes. Using this ability, an anumeric
operator of a saündal can understand that each peg, taken in isolation, corresponds to one
day, i.e., that they are “the same” in quantical terms. The OFS also enables the anumeric
operator to take out exactly one peg per day, instead of two or three. When there are no
remaining pegs, which the operator can also perceive through her OFS, she knows that the
feast day has come.
In fact, subitizing seems to be the quantical ability that makes the establishment of one-
to-one correspondences possible. The aforementioned experiments with the Pirahã show
that they relied on subitizing when collections were small. In the linear matching task, they
performed accurately when the row of objects consisted of up to three elements. In the or-
thogonal task, they succeeded with up to two items (Gordon,     ). Their failure with num-
bers above the subitizing limit indicates that they did not decompose the task into smaller
tasks manageable with subitizing. For example, if they had thought of a row of six batteries
as a shorter row of three juxtaposed with another row of three, they could have succeeded.
More generally, any collection of objects can be decomposed into singletons which can be
easily dealt with using subitizing. Instead of proceeding in this way, though, the Pirahã es-
timated the numerosity of the whole line of items and then tried to deploy a set with the
same quantity by estimating it again. What the Pirahã did not realize is that they could have
shifted their attentional focus from the whole collection to its parts. The ability to shift the
attentional focus in this way does not seem to require training. However, that this can be
done in order to successfully complete the task seemingly requires an insight.
Tallying techniques may have been invented when people realized that any two collec-
tions, no matter how big they are, can be compared if decomposed into singletons, which
can be successively paired with each other, relying on successive subitizations for this. If
inventions come from the recombination of previously available elements motivated by ne-
cessity, then anumeric people, or people who know only numbers from one to three or four,
are in the position to invent tallies once necessity arises, given that they already have the
elements to recombine: the ability to shift the attentional focus from a collection to its el-
ements, subitizing, and collections of discrete objects that can be used as model collections
to measure the cardinal size of other collections. There is no reason to doubt that human
creativity is capable of assembling these elements to develop tallying techniques.
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There is evidence that cultures with a very limited numeral system use tallying tech-
niques to expand their numeral systems. For example, the people from Kiwai Island, in
Papua New Guinea, speak a dialect of Southern Kiwai that has a base-two numeral system,
in which the word for one is na’u, and the word for two is netowa. Words for larger numbers
are compounds of these two by addition: three is netowa na’u bi (two one), four is netowa
netowa (two two),  ve is netowa netowa na’u (two two one), and so on (Owens, Lean, Paraide,
& Muke,     , p.   ). Although in principle this system does not have an upper limit, it
is easy to see that the expression of larger numbers becomes increasingly cumbersome. For
this reason, Kiwai islanders prefer to use tally sticks when dealing with larger quantities.
According to Smith, as cited in Owens et al. (    , p.    ),
the most common method of keeping count of large numbers in traditional Kiwai so-
ciety was the use of tallies. Tally sticks each representing an object could be kept in a
bundle or tied to a string. Tallies were used to represent the number of heads captured
by a man in battle, or the pigs killed in the bush, or any other signi cant number.
Smith also reports that the Kiwai used this tallying system in ceremonial feasts in order
to keep track of the number of gifts they received, so that they could repay slightly more
during the return feast, and also to determine the day when the return feast was to be held,
by using a method quite similar to the Korowai’s saündal:
[at the end of the feast] the donor and recipient groupswould part, each having a bundle
with the same number of sticks. Each day, both groups would discard a stick until the
bundle was exhausted and the pre-arranged day for the [return] feast had thus been
reached (Owens et al.,     , p.    ).
Simpler one-to-one correspondence procedures, without involving any device, can also
be invented in the context of exchanges. In many small-scale societies, practices of gift giving
involve the obligation to reciprocate (Mauss,     ). To give a concrete example, among the
Juruna, an indigenous people from the Brazilian Amazon forest, gifts such as arrows must
be reciprocated in the same number as they were received (Ferreira,     , p.   ). Societies
with a very limited numeral system and a social rule to reciprocate gifts in the same number
are likely to  nd a solution in one-to-one matching. Another social practice present in some
small-scale societies that can lead to the development of one-to-one matching is the require-
ment for an equal distribution of goods among its members. In the absence of arithmetical
abilities, successive rounds of distribution where one item is given to each member at a time
seem to be a natural solution. In fact, practices like this can be found among the Xérente,
another indigenous group from the Brazilian Amazon forest. Melo reports:
[w]hen the festival takes place in the village, family heads naturally form a circle around
the food, which is delivered apparently in accordancewith a principle of quantity/person
ratio; for example, if a person receives four packages of co ee, all family heads should
also receive four packages (Melo,     , p.    , my translation).
Traditionally, the upper limit of the Xérente’s numeral system is four. Today, they also
use Portuguese numerals, but they still keep this traditional practice of the distribution of
goods.
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These simple techniques will be invented only if people feel the need to distribute things
equally, or to reciprocate the exact number of gifts, or to keep track of passing days, or
have other reasons to be interested in determining the exact cardinal size of collections with
more than three or four items. But, once tallies are in use, people who master a tallying
procedure are halfway through acquiring number concepts. Tallying methods can be seen
as precursors to counting because they are cognitive tools governed by three out of the  ve
rules that govern the cognitive tool of counting: the principle of one-to-one correspondence
(obviously), the principle of order irrelevance of objects, and the principle of abstraction.
In its tallying version, the principle of order irrelevance can be rephrased as stating that the
order in which items of the target collection are paired with items of the model collection is
irrelevant, i.e., it may change across di erent tallying events. In Ifrah’s example quoted at the
beginning of this section, a shepherd who tried to always assign the same sheep to the same
notch in his tally bone would  nd himself in pointless trouble. The principle of abstraction,
in turn, regulates tallies as long as people realize that collections of di erent sorts of objects
can be tallied, a practice that can be found in small-scale societies as exempli ed above.
But two of the counting principles may still be missing in tallies. One of them is the car-
dinality principle, which in its tallying version would say that the model collection obtained
at the end of a tallying event should be seen as representing the cardinal size of the target col-
lection. In the given examples, though, the model collections are not produced to determine
nor to represent the cardinality of the target collections, but only to ful ll a practical need.
When using a saündal, for example, the agent may not be especially interested in how many
days have to go until the feast takes place, but only in getting there on the right day. The
saündal is used to perform an operation, rather than represent. Although its operator could
think of the collection of remaining pegs as representing a number, she does not need to do
so in order to succeed in attending the feast on the right day. The other principle missing
is the stable order of counting words. In its tallying version, this principle would say that
the items of the model collection should be used in a stable order across di erent tallying
events. In tallies such as those in the above examples, this would be not only counterproduc-
tive, but also very hard to do, given that the items (e.g., pegs) of the model collections are
hardly distinguishable from each other.
Lacking these two principles, tallying systems such as those exempli ed above are not
likely to give rise to proper counting and number words/concepts.  As Hurford (    , p.   )
points out, this is because “sticks, or buttons, or whatever, have no names, and therefore
th[ese] system[s] provid[e] no names for the numbers themselves.” Without symbols associ-
 Overmann, Wynn, and Coolidge (    ) and Malafouris (    ,     ) claim that the sole use of material
artifacts—such as tally sticks, clay tokens, etc.—could give rise to number concepts. However, the lack of two
counting principles in tallying systems that rely exclusively on hardly distinguishable material artifacts makes
this possibility unlikely, as I argued above. Model collections with distinguishable items, such as those employed
in the system of clay tokens in Sumer (Schmandt-Besserat,     ) could overcome this di culty, but Malafouris’s
explanation of the emergence of number concepts by means of the Sumerian system of clay tokens is probably
anachronic. Given the complexity of Sumerian society by the time the system of clay tokens was being developed,
it is highly unlikely that they had not yet developed number words for larger numbers (Overmann (    ) calls
attention to this point). The development of the system of clay tokens in Sumer is better seen as a response to
the need to record numerical quantities in permanent media, rather than to the need to count, which could have
been solved earlier with words or simpler techniques.
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ated with quantities on a regular basis, ideas of cardinal values are unlikely to be created in
the mind. What is needed for the emergence of number words and cardinal values is a tal-
lying technique based on named objects, which could be paired with the items of the target
collection always in the same order, and whose names could be recited along with pairing
acts. Body-part tallying systems display these features.
Typically, the  ngers and other bodyparts involved [in tallying] have verbal names.
While pointing at a bodypart sign for a number, the verbal name of that bodypart can
be uttered (Hurford,     , p.   ).
With this method [body-part tallies] . . . there are still no verbal names for numbers,
but the various bodyparts,  ngers, and so on could themselves be taken as signs for the
numbers. And there is, at this stage, a conventional ordering of these bodypart signs
(Hurford,     , p.   ).
In the next section we will see the relationship between body-part tallying systems and
the emergence of words for numbers larger than three or four.
 .  Four and beyond: tallies with body parts
Fingers, toes, and other body parts seem to have played a central role in the emergence of
number words. Tallying systems based on body parts, where the name of each part is uttered
along with a gesture pointing to it, have been documented in many cultures across the world.
Especially the various body-part tallying techniques found in New Guinea are often cited in
accounts of the history of numerals as paradigmatic cases (Owens et al.,     ). The origins
of these systems can be seen as quite similar to the origins of tallying techniques based on
pegs, sticks or notches, discussed in the previous section. Body-part tallies di er only with
regard to the model collection their creators have chosen:  ngers and, if necessary, toes and
other body parts. This choice, however, had the fundamental consequence of paving the
way for the creation of number words. Hurford’s proposal is that, through a gradual process
of lexicalization, the names of the body parts uttered along with pairing acts in body-part
tallies gave rise to numerals.
The normal processes of language-change over a long period would lead to words which
originally had bodypart associations losing these associations and becoming pure nu-
meral, or at least counting, words. There would tend to be a phonological split, re ect-
ing the clear semantic di erence between number and bodypart concepts (Hurford,
    , p.   ).
It is believed that a process like this took place in the formation of the Indo-European
numerals. According to Mengden (    , p.    ), “one of the least debated etymologies [of
Indo-European numerals] is that of the expression for ‘ ’, *pénkwe, which is related to the con-
cept ‘ nger’ or ‘ st’.” The number words for four, eight, and ten in Indo-European languages
alsomight have been derived from expressions related to tallies with ngers (Martínez,     ).
These and other observations “strongly suggest that, at the time of the disintegration of the
individual branches of proto-Indo-European, a  nger counting method had developed into
a pure decimal numeral system” (Mengden,     , p.    ).
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At the same time that a process of lexicalization may have given rise to number words,
a process of re-semanti cation may have given rise to number concepts. Body-part tallies
provide all the su cient conditions for the emergence of number concepts according to the
accounts of number acquisition we saw in Chapter  . The  rst thing to notice is that, just
like tallying with notches in bones or bundles of sticks, tallying with  ngers and other body
parts does not require previous familiarity with number concepts. Thus, anumeric or few-
number cultures can develop such techniques. However, even if conceptual understanding
of numbers is absent at the beginning, the point is that number concepts can arise after
mastery of a body-part tallying system is obtained. This happens because body-part tallying
naturally suggests the two counting principles that are absent in other methods of tallying:
stable order and cardinality. Wiese (    ) explains how, starting with the principle of stable
order.
The use of  ngers (and other body parts) as tallies can lead to the emergence of a
stable conventional order and hence give rise to a second stage in number development:
when  ngers are used to represent elements of another set, they tend to be singled out
successively, following the natural order of  ngers on each hand. . . . In this order
one could, for instance, start with the thumb on one hand, go all the way to the little
 nger, and then use the  ngers of the second hand in the same way. As the di erences
in  nger counting in modern cultures show, other orders are possible as well, of course;
what is important here is that the salient order of  ngers on each hand will support a
convention for singling out individual  ngers successively in a  xed order. . . . Given
that body tallies are frequently accompanied by verbal tallies (namely the names for
the body parts in question), a stable conventional order of  ngers used in cardinality
icons will lead to a stable conventional order of words (Wiese,     , p.    ).
Once there is a stable order of words being used regularly in body-part tallying events,
the cardinality principle may be seen as a natural consequence.
The  nal word in a sequence is always more salient andmore accessible than the others.
This leads, for instance, to ‘recency e ects’ shown in memory experiments: the last
word in a list can be better recalled and memorised than the others (probably based on
a bu er in short-term memory).
This leads to a prominent status of the  nal word that is used in an iconic cardinality
representation. Once the words are used in stable order, for a set of a given cardinality,
the same word will always come last and hence be particularly salient for the repre-
sentation of this cardinality. This, then, will support the emergence of indexical links
between individual words and sets of a certain cardinality (Wiese,     , p.    ).
Cognitively, these indexical links take the form of cardinal values. Once the  ve count-
ing principles are being used in a body-part tallying procedure, number concepts will emerge
by the same means as they emerge in today’s children. According to the ANS-based account
of number acquisition, the repeated association of the last word used in a tally with a cer-
tain quantity has the power of sharpening numerosity representations and, thus, produces
cardinal values. In the OFS-based account, the emergence of cardinal values for numbers
above three or four requires bootstrapping, which is viable at this point because all the ele-
ments necessary for it are already present in the tallying techniques. When a tallying system
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is in place, words/concepts for the smallest numbers are likely to already be consolidated.
These words are likely to be recited along with the  rst three (or four) pairing acts in tallying
episodes, which then go on by the recitation of body-part names (at least, this is the case in
Nadahup languages, as we will see below). Thus, people who are already familiar with the
number words/concepts for one, two, and, three, and are becoming familiar with a body-part
tallying system, are in the right position to bootstrap. Once number concepts for numbers
larger than three or four are in place, the body-part names uttered along with pairing acts
are re-semanticized—they start referring to cardinal values in the context of tallying—and
then the  rst pairs of words/concepts for numbers larger than three or four come to light.
A vivid illustration of the di erent stages of the processes through which number words
and concepts may have stemmed from body-part tallying systems can be seen in Nadahup
languages. Dâw, one of the Nadahup languages, has consolidated number words only for
numbers from one to three (Epps,     ). Speakers of Dâw can be seen as subset-knowers
in that they only know numbers smaller than four. But the following Dâw sentence clearly
shows that their few number words are already employed in accordance with the cardinality
principle:
ãr nĩĩ mutuwap bok çarwu
I                    
“I have three clay pots”
This sentence and its translation (into Portuguese) is given by Martins (    , p.   ). In
this sentence, the wordmutuwap, whose etymology inDâw also goes back to “rubber tree seed
quantity,” refers to the cardinality of a whole collection of clay pots, in full accordance with
the cardinality principle. The use of small-number words consistent with the cardinality
principle can provide the model from which users of a body-part tallying system could start
using the last word they recite in a tallying event to refer to the cardinality of the whole
collection, as happens with children in Carey’s model.
The Dâw use a body-part tallying system, but one which lacks a crucial feature and thus
has prevented them from developing other number words/concepts. For quantities above
three, Dâw speakers use a tallying technique that Epps (    ) calls the “fraternal strategy”
and Martins (    ) calls the “even/odd system.” As Martins describes it, in this technique,
a representation of a collection of four items is made by separating four  ngers of one hand
(the thumb is kept bent) into two groups of two  ngers. This gesture is accompanied by
the words mẽ’n mab, which translates into English as “has a sibling.” The reason is that, in
this con guration, each raised  nger is accompanied by another  nger, i.e., each  nger has
a “sibling.” To obtain a representation of a collection of  ve items, the thumb is raised,
accompanied by the words mẽ’n mab mẽr, i.e., “has no sibling,” indicating that the thumb is
alone. For six, the thumb of the other hand is placed against the  rst thumb to make a new
pair, and then it is said again that it “has a sibling,” and so on up to ten, when all  ngers of
both hands are grouped in ve pairs and the process nishes with the words “has a sibling.” In
this system, one and the same expression is associated withmultiple cardinalities. The phrase
mẽ’n mab is associated with four, six, eight, and ten, whereas mẽ’n mab mẽr is associated with
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 ve, seven, and nine. Without a single expression for each cardinality, the corresponding
number words/concepts cannot arise. 
Despite the fact that in Dâw the fraternal strategy did not give rise to words for four and
up, in Hup and Yuhup the etymology of the word for four is clearly traceable back to this
tallying technique. Importantly, Hup and Yuhup speakers no longer use the fraternal tallying
system, and thus the expression “has a sibling,” in these languages, is uniquely associated with
four. Currently they use a base- ve body-part tallying system which starts with their words
for one, two, and three (Hup words were presented in section  . ), includes a fraternal word
for four, and goes on with phrases that translate into English as “one hand” ( ve, the base),
“one other  nger stands up” (six), “two other  ngers stand up” (seven), “three other  ngers
stand up” (eight), “four other  ngers stand up” (nine) and “ ve other  ngers stand up” or
“both hands” (ten). Above ten, counting goes to toes and the system becomes ambiguous.
The phrases that accompany pairing acts in the interval between    and    are repeated for
pairing acts between    and   .
Not all of these phrases are already lexicalized and constitute real couples of number
words/number concepts detached from the tallying system. Epps (    , p.    -   ) reports
that
Numerals greater than ‘ ve’ are more likely to receive an accompanying gesture (usually
a tally on the  ngers), and although most Hup numerals do not depend on a gesture
for their exact value to be understood, it may be di cult to label gesture as secondary
(at least for those speakers who always combine the two). In the case of the ambiguous
numerals like those between   -   and   -   (as with  -   in Dâw), however, the spo-
ken forms are themselves not enough to indicate an exact value, and can therefore be
considered dependent on gesture.
Much as S. Martins (    :    ) notes for Dâw, Hup speakers rarely make use of their
numeral terms over ‘ ve’. The expression d eb “many” is commonly used, and borrowed
Portuguese numerals are typically preferred (particularly by younger speakers) when
a speci c numeral larger than ‘ ve’ is required. . . . Ospina (    :    ) notes that
the Yuhup numerals are frequently accompanied by gestures involving the  ngers (and
sometimes even the feet for higher values).
These data suggest that, in Hup and Yuhup, only the words for numbers from one to
 ve are fully associated with consolidated cardinal values. The other “numerals” are still
seen just as phrases that accompany tallies. This suggestion is corroborated by a closer look
at the level of lexicalization of candidate numerals. The phrases that originated the words
for four and  ve are already lexicalized as true numerals. In Hup, four is hi-bab’ní, whose
etymology is analysed by Epps as “(fact)-have.sibling/accompany.nmlz.” It is interesting to
note that the word ends with a nominalizer (nmlz), which converts the original phrase into
a noun or, more precisely, a numeral. This clearly shows that Hup speakers see the cardi-
nal value corresponding to four as an independent concept. In Yuhup, four is bab-ní-w’ǎp,
whose etymology is analysed by Epps as “has-sibling-quantity.” Here the use of the su x
-ǎp (quantity) is what shows that Yuhup speakers are referring to the cardinal value of four,
 That mẽ’n mab and mẽ’n mab mẽr are not number words nor associated with number concepts is further
indicated by the observation that young Dâw speakers use a hybrid system where words for numbers above
three are borrowed from Portuguese (Martins,     , p.   ).
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and not to the gesture or to the idea of having a sibling. The word for  ve in Hup has a few
variants. One variant is not a word, but the phrase “one hand” (ºayǔp d’apǔh). But there is
also another variant that displays a process of lexicalization through phonological reduction:
ºædapǔh. The Yuhup word for  ve has only one variant—cãh-põh-w’ǎp—where the su x ǎp
shows that speakers are referring to the cardinal value of ve. In contrast to the words for one
to  ve, the phrases that accompany tallies for values above  ve present several variants and
do not show signs of lexicalization. To give just one example, Epps (    , p.    ) identi ed
the following variants in Hup for the phrase accompanying the gesture for six:
cãp cob cakg’et ºayǔp “other  nger stands up one”
ºayǔp cob cakg’ t “one  nger stands up”
cãp cob popǒg “other  nger    -big (=thumb)”
These are full phrases, with no signs of lexicalization. This observation, along with the
fact that Hup and Yuhup speakers usually show their  ngers when referring to six and up,
and that youngsters prefer to use Portuguese numerals above  ve, suggests that  ve is the
limit of proper number words/concepts in Hup and Yuhup. To reach that many, though,
they must already have broken the barrier of subitizing, and they managed to do so by using
a body-part tallying system.
In Hup and Yuhup, the words for numbers from six to ten are not ambiguous; all the suf-
 cient conditions for the emergence of cardinal values seem to be in place. However, judging
by the absence of lexicalization of the corresponding expressions, it seems that cardinal val-
ues for numbers above ve have not emerged. Why? Ontogenetic studies have shown that the
speed of development of number concepts depends on the amount of exposure to situations
where numbers are used. Piantadosi et al. (    ) suggest that the transition across stages
of number knowledge (from one-knower to CP-knower) is driven, to a large extent, by the
input a child receives: the greater the exposure to numbers, the faster the acquisition. This
has been con rmed in a study conducted with Tsimané children (Piantadosi, Jara-Ettinger,
& Gibson,     ). The Tsimané are a farming-foraging group who live in the Bolivian Ama-
zon. Tsimané children undergo the same knower levels as English speaking children do, but
between two and six years later, because number words are used less frequently in their cul-
ture. Thus, we can suppose that among the Hupd’ eh and the Yuhup, hunter-gatherers who
live in even smaller societies, the use of numbers above  ve (and the operation of tallies for
quantities greater than  ve) is so rare that people never develop concepts for them, even
if they have mastered a process which, if used more frequently, could lead them to acquire
such concepts. The Hupd’ eh and the Yuhup may be in the stage identi ed by Davidson et al.
(    ) (mentioned in section  . ) where children have generalized the cardinality principle
only as a mechanical procedure, and have not yet made a semantic generalization for all the
numerals in their counting list. That is, the Hupd’ eh and the Yuhup may be able to realize
that the  nal gesture made and the  nal phrase uttered at the end of a tallying event repre-
sent the cardinality of the whole collection, and thus can be used to denote it, even if they
have not yet formed the corresponding cardinal values. This would explain why the phrases
for six and up were not lexicalized. There is no point in using the su x -ǎp (quantity) or
nominalizing the phrases to refer to a concept that they do not have. In the absence of a new
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concept, the phrases are not re-semanticized and speakers simply give the literal description
of the tallying gesture.
If my analysis is correct, the Nadahup languages give us the opportunity to see a nu-
meral system under construction. The building blocks are words brought in from a non-
numerical context—descriptions of gestures—and a tallying procedure. The operational use
of these words for tallying leads to their re-semanti cation, and eventually the new concepts
so produced prompt the transformation of the originally non-numerical words into proper
numerals. Let us take a closer look into the process of re-semanti cation that makes number
concepts appear where they had not been before.
 . .  A closer look at re-semantification
As we saw in section  . , one condition for re-semanti cation taking place is the use of sym-
bols to perform certain operations, instead of to denote or communicate, since this opens
up the possibility of them being de-semanticized. This condition is met by the words recited
during the operation of a body-part tally. In the Hup and Yuhup systems, the recited words
are literally describing the gestures the operator makes with her hands (e.g., “one other  nger
stands up”). These descriptions can be de-semanticized because they do not aim at commu-
nicating or denoting anything. There is no point in describing for oneself each gesture one
makes, or in telling others this during the production of a tally. The words recited during
a tallying event are best seen as being addressed to the operator themselves, probably with
the same purpose as when we subvocalize counting words: to help single out objects and/or
raise  ngers sequentially, so that the counter/tallier does not lose track of the one-to-one
matches she is making.
There is experimental evidence that raising the exact number of  ngers to represent the
size of a collection can be di cult for people who have not undergone adequate training. In
an experiment with deaf individuals who did not learn to count nor use a conventional sign
language (but who are able to communicate with their families through a home-developed
system of signs), Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey, and Goldin-Meadow (    ) showed that,
although participants were able to use  ngers to express quantities in certain circumstances,
“they do not consistently extend the correct number of  ngers when communicating about
sets greater than three” (Spaepen et al.,     , p.     ). These home-signers learned to use  n-
gers to represent the size of collections, but they did not learn amethod to do so consistently.
Without following a stable, coordinated procedure, they cannot raise the right number of
 ngers for quantities above the subitizing limit. The act of raising  ngers to tally, which is
easy for trained people, may be demanding for untrained ones.
There is also experimental evidence for the positive e ect of private speech (speech spo-
ken to oneself) on self-regulation. Research on this topic started with Vygotsky (    ), who
highlighted the operational role of language in serving as a self-regulatory tool for develop-
ing children. In a more recent study, Winsler, Manfra, and Diaz (    ) tested  ve-year-old
children in a counting task. They asked children to tap a peg with a toy hammer a certain
number of times. They instructed children either to count aloud or to keep silent while
performing the task, and observed that children’s performance improved signi cantly when
they counted aloud, probably because speaking the counting words aloud helped them more
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e ciently self-regulate their actions. It has also been observed that both children and adults
use private speech more in tasks that they  nd more di cult, and that the use of private
speech decreases as subjects become more skillful at the task (Winsler,     ).
Taken together, the fact that singling out  ngers sequentially in a tallying procedure
may be di cult for people with little practice at this task (as is the case for people who
are just inventing the procedure or perform it only occasionally), and the fact that private
speech helps self-regulation in demanding tasks, are in line with the hypothesis that the
words recited in body-part tallying serve to self-regulate tallying gestures and thus improve
performance. If this is so, these words are used for operation (rather than for communication
or denotation), and one condition for de-semanti cation is met.
A second condition for de- and re-semanti cation is the use of symbols in a mechanical
procedure. Aswe saw in section  . , the concepts of de-semanti cation and re-semanti cation
were originally introduced in the context of operative writing and formal systems. Body-part
tallying techniques do not involve written language and are not like formal systems in many
aspects. Nevertheless, body-part tallying and formal systems have at least two relevant simi-
larities that make their operation automatable. First, both are regulated by clear-cut opera-
tional rules. As we saw above, tallying systems in general are regulated by modi ed versions
of three counting principles (one-to-one correspondence, order irrelevance of pairing acts,
and abstraction), and body-part tallying adds two more principles, stable order and cardi-
nality. Second, the phrases recited and the gestures made during the production of body-part
tallies, just like formulas of a formal system, are produced by clear-cut syntactic rules. For
example, in the Dâw fraternal strategy, words and gestures are produced following this sim-
ple rule:  ngers are raised one by one, while the phrases “has no sibling/has a sibling” are
uttered alternately. The rule in the Hup and Yuhup base- ve strategy says that  ngers of the
second hand are raised one by one followed by a phrase formed through the pattern “( ,  ,  ,
 ,  ) other  nger(s) stand(s) up.” These simple rules, once mastered, allow for the mechanical
execution of the tallying procedure, so that the operator does not have to pay attention to
the meaning of the words she is uttering. The more automatized the procedure, the more
“ritualized” the role of the uttered words becomes, and the weaker their association with
their original meanings. In this way, the words may end up de-semanticized. In fact, lin-
guists have proposed that number words may have originated from the ritualistic execution
of a procedure involving meaningless words. The following passages by Hurford summarize
what he calls “the ritual hypothesis:”
The Ritual (or ‘Eeny, meeny, miny, mo’) Hypothesis is that at a stage before the de-
velopment of proper numeral words, rituals exist in which sequences of words which
have no referential, propositional, or conceptual meaning are recited while the human
actor simultaneously points (in some way) to objects in a collection (Hurford,     ,
p.    -   ).
The Ritual Hypothesis being put forward for examination here is that numeral systems
arose out of counting, developed as a method of achieving a practical purpose simply
and reliably, using a conventional sequence of recited words . . . The sequences of words
used in such rituals would become interpreted numerically (Hurford,     , p.    ).
Hurford’s ritual hypothesis is quite similar to what I am proposing here, with the di er-
ence that, in my account, the words employed in the ritual were not originally meaningless.
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They were descriptions of the actions performed in tallying events that, because of their op-
erational role in a procedure executed ritualistically (mechanically), were de-semanticized.
Importantly, the ritualization/automatization of the procedure is crucial for its successful
execution, since it prevents distraction. If at each step the operator stopped to grasp how
many  ngers she had already used, she could lose track of the tally. The procedure is more
accurate if executed uninterruptedly.
Words de-semanticized by the ritualistic production of tallies provide all the psycholog-
ical conditions for the emergence of number concepts. Like today’s children in the earliest
stages of number learning, people using a body-part tallying system are reciting a sequence of
meaningless words during the execution of a procedure governed by the  ve counting prin-
ciples. At a certain point, the de-semanti cation of the  nal word of a tallying event makes
room for its association with a new meaning. In the ANS-based account of number acqui-
sition, this new meaning is the fuzzy ANS representation of the numerosity displayed in
 ngers. Over time, the recurring association between symbol and numerosity will sharpen
a representation of the latter and give rise to a proper cardinal value. In the OFS-based
account, the new meaning associated to the re-semanticized word is a cardinal value boot-
strapped from the previously formed, smaller cardinal values. Either way, as new concepts
emerge and the original words are re-semanticized, the creation of new words through pro-
cesses of lexicalization is encouraged.
As in other cases of re-semanti cation mentioned in section  . , here re-semanti cation
also takes place in a mechanical procedure that helps overcome a cognitive bias or limita-
tion. Tallying techniques enabled our ancestors and contemporary people who live in few-
number cultures to evaluate the cardinality of collections with more than three or four items
precisely, which they could not do by relying solely on their quantical abilities. Tallying tech-
niques give access to information otherwise unavailable; once this information surfaces, new
concepts can be formed.
Nevertheless, body-part tallying systems, even after they have given rise to number con-
cepts and to new words, are not yet fully- edged verbal counting systems. Insofar as their
users still see body parts as the model collection, they are not properly counting. In verbal
counting, the model collection consists of words. A fully- edged verbal counting systemwill
emerge only when people no longer care about mapping each element of the target collection
onto a body part, realizing that, for all purposes, it is su cient to say the ritualized words
in the right order. Wiese (    , p.    ) suggests that this last step towards purely verbal
counting “would be supported by a gain in e ciency: using words instead of  ngers frees
the  ngers of their representational task [as items of the model collection] and enables us to
use them for pointing to the objects we want to represent,” which could make one-to-one
matching easier and more accurate.  Once this last step is taken, a proper verbal counting
system has emerged. At this stage, though, it has become a more powerful tool, since it can
bene t from linguistic resources—especially recursion—and be no longer limited in range.
This is the topic of the next section.
 This highlights the tool-like character of counting words at their origins: they took over the function of
three-dimensional objects (sticks, notches, body parts) as model collections. This is a function counting words
still ful ll today.
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 .  Towards in nity
A crucial di erence between tallying and counting lies in what is used as the model col-
lection. In tallying, the model collection consists of external physical objects (e.g., sticks,
notches,  ngers and toes), whereas in counting the model collection is a sequence of words.
Model collections of physical objects face natural limitations at relatively low levels. Al-
though sticks and notches are in principle unlimited in number, it becomes increasingly
hard to carry an increasingly large bundle of sticks or to engrave an increasingly long se-
quence of notches. Body parts have a limit at much lower levels. Body-part tallying systems
that use only  ngers and toes, like those of the Hupd’ eh and Yuhup, can “count” up to   
items only. The tallying systems used in New Guinea, which also include body parts such
as wrists, elbows and shoulders, have their upper limit at about    (De Vries,     ). One of
the main advantages of using a verbal model collection is that it inherits from language “the
liberty of convention and the power of its generative rules” (Wiese,     , p.    ), making
verbal model collections potentially in nite.
Because counting sequences are sets of words, we are free to choose anything we like
when we want to add new elements to them, as long as we obey the phonological rules
of the language we are in. Convention allows us to use arbitrary words for our purpose
once the tie to  ngers is loosened. And because counting words are words, we can gen-
erate in nitely many of them (based on a small set of primitive items) by employing the
recursive rules our linguistic system provides: language allows us to employ recursion
in our system and thereby gives it potential in niteness (Wiese,     , p.    ).
A recursive system is, roughly, a system in which primitive elements are combined to
obtain new, derived elements, which in turn can be combined again to obtain more derived
elements, and so on inde nitely. Recursion appears in natural languages, for example, in the
fact that we can obtain increasingly complex sentences by combining a limited set of simple
sentences. Relying on this feature of language, an incipient verbal counting system with only
a few number words can be extended inde nitely through the recursive recombination of
its primitive words. Although in principle any arbitrary recursive rule for the formation of
new counting words could serve this purpose, in practice the rules that guide the growth of
most counting sequences around the world follow a common pattern.
The Hup and Yuhup systems are again a case in point, since they are fairly typical in
this regard. As we saw above, these languages use a base- ve body-part system in which the
word for  ve translates into English roughly as “one hand,” and the words for the interval
from six to ten are produced according to the rule “( ,  ,  ,  ,  ) other  nger(s) stand(s) up.”
In Yuhup, though, there is a variant of the word for ten that translates into English as “two
hands” (Epps,     , p.    ). A portion of this particular variant of the Yuhup system displays
the most typical elements and rules found in counting systems around the world.
In general, verbal numeral systems have three components: simple numerals (which can
be either atoms or bases), complex numerals, and formation rules which determine how the
latter are obtained from the former (Mengden,     , p.    ). Atoms and bases are called
“simple” because, in mature systems, they are apparently mono-morphemic arbitrary words
(this is not so in the systems of the Nadahup family, where simple numerals are compound
and non-arbitrary, as we have seen). Complex numerals, by contrast, are compound words









  ‘one hand and one  nger’  + 
   ‘two hands’  x 
   ‘three hands’  x 
   ‘three hands and one  nger’  x + 
   ‘four hands’  x 
   ‘four hands and four  ngers’  x + 
Table  . : Hypothetical Yuhup-inspired base- ve system.
formed in accordance with rules that represent arithmetical operations. The most common
operations across languages are addition and multiplication.
In the portion of the Yuhup system that comprises numerals for numbers from one to
ten, the words for numbers from one to four are the atoms, the word for  ve (“hand”) is the
base, and the rules for combining them are addition (e.g., six is one hand plus one  nger)
and multiplication (ten is two times one hand). In principle, these rules su ce to generate
a potentially in nite sequence of numerals. Table  .  presents a hypothetical system based
on a generalization of this portion of the Yuhup system (using English words for ease of
understanding).
Similar additive and multiplicative rules govern the formation of numerals in English,
with the di erence that its  rst base is “ten” (there are more bases, as we will see shortly), and
the words from ‘one’ to ‘nine’ are the atoms (and they are truly mono-morphemic, apparently
arbitrary words). Thus, the English numeral ‘sixteen,’ for example, is the combination of the
atom ‘six’ and the base ‘-teen’ (a variant of ‘ten’) by addition ( +  ), and the numeral ‘forty’
is the combination of the atom ‘for-’ (a variant of ‘four’) and ‘-ty’ (another variant of ‘ten’)
by multiplication ( x  ).
There is a further element in mature counting systems, though. Notice that Table  . 
does not list numerals for numbers above   . Following the same pattern of numerals for
smaller multiples of  ve in this system—“two hands” ( x ) for   ; “three hands” ( x ) for
  ; and “four hands” ( x ) for   —the numeral for    should be “one hand of hands” ( x ).
However, this is not the way most numeral systems proceed in situations like this. When
bases would encounter themselves in the composition of a complex numeral, this encounter
is preferably avoided by the introduction of a new base (Mengden,     ). Following this
practice, an arbitrary simple numeral should be introduced to mean   , which then should
be used as a new base to obtain numerals for larger numbers (see Table  . ).
As a rule, in systems that use multiplicative rules, bases can encounter themselves at the
powers of the smallest base. In decimal systems, the  rst opportunity for this is the numeral
for    . In English, numerals in the interval from    to    are obtained by the rule (atom




   ‘hudon and one’   + 
   ‘hudon and two’   + 
   ‘hudon and one hand’   + 
   ‘hudon and four hands and four’   + x + 
   ‘two hudons’  x  
    ‘four hudons and four hands and four’  x  + x + 
Table  . : Continuation of the hypothetical base- ve system of Table  . .
x base)+atom (where the addition is optional). Thus, ‘seventy’ is  x  , ‘eighty’ is  x  , and
‘ninety’ is  x  . If this pattern were to be continued, the operation behind the numeral for
   would be    x   , which would be rendered in words as “tenty.”  However, this encounter
is avoided by the introduction of a second base: ‘hundred.’ This new simple numeral is then
used to obtain numerals up to ‘nine hundred ninety-nine.’ At    , a similar situation takes
place and a third base is introduced: ‘thousand.’ By the same token, in the base- ve system of
Tables  .  and  . , a third base would be needed to represent    , if the compound numeral
“one hand of hudons” were to be avoided.
It is not entirely clear why most languages avoid this kind of construction and prefer to
introduce new bases for the powers of the  rst base (or at least for some of them). The most
accepted hypothesis is that this is motivated by a speci c kind of counting practice, which
Hurford (    ,     ) calls the Packing Strategy. The idea is that each base is a label that
“packs” a determined number of items already counted into a whole, as if they make up a
new unit. The rationale behind this strategy may be expressed by two maxims: (a) count as
high as you can with the words you have; and (b) minimize complexity (Hurford,     , p.
   -   ). To illustrate how these maxims work, let us take the base- ve system of Table   in
an earlier stage when its upper limit was still  ve (“one hand”). It would be natural for people
using this system to split up large collections into groups of  ve, because this ( ve) is the
highest they can count with the words they have. Thus, to count a large collection, they could
count “ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,” “ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,” . . . , several times. Once they have split up the collection
into various groups of  ve, it would be natural to count the groups as units (viewing each
group as “a hand”). Then, they could count how many groups of  ve (“hands”) they have as
follows: “one hand,” “two hands,” . . . , “one hand of hands.” At this point, however, they have
a new group of  ve (a group of  ve groups), which can again be seen as a unit. Then, maxim
(b) comes in: to minimize complexity, a new word is introduced to designate a group of  ve
groups with  ve elements each (i.e., to designate   ). This word becomes the second base
of the system, from which the counting sequence can be iterated again (i.e., a new round of
 Aword like ‘tenty’ did exist in Old English, where the numerals for    ,    , and     continued the pattern
of smaller decades. They may be rendered in Modern English as “tenty,” “eleventy,” and “twelvety.” For the
original forms in Old English see Mengden (    , p.    ). Mengden also points out that Old English was very
unusual in this regard, since “[t]he cross-linguistically most common strategy would be to employ the expression
for the second base as an augend [i.e., a constant addend] for the numerical values from ‘   ’ onwards” (Mengden,
    , p.   -  ).
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“count as high as you can with the words you have,” but now enriched with a new base, as
illustrated in Table  . ). When ve groups of ve groups with ve elements each are obtained
(  ), they are again seen as a new unity (“a hand of hands of hands”), and then a third base is
introduced to minimize complexity, and so on.
Hurford’s Packing Strategy is perfectly exempli ed by the counting practices of the
Farempeoplewho live in SouthernNewGuinea.  The Farem speak a language calledKomnzo,
whose grammar was recently documented by Döhler (    ). The Komnzo numeral system
uses quite an unusual base—six—but it is completely regular in other aspects. This system is
predominantly employed in a ritualized procedure for the counting of yam tubers, the most
important crop for the Farem. The Komnzo system has atoms for numbers from one (näbi)
to  ve (tabuthui), and its  rst base is nibo (  ). Complex numerals are obtained by combin-
ing atoms and bases through additive and multiplicative rules, and a new base is introduced
for each power of six up to    (fta (  ), taruba (  ), damno (  ), wärämäkä (  ), and wi (  )
(Döhler,     , p.   )). The practical utility of this sequence of bases for counting is made
evident in Döhler’s description of the ceremonial counting of yam tubers: 
The counting procedure involves two men who move the yam tubers from a prepared
pile. They take up three yams each, move a few meters and deposit them together in
a new pile. One of the two is the designated counter and he shouts out näbi näbi näbi
‘one one one’. This means that they have moved the  rst unit of six. Without pause
they take up again three yams each and move them over, while the counter shouts out
yda yda yda ‘two two two’. Now two lots of six or    tubers have been counted. Again
they pick up three yams each shouting ytho ytho ytho ‘three three three’. The two men
continue with this process until they reach nibo ‘six’ (Döhler,     , p.   -  ).
This is the count-as-high-as-you-can phase of this counting procedure. In this phase,
they use up the entire sequence of simple numerals in their system that represent the smallest
cardinal values. But notice that they are already counting groups of six. They do not need to
explicitly count the elements of each group because they bene t from subitizing: each man
picks up three yams at once, without needing to count them. Next comes the minimize-
complexity phase:
Now    yams have been counted . . . This amount corresponds to one fta or   . Each fta
is marked by putting a single yam on the side of the new pile. The two men continue
until all yams have been counted, and the little pile on the side which indicates the
amount of fta slowly grows (Döhler,     , p.   ).
When the whole pile of yams has already been grouped in ftas, the second round of
counting-as-high-as-you-can commences, in which ftas are counted. This is followed by
a new minimize-complexity phase, as Döhler describes in the continuation of the passage
above:
 Apparently, Hurford did not base his formulation of the Packing Strategy on any description of a real
counting practice. He came up with the Packing Strategy solely as an hypothetical explanation of regularities
observed in numeral systems around the world. Thus, Döhler’s documentation of the Farem counting method
can truly be seen as a con rmation of Hurford’s Packing Strategy.
 Döhler’s video recording of the counting ceremony is impressive. It is available at
https://vimeo.com/        .
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Next, this pile [of ftas] is counted in the same fashion, only that each counting yam
that is put to the side, now marks one taruba, which corresponds to     or   . One
may continue in the same fashion. Six taruba make up one damno [which] corresponds
to the amount  ,    or   . For example, one damno is [the] amount of yams that a
man should store in order to bring his family through the year. Six damno make up
one wärämäkä, corresponding to  ,    or   . Finally, six wärämäkä make up one wi,
corresponding to   ,    or   . I should add that nobody in Rouku remembered the
last time this number was actually reached. The recursive counting procedure gives rise
to the senary [base-six] system (Döhler,     , p.   ).
This ritualized counting procedure clearly exempli es the Packing Strategy and how
it can give rise to the sequence of bases which are so often found in fully- edged numeral
systems across the world. The Komnzo numeral system is completely regular in this regard:
it has bases for every power of   (up to the sixth power) and only for powers of six. Other
languages may use less regular systems. There are systems that have bases that are not powers
of the smallest base (such as the French system, which uses a vigesimal base for numerals
such as quatre-vingts), and systems where there are powers of the smallest base that are not
designated by a simple numeral (such as the English system, which does not have simple
numerals for   ,    and    ,   ).
Be that as it may, every known fully- edged numeral system uses a system of bases to
some extent compatible with the Packing Strategy (Hurford,     ,     ). This has an impor-
tant consequence: the potentially in nite recursive rules for the formation of numerals  nd
a virtual limit when the counting sequence reaches the  rst power that should be “packed”
into a simple numeral, but for which a simple numeral has not yet been designated. For
example, in Komnzo this limit is   . In English, the highest existing base seems to be centil-
lion (     ) (Mengden,     , p.    ), and therefore the limit is the next still non-named base.
This does not mean that numbers exceeding this limit cannot be expressed in the language;
of course they can, either by means of explicitly saying an arithmetical operation or by using
non-standardized constructions in the numeral system. The point is that the standard, sys-
temic sequence of numerals has an end at a certain point. Because of this, “linguistic numeral
systems, in spite of their potentially great scope due to their recursive principles . . . , must
necessarily remain  nite. Every numeral system of a natural language has a highest express-
ible number” (Mengden,     , p.   ). Yet, as Mengden also points out, “every numeral system
is designed such that, by introducing more and more bases, it could theoretically be enlarged
ad infinitum” (Mengden,     , p.   ). This means that it is not fully- edged verbal numeral
systems that are potentially in nite; it is their potential for growth that is in nite. The fact
that even mature numeral systems have an upper bound will be relevant for the discussion
about the emergence of the idea that numbers are in nite in the next chapter.
 .  Conclusion
In this chapter, we saw how numeral systems may have emerged among anumeric societies.
Genetically evolved quantical cognition gives us the ability to perceive discrete quantities.
This ability is present in all human beings. Due to environmental and cultural factors related
to practical needs, some cultures have developed, on top of it, words to designate clearly
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distinguishable, small numerosities, and tallying and counting procedures. When people
started referring to small numerosities, they triggered a cognitive process similar to the ones
that take place in today’s children that culminated in the emergence of concepts for the
 rst three (or four) numbers. As a result, the words that initially referred to transitory
perceptions of numerosity, always associated with speci c collections, became symbols used
to express cardinal values. In a next step, pressed by the necessity of keeping track of larger
quantities with the same precision provided by subitizing, people devised simple one-to-one
matching techniques that led to the invention of tallying systems. When the production of
tallies was accompanied by the recitation of a stable sequence of distinct words, where the
utterance of each word or phrase regularly coincided with a pairing act, cognitive processes
were triggered similar to the ones that take place in today’s children that culminated in the
emergence of concepts for numbers above three or four. As a result, the words recited during
the production of tallies were re-semanticized and became symbols for numbers. Judging by
the linguistic evidence mentioned above, processes like these may have taken place several
times in human history, in di erent cultures.
If this is so, both ontogenetically (as we saw in Chapter  ) and historically, number con-
cepts arise from the internalization of symbolic systems initially experienced as consisting
of de-semanticized symbols used in procedures regulated by the counting principles. Expe-
rience with these cognitive tools is what gives us number concepts.
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Chapter  
The rei cation of number concepts
B     numerical competence emerges, both ontogenetically and historically, from themastery of number words and the counting procedure, as we have seen in the previous
chapters. In section  . , based on this observation, I suggested that propositional knowledge
in arithmetic is nothing more than descriptive knowledge of the workings of the cognitive
tools that give rise to numerical competence, namely, number words and the counting pro-
cedure. I develop this proposal in Chapter  , but before addressing this point, we still have
to examine a second step in number learning, namely, what happens when children, after
already having learned to count, learn to calculate.
As we will see in this chapter, what happens in this second phase helps explain why,
according to the standard reading of arithmetical statements, numerals are seen as terms
referring to independent objects. Recall that at earlier stages (both in ontogeny and in his-
tory), number words and number concepts do not necessarily refer to anything. Knowing
what a collection with one, two, or three objects “looks like,” and knowing how to execute
the counting procedure (for larger quantities) are all that is needed in order to pass the Give-
a-Number task, the standard test for number understanding in numerical cognition studies.
Yet, talk of numbers as if they were objects is quite pervasive, not only in mathematics and
platonist philosophy of mathematics, but also in everyday contexts such as at primary school
(e.g., in statements such as “the number two is even”). But where does the idea that numbers
are objects, or this way of speaking of numbers as if they were objects, come from?
Here I will argue that this way of speaking comes from the common human tendency to
use the same linguistic framework we use to talk about objects (prototypical objects are the
three-dimensional, medium-sized things we encounter in ordinary experience) to talk about
non-objects (e.g., events, procedures, properties, collections, etc.).  In other words, this way
of thinking and speaking of numbers is due to our tendency to reify.
Reification, also known as objectification or hypostatization, is the act of conceiving of a
non-object as if it were an object. Mostly because of the “as if” proviso, these words usually
carry negative connotations. In lists of fallacies, for example, ‘rei cation’ and ‘hypostatiza-
 I am using object in contradistinction to event, procedure, property, collection, thought, idea, concept, and
possibly other non-objects. In the terminology I adopt here, the latter can be about or involve objects, but
they are not classi ed as objects. An event may happen to an object, a procedure may be executed on objects, a
property may belong to an object, a thought may be about an object, and so on.
   
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tion’ are alternative names for the fallacy of “misplaced concreteness,” de ned as the act of
“[c]onsidering a word to be referring to an object, when the meaning of the word can be ac-
counted for more mundanely without assuming the object exists” (Dowden,     ). Despite
its bad reputation, rei cation has undeniable cognitive bene ts, as we will see below. Espe-
cially when it comes to numerical discourse and mathematics in general, rei cation seems
to produce a major cognitive boost.
In the  eld of mathematics education, a number of scholars have proposed that a key
component of learning mathematics is the development of the ability to reify mathematical
procedures, i.e., the ability to think of mathematical operations as if they constituted a sin-
gle whole, which is then taken to be a new kind of object (e.g., Dubinsky (    ); Gray and
Tall (    ); Sfard (    ,     )). This claim is based on the observation that many mathe-
matical statements have two possible readings, one procedural and the other objectual. For
example, ‘ + ’ can be read both as a command to do something (“add   to  ”) or as a symbol
for  ve. Educators claim that children start seeing mathematical operations as procedural
commands, and only gradually develop the ability to see them as unitary symbols referring
to an object. The ability to reify what was initially experienced as a procedure allows chil-
dren to “encapsulate” the complexity of mathematical operations into a “black box,” which
then becomes a building block for more complex operations, which are in turn encapsulated
again, and so on, making complex operations more easily manageable. Rei cation seems to
be a cognitive prerequisite for progressing from simpler to more advanced mathematics in
typical development (Sfard & Linchevski,     ).
The bene ts of rei cation were noticed a long time ago by Peirce. “Very shallow is the
prevalent notion that this [hypostatization] is something to be avoided . . . The true precept
is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently” (Peirce,     , § .   ). For
him, hypostatization is done intelligently in mathematics.
It may be said that mathematical reasoning . . . almost entirely turns on the consider-
ation of abstractions as if they were objects. The protest of nominalism against such
hypostatization . . . is simply a protest against the only kind of thinking that has ever
advanced human culture (Peirce,     , § .   ).
Quine is another supporter of the utility of rei cation, not only for mathematics but for
language in general.
The e cacy of rei cation in forging links between clauses and sentences has become
evident from our examples . . . It could be said, going a step beyond Voltaire, that if
things had not existed they would have had to be invented. And indeed we have found
fruitful to press our rei cations beyond space and time. We posit abstract objects—
numbers, functions, classes—and our natural science would be a pretty sorry a air
without the loyal support of that ghostly host (Quine,     , p.    ).
The  ndings frommathematics education and numeric cognition to be discussed in this
chapter lend support to the fruitfulness of rei cation, at least when it comes to arithmetic.
As we will see, not only the idea of numbers as objects, but also the ideas of potential and
actual in nity in arithmetic are likely to have emerged from successive acts of rei cation.
What is more, by creating as-if objects, rei cation paves the way for the emergence of pure
 . . A GENERAL THEORY OF REIFICATION    
arithmetic. Despite Peirce’s extreme optimism, though, rei cation also has some disadvan-
tages, as we will also see.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section  . , I present Sfard’s (    ) general the-
ory of rei cation. In section  . , still following Sfard, I show how the idea of numbers as
objects emerges from the rei cation of counting. In section  . , we will see that the rei -
cation of number concepts gives us a new cognitive tool—namely, numbers—which enor-
mously increases our capacity to calculate. In section  . , I address the emergence of the
ideas of potential and actual in nity in arithmetic by means of rei catory processes. The
role of rei cation in the emergence of the idea that numbers are existing objects naturally
suggests that numbers do not exist. In section  . , I address an objection that can be raised
against this conclusion, according to which an argument against the existence of numbers
based on the fact that our idea of number emerges through rei cation falls victim to the ge-
netic fallacy. I conclude that, judging by the scienti c description of our relationship with
numerals and number concepts, nothing indicates that their reputed referents are really out
there.
 .  A general theory of rei cation
In this section, I present Sfard’s theory of rei cation. Before starting, though, a terminolog-
ical remark is in order. Sfard uses the term ‘rei cation’ idiosyncratically to refer to a speci c
process of objecti cation, which is commonly called encapsulation by other authors (e.g., Du-
binsky (    ); Gray and Tall (    )). In turn, she uses the term ‘encapsulation’ to refer to a
di erent process of objecti cation. In what follows, I will adopt the standard terminology,
using ‘rei cation’ as an umbrella term to cover all kinds of objecti cation, not just encapsu-
lation, and ‘collection’ to refer to the process of objecti cation Sfard calls ‘encapsulation.’ 
Apart from these terminological modi cations, my presentation here closely follows Sfard
(    ). 
The main tenet of Sfard’s theory of rei cation is that rei cation occurs when ways of
thinking and speaking characteristic of discourse about physical objects are transplanted to
discourse about non-objects. We think of the physical world as constituted by enduring,
clear-cut objects, which we can name and describe. We use nouns, pronouns and de nite
descriptions to refer to physical objects, and we usually talk about them by using their names
in the grammatical positions of subject and object. Rei cation takes place when we apply
 In other words: where Sfard says ‘objecti cation,’ ‘rei cation,’ ‘encapsulation,’ I say ‘rei cation,’ ‘encapsu-
lation,’ ‘collection,’ respectively. This terminological modi cation may seem pointless to those already familiar
with Sfard’s work. However, for those who are not, it could be quite confusing to use the terms ‘objecti cation’
and ‘rei cation’ as something other than full synonyms.
 Sfard’s theory of rei cation is just one part of a broader theory she calls “commognition.” ‘Commognition’
is a neologism she created by con ating the words ‘communication’ and ‘cognition.’ The core premise of com-
mognition is that thinking is an individualized form of communication with oneself. For Sfard, all distinctively
human cognitive processes result from the internalization (“individualization,” in her terms) of discursive dia-
logical practices. Her account is inspired by Vygotsky and Wittgenstein (Sfard,     , p. xiii). With regard to
arithmetic, commognition is in line with the evidence we have seen in the previous chapters which shows that
numerical cognition results from the internalization of symbolic cognitive tools which children  rst experience
in interpersonal space. In fact, Sfard’s commognition theory originated from her long experience as a researcher
in the  eld of mathematics education.
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these cognitive and discursive structures to domains not constituted by objects, such as the
domains of events, procedures, and actions. In her account, rei cation does not need to
involve a deliberate act of postulating the existence of objects where they do not really exist;
it is just a cognitive and linguistic arti ce. We reify simply because it is cognitively bene cial
to us, regardless of any considerations about the true nature of the “things” we are dealing
with.
Sfard’s ontology of objects is quite economical. For her, only perceptual objects are ob-
jects in the literal sense. She calls them “primary objects” (Sfard,     , p.    ). Application
of the term ‘object’ without referring to perceptual objects is always metaphorical. In doing
so, we build what she calls “discursive objects,” i.e., rei cations that occupy the usual places
of objects in our speech and thoughts.  Sfard describes three mechanisms through which we
build discursive objects: collection, encapsulation, and saming (in her terminology: encap-
sulation, rei cation and saming, respectively). Let us see each in turn.
Collection is the act of assigning a noun to a plurality of objects and using this noun in
singular when talking about all the members of that plurality collectively.
[Collection] is the creation of the pair <noun, speci c set of objects>, which turns a
number of objects into a single entity for any communicative purpose. For example,
when we speak about the Addams family, we may continue and say “The Addams family
is rich,” and this is discursively equivalent to saying, in plural, “Members of the Addams
family, when taken together, are rich” (Sfard,     , p.    ).
In Sfard’s account, the Addams family is a rei cation because there is no perceptual
object that could be the referent of the expression ‘the Addams family,’ and because this
expression is used in grammatical positions typically occupied by names of physical objects.
What is rei ed here is the plurality of family members: this plurality is composed of several
objects, but by subsuming all of them under ‘the Addams family,’ the plurality can be treated
as if it were a unit. This illustrates the remark I made above: it is not required for a rei -
cation to be in place that the speaker of the statement ‘The Addams Family is rich,’ besides
asserting it, also explicitly claims that the Addams Family exists as an object in addition
to its members. The sole metaphorical use of linguistic structures whose literal application
is in discourse about physical objects is su cient to characterize rei cation. This makes
rei cation a rather common phenomenon, all the more if we consider two other ubiquitous
mechanisms of rei cation.
Encapsulation is the act of assigning a noun to processes, operations or actions by means
of which narratives about them can be told as stories about objects (Sfard,     , p.    ).
Take, for example, the statements “I had a swim” and “Purchases are growing rapidly.” In
these statements, ‘swim’ and ‘purchases’ are nouns; they occupy the grammatical positions
of object and subject, respectively, which are typically occupied by names of physical ob-
jects (contrast these statements with “I had a co ee” and “The trees are growing rapidly”).
However, ‘swim’ and ‘purchases’ do not refer to objects, but to actions or events. The use
 More speci cally, Sfard distinguishes two kinds of discursive objects: atomic and compound. Atomic dis-
cursive objects are not rei cations; they arise in the act of baptizing a primary object. Compound discursive
objects, in turn, are rei cations (Sfard,     , p.    -   ). For the sake of brevity, I will refer to atomic discursive
objects simply as primary objects, and will reserve the term ‘discursive object’ for compound discursive objects
only.
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of these nouns, in Sfard’s account, is metaphorical. Notice that someone not familiar with
the meaning of ‘swim’ and ‘purchase’ could think, based solely on the grammatical structure
of these sentences and in the literal meaning of the verbs ‘had’ and ‘growing,’ that ‘swim’
and ‘purchases’ referred to genuine objects. Non-rei ed ways of saying the same would be “I
moved in water by agitating my limbs” and “The number of events in which people acquire
goods by the payment of money is growing rapidly.” These statements describe actions, in-
stead of encapsulating them into nouns. Needless to say, encapsulation saves many words.
By encapsulating, we do not need to describe the whole process every time we mention it.
The thirdmechanism of rei cation is what Sfard calls “saming:” “the act of calling di er-
ent things the same name” (Sfard,     , p.    ). Saming takes place when di erent primary
objects are perceived as sharing de ning properties, so that agents react with the same word
whenever confronted with any of those primary objects. “This is the case, for example, when
an interlocutor uses the word cat for any member of a certain family of four-legged long-
tailed creatures, as opposed to using speci c symbols for each catlike animal that strays into
her  eld of vision” (Sfard,     , p.    -   ). In contexts such as this, ‘cat’ does not refer to
a primary object. However, it is undeniable that single cats are perceived as similar to each
other, which allows us to call all of them cats. In doing so, we assign a noun to the set of
perceived similarities (as if this set constituted an object, like a universal, in platonic terms)
and start using this noun as a discursive object. For example, this occurs when we say “The
cat was proclaimed a sacred animal in Egypt,” which is not about a speci c cat, but about
the species. It is practically impossible to present a non-rei ed version of sentences like this
one, which indicates that in some cases, rei cation may be unavoidable.
Fortunately, we do not need to eliminate all rei cations, since rei cation is not harmful
per se. On the contrary, the bene ts of rei cation to communication and cognition exceed
by far its possible drawbacks, as the above examples make clear (but there are drawbacks,
as we will see shortly). Sfard emphasizes that, cognitively speaking, rei cation can be not
only bene cial but also indispensable. “We objectify because we have to” (Sfard,     , p.   ).
Rei cation simpli es sentences and related cognitive tasks that are otherwise too complex,
too long, or too convoluted. By reifying, we see a plurality as a unit, a complex operation as
a “black box,” and di erent things as the same. These simpli cations make rei ed discourse
less cognitively demanding, and amplify our potential to deal with increasingly more com-
plex situations, since we can always reduce complexity by reifying some parts of discourse.
Sfard also sees rei cation as an attempt to cope with the “incessant change” of the  ux of
events unfolding before us.
Reifying is an attempt to “make the moment last”—to collapse a video clip into a
generic snapshot. It is grounded in the experience-engendered expectation, indeed
hope, that in spite of the ongoing change, much of what we see now will repeat itself
in a similar situation tomorrow. On the basis of this assumption, rei cation makes us
able to cope with new situations in terms of our past experience and gives us tools to
plan for the future (Sfard,     , p.   -  ).
Thus, for example, we believe that John can deliver the same speech (a rei cation produced
by means of encapsulation and saming) once more, even if in fact he is going to perform a
di erent action. Usually, rei cation is a matter of idealization with practical aims. Tak-
ing into account all the minor di erences between John’s speeches, delivered several times,
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would be costly, probably useless, and could hinder planning for the future. “Considering
all these gains, the importance of objecti cation can hardly be overestimated. Objectifying,
it seems, is the very technique that gives our communication its unique power actually to
shape our actions and accumulate achievements” (Sfard,     , p.   ).
The examples above, some of them quoted directly from Sfard, may suggest that things
such as natural kinds (e.g., cats) and abstract objects (e.g., speeches) do not exist. These
“things” would be mere discursive objects produced by the rei cation of collections, pro-
cesses, and perceived similarities. In fact, Sfard’s conception of object admits only tangible
physical objects (primary objects), as I mentioned above. I do not want to commit to such a
parsimonious ontology here, since this would demand much more philosophical argumen-
tation than what time and space allow. However, as I will argue in the next section, at least
when it comes to arithmetic, rei cation plays a crucial role in our idea of numbers as ob-
jects. Before moving on, though, we still need to discuss another process associated with
rei cation—namely, alienation—and the scienti c drawbacks of rei cation.
Alienation is a further step in rei cation. It is the act of alienating discursive objects
from the agents who gave rise to them. Take, for example, the speech John delivered. It
is possible to reify John’s actions by subsuming them under “the speech,” but still see the
speech as something John produced. However, we can objectify the speech to a higher de-
gree by completely eliminating John from the picture. In this case, the speech starts to be
seen as something whose existence is independent of John delivering it or not—just like a
non-human-made physical object whose existence is thought to be permanent and mind-
independent. Linguistically, alienation appears in the use of the passive voice and in the
employment of the names of discursive objects in the role of grammatical subject (Sfard,
    , p.   ). For example, “The speech was delivered at the Parliament” alienates John from
his speech, and “The purchases are growing rapidly” alienates the people who are buying
more. Alienation is “an almost inevitable by-product of incorporating the newly created
nouns [for discursive objects] into linguistic templates taken from discourses on material
objects” (Sfard,     , p.   ) and it is also bene cial insofar as it simpli es communication
(after all, sometimes it does not matter who are buying more). However, alienation, as well
as rei cation, may become detrimental when we forget that certain rei ed and alienated
collections, processes or similarities are mere discursive objects created by us.
The bad reputation rei cation traditionally has comes from its consequences for sci-
ence and philosophy, especially when it comes to ontological questions, for obvious reasons.
Sfard voices many criticisms against the rei cation of cognitive processes and human ac-
tions in cognitive science, which, according to her, has damaging e ects on the scienti c
understanding of concepts such as thinking, communication and learning. I will not address
these speci c criticisms here, but rather concentrate on the general problem Sfard calls “on-
tological collapse.” Ontological collapse takes place when discursive and primary objects
are erroneously collapsed into one and the same ontological category of real things. In this
way, mere discursive objects are believed to exist in addition to primary objects. The most
obvious negative consequence of ontological collapse is the overpopulation of the ontology
of the real world. Another, perhaps less obvious, negative consequence a ects scienti c and
philosophical debates. After ontological collapse, discursive objects are seen as having es-
sential characteristics due to reality that must be re ected in narratives about them, on pain
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of falsity. However, discursive objects do not correspond directly to anything in the world;
many of their characteristics are a matter of de nition. When this is forgotten,
we often entangle ourselves in controversies that have every appearance of disagree-
ments about the “correctness” of one’s worldview but, in fact, cannot be resolved by
appeals to empirical evidence. The mechanism that produces the illusion of factual
controversy, although simple, is also mostly invisible. After objecti cation, we often
interpret metastatements, that is, statements about discourse, as statements about the
extradiscursive world . . . Similarly, the traditional form of dictionary de nitions and
of the de nitions found in mathematical and scienti c textbooks conceals the fact that
de ning is a matter of human decision about the use of words. Thus, instead of saying
We shall call a polygon a triangle if and only if it has three sides, we say A polygon is a triangle
if and only if it has three sides. Through the very form of sentences such as the latter
we “ atten” the discursive hierarchy so that the consecutive discursive layers become
like a series of transparent window panes through which all the objects—discursive
(words, expressions) and extradiscursive (independently existing material objects)—
seem to belong to the same ontological category of “things in the world,” with their
mutual relations being similarly “objective” andmind-independent (Sfard,     , p.   ).
Sometimes, scientists are well aware that some discursive objects are terms of art whose
de nition is amatter of human decision. This can be seen, for example, in the reclassi cation
of Pluto as not being a planet, which happened after members of the International Astro-
nomical Union voted for a de nition of ‘planet’—a term of art—which Pluto does not meet
(IAU, n.d.). When there is no such clarity, however, scientists or philosophers may entangle
themselves in controversies that cannot be solved by appeal to empirical evidence, as Sfard
notices. This may be the case for philosophical debates about the nature of numbers that,
from the outset, collapse numbers into the ontological category of real things. When this
is done, there is no empirical evidence that can settle the debate. In order to adopt a more
factual approach, we need to take a step back and consider the possibility that numbers are
mere discursive objects.
 .  Rei cation in numerical discourse
Number concepts are not learned through contact with any particular kind of perceptual
object. Instead, number concepts result from mastering a technique for assessing the car-
dinality of collections with precision. This technique—counting—involves a sequence of
distinctive tags (counting words) which are paired in a stable order with the elements of the
collection whose cardinality we are assessing. Number concepts arise from the regular asso-
ciation between each tag and a speci c cardinality during counting events. Notwithstanding
their procedural origins, number concepts are often treated as if they represent objects of a
certain kind, namely, numbers. But, given that these putative objects are not at the origin of
number concepts, nor do we access them or have any information that someone has done so
in other circumstances, the idea that numbers are objects is in need of explanation. In this
section, we will see that this objectual view is likely to come from a cognitive process that
gradually converts what were initially experienced as processes into discursive objects—in a
word, rei cation. Peirce, who noticed the utility of rei cation for mathematics in general,
as mentioned above, also noticed the role of rei cation in the objectual view of numbers
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long before we had the scienti c understanding of the roots of numerical cognition we have
today:
In order to get an inkling—though a very slight one—of the importance of this opera-
tion [hypostatic abstraction] inmathematics, it will su ce to remember that a collection
is an hypostatic abstraction, or ens rationis, that multitude is the hypostatic abstraction
derived from a predicate of a collection, and that a cardinal number is [a hypostatic]
abstraction attached to a multitude (Peirce,     , § .   ).
‘Multitude’ is the term Peirce uses for cardinality (Peirce,     , § .   ). Peirce’s view is
in line with the account of the rei cation of numerical discourse we will see in this section,
except for him not mentioning that cardinal numbers emerge from the encapsulation of
subprocesses of the counting procedure. This latter observation is at the core of Sfard’s
account.
As we have seen, children start learning numbers by learning to count collections of
material objects. The learning process takes about two years in typically developing children
with the “right” kind of exposure, and only at the end of this period are children able to
use numerals to describe the cardinality of collections in a consistent manner. This level of
pro ciency is achieved when children  nally understand the cardinality principle, according
to which the number word used for tagging the last item in a count represents the cardinality
of the whole counted collection. Before children become CP-knowers, they pass through
a stage in which, if asked a “how many” question just after they have  nished counting a
collection, they count it again (Wynn,     , p.   ).
Now, in light of Sfard’s theory of rei cation, we can identify increasing levels of rei ca-
tion during the process of learning to count. Subset-knowers, who understand “how many”
questionsmerely as requests to execute a procedure (to count), show a completely non-rei ed
understanding of numbers. They count everything again when asked “how many?” because
they have not yet realized that they could refer to the procedure they have just  nished by
using a single word. The  rst step towards rei cation is taken when children become CP-
knowers. Indeed, in light of Sfard’s theory, the cardinality principle is a command to encap-
sulate episodes of counting. Rephrased in terms of encapsulation, the cardinality principle
states that the number word used for tagging the last item in a count is a shortcut that en-
capsulates or names the whole operation (Sfard,     , p.   -  ), just like the noun ‘swim’
(in “I had a swim”) encapsulates the action of moving one’s limbs in the water. When a child
becomes a CP-knower, she learns how to assign a noun—the numeral ‘n’—to the action of
counting up to ‘n.’ At this stage, a statement such as “There are  ve marbles in the box” is
a shortcut to “If you count the marbles in this box, you end up with the word ‘ ve’” (Sfard,
    , p.   ).
That newly-turned CP-knowers do understand numerical statements in this way is con-
 rmed by the observation that they have purely mechanical command of the cardinality
principle. As we saw in section  . , newly-turned CP-knowers have not yet developed the
number concepts which will give them full semantic understanding of numerals, which is in
line with the hypothesis that, even when they use expressions like “ ve marbles,” they still
understand ‘ ve’ procedurally, as an abbreviation of counting “one, two, . . . ,  ve marbles.”
At this stage, procedural understanding is all they need to pass the Give-a-Number task: if
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asked to give n items, the procedural understanding of numerals makes them able to “un-
pack” the expression “n items” in terms of the counting procedure (“count items up to the
word ‘n’”) and provide the right number of items.
But becoming a CP-knower is only the  rst step towards the rei cation of numerical
discourse. Rei cation will not take place while numerals are not used in grammatical posi-
tions typical of nouns. Frege has famously pointed out that numerals can be used both in the
positions of nouns and in the positions of adjectives. In adjectival position, numerals can be
seen as expressing a property, rather than denoting an object. For example, in the sentence
‘Jupiter has four moons,’ the numeral ‘four’ describes the cardinality of the collection of
Jupiter’s moons. Frege, who was sympathetic to the idea that numbers were in fact genuine
objects, argued that the adjectival use of numerals “can always be got around. For exam-
ple, the proposition ‘Jupiter has four moons’ can be converted into ‘the number of Jupiter’s
moons is four’” (Frege,     , §  , p.   ). He claims that, for the purpose of science, the nom-
inal use of numerals and the corresponding view of numbers as self-subsistent objects are to
be preferred. Although Frege is right in cognitive terms—a rei ed view of numbers is cog-
nitively more advantageous, and therefore more adequate for scienti c purposes—adjectival
use precedes nominal use of numerals in ontogeny, as I will now show, which supports the
claim that the idea that numbers are objects is due to a process of rei cation (and that num-
bers, therefore, are not genuine objects).
Empirical evidence shows that newly-turned CP-knowers use numerals predominantly
in adjectival position. Only much later will numerals be turned into nouns and start to be
used in statements such as “The number of Jupiter’s moons is four” or “Four is bigger than
three.” In a longitudinal study with children from    to   months old in the USA, Levine et
al. (    ) videotaped episodes of parent-child conversations, and analysed the use of number
words in these episodes. Their data con rm that children—and also adults when talking to
children—use numerals mostly in adjectival position for the description of the cardinal size
of collections (like in “ ve little monkeys”) and in the counting procedure itself. In their
data, situations in which number words occupy a nominal position correspond to a very
small proportion of parent-child interactions ( . % of parent’s number talk, and  . % of
children’s number talk). This reveals a fairly non-rei ed use of numerals at early stages of
development.
Sfard points to other signs that younger children have not yet rei ed numerical dis-
course. One of them is children’s refusal to use the expression “the same” when comparing
collections with the same number. As we saw above, saming is a mechanism of rei cation
where one and the same noun is applied to distinct things that bear relevant similarities.
The  rst step for saming is the recognition that there is “something” in common between
two objects or situations, so that they can be said to be “the same” with respect to this. In
this way, collections a and bwith, say, three objects each can be seen as having their numbers
in common, and therefore as being “the same” with regard to number, but only if one thinks
or speaks of number as being a “thing” shared by collections.
Sfard illustrates this point by transcribing the following dialogues between Roni, a four-
year-old girl, and her parents. These dialogues took place on two di erent occasions when
Roni and her parents had two boxes in front of them, with two marbles in each box. On the
 rst occasion, before the transcription below began, Roni had already answered the question
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“Where are theremoremarbles?” by replying “In none.” In the follow up questions, the father
intentionally tries, unsuccessfully, to make her say that the boxes have the same number of
marbles.
Father: Why? Why do you say this? [that in none of the boxes there are more marbles]
Roni: Because there are two in one, and in [this] one there are another two.
Father: So, this is why there is more in none of them? So, in both of them there is. . .
what?
Roni: Two.
Father: And this is. . . more or less?
Roni: Less.
Father: Less than what?
Roni: Than. . . than. . . than big numbers.
Father: Than big numbers? That means. . . If there are   in one box and   also in the
other, then what is there in the two boxes?
Roni: Four.
Father: Aha. Together, there are four?
Roni: Yes.
Father: And in each box there is the sa. . .
Roni: Because it is between. . .
Father: I see. And there is the same in each box?
Roni: . . .
Father: How many in each box?
Roni: Two.
Father: Oh well. . . (adapted from Sfard,     , p.    -   )
On the second occasion, seven months later, the child still resisted using the expression
“the same” to describe two boxes with the same number of marbles:
Mother: If there is   here and   here, in which is there more?
Roni: In none.
Mother: And where is there less?
Roni: In none.
. . .
Mother: And this is. . . more or less?
Roni: It is not more and not less.
Mother: Neither more nor less? So what?
Roni: In the middle. (adapted from Sfard,     , p.    )
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Sfard points out that the problem was not with the expression ‘the same’ itself, since
Roni was able to use it properly on other occasions, such as when she said that her friend
“did the same thing” (Sfard,     , p.    ). According to Sfard, the point is that, although
the child can perceive the similarity between the two collections, she does not see any reason
to say that there is the same “thing” in the boxes in any sense, because she has not yet rei ed
numbers.
One may speculate that so far, the children [Roni and her friend, who also displayed
non-rei ed language] have been using the expression the same while seeing something
they saw before. They might be able to say, for example, that they met the same person
on Monday and on Friday. For them, the words the same . . . implied seeing one thing
at di erent times. No wonder, therefore, that they found no use for the expression the
same while seeing two boxes simultaneously present alongside one another. For those
whose discourse on numbers has been objecti ed, the “one thing” that “resides” in both
boxes and thus justi es the use of the words the same is the object called two; for those,
however, for whom number-words are mere sounds that people make as a part of a
ritual chanting, nothing in the boxes warrants the talk about “the same things.” This
delicate di erence clearly escaped the father, for whom his daughter’s None-has-more
and his own They-are-the-same were perfectly exchangeable in the numerical context
(Sfard,     , p.    -   ).
Recall that the possibility of making statements of identity is regarded by neo-Fregeans
as being the hallmark of a sortal—a concept whose instances are existing objects (Wright,
    , p.  ). Since pre-school children refrain from making identity statements between car-
dinalities expressed in numerals, it may be interpreted as a sign that children at early stages
of development do not see numbers as sortals yet, which is in line with young children’s
predominantly adjectival use of numerals, too.
Sfard calls attention to yet another sign of pre-school children’s non-rei ed use of nu-
merals. In making numerical comparisons, they prefer the words ‘more’ and ‘less’ to ‘bigger’
and ‘smaller.’ ‘Bigger’ and ‘smaller’ are comparative adjectives. As adjectives, they mod-
ify nouns, and are used when objects are compared (e.g., “The Maracanã is bigger than the
Colosseum”). By contrast, when ‘more’ and ‘less’ function as adverbs, they modify determin-
ers, such as adjectives, but not nouns directly (e.g., the following is non-standard English:
“The Maracanã is more than the Colosseum”).
When number words are used in conjunction withmore or less, like in the sentence    is
more than   . . . , these words [‘ten’ and ‘eight’] function as determiners rather than nouns,
and this implies that the objects of the talk are sets [collections of material objects] and
their elements. Indeed, it would be natural to complete such sentence to “   marbles
is more than   marbles.” When number words are used as referring to self-sustained
entities, the result of comparison is presented with the words smaller or bigger [   is
bigger than  ]. . . In our study, the adverbs more and less dominate the conversation,
and the adjectives big and bigger appear only in the last subepisode (Sfard & Lavie,
    , p.    ).
The non-rei ed use of number words begins to coexist with rei ed forms when children
are confronted, at a later stage, with numerals in nominal position at school. This is the
case of statements like “Four is even,” where the numeral ‘four’ appears in the position of
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grammatical subject, and of the reading of equations such as “ + = .” In principle, statements
like these can still be unpacked in non-rei ed terms, but at this point children have cognitive
incentives not to do so. Sfard (    , p.   ) suggests the following “un-capsulation” for the
equation ‘ + = :’
• If I have a set so that whenever I count its elements I stop at the word three,
• and I have yet another set such that whenever I count its elements I stop at the
word four,
• and if I put these two sets together,
then
• if I count the elements of the new set, I will always stop at seven.
As Sfard remarks, “[a]fter this example, there is hardly need for any further argument
about the merits of rei ed numerical discourse: The length and complexity of the ‘unrei ed’
numerical equality speak for themselves” (Sfard,     , p.   ). (Young children who do not
yet have a rei ed understanding of numbers do calculate like this, as we will see shortly.)
Hofweber (    ), in the course of a philosophical investigation that has nothing to do
with mathematics education, makes a similar point. He observes that an equation such as
‘ + = ’ can be read both in the plural and in the singular: “two plus two are four” or “two
plus two is for.” According to Hofweber, the plural reading betrays a less objecti ed view,
since numerals in the plural form can still be seen as determiners (“bare determiners,” in
his terminology), rather than nouns. In his account, “two plus two are four” can be spelled
out as “two items and two items are four items,” which expresses a general fact about col-
lections, rather than a fact about numbers as objects. Notice that the singular reading does
not allow this interpretation. “[W]hen we speak in the singular and say . . . Two and two
is four, then it seems that we are saying something about particular objects” (Hofweber,
    , p.    ). Hofweber observes that the plural reading of arithmetic equations (in which
numerals are bare determiners, therefore non-rei ed) would become increasingly costly, in
cognitive terms, as complexity grows:
The contexts in which arithmetical symbols are introduced [for children], and the ex-
amples with which arithmetical equations are illustrated, suggest that arithmetical
equations at  rst express bare determiner statements. After all, teachers introduce
the symbolism with explanations about sizes of collections, about there being so many
marbles or cats . . .
However, thinking about arithmetic in this way, involving bare number determiners,
has its cognitive obstacles, in particular when the numbers get larger. Once we try to
make calculations that are not obvious any more, and once we try to solve arithmeti-
cal problems of a somewhat greater complexity, we run into cognitive di culties. . . .
Anything that helps in solving arithmetical problems will be gladly adopted (Hofwe-
ber,     , p.    ).
At this point, childrenmay shift from the plural reading of arithmetical equations, where
numerals are bare determiners, to the singular reading, where numerals are singular terms
which are seen as referring to objects. “Our minds mainly reason about objects. Most cog-
nitive problems we are faced with deal with particular objects, whether they are people or
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other material things. Reasoning about them is what our mind is good at. And this is no
surprise. We are material creatures in a material world of objects, and the things that matter
the most for our survival and well-being are material objects” (Hofweber,     , p.    ).
If Hofweber’s analysis is correct (and it seems to be, in light of Sfard’s  ndings), we
can expect to see children’s reading of arithmetical equations changing from plural to singu-
lar, as they start dealing with more complex operations. To my knowledge, this has not yet
been empirically investigated. An investigation into this question can shed further light on
the hypothesis that children start their learning journey with a less- or non-rei ed numeri-
cal discourse and gradually move to more rei ed forms as they become more competent in
arithmetic. 
According to mathematics educators, non-rei ed readings of arithmetical formulas are
cognitively more demanding because they involve a hierarchy of operations on operations. A
non-rei ed reading of an arithmetical formula such as ‘ + ’ makes of it a command to operate
(“add four to three”). Numerals, in turn, encapsulate subprocesses of the counting procedure
(‘four’ is understood as the operation of counting up to ‘four’). Therefore, in a thoroughly
non-rei ed reading, arithmetical formulas become second-order operations performed with
 rst-order operations (i.e., operations performedwith the procedures encapsulated into each
numeral). This is more complex than seeing arithmetical formulas as  rst-order operations
performed with objects. That is why mathematics educators argue that rei cation should
be encouraged throughout mathematics learning. The idea is that what is initially learned
as an operation at one level has to be seen as an object at the next level, so as to become the
basic units of the operations at the higher level. In the very beginning of mathematical learn-
ing, subprocesses of the counting procedure go through this transformation:  rst, they are
encapsulated into numerals (when children become CP-knowers) and, once rei ed, become
the units with which arithmetical equations operate. In the following stages of mathematical
learning, the very arithmetical equations themselves will be rei ed. For example, ‘ + ’ will
start to be seen also as a symbol for seven, instead of only a command to add. In this way,
‘ + ’ can become part of more complex operations such as  ◊( + ) (Gray & Tall,     ; Sfard,
    ).
This observation is con rmed in studies that investigate the strategies children adopt
to calculate simple additions. According to Gilmore et al. (    , section  . . ), starters usu-
ally rely on the strategy called “count all:” if asked to calculate  + , they will use  ngers or
other available objects to form a group of three and a group of four, and then will count all
the objects in the two groups to  nd out the result of the addition. In other words, they
un-capsulate the numerals and count the resulting physical collections directly. More expe-
rienced children realize that they do not need to unpack both numerals: it is su cient to
unpack one of them, and count on from the other. In the “count on” strategy, they calculate
 +  by counting “four,  ve, six, seven.” Finally, children adoptmore e cient strategies where
unpacking numerals and recourse to counting are no longer needed. One of these strategies
 Sfard mentions that preference for singular or plural forms in numerical discourse could be a way of de-
tecting its level of rei cation, but she herself did not investigate this in her sample because in Hebrew—the
language in which her studies were conducted—there is no such distinction in certain situations (Sfard,     ,
p.    , fn.   ). Hofweber himself does not cite any study corroborating his analysis (as is the practice in traditional
analytic philosophy, where mere plausibility about empirical matters is regarded as su cient).
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is retrieval from memory, when the agent simply remembers the solution of an operation
from previously memorized arithmetical facts. Another strategy, which more clearly shows
the role of rei cation, is decomposition. In this strategy, the agent decomposes the addends
into smaller numbers, so that she can use known facts or properties of the decimal system to
calculate. For example,   +   can be calculated in two steps as   +  =   , and    +  =   .
This strategy involves the idea that numbers are objects that can be decomposed and re-
combined in di erent ways. A similar transition from strategies based on un-capsulation
and counting to strategies based on memory retrieval and decomposition can be found in
children’s resolution of subtraction problems too (see, e.g., Caviola et al. (    )).
When the process of rei cation is  nished, children have an objectual view of numbers.
Sfard (    ) remarks that, at the end of this process, the very meaning of the word ‘number’
has changed. At the beginning, for children, ‘number’ was nothing more than a synonym
of ‘number word,’ but after rei cation takes place, ‘number’ becomes the name of the cat-
egory of objects signi ed by number words. In the  nal step of objecti cation, the rei ed
concepts named by digits and number words are alienated from their creators, and start to
be seen as having properties of their own. At this  nal stage, it becomes more natural and
straightforward to say “eight is divisible by two” than “if you divide eight by two, you get a
whole number,” or to say “there is no biggest number” than “if you start counting and never
stop, you will never reach the end of numbers.”
By eliminating the human subject, these sentences e ectively disguise the fact that
numbers are discursive constructs and, as such, are human-made rather than given.
With the last traces of people’s agency carefully erased, even the most common arith-
metical proposition . . . conveys the message of mind-independent existence of the
mathematical object. Once rei ed and put into impersonal sentences, the numbers
appear as to have a “life of their own.” They return to their human creators disguised
as exclusive masters of their own fate, whereas the participant in arithmetic discourse
begins experiencing them as “happening to people” rather than caused by them, and as
preexisting discourse rather than as its product (Sfard,     , p.   ).
This does not mean, however, that everyone becomes a platonist about numbers. As
emphasized in the previous section, rei cation does not require the explicit postulation of
the existence of extra objects in addition to ordinary physical objects. For rei cation to be
present in numerical discourse, it is su cient that the use of impersonal linguistic structures
whose literal application is in discourses about physical objects is naturalized and regarded as
an adequate way of speaking about numbers. These ways of speaking and thinking naturally
erase the ties between numbers and their creators and convey the impression that numbers
are genuine objects. Even so, most people, possibly including professional mathematicians,
if asked about the existence of numbers, will probably not have strong opinions on this,
and may even deny independent existence to them by saying something like “numbers just
exist in our heads.” This way of speaking of numbers as if they were objects but without
necessarily committing to their existence has already been identi ed and named in the phi-
losophy of mathematics. Shapiro (    ) calls it “working realism,” in contradistinction to
“philosophical realism.” The working realist uses or accepts the mathematical consequences
of numbers being objects, but does not necessarily endorse the claim that numbers exist as
genuine objects.
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It [working realism] is a statement of howmathematics is done, or perhaps a statement
of howmathematics ought to be done, but there is no attempt to answer the important
philosophical questions about mathematics. Working realism, by itself, has no conse-
quences concerning the semantics, ontology, and epistemology of mathematics, nor
the application of mathematics in science. The strongest versions of working realism
are no more than claims that mathematics can (or should) be practiced as if its subject
matter were a realm of independently existing, abstract, eternal entities. Working real-
ism does not go beyond this “as if.” Indeed, it is consistent with anti-realism (Shapiro,
    , p.  - ).
Working realism is compatible with anti-realism because, although mathematical prac-
tice requires thinking of numbers as objects, it does not require the objects themselves. As
Azzouni (    , p.   ) aptly puts it, “[t]he impossibility of our being able to—as it were—
‘think away’ our thoughts of numbers when we calculate is di erent from the question of
whether there are such things.” Shapiro’s description of working realism seems to be the
best characterization of the attitude most of us hold towards numbers after years of school-
ing. This may explain why philosophical realism/platonism is widely regarded as the most
intuitive account of the ontology of arithmetic—it simply drops the “as if” proviso.
 .  Numbers as internal cognitive tools
We saw in Chapter   that pegs,  ngers, and other kinds of discrete physical objects, used as
model collections in one-to-one correspondence, function as cognitive tools that allow us to
keep track of the cardinality of collections with more than three or four items. A special ver-
sion of these cognitive tools—body-part tallying systems—gave us number words, counting
and number concepts. In the above section, we saw that the rei cation of number concepts
gives us discursive objects that facilitate calculation. Calculation executed by purely proce-
dural means, i.e., by the “count all” strategy or by means of non-numerical tallying systems,
is more demanding and time-consuming. Number-based calculations, compared to these
other methods, are labor-saving. Why are numbers  so useful?
Imagining the strategies that anumeric people could use to calculate without numbers
(and without numerals) can shed light on this question. Ifrah (    ) devises a method that
people using a body-part tallying system and “lacking any conception of abstract numbers”
could use to calculate   ◊  . In his characteristic manner, Ifrah embeds the example in a
short story, which I adapt as follows:
A group of anumeric people has recently skirmished with a rebellious neighbouring
village and won. The group’s leader decides to demand reparations, and entrusts one
of his men with the task of collecting the ransom. “For each of the warriors we have
lost,” says the chief, “they shall give us asmany pearl necklaces as there are from the little
 nger on my right hand to the little  nger on my left hand.” What this means is that
the reparation for each lost soldier is    pearl necklaces. In this particular skirmish, the
group lost sixteen men. Of course, none amongst the group has a notion of the number
  , but they have an infallible method: on departing for the  ght, each warrior places a
 From this point onwards, I will use the word ‘number’ to refer to the discursive objects (rei cations), unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
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pebble on a pile, and on his return each surviving warrior picks a pebble out of the pile.
The number of unclaimed pebbles corresponds precisely to the number of warriors lost.
In the presence of the pile of pebbles, the man in charge collects the booty in the fol-
lowing manner: he says “Bring me a pearl necklace each time I raise a  nger,” and then
he raises the little  nger of his right hand, the ring  nger, the middle  nger, and so on
until the little  nger of his left hand. So without having any concept of the number
  , he obtains ten necklaces. Then one pebble of the pile is set aside, and the whole
operation of bringing one necklace for each  nger is repeated again, allowing another
pebble to be set aside, and so on, until there are no pebbles left in the pile. In this way,
our imaginary tribesman has unknowingly calculated    x   , even with such limited
tools (adapted from Ifrah (    , p.   -  )).
What this example shows is that, if we are to calculate without numbers, we need collec-
tions of physical objects (e.g.,  ngers, pebbles) to model the quantities we are interested in,
and we need to move these physical objects around in a certain way. This means that even
calculations as simple as   ◊  , which numerate people who use Arabic digits can calculate
very quickly mentally, must be performed externally, following a strategy quite similar to
the “count all” method young children adopt. These external calculations without numbers
rely on two basic elements: model collections consisting of physical items and procedures
that determine how these items should be deployed or rearranged, depending on the oper-
ation one wants to perform. Notice the parallel with number-based calculations, where we
have numbers and algorithms for the operations. In the transition from non-numerical to
number-based calculation, numbers substitute the physical model collections, and the algo-
rithms substitute the manipulations performed on the items of model collections. This par-
allel makes evident the advantage of using numbers, compared to non-numerical methods:
equipped with numbers and algorithms, we do not need to execute external manipulations
on collections of physical items; we can calculate mentally by using numbers and calculation
algorithms instead. Even when we still need to rely on external sca olding to compute more
complex calculations, such as pencil and paper or a calculator, we no longer need to mate-
rialize quantities in the form of collections. Digits on paper or screens are seen as referring
to numbers, i.e., to the discursive objects originated from rei cation, which substitute the
physical model collections that had to be deployed in pre-numerical calculation techniques.
Numbers are useful because they function as internal, “pre-made” model collections.
Consider another example, now aimed at illustrating how the emergence of numbers
facilitates calculation in ontogeny. Suppose that a child who still uses the “count all” method
is asked to calculate   + . This child already knows how to count and can understand what
numerals mean, but she does not bene t from the rei cation of number concepts yet. In
order to add ten to four, she will  rst deploy two physical model collections, one with ten,
say, pebbles, and the other with four pebbles. Then she will unite both collections and count
all the pebbles. At this early stage, the operation is performed externally, and she uses her
numerical knowledge only to un-capsulate numerals in the form of collections of pebbles.
Later on, when she has already rei ed number concepts—which happens at about the same
time that she is becoming more familiar with the algorithms for operations with Arabic
digits—she will no longer need to do so. Instead, she will simply calculate with numbers
directly, using the relevant algorithm. At this later stage, she will start seeing numbers as if
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they are the collections she is “manipulating” or, more abstractly, the sizes of the collections
she is adding. What is more, she will no longer need to rearrange the items of these ethereal
model collections as she did with pebbles, since calculation algorithms already give her the
result of such rearranging operations without her needing to perform them. (As we will see
in Chapter  , calculation algorithms are like shortcuts that take us directly to the outcome
that would be produced if we “manipulated” the collections each number substitutes in the
proper way.)
The possibility of computing with mental, pre-made model collections by means of ef-
 cient algorithms is what gives us an advantage over Ifrah’s tribesmen. Numbers and the
associated mental procedures that implement calculation algorithms internalize the external
cognitive tools (based on pebbles,  ngers, recited words, etc.) we started with. Recall what
we saw in Chapter  : the internalization of symbolic cognitive tools gives us new cognitive
abilities. These cognitive abilities, whose implementation is described in the Triple Code
Model, are what allows us to both calculate mentally and use external symbolic resources
(i.e., signs that substitute the collections or sizes of collections we are interested in) to cal-
culate with pencil and paper.
Numbers as internal, pre-made model collections also gain a new function. As with
models in science, numbers, being themselves models, can be used for making predictions.
In fact, Dehaene (    , p.  ) de nes calculation from a cognitive perspective as the ability
“to predict by symbolic manipulation the result of a physical regrouping or partitioning
act without having to execute it.” For example, if ten cookies are to be distributed equally
among  ve children, we do not need to actually distribute the cookies to  nd out how many
each children will get; we can anticipate this by calculating   ÷ , where    substitutes for
the cookies and   substitutes for the children. And, of course, we can also calculate in total
abstraction from any particular collection. For instance, we can anticipate the result of
  ◊    , regardless of it being impossible to model this operation with physical items, since
its result surpasses the number of atoms in the universe. Numbers, as merely discursive
objects, free us from the limitations of matter.
This freedom gives us an important by-product, namely, pure arithmetic (by ‘pure’ I
mean arithmetic that is not primarily concerned with immediate application). Those who
have already rei ed number concepts and are performing calculations directly with numbers
can now turn to the investigation of the properties of numbers for their own sake, without
envisioning application in a particular situation. Recall that the process of rei cation of
numerical discourse makes us “working realists,” which is a completely appropriate mindset
for the emergence of pure arithmetic.
The applicability of puremathematics to the physical world has been a continuous source
of wonder. How can such theories, most of them developed in a predominantly a priori
way,  t so aptly in the physical world? In the following passage, Russell re ects on the
applicability of arithmetic to things we have no experience of:
It seems strange that we should apparently be able to know some truths in advance
about particular things of which we have as yet no experience; but it cannot easily be
doubted that logic and arithmetic will apply to such things. We do not know who
will be the inhabitants of London a hundred years hence; but we know that any two
of them and any other two of them will make four of them. This apparent power of
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anticipating facts about things of which we have no experience is certainly surprising
(Russell,     , p.   -  ).
The instrumental origins of numbers and the way numbers allow us to make predictions,
as explained above, should su ce to dispel any feeling of surprise here. We do not need to
physically approach every pair of London inhabitants to know that they conform to the
mental model we call two. Numbers are an internal way of modelling collections of discrete
objects or, more abstractly, their cardinal sizes. Insofar as future inhabitants of London
remain discrete items, a pair of them will  t the cardinal type of two, and two pairs of
them will  t the cardinal type of four. Using rei ed number concepts, we need not make
any empirical observation (besides the observation that inhabitants of London are discrete
items) or any physical manipulation to arrive at this conclusion; we can draw this conclusion
with our eyes closed. This may explain the impression of aprioricity in this operation. But,
in fact, there is nothing especially a priori here, since we have simply applied a technique
developed to copewithworldly problems tomake a prediction about the future of this world.
The applications of numbers would be surprising if numbers had been created by an
arbitrary act of will, or discovered by purely a priori re ection, and only later found to have
wonderful applications in the world. The empirical  ndings we reviewed in this and in the
previous chapters should su ce to show that, in reality, it was the other way round. True
enough, after the emergence of pure arithmetic, new developments in number theory have
found remarkable applications. But this is not surprising either. Even if the development
of pure arithmetic could be carried out by purely a priori means, it builds on a corpus of
techniques that were originally developed to cope with worldly problems. It is only natural
that careful re ection on techniques originally deployed to cope with worldly problems can
make them even more powerful.
 .  In nity
In the above sections, I argued that what we regard as the referents of numerals are, in
fact, internal mental models (number concepts) that are seen as if they are external objects.
The role of rei cation in this process seems to lead to a mentalist account of the nature of
numbers—after all, rei cations exist only in our heads, as mental concepts. In the literature
on the philosophy of mathematics, mentalist accounts have been rejected on the basis of an
ontological argument, which can be summarized as follows: given that human minds are
 nite and numbers are in nite, there are not enough mental entities to  ll the ontology of
arithmetic; therefore, numbers cannot be mental entities (e.g., see Giaquinto (    , p.  )).
Related problems faced by mentalist accounts are the consequent excess of mental entities
corresponding to the most used numbers—for example, there could be billions of twos, one
in every mind of almost every human being alive—and the possibility of gaps in the sequence
of numbers—if no one has ever thought of a certain number, this number cannot exist (Frege,
    , §  , p.   -  ).
Despite being mentalist in a sense, an account of the nature of numbers based on rei -
cation does not run into these problems. The  rst point to be noted is that, according to
this account, numbers, i.e., the entities that numerals apparently denote, do not exist. In
certain situations, we use numerals as if they successfully denote existing objects, but in fact
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they do not. The idea that numerals denote numbers is only an idea, a product of rei cation.
Numerals do not denote mental entities either; they do not denote anything (how this can
be reconciled with the standard, referential reading of arithmetical statements is the topic
of section  . ). Therefore, according to this account, the ontology of arithmetic is empty (the
epistemic consequences of this will be discussed in Chapter  ).
Nevertheless, the idea that in nitely many numbers exist is part of working realism.
Therefore, the origin of this idea has to be explained, all the more so if in fact there are
not in nitely many numbers. In the remainder of this section, I explain how the idea that
numbers are in nite may have emerged by considering, as before,  ndings from numerical
cognition and mathematics education.
Descartes famously claimed that the idea of in nity could not be accessible to  nite
beings, like us, unless it had been instilled in us by God, himself an in nite being (Descartes,
    , p.   -  ). In our secular era, there is no place for God in scienti c explanations, but
Descartes’s way of posing the problemmakes clear themain di culty in explaining the origin
of the idea of in nity: how could  nite beings who have only  nite experiences ever come
to develop the idea of in nity?
In contemporary accounts of this topic, the key to solving this problem has been the
observation that it is possible to make in nite use of  nite means (Humboldt (    , p.   );
Chomsky (    , p. v)). This possibility is taken to be behind the creative aspect of language,
which allows the generation of in nitely many distinct sentences out of a limited set of
words. As we saw in section  . , verbal numeral systems inherit this feature from language
and, bymeans of recursive rules for the formation of words, can produce a potentially in nite
sequence of number words. As we will see below, recent  ndings in numerical cognition
suggest that the recursive rules for the formation of verbal numerals play a central role in
the acquisition of the idea that numbers are in nite.
Earlier accounts, such as Carey’s (    ), proposed a faster route to the idea that numbers
are in nite that does not involve the recursive rules for the formation of numerals. In fact, at
least in theory, this idea can emerge at the semantic level by means of the successor function.
The successor function determines that, for every natural number n, its successor is n+ .
Someone who knows the number one and is able to add one to any given number can, in
principle, easily infer that there is no largest number. The successor function is a way of
making in nite use of  nite means.
On Carey’s (    ) account, children grasp the successor function at the moment they
become CP-knowers. Carey’s original account, however, did not  nd con rmation in sub-
sequent studies. These studies showed that children are more likely to learn a mechanical
procedure when they become CP-knowers; no semantical generalization tantamount to a
grasp of the successor function is achieved. This  nding,  rst reported by Davidson et al.
(    ), has been con rmed in several further studies (Cheung et al.,     ; Schneider et al.,
    ; Spaepen et al.,     ; Wagner et al.,     ). Carey herself has recently admitted that,
in contrast to her original proposal, knowledge of the successor function is not what causes
children to become CP-knowers. The new  ndings suggest that it is the other way round:
becoming a “mechanical” CP-knower (as discussed in Chapter  ) is a prerequisite for under-
standing the successor function (Carey & Barner,     , p.    ). To date, most developmental
psychologists still maintain that children come to realize that numbers are in nite by intu-
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itively understanding the successor function. What was not clear in earlier accounts was that
children cannot do so without the help of the recursive features of numerals.
In a study with one hundred English-speaking children, Cheung et al. (    ) observed
that children acquire intuitive understanding of the successor function much later than pre-
dicted in Carey’s original account: around age six. In this study, a child was classi ed as
truly understanding the successor function if she (a) was able to  nd the successor of every
number in her count list, and (b) knew that all numbers have a successor, even numbers that
are beyond the upper limit of her count list. Newly-turned CP-knowers failed to meet either
requisite. In their sample, Cheung et al. (    ) identi ed four di erent levels of understand-
ing of the successor function:
• In nity non-knowers: children who believe that it is not always possible to add one
to a number and, coherently, believe that there is a largest number;
• Successor only knowers: children who believe that it is always possible to add one, but
nevertheless still think that there must be a largest number;
• Endless only knowers: children who believe that it is not always possible to add one,
but even so believe that there is no largest number;
• Full in nity knowers: children who believe that it is always possible to add one and,
coherently, that there is no largest number.
The existence of all these di erent levels of understanding shows that children’s com-
prehension of the successor function is progressive and fragmentary. In particular, the ex-
istence of successor only knowers and endless only knowers indicates that what seems like
a straightforward inference for adults—if it is always possible to add one, then there is no
largest number—may be a di cult step for children. These results suggest a developmental
scale with at least three stages: “[I]t seems likely that children begin by learning that every
number they know has a successor, and by then generalizing this to all possible numbers,
before ultimately realizing that this belief implies that numbers never end—a perhaps non-
obvious entailment of an unlimited successor function” (Cheung et al.,     , p.   ). These
three developmental stages take place only after the child has become a CP-knower. 
In Cheung and colleagues’ sample, full in nity knowers were older (their mean age was
 .   years, contrasting with a mean age of  .  years for in nity non-knowers) and, impor-
tantly, were able to count up to higher numbers than children in other levels. Only children
with substantial counting experience—those who could count to at least around   —were
able to  nd the successor of every number in their count list, and among them full in nity
knowers could count to around    . These results suggest that, contrary to what was previ-
ously thought, children need a much larger sample of number words and counting practice
to generalize the successor function.
 Endless only knowers do not  t into this developmental pattern, since they believe that there is no highest
number before they have realized that it is always possible to add one. The experimenters found only six children
in this group, in a sample of one hundred children. They suggest that these children may be in fact in nity non-
knowers who have randomly guessed, or been explicitly taught by caregivers that numbers are in nite before
they have understood why (Cheung et al.,     , p.   ).
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That it could not be easy to infer the successor function from experience with only very
small numbers had already been anticipated by Rips, Bloom eld, and Asmuth (    ), years
before empirical  ndings con rmed that recently turned CP-knowers do not know the suc-
cessor function. Rips and colleagues argued that the type of information children get from
counting to only a  xed, small number is compatible with various possible inductive in-
ferences. For example, a child who is only able to count up to ten, and who has correctly
noticed that, within this limited range, the cardinal value of a number word corresponds
to the cardinal value of the previous number word plus one, may still infer that ten is the
highest number, or that the sequence of numbers restarts after ten (and so ‘eleven’ would
mean one, ‘twelve’ would mean two, and so on). According to Rips and colleagues, there is
nothing in a limited sequence of numerals that could prevent children from thinking that
numbers  nd an end or make a loop. This is especially true of numerals for small numbers.
In English and many other languages, words for small numbers are lexical primitives, i.e.,
arbitrary morphemes that do not display an internal structure (Hurford,     ; Mengden,
    ). Children learn these  rst number words one by one, since there is no rule of forma-
tion that could tell them how the sequence continues. In this aspect, the sequence of lexical
primitives for small numbers resembles other lists children are learning at the same time,
such as the days of the week and the months of the year. These lists do have an end and
make loops. While children know only a limited sequence of number words that are lexical
primitives, they might mistakenly think that number words do the same.
However, this changes as children start learning words for larger numbers. Whereas
words for the  rst numbers are arbitrary morphemes—called atoms—words for larger num-
bers are compounds of atoms and a base, following recursive syntactical rules which encode
arithmetical operations, as we saw in section  . . When children understand these syntacti-
cal rules, they nd out that the sequence of numerals is not like the sequence of the days of the
week; there may be many more numerals beyond the highest numeral they have ever counted
to. This may be the reason why children need to  rst acquire experience with counting up
to higher numbers before they can generalize the successor function.
Although the  rst twenty numbers in English provide little evidence for repeating
structure, as children learn to count beyond    they gain increasing evidence for the
base    system. After    , they learn that the system is truly recursive, and that the en-
tire count list from   to     can be recycled for labeling larger numbers (Barner,     ,
p.    ).
But this is not su cient to completely dispel Rips and colleagues’ concerns yet. Although
the recursive syntax of numerals may suggest that number words never end, children can still
think that their meanings (numbers) make loops. Barner (    ) then proposes that what
prevents children from thinking that numbers make loops is the association of the counting
procedure with the ANS. Even if concepts for larger numbers do not originate from ANS
representations of numerosities, children can still make use of intuitions provided by the
ANS to understand that numbers increase constantly.
Speci cally, if children know that the ANS represents a monotonically increasingly set
of magnitudes, and that the count list is meant to explain this ordered set, then they
could restrict their hypotheses regarding the logic of counting to only thosemodels that
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result in a monotonically increasing set of precise cardinalities (Barner,     , p.    -
   ).
All things considered, two new ingredients must be added to Carey’s original proposal
before children can generalize the successor function. Besides knowing the cardinality prin-
ciple, (a) they need to gain experience in counting to higher numerals (about    , in English),
so that the recursive syntax of numerals can suggest to them that there are more numbers
beyond the last numeral they have ever counted to; and (b) they need to establish an initial
association between the series of number words and ANS numerosities.
Others have suggested that the importance of the recursive syntax of number words can
be evenmore signi cant for the idea that numbers never end. Buijsman (    ) andGuerrero,
Hwang, Boutin, Roeper, and Park (    ) claim that children can infer that there is no largest
number by using the very arithmetical operations embedded in the syntactical rules for the
formation of number words, instead of using the arguablymore abstract “plus one” operation
presupposed in the successor function. Buijsman (    ), analysing interviews with children
reproduced in Falk (    ), observes that when children are asked to produce higher numbers,
they prefer to do so by increasing the left-most component of the previously given number
word, instead of simply adding one to the given number (which would be the more likely
behavior if they were thinking in terms of the successor function). For example, if a child is
asked to produce a number larger than “ ve hundred,” it is more likely that she will answer
“six hundred” than “ ve hundred and one.” In this case, the realization that numbers never
end could be driven by the arithmetical operations embedded in the syntax of numerals, and
not by a semantic generalization resembling the successor function.
In addition to experience with higher numerals and an initial association of the sequence
of counting words with the ANS, a third ingredient seems to be necessary for the acquisition
of the idea that numbers are in nite: rei cation of numerical discourse. This is because, in
order to develop the idea that there are in nitely many numbers, the child has to under-
stand that there are more numbers than numerals she knows, and this involves conceiving of
numbers as objects in their own right. Furthermore, as we saw in section  . , verbal numeral
systems use the Packing Strategy, according to which new bases (corresponding to powers
of the smallest base) have to be introduced regularly so that higher numerals can be formed.
This places a constraint on the ability of users to form numerals beyond the last base they
know, and makes numeral systems  nite in practice. Thus, even a person who knows the full
list of number words in her language needs to see numbers as objects independent of their
names in order to obtain the idea that there are in nitely many numbers.
I mentioned in section  .  that Sfard (    ) observes that themeaning of the word ‘num-
ber’ changes when children reify numerical discourse. Before rei cation, “numbers” are noth-
ingmore than numberwords; after rei cation, numbers are seen as the objects numberwords
refer to. This change is indispensable for children to realize that numbers never end, since
number words do end. Children who have not yet made this distinction may misunderstand
questions about “the highest number” as questions about the highest numeral there is, or the
highest numeral they know, as Sfard (    ) notices in her comments on Falk’s (    ) study.
Falk probed children’s understanding of the idea that numbers are in nite through a
cleverly designed competitive task, in which the aim is to say a number bigger than the
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number previously said by one’s opponent. The participant who fails to name a larger num-
ber loses. Children who misunderstand the game as being about numerals are likely to fail,
since they can run out of numerals. The following is the transcription of a   -year-old girl
(identi ed as “G  ”) playing the game with the experimenter (experimenter’s numbers and
remarks are within parentheses):
G   [in the continuous sequence of Game  ]: (   )     ( ,   )  ,    ( ,   )  ,   
(million) million and a hundred (  millions)    millions (billion). What is that? (A
very large number.) I don’t know, I cannot go on because I don’t know any more names
of numbers (Falk,     , p.   ).
The girl lost because she ran out of “names of numbers.” Although her way of speaking
suggests that she already sees numbers as being independent of their names, this did not
allow her to succeed at the task. In contrast, children who correctly understand the game
as being about numbers, and not about their names, and who have already understood that
numbers do not have an upper bound will realize quickly that no one can win this game.
An interview with another girl (G  ) exempli es this point (experimenter’s question and
remarks within parentheses):
G   [Game  ]: (Can we end the game?) No, because there is no end to numbers. (A
minute ago you said that I had named a number that you didn’t recognize.) This is
right, but I can deal even with numbers that I don’t know. Whatever you say, I’ll say  
or   more (Falk,     , p.   ).
Falk concludes:
Conceivably, because of the important role of the label in forming the number concept
(agreed among many scholars), after having made the connection, undoing the tie be-
tween a number and its name is not easily accomplished . . . In our three experiments,
participants referred time and again to this connection, both when obstructed in per-
ceiving the in nity of numbers because of lack of names and when succeeding in the
in nity task by disengaging numbers from their names and realizing that labels can be
changed or invented . . . The ability to acknowledge the existence of unnamed numbers
proved an important key to conceiving their in nitude (Falk,     , p.   -  ).
Overall, the experimental results we have seen in this section show that children come
to understand that numbers are potentially in nite by (a) mastering the recursive structure
of numerals, (b) becoming able to generate increasingly larger numbers (be it by means of
the successor function or the operations embedded in the syntax of numerals), and (c) dis-
tinguishing numbers from their names (which requires rei cation). The latter is especially
important because, in fact, no one is capable of making infinite use of  nite means. In prac-
tice, we make only finite use of  nite means. “In nite use of  nite means” is only a  gure of
speech that points to the dissociation between what we actually have— nite lists of numer-
als, in the case under discussion—and how we think about what we have—that  nite lists of
numerals refer to an initial segment, which can be as long as we please, of the truly in nite
sequence of numbers.
This leads us to the idea of actual in nity. Sfard (    ) suggests that the idea of actual
in nity results from the encapsulation of unending processes that generate the potentially
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in nite series of numbers (e.g., the successor operation, the operation of counting inde -
nitely, or successive additions and multiplications). Expressions such as ‘in nity,’ ‘in nite
set of numbers,’ and @0 are the labels that encapsulate these processes. As Falk (    ) ob-
served in her study, in ontogenetic development, full understanding of actual in nity comes
much later. Falk found that children start understanding basic aspects of the idea of actual
in nity from about age eight, but their conception is incomplete and it may remain incom-
plete even in adult life. This con rms the expectation, suggested by the history of the topic,
that the conception of actual in nity is more removed from commonsense. (I refer the reader
to Pantsar (    ) for an account of the emergence of the mathematical conception of actual
in nity that is in line with the  ndings in numerical cognition and mathematics education
reviewed here.)
 .  The non-existence of numbers
We have seen in the previous chapters that, both ontogenetically and historically, the emer-
gence of number concepts is not related to acquiring familiarity with a class of objects (be
they spatiotemporal or not), but to learning some words and mastering techniques such as
tallying and counting. In addition to this, in this chapter we have seen that the idea that
numbers are existing objects seemingly emerges from a process of rei cation of these tech-
niques. All things considered, we are naturally led to suspect that numbers conceived of as
genuine objects do not exist. We speak and think as if they do, we need to do so due to cog-
nitive reasons, but the idea that numbers are existing objects is a mere product of rei cation.
The conclusion that numbers do not exist seems to follow naturally. This description of the
cognitive processes underlying human numerical competence suggests nominalism.
But why should a story about how children acquire numerical ideas matter for an inves-
tigation into the existence of numbers? Is this not a case of genetic fallacy? Genetic fallacy
is a fallacy of irrelevance: in certain circumstances, a genetic account of how some idea came
about may be irrelevant for the cogency or truth of the idea. An accusation of genetic fallacy
here could run as follows:
The fact that children form the idea that numbers are objects through a process of
rei cation is irrelevant to the claim that numbers really exist. The claim that numbers
exist is justi ed by other reasons, linked to the truth and objectivity of arithmetic,
which have nothing to do with how this idea comes about in our minds. Evenmore so if
we take into account that numbers, if they exist, are outside of space and time, therefore
completely inaccessible to us. For obvious reasons, numbers themselves cannot play
a causal role in children’s numerical education. These psychological processes which
culminate in the “rei cation” of number concepts may be exactly the ways through
which our minds are opened to the self-existing realm of numbers.
There are two problems with this objection. The  rst is the assumption that existing
numbers have to be postulated in order to account for the epistemic properties of arithmetic,
such as truth and objectivity. As I will show in Chapter  , this is not so. What truly justify
our numerical beliefs and explain their truth and objectivity are their connections with the
practices that give rise to them. Since for now I cannot advance on this topic—since it
requires a whole chapter—let me focus on the second problem.
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The second problem is that this objection only holds from a dogmatic point of view. It as-
sumes from the outset that numbers are abstract objects outside of space and time, and relies
on this assumption to explain why we should not expect to  nd numbers having any causal
role in this world, in particular in children’s numerical education. As I argued in Chapter  ,
platonism makes the hypothesis that numbers exist (as platonic entities) irrefutable. In fact,
the existence of numbers as platonic objects is compatible with everything I presented here.
It may really be the case that we come to believe that numbers are objects by means of a pro-
cess of rei cation, and, by happy coincidence, the  nal results of this process are beliefs that
correspond nicely to a description of the real, but inaccessible, realm of non-spatiotemporal
numbers. We will never know. But this conclusion does not recommend belief in the ex-
istence of numbers nor agnosticism. A point famously made by Russell about belief in the
existence of God  ts this situation nicely.
Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove
received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake.
If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving
about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion
provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our
most powerful telescopes (Russell,     , p.    -   ).
Russell grounds his atheism, rather than agnosticism, in the observation that the hy-
pothesis that God exists is irrefutable by de nition. The same attributes that make God
irrefutable make him undetectable, in the same way that the minuteness of the teapot makes
its existence undetectable but also irrefutable. This should place the burden of proof with
the dogmatist. If Russell does not provide any other reason to support his claim that there
is such a teapot orbiting the Sun—he does not show that someone has launched it into or-
bit, for example—then we are justi ed in emphatically denying its existence. By the same
token, if we do not have any other reason to think that God exists—science has explained
most of the phenomena that God was believed to be involved in—then the skeptic is justi-
 ed in being atheistic, rather than merely agnostic. It is not di cult to see that the non-
spatiotemporality of platonic numbers plays the role of the minuteness of Russell’s teapot,
making platonic numbers undetectable and irrefutable at the same time. True enough, the
platonist provides other reasons for the existence of numbers, linked to the epistemology of
arithmetic. However, once platonic numbers have been explained away in the epistemology
of arithmetic—which is the case if my arguments in Chapter   are sound—we are justi ed
in emphatically denying the existence of platonic numbers.
Another point that can be adduced to show the relevance of a genetic account of num-
ber beliefs is the fact that realists themselves have adopted this approach. The claim that
numbers are abstract objects outside of space and time makes numerical knowledge a mys-
tery, and therefore realists feel the need to explain the origins of numerical beliefs so as to
explain how we can acquire the correct beliefs about a non-spatiotemporal reality. For ex-
ample, Shapiro dedicates several pages to a (mostly speculative) explanation of how humans
could obtain knowledge of ante rem structures through ordinary experience with physical
patterns (Shapiro,     , p.     ). As Shapiro points out, “[t]he realist . . . owes some account
of how a physical being located in a physical universe can come to know about abstracta
like mathematical objects” (Shapiro,     , p.    ). What Shapiro does not do is investigate
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the real psychological processes through which those beliefs come about. And, as the good
practices of scienti c methodology recommend, such a scienti c investigation should not
be conducted in order to con rm a point dogmatically believed to be true in advance. This
is why a scienti c investigation of the origins of numerical beliefs must be open to the pos-
sibility that these beliefs have nothing to do with abstracta (in the sense of being outside of
space and time) at all. A genetic account of our numerical ideas in the spirit of the “reverse
engineering” proposed in the introduction to Chapter  , which takes a neutral stance on the
existence and nature of numbers, seems to be the best way to undertake a non-dogmatic
scienti c investigation of this topic. As we have just seen, this reverse engineering ended up
revealing that numbers are mere discursive objects and do not have real existence. To nail
down this conclusion, the only thing still lacking is an explanation of arithmetical knowledge
in the absence of existing numbers, which I will provide in the next chapter.
 .  Conclusion
The sequence of events in cognitive development and history we have been seeing since
Chapter   reverses the traditional schema according to which  rst there were the eternal
numbers, then number representations in the mind, and  nally numerals (created and used
by those who already knew numbers). The sequence of events we saw reveals that it is ac-
tually the other way around:  rst there were numerals (created and used by people who did
not yet know numbers), then number concepts, and  nally numbers (discursive objects, the
reputed referents of numerals and number concepts). Those eternal numbers of the tradi-
tional schema apparently do not exist. The thought that numbers are objects seems to be
cognitively indispensable, but nothing indicates that they are really out there.
Chapter  
Back to the philosophy of arithmetic
T   role of rei cation in the emergence of the idea that numbers are objects suggeststhat numbers, conceived of as genuine objects, most likely do not exist, as argued in
the previous chapter. What is needed to assert more conclusively that numbers do not exist
is an account of the semantics and epistemology of arithmetic in which the nonexistence
of numbers does not compromise the standard reading of arithmetical statements nor the
epistemic attributes traditionally ascribed to arithmetic.  It has been claimed that nominal-
istic accounts of arithmetic must either give up the referentiality of numerical statements
or their truth. Wright, for example, claims that the neo-Fregean argument for the existence
of numbers “must succeed unless either the apparent singular terms of arithmetic do not
really function as such or the apparently true ‘appropriate’ contexts in which they feature
are not really true” (Hale & Wright,     , p.    ). More generally, platonists have argued
that the existence of numbers must be postulated if an account of the referentiality, truth,
objectivity, necessity, and apriority of arithmetical statements is to be tenable.
Against these views, in this chapter I submit a nominalistic, empirically informed ac-
count of the semantics and epistemology of arithmetic that makes it possible to maintain
the referential reading of arithmetical statements and explain why and in which senses they
are true, objective, necessary, and a priori. All the elements necessary for this have already
been discussed in the previous chapters. We have already seen that arithmetical beliefs are
shaped by counting and calculating practices, rather than by a class of objects. What we will
see in this chapter is that it is these practices that constitute the objective subject matter
that makes arithmetical statements true, objective, necessary, and a priori. The epistemic
role traditionally ascribed to numbers as existing objects is played by the procedures encap-
sulated within numerical statements. This is the core idea to be elaborated here.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section  . , I introduce a Peirce-inspired triadic
account of referencewhich allows the treatment of numerals as referring terms in the absence
 There may be philosophers who do not mind if it turns out arithmetical statements have to be read non-
literally, or if they end up to be false. This is not my case. Furthermore, there is nothing in the scienti c
description of numerical cognition that we have seen in the previous chapters that could suggest an alternative
reading for arithmetical statements or their falsity. On the contrary, the objectual reading of arithmetical state-
ments is not only real as a human practice but also encouraged by mathematics educators, as we saw in Chapter
 .
   
    CHAPTER  . BACK TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC
of extant numbers. In section  . , I explain the truth of arithmetical statements in virtue of
the processes they encapsulate. In section  . , I investigate the normative and descriptive
aspects of arithmetic, and explain in which sense it is necessary, objective, and a priori.
In section  . , I contrast some key aspects of my nominalistic account of arithmetic with
similar accounts: Wittgenstein’s, Kitcher’s, and  ctionalism. In section  . , I summarize the
argument for the nonexistence of numbers I presented in this dissertation and exemplify
which kind of empirical counter-evidence might refute it.
 .  Separating semantics from ontology
In the standard platonist account, symbols for numbers function as names that designate
existing objects. Both symbolic systems and the objects they designate are usually viewed as
freestanding entities, whose links to human beings are thought to be irrelevant to semantic
inquiry. As a result, the relationship between a numeral and the number it designates is
seen as dyadic: a relation between the symbol and the object only. But, if we ask how this
relationship was established, we have to add a third element. The symbol ‘ ve,’ for example,
is a linguistic convention, and as such it designates  ve only because most English speakers
associate ‘ ve’ with the number  ve. That is, people are what establish the relationship be-
tween numerals and numbers. Observations such as this led Peirce to argue that meaning is,
in fact, a triadic relationship. For Peirce, a symbol (in his terms, a sign) consists of a triadic
relationship between the signi er (e.g., pixels on a screen), the referent of the signi er, and
the “interpretant.” The interpretant is the understanding an agent has of the signi er as
referring to something else. In Peirce’s words, the interpretant is “the e ect [of the signi er]
upon a person” (Peirce,     , p.    ). It is the mental component of meaning.
The Peircean triadic approach is as compatible with platonism as the more common
dyadic approach. In fact, the dyadic approach can be seen as a simpli cation of the triadic
approach. After all, it is undeniable that minds play an essential role in establishing relations
between symbols and their meanings, but from this it does not follow that all scienti c or
philosophical investigations of meaning should take themental part of the phenomenon into
account. In the analytic tradition, semantic inquiry has predominantly disregarded mental
aspects and assumed a dyadic approach. However, although the dyadic approach may su ce
for certain purposes, it is not a simpli cation without consequences.
First, it has to be noted that the dyadic and triadic approaches di er in their conditions
for meaningfulness. In the dyadic approach, a sentence wherein referring terms occur can
be meaningful only if its constituent terms successfully denote an object. In the triadic ap-
proach, in turn, there is no meaning without a mind, since it is the mind that establishes the
relationship between symbols, mental contents, and the world. These di erent conditions
for meaning lead to di erent ontological consequences. In the dyadic approach, the fact that
a statement is meaningful implies (at least prima facie) the existence of the referents of its
constituent terms. In the triadic approach, this implication is not direct, since a referring
term can fail to denote, but still be meaningful. The presence of an intermediate between
symbols and the world—a mind—in the triadic approach opens up the possibility of refer-
ring terms having meaning without denoting because their meanings can be con ned to the
activation of a mental concept at the intermediate level. The dyadic approach con ates se-
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mantics and ontology. The triadic approach allows for a separation between semantics and
ontology.
The semantics of apparently empty names poses a problem for dyadic approaches. The
classical examples are names of  ctional characters. How can a sentence such as ‘Sherlock
Holmes lives at Baker Street’ bemeaningful and putatively true if ‘SherlockHolmes’ does not
denote anything in reality? There are several proposals on how to accommodate apparently
empty names in a dyadic semantics. Platonists deny that apparently empty names are really
empty and postulate the existence of a non-spatiotemporal reality where the referents of
these names are to be found. Nominalists can opt between translating empty names into
de nite descriptions, using a free logic, or claiming that it is possible for a name to stand
for a non-existing thing. Another option for nominalists is to reject the dyadic approach
altogether, in favor of a triadic approach. This is the path I will take here.
A decisive factor for my preference for a triadic approach over dyadic alternatives is
that the former is more faithful to the phenomenon I aim at modelling. After all, meaning
is a “human thing.” True enough, a scienti c or philosophical account of a phenomenon can
disregard some aspects of it if they are not essential to the theory. However, it is tempting to
think that the di culty the dyadic approach has in accounting for the semantics of empty
names points to the need to take additional aspects of the phenomenon into account. The
ease with which the semantics of empty names is accounted for by the inclusion of an inter-
mediate level between names and their optional worldly referents suggests that the missing
aspect in the dyadic approach is the human factor.
The inclusion ofminds in the semantics of mathematical expressions has been rejected in
the face of apparent di culties. Frege, for example, has famously objected to this due to con-
cerns regarding identity and objectivity. According to him, if the content of the Pythagorean
theorem were an idea in the mind, then “we should not really say ‘the Pythagorean theorem’,
but ‘my Pythagorean theorem’, ‘his Pythagorean theorem’, and these would be di erent”
(Frege,     , p.    ). Here, I will not o er a general solution to this problem. However, at
least when it comes to the semantics of numerals and arithmetical expressions, we will see
that these concerns are unwarranted. Before addressing the semantics of numerical state-
ments, though, let me introduce some conceptual distinctions, mostly inspired by Azzouni
(    ) and Crane (    ), which will help in this task.
Azzouni (    ) and Crane (    ) provide two similar accounts of the meaning of empty
names. They are concerned both with preserving the referentiality of empty names and, at
the same time, accounting for their meanings without needing to connect them to existing
objects. To this end, they both distinguish between two kinds of semantic relationships that
names can have with their referents. Let us look at their proposals in turn.
For Azzouni, both empty and genuine names refer to something, but in two di erent
senses of ‘reference.’ In the  rst sense, which he calls referencer, there is a genuine relation-
ship of denotation between a name and the object it designates in the world. Genuine names
referr. In the second sense, which he calls referencee, there is no relation of denotation. Empty
names refere. For Azzouni, referencee is not a relationship at all. “Instead, [referencee is a
characterization] of certain terms (names, quanti ers, etc.) when such play a certain role
in discourse: have grammatical and semantic roles in sentences indistinguishable from oth-
erwise referentialr terms” (Azzouni,     , p.   ). In other words, for Azzouni, referencer
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establishes a real relationship between a genuine name and an object in the world, whereas
referencee is an intralinguistic phenomenon typical of empty names. In Azzouni’s account,
the observation that a name such as ‘Pegasus’ refers (more precisely, referse) solely means
that the name ‘Pegasus’  ts in
the name-schemata ‘ ’ refers to , one that applies to every name by virtue of
sheer grammatical role. That this name-schemata can be appropriately applied to a
name doesn’t require a metaphysical state of a airs in which that name is related to an
object—in any sense of ‘object’ that attributes a metaphysical status to such (Azzouni,
    , p.   ).
For Crane, all names are about “intentional objects” (or “objects of thought”), but only
genuine names refer to objects in the external world. Aboutness, as de ned by Crane, is a
relationship between words and thoughts only, whereas reference is a relationship between
words/thoughts and the world. In Crane’s account, ‘Pegasus’ does not refer to Pegasus, since
this winged horse does not exist, but ‘Pegasus’ is about Pegasus, conceived of as an intentional
object. Crane de nes intentional objects as “those things in the world which we think about;
or those things which we take, pretend, or otherwise represent to be in the world; or which
wemerely represent in thought” (Crane,     , p.  ). According to this de nition, intentional
objects can have an external counterpart or not. All names are about intentional objects;
those which are about intentional objects that have an external counterpart also refer; those
which are about intentional objects without an external counterpart, do not.
Azzouni’s and Crane’s distinctions are not merely terminological. They point to dif-
ferent parts of a name’s semantic relationship with the mind and the world in a triadic
semantics. Consider the three-level semantic schema depicted in Figure  . A. Once we have
introduced the intermediate mental level, the relationship between a name or noun and
the world is divided up into two segments:  rst, the relationship between the symbol and
the mind; second, the relationship between the mind and the world. It is easy to see that
Azzouni’s referencee is a relationship of reference where only the  rst segment of the seman-
tic relationship is present, whereas referencer spans the two segments.  By the same token,
Crane’s aboutness corresponds to the  rst segment of the semantic relationship, whereas
Crane’s reference spans the two segments.
Following Azzouni and Crane, I will use di erent terms to refer to the di erent seg-
ments of the semantic relationship. I will reserve ‘reference’ to designate the  rst segment
(referencee and aboutness, in Azzouni’s and Crane’s terminologies, respectively), and ‘deno-
tation’ to designate the second segment (referencer and reference, in Azzouni’s and Crane’s
terminologies, respectively). The distinct uses I ammaking of ‘reference’ and ‘denotation’ are
not intended to capture a real distinction in the ordinary meaning of these words. Even so,
my use of these words does bene t from a slight di erence in their ordinary meanings. One
of the dictionary de nitions of the verb to refer is to direct someone’s attention or thoughts
 As mentioned above, Azzouni claims that referencee is not a relationship at all, but an intralinguistic char-
acteristic of names. Azzouni seemingly takes language abstractly, and hardly speaks of meaning in terms of
mental contents, although it seems that he admits that, ultimately, the meaning of empty names is con ned to
the mind (Azzouni,     , p.     and p.     fn.   ). Here, I am freely interpreting Azzouni’s account. In my view,
the distinction between referencee and referencer becomes much more natural when conceived of in terms of a
triadic approach where minds are the protagonists of semantic relationships.
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Figure  . : In (A), the agent interprets the sentence as being about the world. In (B), the agent
interprets the sentence as being about an intentional object lacking an external counterpart. The
arrows indicate the segments of the semantic relationshipmediated by themind. In the  rst segment,
nouns/names refer tomental contents. In the second segment, depending on how the agent interprets
the relationship of the sentence with the world, nouns/names may or may not denote objects in the
world.
to something that can be, for example, information. By contrast, the verb to denote conveys
more explicitly the idea of a symbol standing for something. For instance, a superscript
number placed after a word in a text refers the reader to a footnote; its function is not to
denote the footnote, but to direct the reader’s attention to a side comment. Analogously, we
can think of a name/noun in a sentence as primarily directing the attention of its addressee
to a mental content. Denotation, in turn, requires from the addressee the establishment of
a link between the mental content referenced by the name and an external object.
Using this distinction, we can say that a name can refer to something (in the mind) with-
out denoting a real thing (in the world). For example, in Figure  . B, ‘Pegasus’ refers to the
idea of a  ying horse (a mental content) without denoting a real animal in the world. De-
notation, just like reference, is a semantic relationship, but it is not essential for names to
have meaning. A statement can have meaning regardless of its terms successfully denoting or
not. This distinction separates semantics from ontology. Semantics is concerned with how
cognitive agents interpret symbols; ontology with what exists. Reference, as construed here,
is an intra-semantical relationship. Denotation, as construed here, is an extra-semantical
relationship that connects symbols and mental contents with the external world. Since this
connection is not necessary for meaning, in triadic approaches of meaning, ontological com-
mitment is not dictated by the logical form of sentences, but by the intentions of the speaker.
If the speaker intends to denote objects in the world by using a name or a quanti ed sen-
tence, then, in this case, she is ontologically committed to the existence of those objects.
Otherwise, she may be operating only at the mental level, referring to and quantifying over
“intentional objects,” in Crane’s terminology.
Quineans see ontological commitment as held primarily by theories. An alternative is
to see ontological commitments as held ultimately by thinkers: thinkers commit them-
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selves to the existence of things when they frame their theories of the world. Without
thinkers, after all, there would be no theories of the world. This suggests that the phe-
nomenon of ‘ontological commitment’ should ultimately be explained in terms of the
mental states of thinkers (Crane,     , p.   ).
These considerations lead to a reconstrual of what a model-theoretic semantics of a for-
mal language implies in ontological terms. Following Quine, it is commonly assumed that
the objects that have to be included in the domain of a regimented theory so as to make its
statements true constitute the ontological import of that theory. In other words, all the ob-
jects in the domain of the theory have to exist (at least according to the theory). But when we
take into account the distinction between reference and denotation, there may be objects
in the domain of the theory that do not denote anything in the world. These may be the
referents of singular terms or the values of bound variables that refer to intentional objects
that lack worldly counterparts. In this case, we cannot view the model of a theory as a  nal
representation of its ontological import. Since what distinguishes mere reference from de-
notation are the intentions of the speakers (or the intentions of the authors of the theory),
in order to  nd out the ontological import of a theory, we  rst have to ask of each of the
objects in its domain whether it is intended to represent an extant object or an intentional
object without an external counterpart. In not doing so, we risk committing ontological
collapse (Sfard,     ), that is, collapsing merely discursive objects (such as rei cations) and
genuine objects into one and the same ontological category of real things.
True enough, often the intentions of the speaker or the proponent of a theory are not
clear even to herself. As we have seen, when rei cation is the process behind the creation of
a discursive object, the agent speaks as if the name of the object really denotes something,
without needing to be aware of the as-if attitude. This means that the investigation into
the ontological import of theories is not a trivial task. In certain cases—as in the case of
arithmetic—a scienti c investigation of what agents are in fact talking about, in spite of what
they are apparently talking about, is required to distinguish non-denoting from denoting
terms in their discourse. This is what I have tried to do in the previous chapters.
Model-theoretic semantics is dyadic and, therefore, it is not able to capture the distinc-
tion between denoting and non-denoting terms. Both denoting and non-denoting terms re-
fer; model-theoretic semantics can be seen as capturing only the referential aspect of names.
Thus, if model-theoretic semantics is to be integrated in a triadic approach, domains and in-
terpretation functionsmust be placed at the intermediate level. Figure  .  illustrates how this
can be done. The model of a sentence (or theory) represents how agents “read” the sentence
(or the sentences of the theory), following the usual syntactic and semantic conventions, in
which names/nouns are referring terms. If the sentence/theory is intended to be about the
world, then relationships of denotation are established, but these are not captured by the
model. Only in cases in which all terms and quanti ers denote, can the mental and worldly
level be collapsed, and then the model can be seen as representing the sector of the world the
sentence/theory speaks of directly. These are the cases in which the dyadic approach pro-
vides a correct, yet simpli ed, semantic account. When denotation is not present, though,
the model only represents how the sentence/theory is read by the agent, leaving unspeci ed
how and whether the sentence is connected to the world.
A sentence whose referring terms do not denote can still be talking about the world.
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Figure  . : In a triadic semantics, the model of a sentence (the set-theoretic structure consisting of a
domain and an interpretation function) stands for its interpretation at the mental level.
Reference in the  rst segment of the semantic relationship does not necessarily require de-
notation in the second segment if a relationship with the world is to be established. Recall
that in rei catory discourse, we use syntactic and semantic resources typical of discourse
about objects to speak of existing things in the world that are not objects. We create discur-
sive objects by reifying pluralities, similarities, and procedures. Names or nouns of discursive
objects created by one of these processes of rei cation will not denote, but even so they will
have worldly counterparts—though their external counterparts are not objects, but plural-
ities, similarities, or procedures. To illustrate this point, let us turn back to one of Sfard’s
examples of rei cation we saw in section  . , the sentence (a) ‘The Addams family is rich.’
Assume that the Addams are real individuals, rather than the homonymous famous  ctional
characters. In this case, ‘The Addams family’ refers to a discursive object created by collec-
tion. This expression does not denote an object in the world (assuming that only individuals
exist), but nevertheless it is incorrect to say that the expression ‘The Addams family’ does
not pertain to the world at all. The point is that ‘The Addams family’ does not denote, but
rather collects several objects in the world. It can be said that its function with respect to
the world is to subsume several objects (individuals, in this example) under the same name.
Figure  .  illustrates this point.
In this way, sentences wherein non-denoting names occur can still be true about the
world. ‘The Addams family is rich’ will be true if and only if its members, taken together,
are rich. As a general rule, it can be said that the truth conditions of a sentence wherein
names of discursive objects produced by collection, saming, or encapsulation occur are the
truth conditions of its un-rei ed version. Azzouni and Crane o er similar accounts of the
truth conditions of sentences wherein empty names occur, as we will see next.
Following his distinction between referencer and referencee, Azzouni distinguishes two
kinds of worldly facts that should be looked into in order to determine the truth value of a
sentence. Sentences whose names and quanti ers referr are made true or false by the prop-
erties of the objects they referencer; following standard practice, Azzouni calls these objects
the truth makers of these sentences. Sentences whose names and quanti ers refere have no
truth makers, but there may be other worldly facts they describe that make them true or
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false. In Azzouni’s terminology, these other worldly facts are the truth-value inducers of these
sentences.
[A truth-value inducer] is to be contrasted with a “truthmaker.” The truth-value induc-
ers are those factors in the world (objects and relations among such) that—dovetailing
with our expressive and inferential needs—force truth values on the sentences we use.
In cases where a sentence contains terms that referr, the relata of such terms and re-
lations among such can be described as truth-value inducers that are truth makers.
But where the terms in a sentence refere, the truth-value inducers are other things
(and relations among such) that the terms in such a sentence are neither aboute nor
aboutr. “MickeyMousewas invented byWalt Disney,” for example, has among its truth-
value inducers, certain objects (Walt Disney, drawings, etc.) that induce its truth value.
Mickey Mouse isn’t among these (Azzouni,     , p.   ).
Azzouni views truth-value inducers as a genus of which truth makers are a species. All
sentences that are intended to be about the world have truth-value inducers. Sentences
wherein referringr terms and quanti ers occur have truth-value inducers which are truth
makers, as generally held. Sentences wherein empty names or quanti ers occur have other
worldly factors, which are not truth makers, as their truth-value inducers. Using Azzouni’s
terminology, we can say that sentences wherein names of discursive objects produced by
rei cation occur have as their truth-value inducers the pluralities, similarities, or procedures
these names reify. In the example of Figure  . , the members of the Addams family are the
truth-value inducers of the sentence ‘The Addams family is rich.’
Following Crane (    ), we can call the process of explaining the truth of a sentence
with empty names in virtue of its truth-value inducers reductive explanation. “A reductive
explanation is an explanation of why truths of a certain kind are true, where this explanation
need not appeal to the entities apparently invoked by the truths to be explained” (Crane,
    , p.    ). Crane gives an example of reductive explanation that is very illustrative for our
purposes here. In the sentence ‘The average family in the UK has  .  children,’ the de nite
description ‘the average family in the UK’ is empty. Even if we assume that families exist, the
average family certainly does not. Obviously, the presence of this empty expression should
Figure  . : The discursive object a, the referent of ‘The Addams Family,’ subsumes a plurality of
primary objects.
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not be seen as making this sentence false. “[E]veryone understands that for this to be true,
there need be no such entity as the average family which has this mysterious number of
children. All that needs to be true is that the number of children divided by the number of
families is equal to  .  (or something near enough)” (Crane,     , p.    ). In other words,
the calculation process that produced this  gure is the truth-value inducer of this sentence.
In fact, using Sfard’s (    ) account of rei cation, we can say that the average family in the
UK is a discursive object that encapsulates a bunch of statistical calculations about families
in the UK. The truth conditions of this sentence are given by its un-rei ed version, wherein
the process of calculation is made explicit. The original sentence will be true if and only if
the input data described in its un-rei ed version is true regarding families in the UK and
the calculation of the average is correct.
Sentences wherein empty names that are names of discursive objects occur have clear
links to the world which can make them true or false, in spite of the fact that these empty
names do not denote objects in the world. Semantics, truth conditions, and ontology do not
go hand in hand when we take into account that we use empty names as linguistic resources
to reify. Having sketched an outline of this triadic theory of meaning, we can start analyzing
the semantics of numerical statements.
As we have seen, numbers are mere discursive objects (or so I claim), missing worldly
counterparts. Therefore, numerals must be empty names. In the terms of the triadic ap-
proach to semantics presented here, then, numerals refer to numbers (discursive objects)
but do not denote any external objects. Notice that the distinction between reference and
denotation is not one that users of numerical discourse are aware of. It is a theoretical dis-
tinction. Thus, for those operating in working-realist mode, referencing numbers amounts
to speaking of numbers as if theywere existing objects or, as I could say here, as if themention
of numbers spanned the two segments of the semantic relationship (reference and denota-
tion). It is only an a posteriori scienti c investigation that reveals that, in fact, the semantic
relationship between numerals and numbers stops at the intermediate level.
This way of understanding the semantics of numerals reconciles two key aspects of nu-
merical discourse. On the one hand, people do speak of numbers using syntactic resources
typical of referential contexts where denotation is intended. On the other hand, the objects
that apparently make up the domain of these discursive practices are not found anywhere
other than at the discursive level. The adoption of a triadic semantics enables us to account
for the referentiality of numerical discourse entirely within themental/discursive level, with-
out needing to postulate the existence of numbers at the worldly level.
This does not mean, however, that discourse about numbers is totally con ned to the
mental realm, without any link to the external world. As we saw above, reference in the
 rst segment of the semantic relationship does not necessarily require denotation in the
second segment for a relationshipwith the world to be established. As products of rei cation
by the encapsulation of procedures, we can expect that the relationship between numbers
and the world translates into events and practices. In fact, we have seen that numbers are
cognitive tools which allow for the performance of certain operations. We can think of
number concepts (of which numbers are rei cations) as “scripts” to perform operations such
as counting and calculating. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that numerical knowledge
is tested by asking people to do something. The Give-a-Number task, which developmental
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Figure  . : The discursive object seven, which encapsulates the procedure of counting up to ‘seven,’
does not denote anything in the world, but allows for the action of counting apples.
psychologists use to probe children’s numerical understanding, is a case in point. According
to this experimental task, a young child shows at least initial numerical understanding when
she is able to produce a collection with the requested number of items. To use a rough
analogy, we can think of the content of a number concept at earlier stages as a cake recipe.
A cake recipe does not stand for a cake; rather, it instructs how to make a cake. Analogously,
a number concept does not stand for nor represent an existing object; rather, it instructs
how to perform certain operations. This is the relationship between numbers (discursive
objects/mental contents) and the world: they allow for the performance of certain activities
in the world, just like a cake recipe allows for the preparation of a cake. Figure  .  illustrates
this in the triadic semantic schema. How this helps explain the truth conditions of numerical
statements we will see in the next section.
 .  Truth
As we saw above, the truth conditions of sentences wherein names of discursive objects pro-
duced by rei cation occur are speci ed by the truth conditions of their un-rei ed versions.
To use Crane’s terminology, the truth conditions of rei ed sentences are reduced to the truth
conditions of their un-rei ed versions. The un-rei ed version usually reveals the relevant
links between the original statement and the external world, and then we can evaluate the
truth of the un-rei ed version following the standard notion of truth as correspondence with
reality. To use Azzouni’s terminology, we can say that these links with reality made explicit
by the un-rei ed version are the truth-value inducers of the original, rei ed version. In this
section, we will see how this approach explains the truth of applied and pure arithmetical
statements.
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Applied numerical statements Consider the following sentence: (a) There are seven mar-
bles in the box. Its un-rei ed version un-capsulates and unalienates the counting event be-
hind it, and can be phrased as follows: (a’) If someone counts the marbles in the box, she
will stop at the word ‘seven.’ The sentence (a’) has no empty singular terms and its truth
conditions are clear and unproblematic. It is easy to see that (a) is true if and only if (a’) is
true: (a’) will be false only if the correct execution of the process of counting the marbles in
the box does not stop at ‘seven,’ in which case there will not be seven marbles in the box, and
then (a) will be false.
In (a), the numeral ‘seven’ is in adjectival position. Placing ‘seven’ in nominal position—
as in (b): The number of marbles in the box is seven—does not change anything with respect
to the truth conditions of (b), which are still given by (a’). However, this modi cation does
change the semantics of (b) at the level of discourse, since now there are two expressions
in (b) referring to discursive objects, whose identity the sentence asserts, according to the
standard platonist analysis of the logical syntax of sentences like (b). If one wishes to preserve
this semantical di erence in the un-rei ed version of (b), an instance of Hume’s Principle
does the job: (b) The number of marbles in the box is seven i  (b’) there is one-to-one
correspondence between the marbles in the box and the numerals from ‘one’ to ‘seven.’ The
right-hand side of this instance of Hume’s Principle, (b’), gives the truth conditions of (b) in
purely procedural terms. (The truth of Hume’s Principle itself is discussed below.)
Both (a’) and (b’) show that the truth conditions of (a) and (b) depend on the cardinality
of the collection of marbles in the box, as expected, since these sentences are asserting a
worldly fact. The di erence between rei ed and un-rei ed versions is that, whereas (a) and
(b) just assert the cardinality of the collection of marbles in the box, (a’) and (b’) not only
assert this but also make explicit the process we use to assess its cardinality. The speci cation
of the truth conditions of applied numerical statements in terms of their un-rei ed versions
is in line with correspondence-oriented and disquotational approaches. Here, the instance
of the T-schema according to which
‘The number of marbles in the box is seven’ is true i  the number of marbles in the
box is seven
is still valid. What is not revealed by mere disquotation, though, is what is behind the word
‘seven’ and, therefore, the links between applied numbers and the world remain obscure. By
substituting (a’) or (b’) for the right-hand side of the above instance of the T-schema, these
links are made explicit. Not only disquotation, but also un-rei cation is needed to account
for numerals conceived of as empty names of discursive objects.
In section  . , I criticized Bueno’s (    ) agnostic  ctionalisms on the basis that his
accounts require some rephrasing of arithmetical statements so that their epistemic con-
tent can be made visible. For example, although we do not know, in Bueno’s accounts,
whether (c) “There are in nitely many prime numbers” is true or false, we do know that
(c’) “If there were numbers, there would be in nitely many prime numbers” (in the van
Fraassen-inspired account) or (c”) “In arithmetic, there are in nitely many prime numbers”
(in the Thomasson/Azzouni-inspired account). Are the changes from (a) to (a’) and from
(b) to (b’) not also a kind of rephrasing? The answer is no. (a’) and (b’) do not rephrase the
original sentences, but only specify their truth conditions, as the parallel with the T-schema
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shows. The sentences (a) and (b) are true (or false) as they stand. The point is that their truth
conditions (their relationships with the world) do not directly re ect their syntactic form,
given the occurrence of empty names that refer to discursive objects. In other words: in
the account proposed here, the syntax and semantics of numerical statements is preserved,
but their truth conditions are modi ed. The dissociation between syntax, semantics, and
truth conditions is made possible by the inclusion of the intermediate semantic level of dis-
cursive objects (or intentional objects, in Crane’s terminology), as explained in the previous
section. These remarks apply to the reductive explanations of the truth of pure arithmetical
statements we will see next.
Non-applied arithmetical equations Take the equation (d)  + =  abstractly, i.e., as stat-
ing a fact about numbers, and not a fact about collections in the world. In this case, each
numeral in (d) encapsulates a segment of the counting procedure abstractly conceived of,
i.e., the action of simply reciting number words in sequence, without counting a particular
collection. To see what the un-rei ed version of (d) is, recall young children’s strategy “count
all,” through which we learn that  + = , as we saw in section  . . To calculate  + , a young
child would  rst deploy a collection of three items (counting ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three’), second
deploy a collection of four items (counting ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’ ‘four’), and then count all the
elements in both collections. In doing so, the child “unpacks” the numerals ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ and
counts their “contents,” as it were,  to  nd out what their sum is. The child needs to rely on
collections of physical items because she has not yet rei ed number concepts, as we saw in
section  . . But it does not matter whether she uses  ngers, beans, or pebbles to implement
this operation. What she is learning is the following procedure:
(d’) if someone counts ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’ and then counts ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’ ‘four,’
and then counts what she has counted in the previous steps together, she will stop at
‘seven.’
This is a fully un-rei ed and unalienated version of (d). Empty names do not occur
in (d’) and it is easy to see that (d) is true i  (d’) is true. Notice that the truth of (d’), as
opposed to the truth of the examples of applied numerical statements considered above,
does not depend on the cardinality of any particular collection in the world. The sentence
(d’) states a fact about the counting procedure itself. It is a condensed form of describing
what happens if someone counts three, counts four, and then counts all. In the absence of
objects to be counted, one can count the very number words to verify it.
A perhaps more elegant way of saying what  + =  describes about the counting proce-
dure comes from the “count on” strategy also used by children to calculate additions. In this
strategy, the child starts at ‘three’ and counts “four,  ve, six, seven.” That is, the child moves
from ‘three’ to four positions ahead in the counting sequence. The equation ‘ + = ’ can be
seen as encapsulating this action. In other words,  + =  is true i  moving from ‘three’ to
four positions ahead in the counting sequence results in stopping at ‘seven.’ This phrasing,
in contrast to (d’), is still rei catory, since it is referring to four. For a less rei ed graphic
 More precisely, the child counts together the collections whose items can be put into one-to-one correspon-
dence with the counting words recited during the execution of the initial segment of the counting procedure
encapsulated by each numeral.
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Figure  . :  + =  is true i  moving from ‘three’ to four positions ahead in the counting sequence
results in stopping at ‘seven.’
description of the process encapsulated in  + =  inspired by the count on strategy, see Figure
 . . Using a still more rei ed way of speaking, it can be said that ‘ + = ’ describes a struc-
tural property of the counting sequence according to which the fourth numeral after ‘three’
is ‘seven.’
Recall that, as we saw in Chapter  , we learn arithmetical operations as higher-order
operations, i.e., operations performed with the counting operation. The second-order na-
ture of addition is clearly depicted in Figure  . . In general terms, an equation of the form
a+b=c describes the outcome of the action of moving b positions forward in the sequence of
counting words from position a. Similar analyses can account for the truth of subtractions,
multiplications, and divisions of natural numbers. Subtraction equations describe actions
of moving backward in the sequence of numerals; multiplication equations describe actions
of leaping forward a number of times in the sequence of numerals; and divisions, actions of
leaping backward a number of times. See Figure  .  for an illustration.
Arithmetical equations describe the functioning of the cognitive tool of counting, and
become themselves cognitive tools for calculation. Once we have learned facts about the
counting sequence, we can make use of them to save labor. For example, if we already know
that a basket contains three apples and four oranges, we do not need to count all the items
in the basket to learn that it contains seven fruits, since we already know that, if we counted
them all, we would stop at ‘seven.’ We can also make use of facts about the counting proce-
dure for making predictions. We do not need to add another three oranges to the basket and
count all the oranges to know that this would result in seven oranges in the basket. Once
we know these properties of the counting procedure, i.e., once we know what happens if we
count this way or that, on certain occasions, we no longer need to count, since we can just
calculate (e.g., by retrieving the outcome from memory). But notice: arithmetical equations
are not generalizations of facts about collections. They describe structural properties of the
counting procedure, regardless of any particular collection (other than the very ordered col-
lection of counting words).
To calculate is to use previously known facts about the counting procedure so that one
no longer needs to reiterate the counting procedure every time (as young children do). Cal-
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Figure  . : (A) illustrates multiplication as a third-order counting operation. The product of  ◊  is
the position in the counting sequence one arrives at after counting up to three twice. (B) illustrates
division as a third-order counting operation. The division of   by   is the number of times that it is
possible to count up to three backwards in the counting sequence, starting at ‘six.’
culation algorithms based on Arabic digits increase our calculation capacity even more by
providing “shortcuts” which dispense us from memorizing a potentially in nite list of facts
about the counting procedure. We just have to memorize the facts compiled in addition
and multiplication tables and know the algorithms. The algorithms take us directly to the
outcome that would be produced if we moved through the counting sequence in the way
speci ed by the intended operation. It is much easier to  nd out the product of     times
    by using the multiplication algorithm than by counting up to ‘   ’     times over the
counting sequence to  nd out which numeral this operation will stop at. The multiplication
algorithm encodes basic facts that are established by counting (such as that  ◊ =  ) and ex-
ploits features of the notation system to reduce the number of counting facts we have to
memorize.
As we saw in section  . , calculation algorithms are cognitive tools in their own right.
“The decimal place-value system is both a medium for representing numbers and a tool for
operating with numbers. This invention creates what can be termed a ‘symbolic machine’”
(Krämer,     , p.    - ). Now we can appreciate the fact that this “symbolic machine” is a
second-order cognitive tool, i.e., a cognitive tool that operates using another cognitive tool,
namely, counting.
As we also saw in section  . , the process of de-semanti cation that takes place when we
use calculation algorithms makes reference to numbers irrelevant. In a sense, by calculating
mechanically, it is as if we go back to the asemantic origins of counting words: a mechanical,
rule-governed technique does all the work, and meaning is just a product of the mechanical
manipulations, rather than their cause. This highlights the cognitive role of numbers as as-if
objects: they serve to endow such operations with meaning for us, to make our understanding
and our execution of these operations easier, but they are irrelevant for the operations them-
selves. This is why machines, which do not understand meanings, can count and calculate.
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This is why procedures, rather than numbers, ground arithmetical knowledge: procedures
are essential, whereas numbers are dispensable (for machines, at least; for us, they are cog-
nitively indispensable for facilitating complex operations, as we saw in Chapter  ).
A few paragraphs above I said, using a rei ed way of speaking, that arithmetical equa-
tions describe “structural properties of the counting sequence” or “the functioning of the
cognitive tool of counting.” However, we need to be very careful with this way of speaking.
On the one hand, it conveys easily and clearly the point I am trying to make here, as usual
with rei catory ways of speaking. On the other hand, these rei ed expressions can obscure
the connections non-applied arithmetical equations have with the world, which I also want
to clarify here. There is a tendency to understand expressions like ‘the process of x’ as having
to denote either a speci c execution of the process or a non-spatiotemporal entity, like a
“procedure type” which is instantiated in each execution. These interpretations should be
avoided here. “The process of counting,” “the counting sequence,” and “the cognitive tool
of counting” do not exist in themselves; what does exist are human beings who know how
to execute a ritualized sequence of actions which, time and again, they do.  These human
beings have mental contents that allow them to execute these actions when required. These
mental contents exist, of course, but they are not “the counting procedure” either, nor are
they the truth-value inducers of arithmetical equations. These mental contents, as said at
the end of the previous section, can be conceived of as scripts, or “cake recipes” that instruct
the agent how to act in order to count or calculate. Arithmetical equations do not describe
these mental scripts, but what would be the outcome of the execution of these scripts. This
is the relationship between arithmetical equations and the world: they describe what hap-
pens if we proceed in a certain way, just like a picture of a cake anticipates the outcome of
following a cake recipe.
Arithmetical statements ranging over in nity As we saw in section  . , statements about
actual in nity encapsulate unending processes. For example, the sentence (e) “The set of the
natural numbers is in nite” encapsulates the procedure of successively adding one, or any
other procedure that generates increasingly large numbers. Therefore, a semi-un-capsulated
and semi-unalienated version of (e) may be the following: (e’) If someone starts adding one
to a number repeatedly, there is nothing in this process itself that will cause her to stop, and
hence she can keep adding as long as she can or wishes. It is easy to see that (e) is true i  (e’)
is true. Notice that (e’) is true in spite of no one being able to keep adding forever. This does
 This kind of approach to procedures is not strange in logical and mathematical contexts. For example,
what we today call a Turing machine and see as an abstract computational device was originally introduced
by Turing (    ) as a procedure executed by a human agent. Interestingly, the features of this “machine” were
motivated by “Turing’s recognition of a set of human limitations which restrict what we can compute (of our
sensory apparatus but also of our mental apparatus)” (De Mol,     , section  . , para.  ). For example, the fact
that the head can read/write only one cell at a time is motivated by Turing’s recognition that there is a limit
to the number of symbols we can observe at one glance: “If he [the human computer] wishes to observe more,
he must use successive observations” (Turing,     , p.   ). It is not di cult to see that the limitations that
prevent a human computer from reading several cells at one glance may be related to the cognitive constraints
that prevent us from grasping the cardinality of collections with more than three or four items at one glance,
forcing us to rely on a procedure—counting—where we use successive observations. Similar technical problems
lead to similar solutions.
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not matter for the truth of (e’) because (e’) states a fact about the procedure of adding one,
not about speci c executions of it. The procedure of adding one has no intrinsic limit; it can
go on forever. We know that the procedure of adding one has no intrinsic limit not merely
by executing it—although by executing it we can convince ourselves that this procedure is
potentially unending—but also because it is governed by clear-cut, deterministic rules, which
allow the use of deductive reasoning to discover facts about it. By a simple reductio, we can
deductively conclude that it never ends. 
Other statements ranging over in nity have di erent truth-value inducers, according
to the procedure they encapsulate. Take, for example, the sentence (c): There are in nitely
many prime numbers. There is no method for generating ever-larger prime numbers, but
there are methods for testing whether or not a number is prime. Thus, (c) can be seen as
a rei catory manner of expressing the observation that, if one keeps testing numbers, she
will always  nd more primes. As above, the truth of this observation is not based on the
experience of continuously testing and always  nding new primes (and here, continuous
testing could not even convince us of this fact). What informs us that (c) is true is a deductive
proof of (c), such as Euclid’s proof. The underlying facts that make (c) true, however, are
still the rules that determine the sequence of numerals and the operation of division. The
proof only reveals these facts. This illustrates how the truth-value inducers of a sentence (in
arithmetic as in other disciplines) can be di erent from the methods we use to determine
its truth value. Again, using rei catory language, it can be said that (c) captures a structural
property of the operation of division performed over the counting sequence.
Hume’s Principle Neo-Fregeans claim that Hume’s Principle is analytic, i.e., true in virtue
of the meaning of its constituent terms. If we take the un-capsulation of its constituent
terms as revealing aspects of their meanings, the analyticity of Hume’s Principle seems to
be con rmed. Consider the following phrasing of Hume’s Principle: (a) The number of
Fs is equal to the number of Gs i  F is equinumerous to G. On the left-hand side of (a),
the rei catory expression “the number of . . . ” occurs twice. Only this side needs to be un-
rei ed, since equinumerosity is already de ned by means of the process of establishing one-
to-one correspondences. The following is a way of un-reifying the left-hand side: if someone
counts Fs and counts Gs (separately), she will stop at the same numeral. Now, recall that
counting is establishing one-to-one correspondence between the elements of the collection
being counted and an initial segment of the counting sequence. Therefore, what the left-
hand side says is that F and G are equinumerous to the same initial segment of the counting
sequence. By the transitivity of equinumerosity, this means that F is equinumerous to G,
and this is exactly what the right-hand side of Hume’s Principle states. Therefore, Hume’s
Principle cannot be false.
 Suppose that the process of adding one has an end. Then, at its end, we get the number n, the last one to
which we can add one. However, by making n+ , it is possible to go on from n, contradicting the assumption.
Notice that here and in (e’) I am referring to the number one. (e’) is not a fully un-rei ed version of (e), but
a fully un-rei ed version can be obtained by un-capsulating the operation of adding one in the way described
above—it is the operation of moving one position ahead in the counting sequence. As we know from section
 . , the counting sequence is  nite, and therefore there comes a point where it is impossible to go on. This is
a limitation of the medium, not of the procedure. I address this issue in the discussion about Peano’s Axioms
below.
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Peano’s Axioms Consider the following formulations of Peano’s Axioms:
( )   is a natural number
( ) For every natural number n, s(n) is a natural number
( ) For every natural number n, s(n) 6=  (  is not the successor of any number)
( ) For all natural numbers m and n, if s(m)=s(n), then m=n (for every pair of numbers,
their successors are di erent from each other)
( ) If Px is any property such that (i) P  and (ii) for every natural number n, if Pn then
Ps(n), then Px for every x natural number.
These axioms give the standard de nition of natural number. As a nonalgebraic theory
(in Shapiro’s (    ) terminology), Peano Arithmetic is intended to be true about a de nite
subject matter. In the working realist view, it is true about the actually in nite set of natural
numbers. In the current account, this means that here we have two levels of encapsulation.
At the  rst level, each number encapsulates a subprocess of the counting procedure. Since
here numbers are being taken abstractly, i.e., not as referring to cardinalities of particular
collections, the procedure encapsulated into each number n is just the action of reciting
number words in ascending order up to ‘n.’ This gives us a potentially in nite sequence
of natural numbers, since the action of reciting number words is potentially unending. At
the second level of encapsulation, the very procedure of obtaining ever larger numbers is
encapsulated into ‘the set of natural numbers’ or N. Peano’s Axioms describe this discursive
object, N.
By undoing the two levels of rei cation that give rise toN, we end up with the counting
procedure abstractly conceived, i.e., the action of reciting counting words without counting
any particular collection. This suggests that, ultimately, Peano’s Axioms, just like arithmeti-
cal equations, describe properties of the sequence of counting words. However, as opposed to
arithmetical equations, which describe speci c facts about the sequence of counting words,
Peano’s Axioms capture essential properties of fully- edged counting sequences.  From this
perspective, the  rst four axioms use rei catory language to state the fact that the process
of reciting a counting sequence is potentially unending and that it does not make loops.
The following are semi-un-rei ed versions (and fully un-rei ed and unalienated versions in
brackets) of the  rst four axioms:
( ’) the process of reciting a counting sequence starts with saying the numeral ‘one’ (if
someone is to recite a counting sequence, she will start by saying ‘one,’ or the corre-
sponding numeral in the sequence she is using)
 A fully- edged counting sequence is one that has numerals for higher numbers, such as the English sequence,
in contrast to counting sequences whose upper limit is low, such as those used in some small-scale societies. As
we saw in section  . ,  ndings from the  elds of numerical cognition and developmental psychology suggest that
experience with higher numbers is required for the development of the idea of an in nite series of numbers, and
only fully- edged counting sequences can provide this kind of experience.
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( ’) once a numeral ‘n’ is recited, the action proceeds by saying the numeral that is the
successor of ‘n’ (if someone is reciting a counting sequence, after reciting a numeral ‘n,’
there is nothing in this process itself that can prevent her from proceeding by reciting
the numeral that is the successor of ‘n’ as long as she can or wishes)
( ’) ‘one’ is never recited as the successor of any numeral (if someone is reciting a
counting sequence, she never says ‘one’ or the corresponding numeral in the sequence
she is using as the successor of any numeral)
( ’) one and the same numeral is never repeated as the successor of di erent numer-
als (if someone is reciting a counting sequence, she never repeats one and the same
numeral as the successor of di erent numerals)
Notice that when we step back from actual in nity to potential in nity, temporal rela-
tionships need to be reintroduced. This is why words such as ‘start,’ ‘proceed,’ and ‘never’
occur in the un-rei ed versions of the axioms. It is also worth noticing that the statements
( ’)-( ’) describe a correct recitation of a counting sequence from its beginning. Surely, some-
one can start at a numeral other than ‘one,’ or can say ‘one’ as the successor of some numeral,
or repeat one and the same numeral several times. But all of these variations will count as
incorrect recitations (I discuss the normativity of the counting procedure in section  . ).
Another point that requires clari cation is related to ( ’). We know from section  . 
that in all languages, counting sequences end. This is one of the reasons why we cannot
speak of in nity without reifying. But, just like other physical constraints that prevent us
from counting forever, the fact that we will eventually run out of numerals is not an intrinsic
limitation of the process of reciting a counting sequence. This process could go on if addi-
tional numerals were provided. This is a limitation of the medium—the particular counting
sequence used—wherein the process is implemented. This is shown by the fact that, varying
the medium, the limit at which one runs out of number words also varies. For example, the
limit in Komnzo, the language spoken by the Farem people in New Guinea, is the numeral
for    (Döhler,     ), much smaller than the limit in English, but the process implemented
in both is the same. Furthermore, ultimately, one can go on by writing down numerals in
Arabic notation, which is truly potentially in nite, or by inventing new number words, or
by using arithmetical operations (saying “‘n’ plus one,” “‘n’ plus one plus one,” and so on).
Ferreirós (    ) gives a rather similar account of the truth of the  rst four of Peano’s
axioms in virtue of the counting sequence. He claims that “the [Peano] axioms are true
of the counting numbers, that is, by re ection on the practice of counting we can realize
that the axioms are correct, true statements” (Ferreirós,     , p.    ), as do I. However, he
con ates numbers and numerals—“the counting numbers are simply the numerals employed
for counting, or any symbols employed to represent them . . . , as determined by the rules for
their generation” (Ferreirós,     , p.    )—and then takes the axioms to be about the rules
for the generation of counting words:
The  rst three Peano axioms are rather trivial; they merely capture basic features of
the process of recursive generation of number-words; as a matter of fact, a precise
statement of the generative rules we employ for numbers in any vernacular language is
much more complicated than the above set of axioms. The fourth axiom just says that
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whenever two numbers are di erent, m 6=n, their successors are also di erent—and this
is also a simple fact based on the generative rules (Ferreirós,     , p.    ).
The problemwith Ferreirós’s account is that the  rst four axioms do not capture features
of the process of the recursive generation of number words. As mentioned above, recursively
generated number words are just a medium with which we commonly execute the process
of reciting counting words, but the axioms are true of the process itself, regardless of the
medium. For example, the axioms would still be true if we used a sequence of randomly
generated tokens as a medium, not following any recursive rules. But Ferreirós’s view is
understandable, since we learn that the process of reciting a sequence of numerals is intrin-
sically unending based on the recursive rules for the formation of number words, as we saw
in section  . . Historically and ontogenetically, the idea of numbers constituting an in nite
set could hardly have emerged if a recursive system of notation was not available. This par-
ticularity, though, is irrelevant for the truth of the axioms. When we reify number concepts,
we no longer see them as attached to number words; numbers are abstracted from the words
that gave rise to them, and in this process, particularities of the medium become irrelevant.
The axioms capture structural properties of the sequence of numbers, as a working realist
could say. Or, as I would say, the truth-value inducers of Peano’s Axioms are the essential
properties of fully- edged sequences of numerals. These essential properties are structural:
they pertain to the positions numerals occupy in such sequences, regardless of the intrinsic
properties of the occupants of these positions. 
The axiom of induction, the  fth axiom, demands a di erent story. The role of this
axiom is to allow proofs by induction in arithmetic. This axiomdoes not describe an essential
property of the process of reciting a counting sequence, as the others, but another operation.
In procedural terms, what the axiom of induction states is that one cannot obtain a proper
subset of the natural numbers that contains the number one and is closed under the successor
function (Enderton,     , p.   ). If one tries to do this, she will end up with the entire set
of numbers. This procedural formulation of the axiom of induction suggests the following
un-rei ed and unalienated version of ( ):
( ’) if someone is to recite only numerals that satisfy a certain structural property,
and ‘one’ (or the corresponding numeral in the sequence she is using) satis es this
property, and for any numeral that satis es this property its successor also does, then
she will perform the whole procedure described in ( ’)-( ’).
As above, ( ’) assumes a correct assessment of the relevant property. One could object that
numerals and numbers have di erent properties, and therefore ( ’) could at most be true of
properties of numerals. But recall that, when statements about numbers are un-rei ed, they
become statements about processes performed with numerals, and therefore properties of
numbers are converted into properties of numerals. For example, the commutative property,
according to whichm+n=n+m, here has its truth reduced to the observation that the operation
of moving from ‘m’ to n positions ahead in a counting sequence stops at the same position as
 This resembles Shapiro’s (    ) and Resnik’s (    ) structuralism. However, keep in mind that, in the
current account, “the natural-number structure” is just a rei ed way of speaking. There is no “ante rem” structure
described by Peano’s Axioms, and numbers are not positions in a structure.
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moving from ‘n’ to m positions ahead. In this way, properties of m and n are translated into
properties of ‘m’ and ‘n.’
Before moving on, let me brie y address a general objection that can be leveled against
my account of the truth of Peano’s Axioms. One may call attention to the fact that Peano’s
Axioms are axioms. As such, they are supposed to be the basic truths which ground all of
arithmetic—including the counting procedure and the sequence of numbers words. Thus, or
so the objectormay claim, what I am doing here is mistaking the explicandum for the explicans:
it is the sequence of counting words that is true in virtue of the axioms, not the other way
around. As a response to this objection, I o er the argument I have been developing since
Chapter  : in ontogenetic and historical terms, meaningless symbols used for tallying or
counting precede number concepts, which suggests that, in reality, it is these practices, rather
than highly abstract axioms which are a late development in the history of mathematics, that
ground arithmetical knowledge. We have good reasons to think that counting is a technique
created to help us cope with large cardinalities accurately, and that pure arithmetic is a
discipline which investigates and further develops this technique. What I showed in this
section is that this reversal does not change anything with respect to the truth of arithmetic.
Peano’s Axioms are a concise way of characterizing the most basic structural properties of
the cognitive technology of counting.
 .  Normativity, necessity, apriority, objectivity
According to platonism, arithmetic is descriptive (it describes how things are in the non-
spatiotemporal realm of numbers), objective (for the same reason), a priori (numerical knowl-
edge does not come from experience) and necessary (facts about numbers are independent
of how the world could be). In this section, I will show why arithmetic as construed here
is also descriptive, objective, a priori and can be thought of as necessary, though not in the
same senses these attributes are conceived of by a platonist.
Normativity Let me start, as usual, with the counting sequence. In platonist accounts, the
counting sequence is seen as representing the sequence of numbers in ascending order, and
the normativity of counting is derived from its primarily descriptive nature. As Frege puts
it, “[a]ny law asserting what is, can be conceived as prescribing that one ought to think in
conformity with it, and is thus in that sense a law of thought” (Frege,     , p. xv). Applied
to platonist arithmetic, this means that insofar as the counting sequence represents what
is the case with respect to numbers, it has normative force in our numerical thoughts and
practices. The idea is that the rules for correct counting are as they are because numbers are
as they are.
In the current account, numbers do not exist, and thus the counting sequence cannot
represent them. Here, the counting sequence is just a model collection used in a speci c
kind of tallying technique where an ordered set of words replaces physical objects as the
items to be matched with the items of target collections. The use of these words is regulated
by  ve principles—the counting principles (Gelman & Gallistel,     ) presented in section
 . —which are exclusively prescriptive: they say what one has to do if she is to accurately
determine the cardinality of a collection by counting it. The counting principles solely pre-
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scribe, without describing anything. Their normative force does not come from their being
true descriptions of an underlying reality—they are not even true or false, since they are
prescriptions—but from their being enforced by hypothetical imperatives.
Hypothetical imperatives were originally introduced by Kant, in contradistinction to
categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives express commands that have normative
force for an agent conditional on what she wants, whereas categorical imperatives express
commands that have normative force for everyone independently of their aims (Kant,     ,
 :   ). The relevant point here is that hypothetical imperatives are if-then clauses in which
the antecedent states a goal and the consequent states a means to achieve the goal. For exam-
ple, “if you want to be healthy, then you have to exercise.” The link between antecedent and
consequent and the resulting normative force of the conditional arises from practical con-
siderations. Which means are suitable to achieve health is not determined by conventions,
laws of logic, physics or metaphysics. Rather, means to achieve health are determined by the
capabilities and characteristics of the agent who has this goal and the relevant environmental
conditions. For this reason, Kant also calls hypothetical imperatives “rules of skill” or “tech-
nical imperatives” (Kant,     ,  :   -  ). Whether the agent will feel compelled to adopt the
means determined by technical imperatives or not, depends on her really intending the goal,
knowing which are the possible means to achieve it, and displaying instrumental rationality,
i.e., the disposition to adopt suitable means to her ends.
The counting principles are enforced by a number of hypothetical imperatives. To make
this point clearer, let me brie y recall the  ve counting principles: ( ) one-to-one corre-
spondence (each item of the target collection must be paired with one and only one number
word); ( ) stable order of counting words (the order in which number words are used must
be consistent across di erent counting events); ( ) order irrelevance of items (the order in
which items of the target collection are counted may vary across di erent counting events);
( ) abstraction (counting applies to any collection of all sorts of objects); and ( ) cardinal-
ity (the  nal number word used in a counting event represents the cardinality of the whole
collection).
The  rst principle, one-to-one correspondence, is mandatory for counting due to our
cognitive limitations. As we have seen in Chapter  , our quantical abilities do not deliver
accurate estimations of the cardinality of collections with more than three or four items.
Given this constraint on our quantical abilities, the following hypothetical is imperative
for us: if one wants to determine the cardinality of a collection with more than three or
four items accurately, then she has to match it with a model collection. The antecedent of
this hypothetical is the primary goal of counting. But this is not its only goal. As we saw
in Chapter  , there are simpler tallying techniques that do not implement all the counting
principles, but even so allow for the assessment of larger cardinalities accurately. This is
possible because the remaining counting principles derive normative force from other goals
not related to accuracy.
The second counting principle, stable order of countingwords, is imperative if onewants
to bene t from the  fth principle, cardinality. The counting word used for tagging the last
item in a count can represent the cardinality of the whole collection only if counting words
are always used in a stable order. The cardinality principle, in turn, derives its normative
force from the goal of being concise and expeditious: someone who does not want to be
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concise and expeditious can simply recite all the counting words up to the last one used in
a count every time she is required to discern the cardinality of a collection. Recall that this
is what young children do before they have learned the cardinality principle, as we saw in
section  . : when asked “how many” just after they have  nished counting a collection, they
count it again (i.e., they recite all the number words again). Tallying techniques implemented
with sticks or other physical items rely on a similar modus operandi: in order to refer to the
cardinality of a collection, the whole model collection has to be displayed. By using the
cardinality principle, one produces the same e ect by “displaying” (saying) only the last item
of the model collection.
The third counting principle, order irrelevance, derives its normative force from the
goal of being e cient: it is counterproductive and futile to keep the order in which items
are counted constant across di erent counting events. Finally, the fourth principle, abstrac-
tion, is imperative for the sake of e ciency and universality: it is counterproductive and
unnecessarily speci c to have di erent counting procedures for di erent kinds of items.
Notice that it is entirely possible to comply with cardinality, stable order and one-to-one
correspondence without complying with order irrelevance and abstraction. This is possible
because the latter derive their normative force from di erent goals than the former.
Now we are in a position to appreciate why the sequence of counting words does not
make loops, as captured by the un-rei ed versions of Peano’s Axioms. If the sequence of
counting words made loops, or if one and the same numeral could be the successor of dif-
ferent numerals, the counting word used for tagging the last item could not represent the
cardinality of the counted collection, thus violating the cardinality principle (precluding
conciseness and expeditiousness). More fundamentally, this would also violate one-to-one
correspondence, since after the  rst loop, di erent items of the target collection would be
associated to the same countingword (precluding accuracy). Notice that the counting princi-
ples do not imply in nity; they are compatible with the nite sequences of numerals available
in natural languages, which are suitable for everyday purposes. In nity becomes mandatory
only in virtue of the goals of full generality and unboundedness typical of scienti c and
mathematical contexts.
That being the case, arithmetic is prescriptive at its roots in the counting procedure.
But arithmetic as construed here also has a descriptive dimension. Pure arithmetic or num-
ber theory (the branch of mathematics that studies the properties and relationships of the
natural numbers) is descriptive in that it is an investigation of the functioning of counting
and calculation techniques, or, in other words, it is descriptive of the conceptual structures
that emerge from these practices through rei cation. For example, Euclid’s Theorem about
prime numbers describes a structural property of the sequence of numbers and the operation
of division; arithmetical equations describe structural properties of the sequence of numerals
and the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division; and Peano’s axioms
describe the most basic structural properties of counting sequences. These descriptive state-
ments also generate prescriptions through the mechanism pointed out by Frege, according
to which any true description is also a prescription, in the sense that we have to think and
behave in accordance with it. For example, the algorithms for calculating additions, sub-
tractions, multiplications and divisions with Arabic digits make use of arithmetical facts
compiled in addition and multiplication tables to prescribe more e cient calculation tech-
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niques.
In its prescriptive dimension, arithmetic is a toolkit of techniques whose primary pur-
pose is to enable us to deal with cardinalities accurately and e ciently; in its descriptive
dimension, arithmetic describes structural aspects of these cognitive tools.
Necessity The observation that the prescriptions made by arithmetic are given their nor-
mative force due to hypothetical imperatives sheds light on the senses in which arithmetic
can be said to be necessary or contingent. It goes without saying that people who do not
have the relevant goals are not bound by the technical imperatives that enforce arithmetical
procedures. For example, in certain cultures, there are taboos against counting certain kinds
of things, or di erent counting sequences are used depending on what is counted (Zaslavsky,
    ). People in these cultures do not value universality with regard to counting as we do,
and therefore are not bound by the principle of abstraction. More dramatically, in some
cultures, there is no need to determine the cardinality of collections with more than three
or four elements accurately. The Pirahã are a case in point. As we saw in Chapter  , they do
not count, nor use any other tallying technique. They are not bound by any of the counting
principles. As a rule, the normativity of arithmetic is contingent on people’s goals.
This means that the emergence of arithmetic is contingent. Arithmetic will not emerge
in societies where people do not have the relevant goals. This, however, does not imply
that arithmetic itself is contingent. It is remarkable that such dissimilar human cultures
have developed such similar tallying, counting, and calculation techniques, often in isolation
from each other. This is because the technical prescriptions that recommend one-to-one
correspondence (and the other counting principles) are imperatives for us. Those who do
not have the relevant goals are not bound by them, but for those who do, these technical
prescriptions are necessary. Recall the discussion about the internalization of cognitive tools
in section  . . Culturally created cognitive tools must  nd their neuronal niche; that is, a
cognitive tool will not be created (or will not be usable, e cient or e cacious) if there are
no previously existing brain functions and capacities that it can exploit and recycle/reuse.
Neuronal recycling is an endogenous force that shapes cultural creations. Given that we, as
humans, share the same genetic endowment, it is just natural that we are bound by the same
cognitive constraints. For example, one-to-one correspondence is unavoidable for those of
us who want to determine larger cardinalities accurately because we cannot keep track of
long chains of subitizing without a memory aid (a model collection). This means that if
the Pirahã or any other anumeric people ever develop a technique to assess cardinalities
precisely, they will develop a tallying or counting technique following at least the one-to-one
correspondence principle and possibly some of the other principles, if they value conciseness,
expeditiousness, e ciency, and universality. Since all typical humans are subject to the same
technical imperatives, they will develop counting and calculation techniques with the same
structural properties (i.e., the same arithmetic). 
When it comes to humans with the relevant goals living in this world, then, arithmetic
is necessary (in the sense that it could not be otherwise). But is arithmetic necessary in
 Tallying, counting, and calculation techniques are remarkable examples of cultural attractors (Scott-Phillips,
Blancke, & Heintz,     ; Sperber,     ). The observation that the counting principles derive their normative
force from technical imperatives explains why they are cultural attractors.
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general—true in all possible worlds? This question is as speculative as it gets. In the absence
of information about all possible worlds, we can rely only on our intuitions about possibil-
ities and impossibilities, forged in this world, to address it. This is not a reliable method
(Machery,     ). However, given the attention this question has received in the literature, I
cannot avoid it here. I warn the reader that from here on, I proceed speculatively.
Intuitively, it is plausible that there are possible worlds where humans have not invented
arithmetic, and possible worlds where humans do not exist, as well as possible worlds where
beings capable of language do not exist. In platonist accounts, arithmetical statements can
be true in all possible worlds because they express platonic propositions whose existence is
independent of the existence of beings who can formulate them. In the current account,
though, arithmetical propositions are human creations, and therefore they cannot be true in
worlds where they are not asserted or thought of. In this sense, arithmetic, as construed here,
is clearly contingent: there are worlds where arithmetical propositions do not exist, because
no one has invented the practices that could give rise to such propositions, and therefore
they are not true in these worlds. 
However, there is another sense in which we can think of arithmetic as construed here as
necessary. Hale, in Hale andWright (    , p.    ), distinguishes between being truly asserted
in a possible world and being true of a possible world. Arithmetical statements cannot be
truly asserted in possible worlds where cognitive agents capable of asserting them do not
exist, or where the practices these statements describe do not exist. However, from our per-
spective, in this world, where such practices do exist, we can assert arithmetical statements
that can be true of those possible worlds. For example, we can assert (in our world) of a
certain world w that, if someone from our world counts two objects in w, and counts an-
other two objects in w, and counts all of them, she will stop at ‘four.’ This statement will be
true of w insofar as  + =  is true of episodes of addition in w. But recall that arithmetical
statements, in this account, re ect structural properties of procedures, and not structural
properties of the world. This suggests that  + =  will be true of episodes of addition in all
possible worlds.
To see this point, consider a bizarre possible world wb where, whenever someone puts
together four items, making up a collection, one of them disappears.   If this happens to
all collections, three is the largest size a collection can have in wb. People living in wb will
probably develop rigid taboos against collecting more than three valuable items so as to
avoid losing one or more of them. Could we truly assert of episodes of addition in wb that,
there,  + = ? Absolutely not; if  +  were equal to  , the inhabitants of wb would not miss
the lost item. What we can truly assert of wb is that there,  +  becomes  . It is still true of wb
 This conclusion does not follow if propositions in general are taken to be platonic entities. Recall that, in
the formulations presented in the previous section, the un-rei ed versions of arithmetical statements, in virtue
of which they are true, are expressed in the form of conditionals. For example, the un-rei ed version of the
 rst Peano’s Axiom runs as follows: “if someone is to recite a counting sequence, she will recite ‘one’”. Thus, in
possible worlds where counting sequences and calculating practices do not exist, arithmetical propositions are
vacuously true. In the following paragraphs I show that the consequents of the un-rei ed versions of arithmetical
statements cannot be false when the antecedents are true. Thus, assuming a platonist stance with regard to
propositions, arithmetic as construed here can be seen as true in all possible worlds.
  This and the following examples echoWittgenstein (    , p.   , §   ). However, the conclusion I draw from
these examples diverges from Wittgenstein’s.
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that, there,  +  is equal to  . What happens is that a modi cation in the environment takes
place whenever four items are put together: the moment two is added to two, a collection
of four items is formed and then one is subtracted. Our arithmetical statements are still
true of counting episodes and calculations about objects in wb. For people living in wb, it
may be undesirable to count beyond three, since every time one tries to do so, items start
disappearing. However, it is still true ofwb that, for example, if one hundred items were to be
collected, ninety-seven of themwould disappear. If the inhabitants ofwb managed to develop
a way of counting abstractly, as we do with numbers, they could realize this arithmetic fact
by themselves.
Arithmetic is not invalidated even in starkly di erent worlds where there are no endur-
ing, clear-cut objects. Imagine, for example, a homogeneous liquid world, where there are no
discrete objects; or a world where ephemeral objects keep popping up and vanishing all the
time, like rain drops  oating in the air and fusing with each other or breaking apart contin-
ually. As I speculated in section  . . , in such worlds, perception of numerosity is unlikely
to emerge, let alone counting practices like ours. However, our arithmetic is still applicable
there. A numerate human who traveled to the rain-drops world could take a snapshot of the
ephemeral rain drops, and then count how many of them there are in the snapshot. In the
liquid world, a numerate human traveler could divide the space into discrete units by means
of an arbitrary system of three-dimensional coordinates, and then count how many of these
units there are in a certain region. In fact, this is what we do when we measure continuous
quantities (e.g., volume in cubic meters).
The observation that arithmetic is about procedures, rather than about the structure of
our world, shows that arithmetic is not invalidated in possible worlds with di erent struc-
tures. But could the procedures that de ne arithmetic be otherwise? As I alreadymentioned,
as far as human agents are concerned, arithmetic could not be otherwise, since it is enforced
on us by technical imperatives.   However, we can imagine that in some possible world, there
are more powerful cognitive agents who are not subject to the same technical imperatives as
us. For example, they may be able to assess larger cardinalities without necessarily having to
use a technique based on one-to-one correspondence. In this case, if they ever needed to de-
velop cognitive tools for assessing cardinalities and calculating accurately, their techniques
may be di erent from our numbers. Even so, insofar as their cognitive tools are accurate,
they will be compatible with ours. What validates a method of assessing cardinalities is cor-
respondence between the outcomes produced by the method and the cardinalities evaluated.
Therefore, two accurate methods of assessing the cardinality of  nite collections   are likely
to agree in their outcomes.  
  Wittgenstein’s pupil (Wittgenstein,     , §    ), for whom     +  is     ,     +  is     , and so on, is not
a counterexample. He can be accused of not following the technical imperatives the practice he is engaged in
requires. Maybe everyone is free to reinterpret a rule as she pleases and still claim that she is following the same
rule. But if the rule is part of a technique that is meant to achieve an end, there aremisinterpretations of the rule
that will not do.
  For in nite sets, di erent methods may produce di erent assessments of cardinality (Benci & Di Nasso,
    ; Mancosu,     ).
  That is whyWittgenstein’s pupil’s additions above      can be dismissed as simply wrong. What shows that
they are wrong is not the conventional meaning of additions, but the end of the practice of calculating additions
(to predict the resulting cardinality accurately), which is not met by the pupil’s procedure.
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All things considered, arithmetic is contingent in that it is a human creation; humans
will not invent it if they are not compelled to do so by certain needs. On the other hand, once
it has been invented and as far as typical humans are the inventors, the procedures that de ne
arithmetic could not be otherwise, provided that all the relevant goals are present. Cognitive
agents who are not subject to the same cognitive constraints as us may be able to develop a
di erent arithmetic, but as far as the goal of accuracy is concerned, their arithmetic and ours
will be compatible in their outcomes. Furthermore, correct arithmetical statements made in
this world will likely be true of any possible world, and in this sense arithmetic is probably
necessary (in the sense of true of every possible world). I say probably not only because the
discussion of this point is speculative, but also because there may be other factors, which I
did not take into account here, that can make arithmetic, or parts of it, false under certain
circumstances. For example, it may be that arithmetic as we know it (i.e., number theory
conceived of as a descriptive theory) is ultimately inconsistent. In this case, the arithmetic
we know cannot be necessary. My point is that the account of arithmetic presented here
does not imply, by itself, that arithmetic is contingent (false of some possible world).
The necessary aspects of a human-created arithmetic indicate that Frege was overly con-
cerned with the possibility of the emergence of arithmetic being contingent on human af-
fairs. Frege argued that, if arithmetic were a human invention,
astronomers would hesitate to draw any conclusions about the distant past, for fear of
being charged with anachronism,—with reckoning twice two as four regardless of the
fact that our idea of number is a product of evolution and has a history behind it. It
might be doubtedwhether by that time it had progressed so far. How could they profess
to know that the proposition  ◊ =  was already in existence in that remote epoch?
Might not the creatures then extant have held the proposition  ◊ = , from which the
proposition  ◊ =  was only evolved later through a process of natural selection in the
struggle for existence? Why, it might even be that  ◊ =  itself is destined in the same
way to develop into  ◊ = ! (Frege,     , p. xviii-xix).
The fact that astronomers can con dently use a human-created arithmetic when inves-
tigating the remote past is easily dealt with by distinguishing between assertions made in the
past and assertions made in the present about the past (analogous to Hale’s distinction between
truly asserted in a possible world and true of a possible world which I made use above). One
second after the Big Bang, there was no one who could truly assert  ◊ = , since the proce-
dures this statement describes had not been invented yet. However, an astronomer working
today can truly assert that, one second after the Big Bang, two protons plus two protonsmade
four protons. Astronomers know the counting technology and therefore they can apply it to
describe the past, present or future, in the same way that an archaeologist can use radiocar-
bon dating to  nd out when a mummy was embalmed in Ancient Egypt (where radiocarbon
dating did not exist) and in the same way that we can use arithmetic to speculate about pos-
sible worlds. Regarding the “evolutionary scale” from  ◊ =  to  ◊ = , this makes no sense
in the light of the normativity of arithmetic as explained above. The correction of  ◊ =  is
established by the application of the counting procedure to produce accurate assessments of
cardinality. A counting sequence in which, starting from the  rst position, two leaps of two
positions ahead stopped at the  fth or third position would be simply wrong.
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Apriority In the above paragraphs we have seen that, since arithmetic is about procedures,
it cannot be invalidated by di erent ways the world could be. This is why arithmetic cannot
be refuted by empirical facts. In this sense, arithmetic as construed here is a priori. However,
it is not knowable a priori. We do need experience by means of exposure and suitable train-
ing with a number of counting and calculating practices to acquire knowledge about these
practices, as we have seen. The point is that, once we have learned these techniques, it does
not matter how things are. It is always possible to segregate space into discrete units, stabi-
lize these units (in reality or in a representation) and apply arithmetical techniques to count
and calculate with these units. Humans invented arithmetic to deal with discrete objects,
and learn arithmetic by manipulating discrete objects, but the techniques that constitute
arithmetic are su ciently general and  exible to be applied in every environment. It is our
autonomy to segregate the world into units and collect these units regardless of the structure
of the world that makes arithmetic empirically irrefutable and universally applicable.
Objectivity A few paragraphs above, I argued that a di erent arithmetic created by cog-
nitive agents not subject to the same cognitive constraints as us should be compatible with
ours, since what validates a method of assessing and calculating with cardinalities is cor-
respondence between the outcomes produced by the method and the cardinal size of the
collections involved. This suggests that cardinalities, i.e., the cardinal size of the collections
to which we apply arithmetical techniques, are the objective subject matter that underlies
arithmetic. This is correct, but this point needs further clari cation.
Following Frege, I have repeatedly stressed that we are free to segregate the world into
units and collect these units as we please. Thus, in a sense, cardinalities are subjective: the
cardinality of an aggregate of matter is a property assigned to it by a cognitive agent. Cardi-
nalities are notmind-independent. This does not mean, however, that there are no objective
facts about cardinalities. The point is that the subjective aspect involved in the determina-
tion of cardinalities is restricted to the operations of segregation and collection. These are
the only factors left to agents’ discretion. Once an agent has segregated a sector of the world
into discrete units and grouped some of them into a collection, the cardinality of the collec-
tion has already been determined. The cardinality of a collection is a procedural consequence
of the segregation and grouping acts that gave rise to it. Once cognitive agents have decided
upon a sortal, it is no longer up to them to decide how many instances of it there are in a
certain sector of the world. A trivial example: it is not up to us to decide whether the solar
system has eight or nine planets once the sortal ‘planet’ has been de ned. Given the current
de nition of ‘planet,’ a method that counts nine planets instead of eight, i.e., a method that
produces a model collection with one item corresponding to each planet plus an extra item,
is plainly wrong. We can immediately notice the error by one-to-one correspondence: after
each planet is paired with one item of the model collection, one item will remain to which
no planet corresponds. In other words, this method would produce a wrong model of the
cardinal size of the collection of planets.
Ultimately, this is what secures the objectivity of applied numerical statements and, as
a result, of pure arithmetical statements (which describe properties of the tools developed
to deal with cardinalities accurately). True enough, the expression ‘objective knowledge’
literally means knowledge of objects, but in the current account arithmetic is not concerned
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with objects. This, however, should not be seen as a problem for my account. In recent
decades, there has been a tendency in the philosophy of mathematics to see objectivity as
possibly independent of the existence of mathematical objects. The origin of this view is
often credited to Kreisel. Dummett (    , p.    ) succinctly expresses it by saying: “As
Kreisel has remarked, what is important is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the
objectivity of mathematical statements,” whichmakes room for an explanation of objectivity
without recourse tomathematical objects. Tait (    , p.   ), who attributes the origin of this
idea to Cantor, says that “the question of objectivity in mathematics concerns, not primarily
the existence of objects, but the objectivity of mathematical discourse.”
Although the association between objectivity and objects is no longer automatic in the
philosophy of mathematics, philosophers of mathematics have not yet given up on the re-
quirement for mind-independence. Shapiro expresses the dominant view: “Intuitively, to be
objective is to be independent of human judgments, conventions, forms of life and the like”
(Shapiro,     , p.   ). On the current account, arithmetic is obviously mind-dependent.
Those who take mind-independence as a necessary condition for objectivity will consider
my account misguided from the outset. I have nothing to say to them beyond suggesting
that they reconsider their narrow conception of objectivity.
There are two approaches to objectivity discussed in the philosophy of science, both
involving mind-dependent aspects, which are helpful for our purposes, namely, product ob-
jectivity and process objectivity. According to the former, “science is objective in that, or to the
extent that, its products—theories, laws, experimental results and observations—constitute
accurate representations of the external world” (Reiss & Sprenger,     , section  , para.  ).
The fact that the external world contains things whose existence is mind-dependent does
not matter for this conception of objectivity. Airplanes, brains, human behavior, all of these
mind-dependent entities can be the subject matter of an objective investigation; the only
requirement for product objectivity is that the  nal product—e.g., a theory—represents as-
pects of these entities accurately. The concept of product objectivity allows for an account
of the objectivity of the descriptions made by number theory and applied arithmetical state-
ments. Number theory is product-objective insofar as it provides correct descriptions of
aspects of a certain kind of human behavior, namely, counting and calculation techniques.
As discussed in section  . , the recitation of the counting sequence and the procedures of
moving backwards and forwards on the counting sequence are some of the practices that
constitute the objective subject matter that underlies number theory. Cardinalities, in turn,
are the objective subject matter that underlies applied numerical statements. The sentence
‘The solar system has eight planets’ is product-objective insofar as it provides an accurate
description of our solar system.
The other conception of objectivity discussed in the philosophy of science that is relevant
here, process objectivity, allows for an account of the objectivity of the prescriptionsmade by
counting and calculation techniques. According to this notion, “science is objective in that,
or to the extent that, the processes and methods that characterize it neither depend on con-
tingent social and ethical values, nor on the individual bias of a scientist” (Reiss & Sprenger,
    , section , para.  ). Or, as Douglas (    , p.    ) puts it, “[t]he key to procedural objec-
tivity is that regardless of who engages in a procedurally objective process, they would do it
in the same way, producing the same result.” Objective processes in science aim at avoiding
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distortions in results due to scientists’ idiosyncrasies and cognitive biases: “when we call a
method objective in the procedural sense, we state that it has been designed in a way that
screens out the possibility of individual biases or idiosyncrasies distorting the results” (Kosk-
inen,     , p.   ). This is exactly what we have seen with respect to the function of counting
and calculating techniques, though at a much more fundamental level. These techniques
were designed to screen out individual “biases”—the distortions produced by non-symbolic
estimation and calculation. Whereas estimation can vary across individuals, the counting
of a given collection, if performed correctly, always produces the same outcome regardless
of who is doing the counting. The same applies to other arithmetical techniques (such as
calculation algorithms).
Thus, even if arithmetic as construed here is not objective in the narrow sense preferred
by some philosophers of mathematics, it is objective in the more plausible senses of objec-
tivity de ned by philosophers of science. Furthermore, it is not up to us to choose how
objective we want arithmetic to be. In the current account, it is a matter of fact that arith-
metic is mind-dependent and not descriptive of a realm of objects. If this is so, then attempts
to provide an account of arithmetic that secures its mind-independence are doomed to fail-
ure.
The account of arithmetic presented here is in line with platonism in several respects, though
with important adjustments at key points. Here, as in platonism, an objective reality under-
lying number theory does exist. This reality, however, is not a realm of non-spatiotemporal
objects, but a toolkit of techniques de ned by means of clear-cut, deterministic rules, whose
correct functioning is determined by their being propermeans to achieve certain ends. Here,
as in platonism, number theory can be seen as necessary, although its sentences would not be
true in all possible worlds, but true of all possible worlds. Here, as in platonism, arithmetic is
universally applicable. Finally, here, as in platonism, number theory is a priori, though only
in the sense that number theory cannot be falsi ed by evidence coming from perception,
not in the sense that it is knowable a priori.
 .  Comparison with other nominalistic accounts
The idea that arithmetic is about operations, rather than objects, is not new. Wittgenstein
and Kitcher already proposed it decades ago. And the idea that arithmetic (and mathemat-
ics, more broadly) involves a certain as-if attitude is not new either. Indeed, pretense is
the core idea of  ctionalism, a trendy approach in contemporary philosophy of mathemat-
ics. In this section I brie y point out important di erences and some similarities between
Wittgenstein’s, Kitcher’s, and  ctionalist accounts of arithmetic when compared to the cur-
rent account.
Wittgenstein Right in the  rst section of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein sug-
gests that numerals “encapsulate”—as I could say here, using Sfard’s terminology—the oper-
ation of counting.
I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked “ ve red apples”. He takes the slip
to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; . . . then he says the series of
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cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word “ ve” and
for each number he takes an apple . . . —It is in this and similar ways that one operates
with words (Wittgenstein,     , p.  - ).
Wittgenstein’s procedural view on themeaning of numerals has been an important source
of inspiration for the present account. This view permeates all of Wittgenstein’s writings,
both earlier and later, on the philosophy of mathematics (Klenk,     ; Kremer,     ). In
keeping with Kremer’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of arithmetical equations in
the Tractatus, it is possible to draw an even closer parallel with the account I defend here.
According to Kremer, Wittgenstein sees an equation such as ‘  ◊ =   ’ as a record of a cal-
culation. The idea is that this expression records the result of performing the multiplication
of    by  . We can always calculate the multiplication again if needed, but the equation
works as a “shortcut” which dispenses us from having to perform the same process again.
In my terminology, this is tantamount to saying that ‘  ◊ =   ’ encapsulates the process of
multiplying    by  .
In spite of these remarkable similarities, there are important dissimilarities between my
account andWittgenstein’s. One of them involves his claim, in the Tractatus, that arithmeti-
cal equations are “senseless,” or that they “say nothing.” It is not trivial to understand what
Wittgenstein wants to convey with this claim, but at this point my account and Wittgen-
stein’s clearly diverge. We have seen that, in the current account, arithmetical equations are
not only meaningful, but true (if correct, of course). According to Kremer, for Wittgen-
stein, arithmetical equations “say nothing” because what they would say cannot be said, only
shown. Equations supposedly show “how one is to go on” in inferences involving numbers
(Kremer,     , p.    ), but they cannot say how to go on because processes cannot be ex-
pressed by propositions (Kremer,     , p.    ).
But, be it Kremer’s interpretation only or Wittgenstein’s real intention, this claim does
not seem plausible. We describe procedures all the time, for example, by giving a sequence
of steps. True enough, descriptions of complex procedures can easily become cumbersome
(this is where recourse to rei cation comes in). It is also true that descriptions of procedures
sometimes fall short of providing all that is needed for their reproduction. This is especially
true of counting and arithmetic in general, where purely verbal descriptions are of no help
to those who have not yet mastered the relevant techniques. If this was what Wittgenstein
had in mind, he was right to point out this limitation. But what is helpful in such cases is not
showing a formula, but showing the execution of the technique itself. Recall that children do
not learn to count and calculate solely by following verbal instructions or seeing formulas,
but mainly by seeing someone counting and calculating and then being actively guided in
their attempts to do the same. It is not that arithmetic equations “say nothing,” but that
they do not say enough about the processes they encapsulate. They say only what is essential
for those who already know how to reproduce the processes they encapsulate.
Anotherway of understandingWittgenstein’s claim that arithmetical equations are sense-
less is to see them as similar to tautologies, in that they could not divide the space of possible
facts because they supposedly show the very logic of the world. “The logic of the world which
the propositions of logic show in tautologies, mathematics shows in equations” (Wittgen-
stein,     , § .  , p.   ). This is another enigmatic claim, but again it is clear that it is an-
other point where my account and Wittgenstein’s come apart. As we have seen, arithmetic
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is universally applicable, regardless of how the world is. Since arithmetic is compatible with
a variety of possible worlds, it is unlikely that it will show “the logic of the world” (of which
world?). Perhaps all possible worlds, even the ones most di erent from ours, share a set of
basic structural features, which would be shown by tautologies and arithmetical equations.
But, again, this does not seem plausible in light of the current account. As I claimed above,
we are free to segment any environment into units and collect them regardless of the struc-
ture of the world, and this is what makes arithmetical statements insensitive to empirical
refutation. Thus, it is more likely that arithmetic describes “the logic” of certain human ac-
tivities we engage in in this world, which can be applicable to other possible worlds, rather
than the logic of any world.
Kitcher In Kitcher’s account, as in the current account, arithmetic is true in virtue of cer-
tain operations. Besides this similarity, however, there are many di erences. Here, I high-
light three of them. The  rst regards the operations that are thought to underlie arithmetic.
For Kitcher, these operations are those of collecting (or merging) and segregating.
I begin with an elementary phenomenon. A young child is shu ing blocks on the  oor.
A group of his blocks is segregated and inspected, and then merged with a previously
scrutinized group of three blocks . . . Children come to learn the meanings of ‘set’,
‘number’, ‘addition’ and to accept basic truths of arithmetic by engaging in activities
of collecting and segregating (Kitcher,     , p.    -   ).
As we have seen, this scenario is not empirically plausible. Children do not start learning
numbers by collecting and segregating objects, but by learning by heart a sequence of initially
(for them) meaningless words, as we saw in Chapter  . Only much later, when the child has
already mastered counting, will she be able to appreciate that, e.g., two groups of three
blocks merged with each other make a group of six blocks. This is not to deny that the
operations of collection and segregation are relevant to arithmetic. As noted above, the
cardinality of a collection is a consequence of our actions of segregatingmatter into units and
collecting these units. However, these operations by themselves cannot trigger the formation
of number concepts and therefore do not underlie arithmetic. Only tallying and counting
practices can do that: these are the operations that underlie arithmetic.
The second relevant di erence is that, for Kitcher, the operations that underlie arith-
metic are not performed by ordinary humans, but by an ideal agent. This is how Kitcher
responds to the problem of providing an in nite ontology for arithmetic so as to make
statements about in nity true. In his account, the bound variables of arithmetical state-
ments range over operations. Of course, there are not enough operations in the world to
ful ll the universe of arithmetic, and thus his only alternative is to postulate ideal opera-
tions performed by an ideal agent. The ontological status of this agent and her operations,
though, are anything but clear (Ho man,     ). Recall that my account does not face this
problem because, here, the variables of arithmetical statements range over discursive objects
(i.e., rei cations).
The third point of contention I want to highlight is Kitcher’s view on the relationship
between arithmetic and the world. He claims that arithmetic is true not only in virtue of
the ideal operations performed by the ideal agent, but also in virtue of the structure of the
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world. The idea is that operations such as segregation and collection reveal “the mathemat-
ical structure of reality” (Kitcher,     , p.    ).
[T]o present my thesis in a way which will bring out its realist character, we might
consider arithmetic to be true in virtue not of what we can do to the world but rather
of what the world will let us do to it. To coin a Millian phrase, arithmetic is about ‘per-
manent possibilities of manipulation.’ More straightforwardly, arithmetic describes
those structural features of the world in virtue of which we are able to segregate and
recombine objects: the operations of segregation and recombination bring about the
manifestation of underlying dispositional traits (Kitcher,     , p.    ).
The claim is that, because the world “a ords” segregation and collection, we can know
that the structure of the world is such that it “a ords” these operations. As he puts it, “math-
ematics is an idealized science of particular universal a ordances” (Kitcher,     , p.   ). But
we have already seen that every structure can be viewed as a ording (or at least allowing
for) segregation, collection and counting for those who already know how to perform these
operations. True enough, judging by all the evidence we have, it seems that our world a ords
quite natural ways of segregating and collecting objects. This fact about our world may be
behind the evolutionary pressures that gave us quantical cognition and that made the in-
vention of tallying and counting advantageous. But although these structural properties of
the world may have awakened us to the development of arithmetic, the cognitive tools that
compose arithmetic do not depend on the existence of such a ordances to be usable. We
are able to segregate, collect and count even when these structural features are not present.
Whether or not segregation and collection carves reality at its joints is completely irrelevant
to the truth of applied and pure arithmetical statements.
Fictionalism In the current account, numbers do not exist but we speak of them as if they
do. Hence, discourse about numbers as construed here can be seen as involving a certain
degree of pretense. After all, when we speak of numbers as if they are objects, we are making
claims that are false if literally interpreted. Is arithmetic a kind of  ctional story? Fiction-
alists think so (though for reasons which have nothing to do with rei cation). According
to Balaguer (    , para.  ),  ctionalism “is the view that (a) our mathematical sentences
and theories do purport to be about abstract mathematical objects, as platonism suggests,
but (b) there are no such things as abstract objects, and so (c) our mathematical theories
are not true.” Clearly, my approach here does not qualify as  ctionalist because, although I
subscribe to (a) and (b), I take arithmetical statements to be true. This is a consequence of
the triadic semantics developed in section  . , which allows for a reconciliation between the
referentiality of arithmetical statements and the non-existence of the objects they purport
to denote that does not compromise their truth, as we saw in section  . .
Balaguer calls those who accept (a) and (b) but reject (c) “de ationary-truth nominal-
ists,” a category in which he places Azzouni (    ), whose notion of truth-value inducers
I adopted here. According to Balaguer, de ationary-truth nominalists advance an alterna-
tive conception of truth. Whereas  ctionalists adopt a homogeneous semantic theory in
which truth conditions for non-mathematical and mathematical statements are the same,
de ationary-truth nominalists adopt a dual theory of truth, in which the truth-conditions
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for mathematical statements do not follow the same rules as those for other parts of lan-
guage. According to Balaguer, this is what Azzouni does by proposing that the truth-value
inducers of sentences wherein empty names occur are not the putative objects they fail to
refer to, which is at odds with the truth-conditions for sentences where only genuine names
occur. Then, according to Balaguer,
the central claim behind that view [de ationary-truth nominalism] is an empirical hy-
pothesis about ordinary discourse. In particular, it’s a claim about the meaning of the
term ‘true,’ or about the concept of truth. When de ationary-truth nominalists say
that, e.g., ‘  is prime’ could be true even if there were no such thing as the number  ,
they are making a claim about the ordinary concept of truth. They are saying that that
concept applies in certain situations that most of us—platonists and  ctionalists and
just about everyone else—think it doesn’t apply in . . .
Given this, most  ctionalists would probably say that the problem with de ationary-
truth nominalism is that it’s empirically implausible. In other words, the objection
would be that de ationary-truth nominalism  ies badly in the face of our intuitions
about themeaning of ‘true.’ And there does seem to be some justi cation for this claim.
For instance, it just seems intuitively obvious that the sentence ‘Mars is a planet’ could
not be literally true unless there really existed such a thing as Mars. Moreover, intu-
itively, the sentence ‘Mars is a planet, but it doesn’t exist’ seems like a contradiction,
and this intuition seems to be incompatible with de ationary-truth nominalism (Bal-
aguer,     , section  . , para.   and  ).
I agree with Balaguer that the point of contention here is empirical. However, the em-
pirical facts to which an adequate conception of truth must respond are not our intuitions
about the concept of truth, as he claims, but our use of the concept of truth.   Although our
intuitions at  rst glance do say that, if we are referring to certain objects, our statements
are to be judged true or false with regard to those objects, this is not how we e ectively
evaluate truth in practice. Figurative speech is a remarkable example of this. The sentence
“It’s raining cats and dogs” is judged to be asserting a truth if it is raining very hard, but its
truth has nothing to do with cats and dogs. Another example is the sentence “The average
family in the UK has  .  children,” discussed above. Does the  ctionalist postulate the ex-
istence of the average familiy in the UK or does she take this sentence to be false? Viewing
the average family in the UK as a rei cation seems more plausible. The evaluation of the
truth of metaphorical and rei catory sentences does not comply with what Balaguer takes
our intuitions about truth to be. There is empirical evidence for discourse about numbers
being a kind of rei ed discourse, as we saw in previous chapters. This is manifested in the
process through which we acquire number concepts and develop our ideas and discourse on
numbers. If talk of numbers as objects is really rei catory, it is a mistake to evaluate the
truth value of numerical statements as if they were literal. Fictionalists make this mistake.
  This is not only aWittgensteinian observation, but also a standard assumption in the empirical investigation
of concepts. “Concepts are typically opaque: People do not have a privileged access to the content of their
concepts, and a thinker is not able to articulate the content of a concept just because she possesses it. As a result,
people can have mistaken views about their own concepts, and, if asked to spell out their content (that is, to
explain how they think about something), they may formulate a mistaken theory. The right way to articulate the
content of a concept is to ask people to use it (e.g., to apply it) and to infer its content from its use” (Machery,
    , p.    ).
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This brings to the fore the hermeneutic character of the approach I am proposing here.
We saw in Chapter   that Burgess distinguishes two classes of nominalisms/ ctionalisms:
hermeneutic and revolutionary. Hermeneutic approaches o er interpretations of mathe-
matical language and practice which are intended to reveal what, “contrary to super cial
appearances, deep-down mathematical language has meant all along” (Burgess,     , p.   ).
This is what I am doing here with respect to arithmetic: I am claiming that number talk was
never about genuine objects, but about discursive objects that encapsulate certain proce-
dures. Revolutionary nominalists/ ctionalists, by contrast, “concede that their reconstruc-
tions of mathematics are not analyses of current mathematics, but amendments to it; not
exegeses, but emendations” (Burgess,     , p.   ), and then advocate for the replacement
of current mathematical practices and ways of speaking by new ones. We saw in Chapter
  that  ctionalists have troubles with Burgess’s dichotomy. For example, Leng agrees with
Burgess that hermeneutic  ctionalism is not viable: “Burgess rightly rejects hermeneutic  c-
tionalism on the grounds that it is not supported by the evidence of mathematical practice”
(Leng,     , p.    ). Balaguer concurs: “hermeneutic  ctionalism is implausible and unmo-
tivated; as an empirical hypothesis about what mathematicians intend, there is simply no
good evidence for it, and it seems obviously false” (Balaguer,     , section  . , para.  ). But
the revolutionary approach is not an option for  ctionalists either: “given the comparative
historical records of success and failure of philosophy on the one hand, and of mathematics
on the other, to propose philosophical ‘corrections’ to mathematics is comically immodest”
(Burgess,     , p.   ).
Whereas  ctionalism is admittedly empirically implausible on the one hand, and risks
“comical immodesty,” on the other, an account where rei cation occupies the role of pre-
tense at the origins of the idea that numbers exist is empirically plausible and, at the same
time, explains why mathematical practice should not change. Pretense requires overt pre-
scriptions to imagine, a make-believe attitude that is unlikely to go unnoticed. Rei cation,
by contrast, is usually a non-intentional process which takes place by a kind of “contamina-
tion” of discourse about processes by ways of speaking typical of discourse about objects, and
we do have evidence for this in arithmetic, as we saw in Chapter  . This “contamination”
is cognitively bene cial, does not imply falsity, and is not to be avoided, but encouraged: it
gives us numbers, powerful cognitive tools.
 .  An empirically refutable argument
The above comparison between my account and other nominalistic accounts highlighted
some important di erences. But the fundamental di erence between the current account
and others o ered in the philosophy of mathematics is the fact that it is empirically in-
formed and, hence, empirically refutable. In this section, I brie y summarize the argument
presented in this dissertation for the non-existence of numbers. I also o er some examples
of the kind of empirical evidence that might refute it.
My argument for the non-existence of numbers can be divided into two parts: the  rst,
presented in Chapters   to  , concerns a scienti c investigation of the origins of our beliefs
and concepts regarding numbers; the second, presented in this chapter, gives a philosoph-
ical account of the semantic and epistemic attributes of arithmetic in light of the  ndings
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presented in the  rst part. The following is a summary of the main conclusions of the  rst
part:
(a) When we examine the ontogenetic and historical roots of our numerical beliefs, we
 nd out that they do not come from a realm of objects, but from experience with cer-
tain procedures involving external symbolic resources, initially experienced as mean-
ingless tokens.
(b) These procedures are aimed at enabling us to determine the cardinal size of collec-
tions of discrete items accurately; familiarity with these procedures gives us number
concepts, which endow those initially meaningless tokens with meaning.
(c) The idea that numbers are objects is due to a process of rei cation of these techniques
which takes place when children start learning to calculate. As higher-order counting
operations, calculations become easier when lower-order operations are rei ed.
This is what a scienti c investigation of the phenomenon tells us. In sum, the idea is that
numbers are as-if objects originated in a context wherein numbers conceived of as genuine
objects played no role. This reverses the platonist schema according to which  rst there were
the eternal numbers, then we somehow gained knowledge of them and thus became able to
count and calculate. The sequence of events described in (a)-(c) reveals that it is actually
the other way around:  rst there were certain symbolic practices created and used by people
who did not know numbers, then number concepts (certain mental contents), and  nally
numbers (discursive objects). Those eternal numbers of the traditional schema apparently
do not exist.
Nevertheless, this does not conclusively show that numbers as genuine objects do not
exist unless we are able to explain how arithmetic can display the semantic and epistemic
attributes we usually ascribe to it—such as referentiality, truth, and objectivity—in the ab-
sence of existing numbers. After all, in the philosophy of mathematics, numbers have been
postulated precisely to account for these semantic and epistemic features. My goal in the
previous sections of this chapter was to show that focusing on the techniques and operations
responsible for the emergence of our ideas about numbers su ces to explain the seman-
tic and epistemic attributes of arithmetic. The main conclusions of this second part of the
argument are the following:
(d) In a triadic semantics, the referentiality of numerical statements belongs to the inter-
mediate mental level: numerals refer to discursive/intentional objects, although they
do not denote anything in the external world.
(e) Unsuccessful denotation does not make numerical statements false, since they are true
of the procedures that the discursive objects they refer to encapsulate.
(f) These procedures are governed by clear-cut deterministic rules and have properties
of their own. Number theory is objective because it describes structural properties of
these processes.
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Other properties of arithmetic, such as normativity, necessity, and apriority are dealt
with as discussed in section  . . Once the postulation of extant numbers has been shown to
be dispensable to account for the semantic and epistemic features of arithmetic, we are in a
position to conclude that numbers do not exist by making use of Ockham’s razor. However,
it is worth noticing that here, the dispensability of numbers is not just a consequence of a
clever logical reconstrual of arithmetic, but an observational matter. It was an empirical in-
vestigation into the phenomenon of arithmetic as embedded in human practices and human
cognition that revealed that the explanatory function traditionally ascribed to numbers as
existing objects is in fact ful lled by procedures encapsulated within numerical statements.
Extant numbers are made super uous by the current account in almost the same way that
phlogiston was made super uous by the chemistry of the late eighteenth century. The only
di erence is that, whereas phlogiston was thought to be a spatiotemporal substance, num-
bers are claimed to be outside of space and time. This is the only reason why Ockham’s
razor must be evoked here, since a direct proof of the non-existence of non-spatiotemporal
numbers is impossible.
As I have repeatedly pointed out, this argument for the non-existence of numbers does
not refute the hypothesis that non-spatiotemporal numbers exist, because this hypothesis is
irrefutable. The dispensability of extant numbers does not necessarily imply their nonex-
istence. However, the irrefutability of extant numbers does not recommend belief in them
either, nor does it recommend agnosticism—that is, unless one is also happy to accept the
existence of Russell’s teapot revolving around the Sun, as argued in section  . .
Surely, the nominalistic account of arithmetic presented here is susceptible to all sorts of
philosophical counter-arguments. But it is particularly susceptible to empirically informed
counter-arguments. As new  ndings in numerical cognition, developmental psychology,
history, and anthropology shed more light on the historical and ontogenetic origins of our
numerical ideas, the account presented here might become progressively outdated, requiring
corrections or major revisions (that is, if new counter-evidence emerges). The reliance of
the current account on non-nativist accounts of the ontogenesis of numerical cognition is a
particularly sensitive point. At present, the non-nativist hypothesis, according to which our
innate quantical skills are non-numerical, seems to be best supported by currently available
scienti c evidence, as I argued in Chapter  . However, nativist accounts are still alive and
kicking, and it is possible that new scienti c  ndings will tilt the balance towards them.
In this case, if it is shown that number concepts are already in place at birth, the idea that
our numerical beliefs result from the internalization of cognitive tools invented by human
beings, as I have claimed, can no longer be tenable. If number concepts are shown to be
innate, counting and calculation techniques are more likely to be externalizations of these in-
born skills. Consequently, my explanation of the truth of arithmetical statements in virtue
of the counting procedure would be, at best, incomplete. We would have to investigate the
phylogenetic origins of inborn number concepts in order to  nd out what they re ect (if
anything). If it is shown that they re ect properties of the environment, then there might be
a sense in which one could argue that numbers exist in the physical world, thus vindicating
theMillian idea according to which arithmetic re ects themost general structural properties
of the world.
It is di cult to conceive of how a scienti c/empirical investigation of the phenomenon
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of numerical cognition could o er support to the platonist hypothesis, due to its speculative
nature. However, original Platonism could bene t from a turn of events in favor of nativism,
since the existence of innate number concepts is in line with Plato’s hypothesis of reminis-
cence. A kind of Kantianism could also bene t from nativism, insofar as inborn number
concepts could be conceived of as framing our perception of the environment, rather than
re ecting it.
As for the role of rei cation in the idea that numbers are objects, new  ndings about
how children progress in arithmetic at school can challenge the hypothesis that they start
with a predominantly procedural view which is progressively rei ed as they start learning
more complex arithmetical operations. Fictionalists such as Leng (    ), in particular, might
be interested in this stage of development, to investigate whether pretense plays some role
in mathematical learning. Prescriptions to imagine are not completely absent from math-
ematics classes. For example, think of a teacher asking pupils to imagine a line that never
ends in order to explain the number line. In schools,  ctionalists may be able to  nd a way of
providing empirical plausibility for their claims. (That is, if philosophers become convinced
of the importance of empirical evidence to the philosophy of mathematics.)
 .  Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided an account of the semantic and epistemic characteristics
usually ascribed to arithmetic as a function of the procedures that underlie numerical cogni-
tion. I started this chapter by showing that it is possible to view numerals as referring terms
in the absence of existing numbers, providing we adopt a more realistic semantic approach
in which the role of human minds is not downplayed. In this approach, numerals refer to
discursive/intentional objects. This semantic account set the stage for the explanation of
the truth and objectivity of numerical statements in virtue of the processes the discursive
objects they refer to encapsulate. I also showed that the contingency of arithmetic in human
a airs does not preclude its universal applicability. In a sense, arithmetic can be viewed as
necessary: at  rst glance, it may be true of all possible worlds, since there is no way a world
could be that would prevent the execution of the processes underlying its statements or in-
validate these processes as accurate techniques to deal with discrete quantities. This also
shows that arithmetic is a priori, i.e., not subject to refutation by means of empirical obser-
vation. Arithmetic does not describe the “mathematical structure of the world” as some have
argued, but structural properties of counting and calculation procedures. Finally, I showed
that the current account, in contrast to other more “traditional” philosophical accounts of
arithmetic, is accountable to empirical data, and can thus be improved or refuted on an
empirical basis.
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Concluding remarks
T    dissertation presented an empirically informed nominalistic account of the nature ofthe positive integers. After a brief discussion of the shortcomings of a priori accounts
of the ontological status of numbers, I started with a investigation into the way we acquire
numerical competence and develop the idea that numbers are objects based on empirical
research done on these issues. This investigation then informed a philosophical approach
to the metaphysics of arithmetic in which existing numbers are replaced by procedures (the
counting procedure and higher-order procedures performed over the counting procedure)
as the objective subject matter that grounds the truth and objectivity of arithmetical state-
ments. The idea that numbers are objects, though, still has a role to play: numbers conceived
of as as-if objects are essential for simplifying calculation, as discussed in section  . . In this
sense, numbers are cognitive tools.
Although appeal to bene cial consequences is not a proper way to defend an empirical
hypothesis, it must be noted that the account presented here has many advantages over other
accounts of the nature of numbers available in the literature. It is epistemically less prob-
lematic than platonism (since here, the objective subject matter that arithmetic describes is
accessible to us) and  ctionalism (since here, arithmetical statements can be true). In the
present account, arithmetical knowledge is not only possible but also simply explainable by
means of a standard causal theory of knowledge. The account presented here is also supe-
rior to some forms of nominalism in that it does not demand modi cations to the way we
read and interpret arithmetical statements. This explains why there is no contradiction im-
plicit in the subtitle of this dissertation. We can speak of the nature of non-existing numbers
because numbers are discursive objects, i.e., they appear in language as if they are real ob-
jects, but in fact they do not exist as such: what exists are the relevant procedures. Here, the
cultural nature of arithmetic is key, but arithmetic is not reduced to social conventions or
collective agreements. Finally, these theoretical bene ts are achieved by mobilizing familiar
concepts and practices most of us have experienced as children. Highly idealized solutions
that are logically impeccable but unrealistic (such as recourse to an ideal agent (Kitcher,
    )) play no role here.
An important point which I did not address in this dissertation concerns the possibility
of extending this approach to other branches of mathematics. After all, I have argued only
that the positive integers do not exist, and from this it does not follow that other mathemat-
ical entities, such as sets, real numbers, and geometric forms do not exist. This should not
be seen as a shortcoming. In the spirit of the current account, we should not expect that an
account of the nature of the positive integers could provide an across-the-board explanation
   
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of the nature of all mathematical entities. Since the account of the nature of the positive
integers presented here was based on empirical  ndings (rather than universal principles),
the extension of this approach to other categories of numbers and branches of mathematics
would require empirical evidence of the sort reviewed in chapters  -  to lead to conclusions
about their existence.
Thus, if the current account were to be extended to cover, for example, the negative
integers, we would need scienti cally gathered data showing that the very use of symbols for
negative integers in certain routines and mathematical techniques is what gives us the idea
that negative integers exist. Indeed, in this case the extension seems to be simple. A negative
number can be seen as encapsulating the outcome of the subtraction of n from m where n
andm are natural numbers and n>m. This is empirically plausible in light of empirical results
showing that negative numbers are encoded in the mind as natural numbers tagged with a
separate polarity sign (Gilmore et al.,     , section  . ). Rational numbers, in turn, can be
seen as encapsulating the outcome of a division of integers (Sfard,     ). Sfard (    ) also
suggests that a similar approach can be applied to geometric forms. For example, a circle
may reify the operation of rotating a compass around a  xed point. But certainly, more data
is needed to substantiate these conclusions.
The amount of data available in the eld ofmathematical cognition about higher branches
of mathematics is still small in comparison to data about arithmetic. However, it is possible
to anticipate that the current account is likely to face major di culties with regard to non-
constructible mathematical objects. Constructible objects are easy to deal with within this
account, since the symbolic procedures performed to construct them are the natural candi-
dates providing the corresponding concepts and the targets of rei cation by encapsulation.
But objects whose existence is proved only non-constructively do not have a known process
of construction. Then what are they? It seems obvious that non-constructible mathemat-
ical objects cannot result from rei cations produced by encapsulation. A possibility to be
explored is whether other processes of rei cation have a role to play with respect to non-
constructible objects. Another possibility is that non-constructibe objects require a com-
pletely di erent explanation. Perhaps we will ultimately conclude that non-constructible
objects are  ctions, or postulations, or even platonic objects. My point is that this is not
something that we can conclude aprioristically.
Philosophers like universal explanations that can account for a large class of phenomena
in a uniform manner. But sometimes (or often!) reality is more diverse than what we would
like and we have to live with this. We cannot approach reality in its full complexity from our
armchairs equipped only with general principles, intuitions and plausible re ections. We
have rejected such an attitude since the so-called “scienti c revolution” when it comes to the
investigation of the physical world. The general message of this dissertation is that this also
applies to the investigation of what has been called the metaphysics of mathematics.
Glossary
alienation The act of suppressing from discourse the agents who reify or perform the rei ed
procedures. See section  . .
ANS Approximate Number System. The innate cognitive system thought to be responsible
for the implementation of the capacity to estimate. See section  . .
CP-knower A child who can understand the cardinality principle and, as a result, can pass
the Give-a-Number test for all the number words in the initial segment of the count-
ing sequence she already knows. See section  . .
de-semanti cation The act of temporally “turning o ” the semantical content of symbols
when they are mechanically manipulated in accordance with operational rules aimed
at ful lling a cognitive task. See section  . .
discursive object A rei cation that occupies the usual place of an object in speaking and
thinking. See section  . .
encapsulation The process of rei cation in which a noun is assigned to processes, operations
or actions by means of which narratives about these non-objects can be presented as
stories about objects. See section  . .
enculturation The thesis according to which higher cognitive capacities result from trans-
formations in the brain driven by the cultural environment. See section  . .
estimation The ability to produce an approximate appraisal of the number of items in a
collection, without active verbal counting. Estimation error grows as quantity grows;
it is subject to the e ects of Weber’s law and sensory adaptation. See section  . . .
number The referent of a numeral.
number concept A concept, here, is understood as a mental content. Accordingly, number
concepts are the mental contents that endow numerals with meaning and underlie
numerical competence. See section  . .
numeral Any culturally created symbol that refers to a number. Examples: ‘eight’, ‘ ’, ‘VIII’.
   
    Glossary
numerical cognition Is both the name of the set of abilities numerate humans possess to
deal with numbers and the discipline that investigates how human beings and other
animals deal with information we usually see as numerical.
numerosity a property of perceptual interactions between an agent and a stimulus, eval-
uated by means of quantical skills, that refers to the perceived cardinal magnitude
of the stimulus as a function of the sortal used by the agent’s perceptual system to
identify and collect discrete items in the stimulus. See section  . . .
OFS Object File System. The innate cognitive system thought to be responsible for the
implementation of the capacity to subitize. See section  . .
platonism The view according to which abstract entities (objects, structures, propositions,
etc.) exist outside of space and time. This term is spelled with lower-case initial so
as to di erentiate it from Platonism, the doctrine held by Plato, since contemporary
platonists are unlikely to endorse all of Plato’s views on this matter.
quantical cognition The set of non-symbolic abilities shared by humans and some non-
human animals to perceive numerosities by means of subitizing and estimation. Also
known as non-symbolic numerical cognition. See Chapter  .
re-semanti cation The process through which the de-semanti cation of a symbolic system
during its mechanical operation makes room for the creation of a new, original inter-
pretation of the symbols. See section  . .
rei cation The act of conceiving of a non-object as if it were an object. Rei cation takes
place when ways of thinking and speaking characteristic of discourse about physical
objects are transplanted to discourse about non-objects. See section  . .
subitizing The fast and accurate enumeration of collections up to three or four elements
without active verbal counting. See section  . . .
subset-knower A child who knows themeaning of the words for numbers smaller than three
or four only, and does not understand the cardinality principle yet. See section  . .
working realism The practice of speaking of numbers and doing arithmetic as if numbers
exist. It is the resulting position towards the existence of numbers after the process of
rei cation of number concepts has taken place. See section  . .
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Summary
In everyday parlance, we rarely distinguish between numbers and numerals. But this dis-
tinction is necessary in mathematical, linguistic and philosophical contexts. Numerals are
symbols for numbers; numbers are the meanings of numerals. This is what allows us to say
that ‘ten,’ ‘  ,’ and ‘X’ all have the same meaning.
Radical skeptics aside, no one doubts that numerals exist. I can show some numerals
here: ‘ ,’ ‘eleven,’ ‘X’ (these very marks on the screen or on paper are numerals). However,
the situation is much more controversial when it comes to numbers. Even if I tried to show
a number by writing down   or by uttering /three/, the only thing that I would have shown
or uttered would be, again, a numeral. If I said “look,   is not this symbol, but the object it
refers to,” a natural reply would be “but where is this object?” To this question, I couldn’t
answer “Three is here [pointing to a collection with three elements],” since, if three is there,
then three cannot be also here: ⌃⌃⌃, which is a di erent collection. Perhaps I could say
that three is instantiated by collections of three elements, but this implies that three itself is
something else.
This and other puzzles have led philosophers to assume that, if numbers exist at all, they
must be outside of space and time. This assumption, however, also leads to problems. If
numbers are outside of space and time, they are completely out of our reach, and then it be-
comes a mystery how we can acquire numerical knowledge. On the other hand, if we simply
deny that numbers exist, we will face di culties in explaining how arithmetical statements
such as “  is even” can be true. If two does not exist, it cannot be anything, let alone even.
Various candidate solutions have been proposed to these problems. I review some of
them in Chapter  . A problem common to all the reviewed proposals is that there is no way
of deciding which one is the correct one based on independent evidence. This is the case (or
so I claim) because all these accounts disregard empirical evidence that is crucial to decide
between them, on the basis of the assumption that, if numbers exist, they must be outside
of space and time.
In this dissertation, I reject this assumption and take empirical data about how we ac-
quire numerical knowledge as the starting point. Research in the  elds of numerical cog-
nition, developmental psychology and mathematics education has progressed fast in the
last decades and has revealed important aspects of the processes through which we acquire
knowledge of numbers at a young age.
The picture that emerges from these  ndings (reviewed in Chapters  - ) can be sum-
marized by paraphrasing a famous biblical passage (John  : ): “In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was used in mechanical procedures, and through them all numbers
   
    SUMMARY
were made.” The ‘Words’ here are numerals, naturally. The idea is that numerals and the
procedures wherein they are used, such as counting and calculation, are the elements from
which numbers are “made up.” Let me unpack this.
Research in developmental psychology has shown that children start learning the se-
quence of counting words as meaningless sounds recited during what they experience as a
mechanical procedure, where each act of pointing to an object is accompanied by the ut-
terance of a word. In the beginning, children do not know what the words mean nor the
purpose of this procedure. Over time, they start learning the meaning of number words pro-
gressively. They do not learn their meanings by associating each word with a speci c object
or class of objects (as they probably learn the meaning of ‘apple,’ for example), but by using
these words in a procedure that, as they understand later, aims at determining the cardinal
size of collections accurately. It is the use of initially meaningless numerals in the counting
procedure that generates the numerals’ own meanings, as discussed in Chapter  .
Historically, it is also plausible that the  rst “counting” techniques used words that orig-
inally did not have numerical meanings. Inmany small-scale cultures around the world, from
New Guinea to the Amazon Forest, body-part tallies ful ll the same function that counting
does in our culture. In body-part tallies, the names of body parts or descriptions of the ges-
tures made replace our counting words. If modern counting systems originated from ancient
body-part tallying systems, then it is plausible that originally non-numerical words (body
part names or descriptions of gestures) gave rise to the  rst numerical concepts. Again, if
this was so, it was the use of words initially seen as non-numerical in a procedure resem-
bling the counting procedure (tallying) that generated the words’ own numerical meanings,
as discussed in Chapter  .
Now we can return to the distinction between numerals and numbers. The observation
that both in history and individual development number words produce their ownmeanings
suggests that numbers are not objects whose existence is independent of the words that
designate them. Rather, the idea that there is a number corresponding to each numeral is
produced by the very use of numerals. It is not like seeing an apple and learning that the word
‘apple’ designates that kind of fruit. We never see a number; we learn certain words that are
recited in a stable order during a certain procedure. Later we realize the function of these
words, and then understand their meanings. The object designated by ‘nine’ is nowhere, not
because it is outside of space and time, but because it does not exist. The idea that it exists
is a product of the use of this symbol for calculation, as discussed in Chapter  .
In this account, however, the nonexistence of numbers does not imply that numerical
statements are false. Once we have established that there are symbolic procedures behind
what we call numbers, we can see that what we say about numbers is, in fact, about those
procedures. A simple example illustrates this point. That  +  is equal to   is not a truth
about objects called   and  ; rather, it is a truth about an operation: “count ‘one,’ ‘two,’ and
then count ‘one,’ ‘two’ again, and then count what you have counted in the previous steps
together; this  nal counting will stop at ‘four’.” In other words,  + =  describes a fact about
the counting procedure, rather than a fact about numbers conceived of as existing objects
(this is developed in Chapter  ). We speak of numbers as if they were objects because it is
simpler and cognitively useful. The idea that numbers are objects makes calculation easier.
This is why numbers, these “objects” that exist only in discourse, are cognitive tools.
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